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ABSTRACT

Environmental Transformative Justice: Responding to Ecocide
By
Manuel Rodeiro

Advisor: Omar Dahbour
My dissertation’s central objective is to normatively devise ethically appropriate
sociopolitical and juridical responses to ecocide (i.e., grave environmental harm). More
specifically, the work seeks to philosophically engage the ethical question of what is owed to
human societies that are displaced due to intentional environmental destruction.
The motivation behind the project stems from the lack of academic research (excluding a
pocket of recent analysis of the international community’s obligation to assist ‘climate refugees’)
involving the question: “What ought to be afforded victims of environmental harm?” The dearth
of scholarship is surprising, considering growing global concerns, vis-à-vis accelerating rates of
environmental degradation, which if allowed to continue, will generate wide-ranging national
and international environmental crises and disasters in the twenty-first century and beyond.
The dissertation attempts to remedy this situation by bringing environmental issues under
the purview of the philosophical species of justice known as Transitional Justice. The novelty of
such an approach is its assertion that ‘social transformation’ rather than merely ‘correcting the
harm done’ or ‘restoring the status quo’ is necessary for overcoming these kinds of wrongs
because absent social change, the conditions that reinforce, entrench, and reproduce these sorts
of injustices remain in place.
Since the focus is on transforming communities’ relationships and interactions with their
environment, instead of simply repairing the damage from past injuries, the dissertation offers a
full account of what I call environmental transformative justice. To achieve this the dissertation
establishes the context in which environmental transformative justice is operative because
of harm suffered (i.e., social death and loss of vital interests stemming from intentional
environmental destruction) and the manner in which the harm occurred (i.e., direct, indirect, or
negligent state action); employs a Rawlsian constructivist theory of justice to determine its ideal
aims; offers guidance on how to pursue these aims by exploring the relationship between
constructivist and comparative approaches to justice (e.g., Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum);
identifies actors’ responsibilities for pursuing these aims by developing a notion of common but
differentiated responsibility based on Iris Young’s two-tiered model of responsibility, and
supports the assertion that environmental transformative justice ought to be pursued from within
a Transitional Justice framework, by demonstrating ways in which Transitional Justice
mechanisms (e.g., criminal tribunals, truth commissions, public apologies, pardons, lustration,
memorialization, reparations, and constitutional conventions) can assist in furthering
environmental aims (i.e., promoting ecological sustainability, preservation, and restoration).
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INTRODUCTION
Excluding a pocket of recent scholarship investigating the international community’s
legal and ethical obligations to assist the subset of victims known as ‘climate refugees’
(Ferracioli 2014, Eckersley 2015, Gendreau 2017, and Herington 2017), academics have roundly
ignored the general question of: “What ought to be afforded victims of environmental harm?”
The theoretical neglect is so pronounced and pervasive that even prior to broaching normative
questions (e.g., “What do these victims deserve?” and “Who ought to be responsible for assisting
the victims?”), the basic ontological questions (e.g., “What are environmental harms?” and “Who
are environmental victims?”) have received scarce analysis. Hence, my dissertation’s core
aspiration is to stimulate this vital discussion by cohesively delving into the above questions
through the domain of political philosophy, in the hope of developing a framework for
determining normatively appropriate responses to severe environmental harms, i.e., offer a
theory of environmental transformative justice for post-ecocide states.1
The goal is to provide post-ecocide communities insight and guidance on how to best
remodel, alter, and remove (pre)existing conditions responsible for generating wrongs, while
correcting the harms victims suffered.2 Thus, the focus is on transforming communities’
relationships and interactions with their environment, instead of simply repairing the damage

1

Transformative justice seeks to repair past harms and change relations, structures, practices,
and institutions responsible for wrongs by making them more inclusive, fair, and less prone to
generate harms in the future. “Transformative justice is defined as transformative change that
emphasizes local agency and resources, the prioritization of process rather than preconceived
outcomes and the challenging of unequal and intersecting power relationships and structures of
exclusion at both the local and the global level” (Gready and Simon 2014: 340).
2
Henceforth, “post-ecocide states/societies” will refer to states/societies that are in the process of
enacting environmental transformative justice after ecocide; “ecocidal states/societies” will refer
to states/societies that still engage in ecocidal activity, and “ecofriendly states/societies” will
refer to states/societies that have completed the environmental transformative justice process.
1

from past injuries. A justification for embracing a transformative approach lies in the fact that
unless structures and practices are altered, the possibility of repeating wrongs in the future
remains. Nevertheless, one may ask: “Why must we wait until after the harms have occurred to
begin the process of social transformation?”
Waiting is indeed unnecessary, as, ideally, we ought to take preemptive and preventative
action to ensure environmental harms do not occur in the first place. Ultimately, however, a
quick glance at the litany of disasters, tragedies, and injustices of history ought to make one
weary of our proactive ability to avoid wrongs. Furthermore, the work contends that our
collective reactive attitudes to grave harms play a central role in furnishing the impetus to spur
social change, i.e., without experiencing the negative consequences, there is less motivation to
take action to alter patterns of behavior. Accordingly, the dissertation suggests that pursuing
environmental transformative justice offers an opening for (re)examining and
(re)conceptualizing our practices, habits, values, norms, and priorities toward nature; in that
reparative and reconciliatory activities represent an opportunity for progressively departing from
current destructive and exploitative treatments of nature, thereby achieving and promoting
sustainable stewardship.3
The work thus proposes that focusing on the need for environmental transformative
justice in actual post-ecocide communities provides provocation and direction for awakening
awareness and understanding of the impact of humans on the environment and the impact of the
environment on humans – recognizing the complex, dynamic, imbedded, and mutuallyconstructing relation of man-to-nature and nature-to-man (Moore 2015). Exploring normatively

3

The founding figures of modern environmentalism (e.g., Thoreau, Muir, Leopold, Carson,
Naess, and White) long emphasized the need to reimagine global industrial civilization’s
relationship with nature; but none of these luminaries offered a concrete step-by-step method for
undertaking this shift in social-consciousness.
2

appropriate responses to ecocide in relation to currently existing states-of-affair (through the use
of real-world examples) has the added benefit of linking the project to insights from various
established fields, e.g., green criminology, environmental psychology, ecotheology,
environmental justice, etc.4 Centrally, the project aims to show how certain acts of environmental
destruction trigger comparable normative concerns to those dealt with in the discipline of
Transitional Justice.5
The first chapter will explain why environmental transformative justice ought to be
situated within the Transitional Justice framework. It will demonstrate how ecocide is a harm
demanding reparation (past-oriented redress of past wrongs, thereby obtaining justice for
victims)6 and reconciliation (future-oriented restoration of civic trust and social solidarity).7 To
achieve this aim, the chapter will proceed in five distinct sections: (1) delineate the range of
environmental harms under consideration as ecocide; (2) provide paradigm (real-world) case
studies that fit the criterion of ecocide; (3) analyze the case studies and offer an idealized

4

It is important to emphasize the positive and constructive nature of the project. The work is
more interested in borrowing insights from other disciplines than in pursuing negative criticism.
The reason for this is simple. In a rapidly changing world, the need for theory construction aimed
at offering novel solutions outweighs the importance of criticizing past views that may no longer
readily apply to present circumstances.
5
Capitalizing the term denotes that we are discussing the discipline of Transitional Justice that
developed in the aftermath of the atrocities of WWII and the Holocaust, gained momentum
during decolonization, and prominence after the collapse of the Soviet Bloc, instead of the
broader philosophical subject of transitional justice, which Charles Mills describes as the process
of improving unjust ill-ordered societies (i.e., in the Rawlsian sense that they don’t satisfy ideal
principles of justice) to gradually make them less unjust, while still remaining ill-ordered
societies (Mills 2015: 66).
6
As Pablo de Greiff states, “[reparations are] measures that may be employed to redress the
various types of harms that victims may have suffered as a consequence of certain crimes…with
the most general aim of a program of reparations to do justice to victims” (De Greiff 2006: 452455).
7
As David Bloomfield states, “at its simplest, [reconciliation] means finding a way to live
alongside former enemies – not necessarily love them, or forgive them, or forget the past in any
way, but to coexist with them, to develop the degree of cooperation necessary to share our
society with them, so that we all have better lives together than we have had separately”
(Bloomfield 2003: 12).
3

descriptive model of the harm; (4) demonstrate that the resulting harm fits within traditional
theories of ‘oppression,’ thus justifying the need for redress, and (5) link the causes of harm to
comparable activities receiving Transitional Justice’s attention. Hopefully, the cumulative and
combined success of each step sufficiently strengthens, supports, and convinces the reader of the
thesis that Transitional Justice’s reparative and reconciliatory measures ought to apply in such
situations of environmental destruction.
The first chapter focuses on Transitional Justice’s ability to provide a platform for
conceptualizing and achieving environmental transformative justice in post-ecocide states. In this
light, it is illustrative to offer cases of ecocide that are, at present, not traditionally considered
matters of Transitional Justice, while concurrently exhibiting that they ought to be. The case
studies analyzed will focus on the “cultural death” of affected communities, e.g., mountaintop
removal mining’s impact on the Wayúu of Colombia, damming’s impact on Cree tribes in
Quebec, and nuclear testing’s impact on the Anangu in Australia.
In summary, the argument of the first chapter revolves around the premise that
oppression claims are themselves prima facie moral claims for remedy or redress. Thus, from a
normative perspective, once a practice has been established as oppressive, the moral case for
opposing, resisting, and correcting the wrongs has already been made. Consequently, the chapter
will show that cases of ecocide satisfying our criteria are oppressive, then it follows that they
require reparative and reconciliatory redress. Since the oppression results from similar practices
(e.g., negligent state activity) and causes comparable harm (e.g., social death and loss of vital
interests) to those within the normal purview of Transitional Justice, then it follows that our
paradigm cases and idealized description of ecocide represent suitable candidates for garnering
Transitional Justice’s attention, i.e., that the field ought to expand to cover the harm of ecocide
(in these and similar cases), beyond any instrumental role the environmental destruction may

4

play in advancing genocide, ethnic cleansing, mass murder, etc.
After the first chapter establishes the argument for the expansion of the Transitional
Justice framework to cover cases of ecocide that were committed intentionally (with the aim of
benefiting the acting group) and resulted in the loss of vital interests (causing partial or complete
social death) of non-consenting cultural groups, the second chapter will then focus on developing
an expansive theoretical account of responsibility that can be applied to our paradigm cases of
ecocide.
The objective of the second chapter is to develop an effective means of delineating and
apportioning actors’ obligations (i.e., the necessary aims, measures, and mechanisms) toward
achieving environmental transformative justice. The conception of responsibility under
consideration must therefore be persuasive, politically useful, reasonably acceptable to the
parties involved, and serve to counter misleading and obscuring narratives that disguise
accountability (both over-inclusively and under-inclusively) for ecocide.
To achieve these aims, the chapter will proceed in two sections: (1) summarize the
conception of responsibility traditionally employed in both Transitional Justice and
environmentalism, so as to discern a common understanding of responsibility that satisfies both
fields; and (2) offer hypothetical instances of ecocide that fulfills all our criteria (i.e., from the
first chapter) as a means of testing a proposed theory of responsibility designed to delineate
classes of actors answerable (morally, legally, politically) to the call for repairing and reconciling
the harm that broadly meets the goals of both fields.
Essentially, the chapter aims to demonstrate that both Transitional Justice and
environmentalism have settled on a theoretical understanding of responsibility that has three

5

central components.8 First, the requisite notion of responsibility must be both backward
(retrospective) and forward (prospective) looking – backward looking in that it is able to hold
actors accountable for deeds which are broadly construed to include both action and inaction;
forward looking in that it is able to discern actors’ obligations toward particular objects,
relations, and ends (e.g., a referee’s responsibility is to call a fair game). Secondly, the notion of
responsibility must be socially capacious, in that the categories and kinds of social entities
included as potential bearers of responsibility is expansive (including individuals, groups,
collectives, corporations, agencies, communities, institutions, states, interstate organizations, and
global networks). Finally, both disciplines benefit from utilizing a conception of responsibility
that is able to hold actors jointly, commonly, and collectively answerable and responsive; while
concurrently maintaining mechanisms for distinguishing and differentiating degrees, levels, and
kinds of culpabilities, accountabilities, duties, and obligations between them.9
Ultimately, the chapter will argue that Iris Marion Young’s two-tiered analysis of
responsibility (i.e., the liability model and social connection model) provides valuable insights
for achieving the above objectives. The second half of the chapter will apply her understanding
of responsibility to both hypothetical and real cases of ecocide, which meet our four criteria from
the preceding chapter.

8

There are undoubtedly more than three points of commonality between Transitional Justice and
environmentalism’s conception(s) of responsibility (e.g., responsibility for harms can track
across state borders, responsibility is not wholly determined by causal proximity, etc.). The
justification for analyzing specifically these three components is that they are important for
devising a notion of responsibility that satisfies core aims of each field.
9
Recently, the international environmentalist community (at least since the 1992 Rio
Declaration) has moved toward developing and promoting a notion of ‘common but
differentiated responsibility’ for environmental harm (Eckersley 2015). Essentially, the
international environmentalist community has opted to embrace a conception of ‘common but
differentiated responsibility,’ out of a desire to cast a wide net, in the hopes of maintaining the
benefits of shared and collective responsibility, while avoiding an overly condemnatory
framework that draws socially insensitive conclusions by blaming victims for environmental
degradation.
6

The third and fourth chapters will analyze the question of what is required of those
responsible for repairing and reconciling the injustice of ecocide. In other words, the second half
of the dissertation will work toward demonstrating the injustice of ecocide and developing a
conception of environmental transformative justice for post-ecocide states.
The dissertation recognizes that an effective response to ecocide necessarily depends on
the pre-existing values and goals of the affected community. Nevertheless, the community’s
actions and decisions involved in the transformative component of reconciliation and reparation
will influence, constrain, habituate, and structure its values and opportunities moving forward.10
Additionally, an adequate response must be iterative and flexible, since any policy decision will
influence other issues and generate unintended consequences in the treatment of the original
problem, i.e., there is constant and continuous feedback between problem/solution and
values/objectives.
Accordingly, the project is amenable to environmental transformative justice measures,
which oscillate between working within the currently dominant neoliberal political paradigm
(i.e., embracing free markets, private property, mass production and consumption, globalization,
atomism, economic growth, or the sovereignty of the nation-state) and those that seek to escape
it (i.e., embracing controlled economy, public goods, subsistence production and consumption,
localization, communitarianism, steady-state economy, or bioregionalism). As such, the work
prioritizes pragmatism over idealism, process over substantive conclusions, and coping with
reality over attempting to copy some immutable Truth, thereby recognizing that there may be no

10

This transformative character of actions occurring at a societal level is analogous to what
Laurie Ann Paul describes of epistemically transformative experiences, occurring on a personal
level. She explains, “because you change dramatically, your preferences concerning the new
outcomes can also change dramatically. If an experience irreversibly changes who you are,
choosing to undergo it might make you care about very different things than you care for now”
(Paul 2015: 762).
7

one-size-fits-all solution to overcoming ecocide.
The work contends there are two distinct approaches to articulating conceptions of justice
in political philosophy: (1) a ‘constructivist’ approach which attempts to
delineate ideal distributive principles and institutional structures that, if enacted with strict
compliance in favorable conditions, would generate a just state – e.g., John Rawls; (2) a
‘comparativist’ approach interested in examining the actual world and asking how it can be
made more just, by observing what lives are like and imagining what people are capable of
achieving through comparing persons and groups – e.g., Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum.
The third and fourth chapters will respectively analyze both approaches’ insights for achieving
environmental transformative justice; comparing their respective strengths and weaknesses as a
means of assisting affected communities in their post-ecocide decision-making.
The third chapter will analyze the ways in which Rawls’s theory of “justice as fairness”
can diagnose the injustice of ecocide. The analysis aims to establish a minimum threshold of
ecological sustainability that “well-ordered” societies must attain. A benefit of employing
Rawlsian theory is its emphasis on the importance of respecting a social pluralism of values and
promoting fraternity between citizens. This makes it well suited to the project of incorporating
the interests of relatively self-sufficient communities (i.e. autarkic communities) into a broader
society. “Justice as fairness,” as it will be presented in the chapter, requires that at least a limited
set of natural resources be protected, in so far as they are essential for enabling certain citizens to
pursue their own conceptions of a good life, develop their moral powers, and become
cooperating members of society.
A problem with relying on a traditional Rawlsian approach is that it only offers guidance
regarding how societies ought to ideally structure themselves moving forward (i.e., it requires
that states respect citizens basic rights, foster a system that engenders fair and equal life

8

prospects, maximally assist the downtrodden, and ensures that future generations can meet their
needs). Such a limited conception of justice is inadequate in that it fails to sate strong intuitions,
felt by both Transitional Justice and environmentalism, that past wrongs require specifically
tailored forms of redress. Accordingly, the conclusion of the third chapter will argue that
environmental transformative justice demands moving beyond a strictly future-oriented
conception of justice.
The final section of the third chapter will explore recent scholarship by Vaca, Espindola,
and Mills which convincingly argues that Rawls’s ideal constructivist theory requires an
additional principle of reparative justice (Vaca and Espindolda 2014) (Mills 2017). However,
even after establishing the need for reparative redress, the constructivist approach to justice
offers little guidance regarding how to combat the injustices of ecocide in the actual world.
Thus, to overcome these real-world application problems (i.e., that knowing the ideal
does not inform how to proceed in overcoming existing injustice), the fourth chapter will
proceed in analyzing comparative approaches to justice (e.g., Sen and Nussbaum), which rely on
robust methods of social evaluation based on examining the actual world and asking how it can
be made more just, by observing what lives are like and what people are capable of achieving
through making comparisons between persons and groups. The hope is that such an empirically
grounded and welfare-oriented approach is better suited to providing more tangible guidelines
for implementing responses to ecocide than constructivists’ transcendental goal of determining
the basic structure of an ideally just society.
Lastly, after relying on the comparative approach’s methodology to articulate social
concerns in post-ecocide societies, the dissertation will attempt to demonstrate ways in which
Transitional Justice mechanisms can assist post-ecocide states in coming to terms with the
injustice of ecocide, i.e., enact environmental transformative justice. To achieve this, the

9

concluding section of the dissertation will evaluate the particular challenges and opportunities
presented by employing Transitional Justice’s sophisticated toolkit of mechanisms and
procedures (e.g., criminal tribunals, truth commissions, public apologies, pardons, lustration,
memorialization, constitutional conventions, reparations, etc.) for repairing past wrongs,
achieving forgiveness, and transforming society in order to prevent future wrongs. The central
focus of the final section involves specifying the ways in which Transitional Justice mechanisms
can further environmentalist ends (including habitat preservation, environmental restoration, and
ecological sustainability) when implemented in service of justly responding to our cases of
ecocide.
In conclusion, much scientific and activist work has focused on a myriad of
environmental concerns (involving abatement, mitigation, and adaptation). However, a sustained
political philosophical analysis of environmental harms attending to reparative and reconciliatory
practices has not yet been attempted. This task I here take up aims at providing practical
suggestions for assisting those affected by environmental disaster, as well as offering and
philosophically justifying a blueprint for the transformation of society from an ecocidal state to
an ‘eco-friendly state.’

10

CHAPTER ONE
What is Ecocide? Situating Ecocide as an Oppression within Transitional Justice

I.

Delineating Cases of Ecocide Under Consideration

The aim of the current project is to develop and analyze a framework for determining
normatively appropriate responses to ecocide, i.e., to offer a theory of environmental
transformative justice for post-ecocide societies.11 The hope is to provide post-ecocide
communities insight and guidance on how to best remodel, alter, and remove (pre)existing
conditions responsible for generating wrong(s); while correcting the harm(s) victims suffered.12
The objective of the current chapter is to explain why environmental transformative
justice ought to be situated within the Transitional Justice13 framework, i.e., demonstrate that

11

Transformative justice seeks to repair past harm(s) and change relation(s), structure(s),
practice(s), and institution(s) responsible for the harm by making them more inclusive, fair, and
less prone to generate harm(s) in the future. “Transformative justice is defined as transformative
change that emphasizes local agency and resources, the prioritization of process rather than
preconceived outcomes and the challenging of unequal and intersecting power relationships and
structures of exclusion at both the local and the global level” (Gready and Robins 2014: 340).
For our purposes, the terms ‘transitional justice’ and ‘transformative justice’ can be used
interchangeably, but for clarity and illustrative purposes the phrase ‘environmental
transformative justice’ is favored, since avoiding the term ‘transitional’ helps highlight the fact
that the work aims at developing a novel concept beyond the scope of the current Transitional
Justice paradigm. Thus, at present, there is no need to articulate normative distinction(s) between
Transitional Justice and environmental transformative justice, in fact such an undertaking is
antithetical to the project’s goal of demonstrating that both are concerned with unequal and
intersecting power relationships, the importance of process, broad social change, etc.
12
The justification for focusing on ‘transformation’ rather than merely ‘correction’ (‘correcting
the harm done’) or ‘restoration’ (‘restoring the status quo’) is that returning things to their prior
condition might only reinforce, entrench, and reproduce the underlying systems that generated
the harm.
13
Capitalizing the term denotes that we are discussing the discipline of Transitional Justice that
developed in the aftermath of the atrocities of WWII and the Holocaust, gained momentum
during decolonization, and prominence after the collapse of the Soviet Bloc, instead of the
broader philosophical subject of transitional justice, which Charles Mills describes as the process
of improving unjust ill-ordered societies (i.e., in the Rawlsian sense that they don’t satisfy ideal
11

ecocide is a harm demanding reparation (past-oriented redress of past wrongs, thereby obtaining
justice for victims)14 and reconciliation (future-oriented restoration of civic trust and social
solidarity, i.e., seeking justice for social rehabilitation and progress).15 To achieve this aim the
chapter will proceed in five distinct sections: (1) delineate the range of environmental harms
under consideration as ecocide; (2) provide paradigm (real-world) case studies that fit the
criterion of ecocide; (3) analyze the case studies and offer an idealized descriptive model of the
harm; (4) demonstrate that the resulting harm fits within traditional theories of oppression, thus
justifying claims for moral consideration and remedy, and (5) link the causes of harm to
comparable activities receiving Transitional Justice’s attention, thus validating the need for
reparative and reconciliatory redress. Hopefully, the cumulative and combined success of each
step sufficiently strengthens, supports, and convinces the reader of the thesis that Transitional

principles of justice) to gradually make them less unjust, while still remaining ill-ordered
societies (Mills 2015: 66). As Alexandra Barahona de Brito and Laurence Whitehead explain the
discipline of Transitional Justice is made up of six main camps or approaches: “First, there is the
work of human rights organizations. This can range from ‘moral denunciation’ to sober and
sophisticated reports on progress (or lack thereof) with transitional justice measures, analyses of
legal issues, reports on the violations themselves, and policy-oriented documents recommending
appropriate action. Second, there is an immense legal-political literature, which focuses on legal
issues and on the national and international laws that are relevant to transitional justice…Third,
there is the literature dealing with victim trauma and recovery…The fourth strand, which was
developed more fully with the rise of postmodern cultural studies, goes well beyond the scope of
transitional justice and focuses on ‘the politics of memory’. The approach is more sociological
and cultural, and it includes analyses of ‘how societies remember’ their collective past, how past
events are memorialized (the study of memory sites), and how narratives about the past are
constructed, including analyses of how ‘history is written’. This partly overlaps with the fifth
strand, the work of ‘classic’ historians, mostly on the Holocaust and other, more historically
distant, collective traumas. Finally, there is the comparative politics/political science literature,
both conceptual and empirical” (Barahona de Brito and Whitehead 2012: 440).
14
As Pablo de Greiff states, “[reparations are] measures that may be employed to redress the
various types of harms that victims may have suffered as a consequence of certain crimes…with
the most general aim of a program of reparations to do justice to victims” (De Greiff 2006: 452455).
15
As Bloomfield states, “at its simplest, [reconciliation] means finding a way to live alongside
former enemies – not necessarily love them, or forgive them, or forget the past in any way, but to
coexist with them, to develop the degree of cooperation necessary to share our society with them,
so that we all have better lives together than we have had separately” (Bloomfield 2003: 12).
12

Justice’s reparative and reconciliatory measures ought to apply in such situations of
environmental destruction.
Essentially, the chapter focuses on Transitional Justice’s ability to provide a platform for
conceptualizing and achieving environmental transformative justice in post-ecocide states. In this
light, it is illustrative to offer cases of ecocide that are at present not traditionally considered
matters of Transitional Justice, while concurrently exhibiting that they ought to be. The strategy
for achieving this objective will be to explore the concept of ecocide broadly in the hopes of
discerning a reasonable set of cases amenable to reparation and reconciliation.

A.

Prescriptive vs. Descriptive Accounts of Ecocide

Etymologically, ‘ecocide’ derives from the Greek “oikos” for home and Latin “caedere”
for kill. In the broadest sense, ecocide is the destruction (death) of an ecosystem (place where
organisms live).16 But the problem with such an expansive definition is that ecosystems can
range in scale from the colonies of microbes living on my fingertip (or smaller) to the entire
Pacific Ocean (or larger). Consequently, such a conceptualization is far too expansive to carry
normative weight, i.e., it implies that every time I wash my hands, eat, or brush my teeth I am
committing ecocide. Thus, to avoid reductio ad absurdum conclusions, e.g., that hand washing
necessitates environmental transformative justice - it is important to distinguish two conceptions
of ecocide: (1) scientifically descriptive and (2) ethically prescriptive.
A scientifically descriptive account of ecocide includes any and all destruction of
ecosystems (including the act of washing my hands and annihilating the microbial habitat).

16

A textbook definition of ‘ecosystem’ – “is a community of living organisms in conjunction
with the nonliving components of their environment (things like air, water and mineral soil),
interacting as a system” (Smith and Smith 2012).
13

Whereas, an ethically prescriptive account of ecocide includes only cases of ecosystem
destruction that are wrong; I assume it seems obvious that the act of washing hands and
damaging microbial habitats is not in-and-of-itself morally problematic, i.e., it falls outside the
scope of our normative concern. Hopefully, the distinction illustrates to the reader that not all
scientifically descriptive instances of ecocide are candidates for reparation and reconciliation.
Hence, for our purposes (i.e., situating ecocide within the Transitional Justice framework) the
concept under consideration is necessarily of the ethically prescriptive variety. As a result,
delineating which cases of ecocide qualify is the central topic of exploration.

B.

Ecocide as Genocide

Transitional Justice is an area of practice concerned with states moving from failed sociopolitical system(s) that engaged in and/or permitted grave social harms (e.g., genocide, ethnic
cleansing, mass murder, etc.); and instead, moving towards societies that respect the rule of law;
afford fair and equal treatment to all its citizens; engender civic connectedness, and strive to
establish reciprocal trust both institutionally and individually. Thus, the most straightforward
approach of situating ecocide within the Transitional Justice framework is to proffer cases of
environmental destruction perpetrated as a means of achieving horrific wrongs (e.g., genocide,
ethnic cleansing, mass murder, etc.) that are already accepted at the heart of the discipline.
Sadly, history is replete with cases of actors intentionally harming the environment to kill
the ecosystem’s inhabitants and destroy their way of life.17 In fact, at the dawn of recorded
history there are documented examples of intentional ecocide perpetrated during warfare, e.g.,

17

The term ‘ecocide’ arose in the context of criticizing the U.S. tactics during the Vietnam War,
particularly the decision to use agent “Agent Orange” and other “jungle eating” defoliants to
diminish the Vietcong’s agricultural base and protective cover (Zeirler 2011).
14

Herodotus describes the retreating Scythian army scorching the earth, destroying food supplies,
and poisoning wells to prevent the advance of the Persians.18
Scorched earth retreats and similar tactics of “defensive ecocide” have been responsible
for countless environmental tragedies, maybe the worst of which occurred in 1938 when the
Chinese attempted to stop the invading Japanese army by destroying the Huayuankou dike of the
Yellow River. Ultimately, the decision to dynamite the dike resulted in flooding millions of acres
of land over three provinces; destroying eleven cities and 4,000 villages; leaving millions
destitute and homeless, and killing hundreds of thousands Chinese citizens (Muscolino 2015).
Nevertheless, the motivation and intention behind these hyper-destructive defensive maneuvers
was survival and protection - not the total annihilation of the enemy and their way of life; as
such, they are unconvincing examples of “ecocide as genocide”.
“Ecocide as genocide” requires cases of environmental destruction deployed as a tactic
intended to exterminate peoples and end their way of life. A paradigm illustration of ecocide as a
strategy of eradication is the apocryphal tale of the Roman legions in the Third Punic War
leveling Carthage and sowing the land with salt to prevent anything from ever growing there
again. Tragically, not all cases of “ecocide as genocide” are legends; a vivid and contemporary
example is Saddam Hussein’s extermination of the Ma’dan (Marsh Arabs).
The Ma’dan inhabited a region of marshes slightly upriver from the intersection of the
Tigris and Euphrates (the largest wetlands in Southwest Asia) since “time immemorial” - it is
estimated that they have lived in the region for over 5,000 years (Dellapena 2007). Over the
millennia, the Ma’dan had developed into a distinct cultural community highly dependent on the
marshes for their traditional way of life and continued survival.
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See Herodotus’ The Histories (4:120).
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After the defeat of the Iraqi army in the Gulf War and spurred on by President Bush’s call
to the Iraqi people to overthrow the Hussein Regime, the Ma’dan and other Shiite Arabs in
southern Iraq rebelled (Dellapena 2007: 402-403). Hussein responded with overwhelming
airpower, artillery fire, well poisoning, and electrocuting the marshes to end the rebellion and
force the Ma’dan to abandon their ancestral home or face near certain death (Dellapena 2007:
403). Moreover, Hussein succeeded this initial onslaught with a comprehensive project to
destroy the habitat and prevent the Ma’dan from ever returning home. “Within months of the end
of the revolt, the Iraqi government undertook to drain the marshes, dredging canals, constructing
dams, and leaving about 90% of the wetlands desiccated” (Dellapena 2007: 403).
Draining the marshes represents a clear example of “ecocide as genocide” as it was a
deliberate plan to destroy the environment as a means of ending the Ma’dan and their way of life.
“It became impossible for the Marsh Arabs to survive where they were. After 1993, only a few
thousand of the perhaps 500,000 Marsh Arabs remained” (Dellapena 2007: 403).
Consequently, conceptualizing the violence committed against the Ma’dan falls squarely
within the Transitional Justice framework, i.e., it is a case of genocide, ethnic cleansing, and
mass murder.19 As such, in this and other cases of “ecocide as genocide” there already exist welldeveloped methods and mechanisms (e.g., criminal tribunals, truth commissions, public
apologies, pardons, lustration, memorialization, reparations, etc.) for conceptualizing and
responding to these sorts of wrongs.
Nevertheless, for our purposes the drawback of focusing on cases of “ecocide as
genocide” is that it may obscure environmental component(s) of the harm. The worry is that if

19

The act violated the UN Genocide Convention that defines genocide as “deliberately inflicting
on [a] group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in
part…with the intent…to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group,
as such” (1948).
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the analysis is limited to instances where ecocide is merely a vehicle for achieving wrongs
already covered by Transitional Justice, then the focus will remain moored to traditional (nonenvironmental) crimes against humanity. Instead, the work is proposing that Transitional Justice
ought to expand to cover the harm of ecocide; beyond any instrumental role the environmental
destruction may play in advancing genocide, ethnic cleansing, mass murder, etc.20

C.

Green Criminology and Expansion of Social Harms

Fundamentally, the current section of the chapter strives to prove that ecocide ought to be
included as a concern of Transitional Justice regardless of whether or not the environmental
destruction was committed in an attempt to cause traditional crime(s) against humanity. In other
words, the wrongness of ecocide is not limited to cases in which the environmental destruction
was committed with genocidal intent. The justification for expanding the scope of wrongs
covered by Transitional Justice stems from a troubling insight advanced in the field of green
criminology - “that much actual harm is perceived to be legitimate and lawful” (White 2014: 1).
Green criminology is a school of criminal justice that arose at the turn of the 21st century.
The disciplines’ core tenant is that environmentally damaging activities are responsible for
causing extensive social harm in contemporary societies; but yet, are generally legal and
applauded.21 Rob White provides a vivid example explaining how felling old-growth forests (i.e.,

20

Obviously, the particular insights gleaned from studying cases of ecocide in-and-of-itself
could be subsequently applied to traditional instances of human rights violations that include
environmental harms.
21
As White explains, “for many green criminologists the greatest threat to environmental rights,
ecological justice and nonhuman animal wellbeing are system-level structures and pressures that
commodify all aspects of social existence, that are based upon the exploitation humans,
nonhuman animals and natural resources, and that privilege the powerful over the interests of the
vast majority” (White 2014: 6-7). Unfortunately, at present there are innumerable real-world
examples highlighting the above concern. For instance, Kaniye Ebeku through a careful review
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an activity that can generate irreversible ecological harm, biological diversity loss, and
widespread disruption to the local community) remains legal in many areas of the world,
whereas the benign activity of cultivating naturally growing hemp is often criminalized (White
2014: 4).
Thus, green criminology argues that if social welfare is to be expanded, then there must
be increased social understanding, codification, and prosecution of environmental harms as
illegal and wrong (White 2014, Natali 2016, South 2017, and Lynch et al 2017). “A key issue is
the weighing up of different kinds of harm and violation of rights, that involves stretching the
boundaries of conventional criminology to include other kinds [environmental] of harm than
those already deemed to be illegal” (White 2014: 6).
When applied to Transitional Justice, green criminology asks us to consider the
possibility that the discipline as currently practiced may be blind to a full range of incidents
responsible for causing widespread social harm (of the type the discipline is traditionally
concerned with) over and above the class of cases currently under consideration. If this is the
case, then Transitional Justice ought to expand its scope to cover broader cases of ecocide to
promote social welfare.
In short, does Transitional Justice promote greater social justice by maintaining the
current model of limiting the analysis of environmental harms to cases of ecocide as a means of

of numerous Nigerian judicial proceedings provides a vivid example, demonstrating ways in
which Nigerian judges’ consistently favor plaintiffs and defendants from the oil industry. As
Ebeku states, “if oil remains an important revenue earner for the country, it is doubtful if the
courts will abandon and economic approach and move towards a more sustainable approach –
protecting individuals, groups, and the environment itself against environmental damage arising
from oil-development” (Ebeku 2003: 207). Hence, the goal of green criminology in this case and
in others is to describe and alter socio-legal attitudes, norms, and practices regarding
environmental harms. “Green criminologists generally agree that destructive and damaging
human activities that harm environments warrant greater attention than has hitherto been the case
within criminology” (White 2014: 1).
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committing traditional crimes against humanity or by expanding the class of harms under
consideration to include ecocide more generally? To begin answering this question, we must
briefly comment on the concept of ‘genocide’ as presently accepted within the field of
Transitional Justice.

D.

Social Death as Genocide

Etymologically, ‘genocide’ derives from the Greek “genos” for race, tribe, or clan and
Latin “caedere” for kill. Thus, genocide in the broadest sense is the destruction (death) of a
people (race, ethnicity, or culture).22 But etymology fails to capture the prevailing understanding
that genocide must be intentionally perpetrated – “there can be no ‘accidental’ genocides” (Lang
2010: 87).23 International law in theory, codification, and practice24 embraces the perspective
that genocide requires mens rea (intention), e.g., Article 2 of the UN Convention on Genocide
states: “Genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or
in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such” (emphasis added)(1948).
But one might question what distinguishes genocide from intentional mass death or are
all intentionally committed mass deaths genocide? In answering this question, Claudia Card
compellingly argues that the distinct harm committed in genocide (and not in other cases of
intentional mass death) is severing the groups’ vital social interests (e.g., cultural identity, inter-

22

Raphael Lemkin coined the term ‘genocide’ during his activist campaigning beginning in the
1930 to establish an international convention to expressly outlaw the practice. But it was not
until after the atrocities of the Holocaust that the concept entered the popular lexicon and was
codified into international law in the United Nations Genocide Convention of 1948 (Stone 2013).
23
For a convincing analysis supporting the view that genocide requires intention, see Hugo
Bedau’s essay, “Genocide in Vietnam?” (1974).
24
An unintentional genocide has never been tried in the International Criminal Court or
prosecuted in any of the other international genocide tribunal (e.g., the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda and the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia).
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and-intra-generational connectedness, social relations, etc.).25 “In my view, the special evil of
genocide lies in its infliction of not just physical death (when it does that) but social death,
producing a consequent meaninglessness of one’s life and even of its termination” (Card 2003:
73).
According to Card for an act to be considered genocidal requires the intentional infliction
of social death (i.e., being stripped of controlling vital interests) upon a group because they are
members of that group. Importantly, embracing such a definition implies that an act can be
considered genocidal even if no group member(s) are physically killed, so long as social death is
intended.
But a worry is that if Transitional Justice remains concerned only with cases of
intentional genocide, then the vast majority of instances of social death will be excluded from
reparatory and reconciliatory consideration. The gravity of this concern becomes pronounced
when we consider the fact that humanity is in the midst of the greatest acceleration of cultural
disappearance in history (UN 2012).26 Countless cultures have lost or are in the process of losing
their cultural identity, traditional means of survival, social relations, autonomy, and connection
to their past. Yet overwhelmingly, most of these cases of social death (via cultural
disappearance) would not constitute genocide because they are unintentional.
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Brian Barry defines “vital interests” as, “certain objective requirements for human beings to be
able to live healthy lives, raise families, work at full capacity, and take part in social and political
life” (Barry 1999: 97) He goes on to explain that promoting ‘vital interests’ constitutes the
central aim of justice. As he states, “justice requires that a higher priority should be given to
ensuring that all human beings have the means to satisfy these vital interests than to satisfying
other desires” (Barry 1999: 97).
26
The UN estimates that within a hundred years 90% of worlds 7,000 languages will disappear
(UN 2012). While the loss of language does not necessarily imply the end of a culture or the
“death of a people” it is the best indicator currently available. As Wolgang Sachs eloquently
laments, “with the demise of languages, entire cultures are vanishing from the history of
civilization, never to be lived again. For each tongue contains its own way of perceiving man and
nature, experiencing joy and sorrow, and finding meaning in the flow of events…once languages
die out, cultures falter” (Sachs 1999: 93).
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Upon taking a birds-eye view of the modern world, it seems uncontroversial that the
primary driver of cultural disappearance is not intentional genocide; but instead, a steady process
of economic growth, social development, globalization, cultural integration, etc. If this is the
case, then the green criminologists’ critique appears credible in that currently legal activities are
responsible for causing social harm at an accelerated rate over and above wrongs recognized,
codified, and prosecuted as illegal in existing domestic and international law.27
Accordingly, if we believe that communities suffering from unintentional social death
deserve reparatory and reconciliatory consideration, then it is necessary to expand the notion of
wrongs covered by Transitional Justice.28 Essentially, what the work aims to prove is that one of
the key drivers behind the accelerating rate of social death is deliberate environmental
destruction; while emphasizing that these environmentally destructive acts are generally not
committed in an attempt to exterminate people(s) or culture(s). It is this realization that drives the
work’s assessment that to promote greater social welfare Transitional Justice ought to embrace
an account of ecocide as a wrong if it causes the same effect as genocide (i.e., social death) overand-above any instrumental role the environmental destruction may have in intentionally causing
traditional crimes against humanity.

27

A cynical, neo-Marxist, or law and economics interpretation of the global social order could
conclude that the reason why criminal justice has not expanded to cover the activities that are
causing the most environmental harm is because the law’s central purpose is to justify, affirm,
and expand the existing economic model. Thus, increased regulation or prohibition of these sorts
of activities would be anathema to the law’s underlying objective.
28
It is important to point out that instances in which the vanishing group voluntarily participated,
acquiesced, or assented to the cultural disappearance are not examples of social death because
the group was not stripped of autonomy and control of their vital interests. Focusing on whether
or not cultural changes are enacted voluntarily or involuntarily allows us to draw a helpful
distinction between social death and social evolution. Thus, voluntary cultural disappearance
(i.e., processes of social evolution) would not constitute wrong(s) requiring reparation and
reconciliation (i.e., they fall outside the scope of the transitional framework).
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It is necessary to reemphasize that this does not mean that every instance of ecocide (i.e.,
descriptive account(s) that include such activities as washing hands and brushing teeth)
constitutes a wrong in-and-of-itself that ought to be afforded consideration from within the
Transitional Justice framework - such a farfetched claim would require a vastly different and
more challenging argument. Instead, what the work proposes is a prescriptive account of ecocide,
which delineates a class of harms limited to instances of intentional environmental destruction
responsible for unintentional cultural loss that ought to be included within the purview of
Transitional Justice.29

II.

Examples of Ecocide as Driver of Unintentional Cultural Loss and Social Death

29

In this sense, the wrongness of ecocide is tethered to its role in causing unintentional social
death. Accordingly, the work is limited to an anthropocentric conception of ecocide (unless it can
be shown that other species besides humans are capable of comparable cultural loss), in that it is
concerned with the impact of environmental destruction on humans and their communities,
instead of on ecosystem loss in-and-of-itself. Nevertheless, the project has multiple motivations.
The first motivation is the surface objective of determining the appropriate responses to ecocide,
i.e., provide practical suggestions for assisting those affected by intentional environmental harms
responsible for social death. But the second motivation aims deeper, its goal is to offer an initial
step towards altering contemporary society’s perception of humanity’s place within nature. The
founding fathers of modern environmentalism (e.g., Henry David Thoreau 1854, John Muir
1894, Aldo Leopold, Arne Naess 1989, and Lynn White 1967) long emphasized the need to
reimagine our relationship with nature; but none of these luminaries offered a concrete step-bystep method for undertaking this shift in social-consciousness. This project suggests that
pursuing environmental transformative justice provides an opening for (re)examining and
(re)conceptualizing our practices, habits, values, norms, and priorities towards nature; in that
reparative and reconciliatory activities represent an opportunity for progressively departing from
current destructive and exploitative treatment(s) of nature and thereby, achieving and promoting
sustainable stewardship. Essentially, the work hopes that focusing on the need for environmental
transformative justice (e.g., after cases of intentional environmental destruction responsible for
causing social death) will provoke, guide, direct, and awaken awareness and understanding of
humans’ impact on the environment and the impact of the environment on humans, i.e.,
recognize the complex, dynamic, imbedded, and mutually-constructing relation of man-to-nature
and nature-to-man (Moore 2015).
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This section will analyze real-world instances of environmental destruction in the hopes
of demonstrating the reach and applicability of situating the wrong of ecocide within the
Transitional Justice framework. To achieve this the work intends to explore cases that foster a
clear intuition that group(s) affected by environmental degradation have suffered grave wrong
(not currently covered by Transitional Justice) that ought to be afforded reparative and
reconciliatory consideration.30 In an attempt to provide broad and compelling analysis the
examples will be varied geographically (i.e., drawn from around the world), in victim type, and
in the kind of activity considered.
In summary, for our purposes the paradigm cases31 of ecocide (i.e., those that meet the
above standard) must satisfy four elements: (1) committed intentionally for supposed benefit of
acting group;32 (2) without consent of impacted group;33 (3) non-instrumental in the commission

30

In turn, the projects by narrowly delineating cases where it seems clear that reparative and
reconciliatory measures are required, also helps in classifying cases where it is intuitively more
ambiguous if such obligations exist. This topic will be explored in subsequent chapters of the
work when discussing responsibility, complicity, and consent.
31
After the analysis of situating the paradigm cases within the Transitional Justice framework is
complete, applying the insights gleaned to non-canonical situations (e.g. instances where the
victims were complicit in the harm; environmental loss was unintentional; crimes against
humanity were perpetrated alongside the ecocide, etc.) remains open. But at present providing a
core set of examples is the aim.
32
It is important to emphasize that the criterion covers “supposed benefits” – i.e., per the
analysis an activity that causes an unexpected harm to the intentionally acting group is still a
viable candidate for consideration, so long as there was an anticipated gain from the
environmental harm. Mao’s Four Pest Campaign (i.e., exterminating rats, flies, mosquitos, and
swallows) is a vivid example; in that the eradication of vectors of disease was supposed to
function as a hygienic benefit to Chinese society. But instead the policy generated a self-inflicted
socio-ecological disaster. Without the swallows, insect populations boomed and devoured rice
and grain crops, which exacerbated the Chinese Famine of 1959-1961 that was responsible for
20-40 million Chinese citizens starving to death (Dvorsky 2012).
33
“Consent” as a concept has numerous meanings. But in the relevant sense under discussion,
“consent transactions” are of a particular structure: “agent A consents to B’s φ-ing, under a
certain description of φ-ing, whether or not the offer was initiated by B” (Kleinig 2010:6). For
example, a community may consent to a company’s mining of their land as part of an agreed
upon arrangement between the community and the state to receive compensation for voluntarily
relocating.
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of a traditional crime against humanity, and (4) undermined the vital interests of a distinct
cultural group, i.e., caused partial or complete social death of impacted group.34 The justification
for limiting our analysis to the above four criteria is that combined they represent minimally
necessary elements required for situating and applying the wrong(s) of the case studies (despite
the fact that they are currently excluded from the purview of Transitional Justice) to canonical
theories of oppression - which will be a topic covered in subsequent sections of the chapter.

A.

Dams

The construction of dams has the potential to produce extensive ecological devastation. It
is important to emphasize that dam-caused ecocide can occur when the edifice functions exactly
as intended absent any structural failure;35 moreover, it is precisely these cases that are ideally
suited (i.e., satisfy the above four elements) for consideration in our attempt to situate ecocide
within the Transitional Justice framework. (1) Dams are intentionally designed to transform
terrestrial environments to aquatic and/or aquatic environments to terrestrial, i.e., impounding the
river floods land upstream and/or dries up lakes and ponds downstream. (2) Damming often
occurs without the consent of the impacted community, i.e., The United Nations Environment
Program (UNEP) World Commission on Dams (WCD) estimated that since the end of WWII

34

One of the benefits of focusing on these four criteria is that inverting the framework offers
insight into the aims of environmental transformative justice: (1) preventing the intentional harm
of the environment; (2) inclusion of affected group(s) in decision-making process(es); (3)
restoring group autonomy and autarky (i.e., self-sufficiency), and (4) repairing ecosystem
functioning. Balancing these potentially conflicting interests will be the focus of subsequent
analysis.
35
Nevertheless, accidental dam failures have been responsible for some of the worst
environmental and human disasters in history, e.g., the collapse of the Banqiao Dam on the Ru
River in Henan province China (1975) resulted in an estimated 171,000 deaths and over 11
million people displaced (Osnos: 2011).
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large-scale damming projects have been responsible for the displacement of roughly 40-60
million people from predominately indigenous, tribal, and peasant communities (2000: XXX).
(3) Generally, dams are built to further economic growth and development; thus, construction
occurs without ill intent or a desire to harm the impacted community (despite the fact that as
previously discussed there are examples to the contrary – e.g., Saddam’s assault on the Ma’dan).
(4) But sadly, even benign damming projects have often resulted in widespread corrosion of the
local populations’ vital interests. Thus, in the hopes of illustrating how and why damming may
cause social death we will examine the James Bay I initiative.
At the end of WWII, the Quebecois government created a public utility called QuebecHydro aimed at expanding the province’s hydroelectric power (Churchill 2002: 296). The utility
grew rapidly in scope, scale, and ambition; in fact, by 1963 it was the largest employer in the
province (Churchill 2002: 297).
Ultimately, Quebec-Hydro aspired to supply power to much of the Eastern Seaboard and
began developing a plan to achieve this, dubbing it the James Bay Project (Churchill 2002: 297298). The scale of the project was colossal; Phase One alone was responsible for “moving
enough earth to recreate the Great Pyramid of Cheops eighty times over” (Churchill 2002: 298).
The stated developmental goal was to build roads, houses, airports, and most importantly
dams in the hopes of opening up the wilderness of James Bay to “civilization.” However, a
problem with the plan was that there was already civilization there! The Cree had inhabited the
James Bay region for generations and desired to keep it that way.36 Thus, as development began
encroaching on their territory the Cree filed suit to enjoin further construction in the region.
Initially, the Superior Court ruled in favor of the Cree and halted further construction; but

36

Case in point, “the first reaction to the information…was one of disbelief, and the hydrological
expert sent to meet with the Cree to explain the situation was nearly run out of town” (Olsson,
Folke, and Berkes 2004: 82).
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in 1973 the Court of Appeal overturned the injunction, stating that it was in the “interest” of the
“greater society” to allow the development to proceed (Churchill 2002: 299). Nevertheless, the
Court of Appeal ruled that the Cree would be entitled to sue for damages (Churchill 2002: 299).
Consequently, the threat of future litigation drove Quebec-Hydro to attempt to settle with the
Cree to avoid astronomical payouts down the road. But the Cree voted to reject Quebec-Hydro’s
offer (Churchill 2002: 300).
In response, the Canadian government established a development-friendly committee of
Cree (comprised of predominantly southern members of the tribe who were further integrated
into mainstream Canadian society) called the “Grand Council of the Crees of Quebec” to
negotiate on “behalf” of the Cree still inhabiting James Bay region (Churchill 2002: 299). This
group had no historical precedent or traditional role in Cree culture; it did not even exist prior to
the negotiation.
Ultimately, the “Grand Council of the Crees of Quebec” agreed to accept $135 million as
compensation for use of “their” land; additionally, an annual stipend was allotted to pay Cree
hunters who were unable to subsist on the land anymore; and finally, funds were committed to
assist any village that needed to relocate in the event of flooding (Churchill 2002: 300).37
However, the indigenous northern Cree still living in the James Bay region objected to the
agreement, “not wanting to relinquish aboriginal rights to their homeland and, for the first time,
accept ultimate federal and provincial authority over their affairs” (Churchill 2002: 301).
Despite indigenous protests as soon as the agreement was reached construction resumed
post haste and by 1979 the La Grande River (third largest in Quebec) and two of its smaller
tributaries, the Eastmain and Caniapiscau had been dammed, “transformed from free-flowing

37

For instance, the agreement included a provision that if families were prevented from safely
crossing the river because the dam prevented it from freezing over, then they would be flown by
helicopter to their ancestral hunting grounds (Olsson, Folke, and Berkes 2004: 82).
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currents into a series of stagnant lakes and ponds incapable of supporting most life forms
(Churchill 2002: 301). The environmental toll caused by damming the La Grande was immense,
in total an estimated 12,000 square kilometers of forestland was inundated, resulting in the loss
of 83,000 linear kilometers of shoreline (Churchill 2002: 305). "The rims of [the La Grande]
reservoirs do not, and cannot, replace any of the lost wetland habitat; they are broad, lifeless
banks of mud, rock and dead trees" (McCutcheon 1991: 98).
The mammals (beaver, muskrat, snowshoe hare, mink and otter) that the Cree hunted as a
source of food and fur either migrated or died (Churchill 2002: 305). Fish stock plummeted after
the loss of their spawning ground and migratory birds stopped returning to the area as their
routes and target destinations disappeared (Churchill 2002: 305).38 All of these ecological
changes proved devastating to the Cree’s traditionally broad-spectrum39 means of subsistence,
which in turn led to rapid social deterioration:
As traditional life has quickly disintegrated along the La Grande, social decay has come
to be manifested in spiraling rates of alcoholism, glue sniffing among young people and
other forms of substance abuse. Concomitantly, domestic violence, child abandonment
and suicide, all of them virtually unheard of among the Cree until recently, have made
38

The loss of fish stock was particularly devastating in that the Cree had proven adept at
sustainably harvesting the resource, “some years [their catch] exceeded the entire Quebec
commercial catch and outperformed other major Canadian subarctic fisheries on a catch per unit
effort basis” (Olsson, Folke, and Berkes 2004: 81).
39
Broad-spectrum indicates a lifestyle dependent on using a wide variety of animal, plant,
mineral, and aquatic resources to avoid overburdening any one source of subsistence, e.g., Kim
Sternly defines the ‘broad-spectrum revolution’ as “the extension of the human ecological base
to birds, fish, and grain” (Sterelny 2011: 811). A benefit of broad-spectrum subsistence practices
stems from the reality that maintaining the ability to pursue alternative resources, aids human
communities in the struggle to survive and flourish. Since, if a community relies overwhelming
on a particular resource and environmental conditions change in a way that diminishes access to
that resource, then the community will be severely resource deprived, in comparison to a
community that can draw upon a vast array of resources to meet their subsistence needs. As
Bruce Waller explains: “The natural world is exactly the place for an autonomy of alternative
possibilities. Our ‘survival strategy’ has shaped us, like our mammalian relative the white-footed
mouse, to keep our options open. We might have evolved like the insects, with rigidly
programmed behavioral patterns. Our evolutionary process took a different tack: we are
‘programmed’ to favor a variety of paths and to maintain such possibilities even when one path
is the most immediately beneficial” (Waller 1998: 9-10).
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their ugly appearances. (Churchill 2002: 306)
Uncontrovertibly, damming the La Grande resulted in ecocide; but additionally, it seems
indisputable that damming the La Grande was directly responsible for stripping the Cree of their
vital interests, i.e., the Cree lost control of their homeland, their means of subsistence, their
ancestral traditions, and meaning in their lives. As native activist Terrance Nelson informed
Ward Churchill, “it's one thing to say they should find meaning in their lives by struggling to
reclaim their homelands and traditions…but how are they supposed to do that when the
homeland itself is under eighty meters of water” (Churchill 2002: 319).
While it is clear that the environmental harm caused social death; the stress, anxiety, and
fear accompanying the loss of their traditional way of life without any viable replacement caused
physical death as well, e.g., Devastation of the Cree: Final Report documents that suicide rates
of native teens were eleven times higher than whites (1986: 97). Ultimately, as the habitat died
so did the indigenous Cree and their way of life.
It appears the James Bay I project represents a clear example of ecocide that satisfies the
four criteria: (1) La Grande dam complex was constructed intentionally under the socially
beneficial guise of development; (2) without the consent of the local Cree; (3) yet, the developers
harbored no ill intent towards the Cree (in fact those responsible agreed to compensate and assist
the impacted communities); (4) nevertheless, the project was responsible for stripping the Cree
of control of their vital interests. With these elements met, the James Bay I project is a clear
instance of ecocide caused by damming, which fits the Transitional Justice framework. In
subsequent sections, we will explore what reparatory and reconciliatory measures the Cree ought
to be afforded, but for now the aim is to move on and provide additional examples of ecocide
that satisfy the four elements.
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B.

Nuclear Weapons Testing

Every phase of nuclear weapons production from mining uranium, to developing and
testing the weapons, to storing spent nuclear fuel involves the potential for ecocide. The fallout
from nuclear contamination can last thousands of years40 creating “sacrifice zones” that are
permanently ecologically impaired and foreclosed from productive use.
But for our purposes the testing phase appears most suited to satisfy the four elements for
situating ecocide within the Transitional Justice framework. For one, the environmental harm
caused in the testing phase is intentional, i.e., increasing national security by ascertaining the
weapon’s capacity for environmental destruction is precisely the objective of the test. Whereas,
the environmental destruction that occurs during the mining, building, or storage phase(s) is most
likely an unintended, inadvertent, and unbeneficial consequence of working with radioactive
material.
Secondly, nuclear testing has often been conducted without the consent of the impacted
group(s) (Ruff 2015). Already at the Dawn of the Atomic Age (July 16th 1945) the detrimental
short and long-term health and environmental effects of nuclear explosions were partially
recognized, thus testing occurred in sparsely populated areas within the state’s contiguous
borders or more commonly it was exported to isolated colonial territories (Ruff 2015: 777778).41 The decision regarding where to locate nuclear test sites clearly expresses government’s

40

Per the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty
Organization, the half-life of Plutonium is 24,000 years and contact with even a miniscule
quantity is a serious health hazard and can cause lung, bone, and liver cancer (2012).
41
For example as Ruff explains, “the total explosive yield of US nuclear test explosions in
Pacific locations – Bikini and Enewetak Atolls in the Marshall Islands, Johnston Atoll in the
central Pacific, and Kiritimati (Christmas Island, lent for the purpose by the British) – at 152.8
megatons (Mt), dwarfs the 1.05 Mt yield of atmospheric tests conducted in the continental US at
the Nevada Test Site” (Ruff 2015: 777).
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marked unwillingness to risk harming their majority population; consequently, the ills of nuclear
fallout have been disproportionately distributed to marginalized minority groups (Ruff 2015:
777-778).42
Obviously, the easiest way to ensure the land was available for testing was to exclude the
marginalized indigenous inhabitants from the decision-making process. As such, the impacted
communities seldom consented to the nuclear trials and were often unaware of the dangers the
tests posed (Ruff 2015).
Nevertheless, the tests were not motivated by genocidal intent, e.g., of the over 2,000
nuclear explosions only at Hiroshima and Nagasaki were the bombs used as weapons of mass
destruction. In all other instances, the detonations occurred with the supposed beneficial aim of
researching and developing weapons, i.e., making them more destructive, more compact, more
deliverable, understanding their impact, and strategizing their use (Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute 2014).
While it might be true that one of the goals of nuclear testing was to study the impacts of
radioactive exposure on humans, there is no evidence that the objective was the social death of
the affected group, i.e., the harms were not committed with genocidal intent, but instead as a
means of collecting data on the effect of nuclear explosions on human bodies and their habitat.
As a British intelligence report states, “the Army must discover the detailed effects of various
types of [nuclear] explosions on equipment, stores and men, with and without various types of
protection” (Tubanavua-Salabula et al 1999: 15).

42

The US conducted tests at the Nevada Test Site on land of the Shoshone people; Soviets
conducted tests in the remote Arctic archipelago of Novaya Zemlya, home to the Nenetz people;
Chinese conducted tests at Lop Nur (in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region) home to the
Uygur minority; France conducted tests in the deserts of Algeria, until the independence
movement forced them to relocate tests to French Polynesia, home to the Maohi people, etc.
(Ruff 2015: 777-778).
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Therefore, any group-level injuries that emerged were inadvertent consequences of the
state’s often reckless disregard for these peoples’ wellbeing, but not overtly orchestrated
attempts to cause their social death. In fact, after the tests, accountable nations responsible for the
tests occasionally endeavored to provide care and compensation to the victims (Ruff 2015).
However, the above comments do not mean to imply that nuclear testing never
undermined the vital interests of affected communities because undoubtedly in many instances it
did. Thus, in the hopes of illustrating how and why nuclear testing may result in inadvertent
social death, we will examine the impact of the British Maralinga nuclear testing range on the
Anangu people.
According to the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban
Treaty Organization, between 1955 and 1963 the British military conducted twelve atmospheric
nuclear explosions at Maralinga in South Australia (2012). Prior to the tests the Anangu people
had inhabited the land for thousands of years.43 The Anangu were a semi-nomadic huntergatherer society, whose lifestyle was deeply dependent and connected with the local
environment. As Yvonne Edwards (an Anangu survivor of Maralinga) states in her book
Maralinga’s Long Shadow:
Before Maralinga the Anangu people cared for their country for generation after
countless generation. Their land was their being, their spirit, their life. They knew no
other. They wanted no other. They loved its rockholes and red sands, its creatures great
and small, its trees, its bushes, its flowers, its fruits. Above all they cared for its kapi, its
water, its precious water, and used it wisely, walking many miles from one rockhole to
another, always seeking permission from Wanampi, the Rainbow Serpent, who guarded
each one, before they took the living water. (Mattingley and Edwards 2016: 1)
Prior to the tests the Australian government revoked the Anangu’s aboriginal reserve of
Ooldea and forced the Anangu to relocate hundreds of miles south of their traditional range to
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Archaeological evidence estimates that indigenous peoples have lived sustainably on the land
for at least 45,000 years; and as, such Aboriginal people of Australia are one of the oldest
documented continuous cultures on the planet (Clarkson et al 2017).
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the Yalata aboriginal reserve (Mcpherson 2009). Yvonne Edwards, an Anangu artist and
survivor, remembers the forced removal as, “a turbulent day of deep distress. They wept and
wailed, and over 60 years on they still wail at the memory of the betrayal, and how they were
forced to leave. Walking, or on the train. Or on trucks taking them from the home and heartland,
which many would never see again” (Edwards and Mattingley 2016: 23).
However, since the Anangu are nomadic many of them continued to travel through their
ancestral homeland unaware that the tests were occurring or of the risk of exposure to radioactive
fallout (Mcpherson 2009). The Royal Commission issued a damning report denouncing the,
“ignorance, incompetence, and cynicism” of the accountable authorities’ treatment of the
Anangu for failing to recognize, “their special vulnerability to radioactive fallout” (1985, 194).
One obvious mistake Ruff mentions, “[is that] warning signs in English were usually
incomprehensible to the Aborigines” (Ruff 2015: 783). Also, the fact that, “a sole patrol officer,
joined after 4 years by a second officer, was given the task of finding and warning all Indigenous
people in an 80,000 square Kilometer area” is clearly evidence of the government’s rampant
disregard for the Anangu’s wellbeing (Noonan 2016: 2).
Unfortunately, the trials and tribulations facing indigenous peoples that did comply with
the order to remain off the land were often equally tragic:
For example, we were told of how Australian servicemen in the area instructed an
Indigenous nomadic family to remain on the road and not to go into the bush to hunt
because of poison. They had become so terrified of the ‘poison’ that they obeyed
instructions implicitly and 4 of the family of 6 eventually died of starvation. (Noonan
2016: 3)
Furthermore, the reserves that the Anangu were relocated to were hotbeds of violence and
alcohol and drug abuse.44 As Yvonne Edwards describes, “Anangu began to turn to drugs [petrol
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“By 1978 the number of deaths each year at Yalata was higher than births, and the birth rate
continued to drop while the death rate rose. In the decade between 1972 and 1982, 29 deaths
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sniffing] and alcohol to blunt their pain, their loss, their longing, to blot out their grief at losing
their homelands” (Mattingley and Edwards 2016: 96).
Tragically, the Anangu’s desire to return home prompted further suffering. In 1974 the
Yalata Community Council was granted salvage rights at Maralinga and homesick Anangu
jumped at the opportunity to return to their ancestral land (Mattingley and Edwards 2016: 77).
Unfortunately, according to the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test
Ban Treaty Organization, the initial cleanup at Maralinga was inadequate, “[involving] merely
burying various radioactive debris, including plutonium, in pits which were covered with
concrete” (2012). And to make matters worse, the returning Anangu were not given any warning
of the potential dangers. Yvonne Edwards recounts wandering around barefoot through the test
site:
We followed bitumen road to place where bomb went off and we were all standing there
looking – a BIG hole with a big fence around it and NO TREES FOR MILES, no green
leaves, JUST DEAD TREES, lots of dead animals. No kangaroos…Nobody told us we
should wear shoes. We went to have a look. We thought it was safe. But it wasn’t. We
went back to village, told whitefellas. They said, ‘You shouldn’t have been there’ But
nobody told us. (Mattingley and Edwards 2016: 84)
Consequently, the Anangu’s dream of reestablishing their traditional way of life in their
ancestral home of Maralinga had become impossible, “nobody would like to live there now. The
damage that’s been done – you can’t fix that. It’s not good to live there any more” (Mattingley
and Edwards 2016: 198). Part of the problem was that the environmental degradation impeded
the Anangu’s ability to subsist on the land. For instance, Yvonne Edwards recounts a journey to
an area of Maralinga that once had abundant resources, but after the explosions now lay barren,
“all the ladies go [there] for maku (witchetty grubs), digging them out of the ground. Walk, get
lots, plenty there. Good soft sand for cooking maku. We were going every road, lots of roads

were alcohol-related, almost a third of all in the community. Between 1986 and 1991, 15 people
died in alcohol-related road accidents” (Edwards and Mattingley 2016: 97).
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there and we followed every road. But no trees anywhere. No grass. No maku. All dead”
(Edwards and Mattingley 2016: 81).
Somberly, a further horror peculiar to radiation exposure is the ever-present anxiety of
future illness, i.e., nuclear survivors have described themselves as feeling like ticking time
bombs waiting for cancer and genetic mutation to strike both on a personal and intergenerational
level. As the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty
Organization describes:
Concern about transmitting genetic mutations to one’s children can all have profound and
long-term direct and indirect physical and mental health consequences. Especially among
the indigenous and traditional communities disproportionately impacted, these effects
are not only individual and family, but extend to kin, communities and peoples. (2012)
But, beyond the devastating health (both mental and physical) and environmental
consequences of nuclear testing, many affected communities are left with lingering social,
cultural, and economic costs, e.g., the Anangu lost forever their land, means of subsistence, and
connection to their ancestral traditions. As such, it seems uncontroversial that nuclear testing at
Maralinga resulted in ecocide that stripped the Anangu of many of their most vital interests.
Thus, it appears the Maralinga nuclear tests represents a vivid example of ecocide that
satisfies the four criteria: (1) the atomic weapons were detonated intentionally to destroy the
environment in the hopes of further understanding, researching, and developing the device for
the sake of national security; (2) without the consent of the local Anangu people; (3) yet, the
British government harbored no ill will towards the Anangu (in fact those responsible agreed to
compensate and assist the impacted communities);45 (4) nevertheless, the tests were responsible
for stripping the Anangu of control of their vital interests.
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In 1991/92 the government made a payment of $618,000 to the Anangu living around
Maralinga for land contamination (Korff 2017). In 1995 the Anangu received $13.5 million
dollars for the loss of their lands and as compensation for the contamination from the British
government and additional $6 million was paid to assist in maintaining their current community
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The Maralinga nuclear explosions are clear instances of ecocide able to fit the
Transitional Justice framework. Thus, in subsequent sections, we will explore what reparatory
and reconciliatory measures the Anangu ought to be afforded. But at present we will move on to
explore a final example of ecocide that satisfies the four elements.

C.

Mountaintop Removal Mining

Global supply-chains and patterns of mass production and consumption, i.e., the drivers
of the modern world, depend on large-scale extractive activities, e.g., the procurement of raw
materials far exceeding the subsistence needs of the local population. A troubling indictment of
modernity is that these activities (e.g., logging, fracking, underground mining, strip-mining,
trawler fishing, oil drilling, etc.) provide numerous examples that fit our criteria; but in an
attempt to focus our analysis the work will explore mountaintop removal mining as
representative of the class.
Mountaintop removal (or extreme strip-mining) is a form of open-pit mining that
exposes ore and minerals (mostly coal) by removing the land above (“overburden”) to reveal
desired seam(s). The process involves dramatic topographical alteration of the landscape, i.e.,
decapitating the mountain, hill or ridge to access desired resource(s) and filling in adjacent
valley(s) with the excess rock and soil (“holler/valley fills”) (Burns 2007).46 Thus, mountaintop
removal mining presents an exceptionally vivid case of environmental alteration in that the

of Tjuntjuntjura (Korff 2017). But yet only five of the survivors have been paid a total of
$200,000 in compensation for their personal injuries (Korff 2017).
46
As Shirley Burns explains, because ore and minerals usually exist in multiple stratified layers,
the blast process can be repeated on numerous seams upon a single mountain, which increases
the mine depth each time and often result in a vertical descent hundreds of feet into the earth
below where the mountain once stood (Burns 2007).
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process in days can undo millions of years of geological activity.
Furthermore, mountaintop removal mining projects intentionally degrade the
environment in an escalating chronological sequence: (1) local animals are exterminated or
relocated; (2) the land is deforested and defoliated; (3) topsoil is scraped off;47 (4) explosives are
used to dislodge unwanted strata of overburden, and (5) the overburden is deposited in adjacent
valley(s) (Burns 2007). Additionally, projects often cause unintended environmental harm(s)
beyond the procedurally necessary phases mentioned above, e.g., structures containing “mine
tailings” and “slurry” (hazardous material and waste that is left over from the extraction process)
can leak, rupture, or burst contaminating rivers and ground water;48 avalanches, landslides, and
mud/debris flows are occasionally triggered by the artificial seismic vibration of explosions and
the destabilization of the mountain face;49 forest, brush, and coal seam fires may occur when
exposed coal is struck by lightning or comes in contact with fire during mining operations;50 and
invariably, windblown dust particles and other loosened debris settle in, disturb, and pollute local
habitats for scores of miles.
Resident populations seduced by the allure of economic development, job opportunities,
and increased wealth often consent to large-scale resource extraction -including mountaintop
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In the US per the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act the top soil is supposed to be
set aside for later reclamation (Burns 2007). However, as Burns documents this requirement is
shirked as waivers are often provided (Burns 2007).
48
For example, in 2015 two dams containing mine tailings from the Samarco iron ore mine burst
killing seventeen; destroying the town of Bento Rodrigues; spreading hazardous slurry over 410
miles and polluting the Rio Doce (Brazil’s fifth largest watershed) (BBC 2015: 12/22/2015).
49
For example, in 2013 a landslide killed 83 miners working on the Gyama copper, gold, and
molybdenum mining project in Tibet (Wong 2013).
50
For example, the once thriving mining town of Centralia, Pennsylvania had to be abandoned
when a mine caught fire in 1962 and is expected to continue burning for another 250 years
(O'Carroll, 2010). Kevin Krajick reveals the extent of the problem, “across the globe, thousands
of coal fires are burning. Nearly impossible to reach and extinguish once they get started, the
underground blazes threaten towns and roads, poison the air and soil and, some say, worsen
global warming. The menace is growing: mines open coal beds to oxygen; human-induced fires
or spontaneous combustion provides the spark” (Krajick 2005)
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removal mining. In subsequent chapters, while discussing the topic of responsibility the
dissertation will investigate such cases, but for now the focus remains on instances where an
affected population did not consent. In terms of our analysis, El Cerrejon mining project in the
La Guajira region of Colombia offers a vivid and useful example in that two distinct cultural
groups (the indigenous Wayúu and Afro-Colombian villages) never consented to the operation
and their vital interests have been gravely undermined.
El Cerrejon mining is the largest mining project in Latin America (Boader 2013: 52). It
consists of seven open-pit mines extending over 270 squares miles centered around Cerrejon
Mountain in the foothills of the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta and Serrania del Perija mountain
ranges in the Guajira Peninsula of Northeast Colombia (Kline 1987: 49). Excavation of Cerrejon
Mountain began in 1985 as a joint venture between Carbocol (a Colombian state company) and
Intercor (a subsidiary of ExxonMobil) (Redner 2014: 54).51 The scale of the project is immense,
i.e., according to Cerrejon Mining’s internal report from 2012; the mine has produced 509
million tons of coal since opening (accounting for almost 5% of its global coal sales).52 But
numerous Wayúu and Afro-Colombian residents of the region have not benefited from the
increased economic productivity.53
The Wayúu are an indigenous group that has populated the Guajira Peninsula for at least
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Subsequently, in 2000 the operation was fully privatized and as of 2006 has been jointly
owned in equal share by BHP Billiton, Glencore, and Anglo American (Redner 2014: 54).
52
Furthermore, the mine employs over 5,000 people and in 2011 it accounted for over 40% of
Colombia’s total export revenue (Redner 2014: 57).
53
Sadly, this is often true regarding mining in Colombia as a lack of regulation and
accountability regularly results in widespread environmental destruction, community
displacement, and human rights abuses. James Rochlin citing a report from the Colombian
Government Accountability Office documents, “that over 80% of the country’s human rights
violations occur in regions where the extractive sector is located. More particularly, extractive
regions of the country hosted 87% of the country’s forced displacement, 78% of attacks against
union members, 89% of human rights violations of the Indigenous, and 90% of human rights
violations against blacks” (Rochlin 2015: 743).
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500 years (Zapach 1997: 1). They were the pre-Columbian inhabitants of the region and never
assimilated during Spanish colonial rule or after Colombian independence (Zapach 1997: 2). The
Wayúu were able to maintain their traditional way of life in part because of the inhospitality of
the terrain and the widespread belief that it held scarce economic value. As Marla Zapach
recounts after her anthropological exploration of the region:
The ground is baked hard by the unyielding sun and winds that buffet the peninsula, and
there is little water to alleviate the incredible heat of the desert. The ground covering is
almost nonexistent, the majority of vegetation being cactus or spiny bushes; and few trees
exist under which to find shade. The land is suitable for only the most hardy of people
and animals. (Zapach 1997: 1)
Thus, despite the fact that the Wayúu are the largest indigenous group in Colombia
(numbering about 500,000 and occupying over a quarter of the national territory) they received
minimal state interest prior to the advent of El Cerrejon (Boeder 2013: 55).
Historically, the Wayúu relied on natural or man-made dugouts to catch rainfall and
facilitate ground water percolation as a means of subsisting in their exceedingly arid habitat
(Zapach 1997: 15). Nevertheless, recurring droughts forced the Wayúu to embrace a nomadic
lifestyle requiring, “constant movement…throughout the peninsula [to] prevent the sole
dependence on one water source and ensure better use of available resources by utilizing all
areas of the peninsula” (Zapach 1997: 15-16).
Prior to Spanish contact (1499) the Wayúu practiced a broad-spectrum subsistencelifestyle based on fishing along the coast, hunting, e.g., deer, rabbit, fox, turtles, iguanas,
armadillos, turtles, and birds, gathering, and limited agriculture (consisting of mostly corn and
yucca) (Zapach 1997: 18 and 26). Interestingly, the Wayúu opted to modify their lifestyle and
embrace nomadic pastoralism after the introduction of European domesticated herd animals
(primarily shepherding goats and sheep because the region was too arid for horse or cattle
rearing) despite the fact that they were never conquered, colonized, or assimilated into the

38

dominant culture (Zapach 1997: 22-23). Consequently, nomadic pastoralism remained the
Wayúu’s principal mode of subsistence until mining at El Cerrejon began to disturb the region’s
ecosystem.
Obviously, surviving in such an unforgiving habitat is difficult and any disruption or
added adversity poses a dire threat. But the Colombian government and multinational
corporations failed to adequately consider the impact of El Cerrejon on the Wayúu’s way of life.
In 1973 the Colombian government without assessing indigenous claims to the land,
offering compensation for loss, or even discussing the matter with the Wayúu declared the El
Cerrejon region a reserva especial, reserving the national government’s right to use (“mine”) the
land (Rivera 1986). Furthermore, it was only after the arrival of international mining companies
that a Social Impact Assessment aimed at understanding and reducing the harm of the project on
the indigenous, mestizo, and Afro-Colombian communities of the region was undertaken (Kline
1982). Shockingly, the report contained little mention of the Wayúu or the impact the mine
would have on their way of life, despite the fact that they accounted for 40% of the peninsula’s
population (Kline 1982: 34-37).
As Zapach citing Rivera explains one reason the Wayúu are virtually absent in the Social
Impact Assessment is that due to their nomadic lifestyle they never permanently inhabited the
region under investigation, “it appears that they occupied them only during times of drought”
(Zapach 1997: 57 and Rivera 1986: 116-117). Sadly, yet predictably, the Social Impact
Assessment failed to consider a pressing issue that during droughts bands of Wayúu dependent
on the water and grazing land or on surrounding Cerrejon Mountain would be left with nowhere
to turn.54
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As Zapach emphasizes, “access to land is essential for Wayúu survival…flexible
migration…is now impossible…they cannot return to the fertile area in the north, due to a
vicious blood feud that exists to this day between clans. Therefore, they are doubly stigmatized,
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Problematically, when such conditions occurred, the affected Wayúu had no available
recourse but to enter resguardos (government supported reservations) and give up their
traditional nomadic lifestyle. “In order to literally survive and stop the onslaught of threats, they
must choose to abandon their animals and the only lives they have known as self-sufficient
pastoralists” (Boeder 2013: 57). As Zapach articulates, these decisions (made under duress) have
greatly undermined Wayúu autonomy and destroyed their way of life:
A group once so fiercely independent and solitary is now relegated to resguardos where
there is insufficient land to provide for them and their families. Their lives revolve
around the land: and to feed oneself and one's family, one must have land on which to
sow and to graze one's animals. To participate in the cultural activities that mark one as
Wayúu, such as prestige exchanges, large families, many goats, and participation within
bridewealth and funeral exchanges, one must have land as the basis to provide for all of
this. (Zapach 1997: 55)
Thus, the environmental destruction caused by the El Cerrejon mining project is creating
a situation in which the Wayúu, a proud and fiercely independent people that resisted conquest,
colonization, and assimilation for hundreds of years, are increasingly reduced to a life of
dependence, i.e., forced to rely on state assistance for survival or absorption into the dominant
culture. But the Wayúu are not the only group affected by mining Cerrejon Mountain; the AfroColombian communities inhabiting the region have been impacted as well.
Tabaco (formally the largest village in the El Cerrejon region) was settled hundreds of
years ago by escaped Afro-Colombian slaves, mestizo peasants, and natives fleeing encomienda
(the exploitative colonial system of forced labor imposed on conquered communities throughout
the Spanish Empire) (Chomsky and Forster 2006). The community was self-sufficient and
subsisted by growing fruits and vegetable and raising goats and chickens (Boeder 2013: 54). At
the time of excavation Tabaco had developed into a village with running water, electricity, a
school, police department, health center, and a population of over 700 inhabitants (Boeder 2013:

as they cannot return home, nor can they survive on the land granted (Zapach 1997: 55).
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54).
But Tabaco sat on lucrative coal seams that the El Cerrejon conglomerate wanted to
access. Thus, in the early 1990s representatives of the company bid to buyout villager’s land
titles; promising that, “they would still be able to farm it or the company would reward them
with new houses in town, job training, and higher incomes” (Boeder 2013: 54-55). Moreover,
community activists explain that the company simply, “informed communities of their plans and
never warned them about mining’s negative consequences” (Redner 2014: 54). As Jose Julio, a
former resident of Tabaco explains, “a lot of people sold, because it seemed like a gift. Even
though the price they paid was laughably low, it was like getting something for nothing”
(Chomsky and Forster 2006). Consequently, by 2001 around 600 of the residents had
relinquished title to the company, but over 100 still remained and refused to leave their homes,
“[since] as farmers, they knew that if they lost their land, they would also lose their source of
food, their history, their cultural identity, and their shared traditions” (Boeder 2013: 55).
Nevertheless, to quell the resistance the Ministry of Mines and Energy declared the
region a mining reserve (authorizing an area speciously affirmed uninhabited and zoned for
mining) despite the fact that the area was clearly populated (Boeder 2013: 55). The community
protested the ruling and filed suit; but on August 9, 2001, a judge sided with the company
ordering the area to be cleared and vacated. “Within hours, employees of Cerrejón, 500 soldiers,
and 200 policemen invaded the church, forcibly evicted everyone, and bulldozed every home
flat” (Boeder 2013: 55).
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A problem for our analysis is that under both Colombian55 and international law56 the
treatment of the Tabaco villagers constitutes an indigenous rights violation. Nevertheless, to
avoid the direct connection to indisputable indigenous rights violation(s) we could likewise
consider smaller Afro-Colombian villages (e.g., Tamaquito, Roche, Chancleta, and Patilla)
similarly suffering from the environmental harms (e.g., water pollution, air is laced with toxic
dust, illness, crop failure, etc.) caused by mining Cerrejon Mountain that have (as of yet at the
time of writing) not been forcefully evicted (Chomsky and Forster 2006). As Eder Arregoces an
inhabitant of Chancleta (a tiny village in the area) laments:
What a paradox: We are surrounded by the world’s largest coal mine, and we don’t have
enough to eat! Most of the families here can only eat one meal a day, all because we
don’t have land. There is outrageous exploitation that fails to see that there are human
beings living here, there are black and indigenous communities. The environmental
situation is worse than critical. (Chomsky and Forster 2006)
Due to myriad environmental harms stemming from the mining of Cerrejon Mountain,
these local communities have been devastated by ecocide, precipitating the dissolution of their
traditional cultures through depletion of their means of subsistence, undermining their overall
wellbeing. Both Wayúu and Afro-Colombian villagers have suffered polluted water, inhalation
of hazardous dust, malnutrition, diseases, resource scarcity, and loss of land due to the impact of
the mine. Furthermore, both groups have had little opportunity to consent or participate in the
decision-making processes pushing them closer to cultural and physical extinction.
Thus, it appears mountaintop removal mining of Cerrejon Mountain represents a vivid
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Colombia ratified International Labor Organization Convention 169 into the Colombian
Constitution in 1991, which affirms the rights of Indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities
to consultation regarding proposed changes to their territories and traditions (Boeder 2013: 55).
56
Colombia endorsed the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in
2009, which protects indigenous peoples’ right to give and withhold free, prior, and informed
consent for development projects and Colombian Constitutional Court ruling have supported,
“[t]he abstract general interest and majority vision of development cannot be imposed when such
projects are developed in indigenous peoples’ territories” (Redner 2014: 54).
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example of ecocide caused by large scale-extractive activities that satisfy the four criterion: (1)
the mountain was cleared and leveled intentionally for the economic benefit of the nation
(politically and commercially) as well as for corporate profits ; (2) without the consent of the
local Wayúu or Afro-Colombian people; (3) yet, the government or multinational corporations
harbored no ill will towards the groups (in fact those responsible to some extent compensated or
attempted to assist the impacted communities); (4) nevertheless, the project was responsible for
stripping both Wayúu and Afro-Colombian communities of control of their vital interests.

III.

Idealized Description of Cases of Ecocide

With the case studies completed, the goal of the remainder of the chapter will be to
further justify integrating ecocide within the Transitional Justice framework by linking the
harm(s) illustrated with examples of typical conceptions of oppression (e.g., Young 1990 and
Cudd 2006). To achieve this, it will be helpful to create a descriptive model of generalized terms
that captures the crucial elements of the aforementioned narratives. Mills defends such an
approach, emphasizing the importance of abstracting away non-salient situational features during
effective normative theorizing:
What one wants are abstractions of the ideal-as-descriptive-model kind that capture the
essentials of the situation of women and nonwhites, not abstract away from them. Global
concepts like patriarchy and white supremacy arguably fulfill this role…These terms are
abstractions that do reflect the specificities of group experience, thereby potentially
generating categories and principles that illuminate rather than obfuscate the reality of
different kinds of subordination. (Mills 2005: 173)
Prudently, stripping away examples of normatively irrelevant detail(s) and producing a
schematic depiction of what Mills calls an “ideal-as-descriptive model” affords further clarity in
our attempt to consider and apply these contingent narratives to specific theories of oppression.
Thus, what are the essential and generalizable features of the above examples?
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A.

Autarkic Communities vs. Roving Imperialists

All of the examples revolve around outside actors intentionally destroying the ecological
basis of local subsistence. Accordingly, each narrative begins with two distinct groups (1) a
highly localized population maintaining a self-sufficient lifestyle requiring deep epistemic
connection to their environment and (2) an outsider population comfortable with their “right” to
deplete and destroy a local habitat for their benefit.57 Ramachandra Guha and Joan MartinezAlier offer an insightful dichotomy discerning key distinctions between the two groups; dubbing
(1) “‘Ecosystem peoples’ – that is, those communities which depend very heavily on the natural
resources of their own locality and [2] ‘omnivores’, individuals and groups with the social power
to capture, transform, and use natural resources from a much wider catchment area; sometimes
indeed the whole world” (Guha and Martinez-Alier 1997: 12).58
In an effort to borrow from and constructively build upon Guha and Martinez-Alier’s
classification, the work will employ the terms roving59 imperialists60 (for ‘omnivores’) and

57

These differences in geo-socio-ecological relations provide ample criteria to carve out distinct
social groups. Since according to Ann Cudd all that is required to constitute a ‘social groups’ is a
“collection of persons who share something that is socially significant” (Cudd 2006: 41).
58
Guha and Martinez-Alier apply the taxonomy to India, thusly, “the first category of ecosystem
people includes the bulk of India’s rural population: small peasants, landless laborers, tribals,
pastoralists, and artisans. The category of omnivores comprises industrialists, professionals,
politicians, and government officials – all of whom are based in the towns and cities – as well as
a small but significant fraction of the rural elite, the prosperous farmers in tracts of heavily
irrigated, chemically fertilized Green Revolution agriculture” (Guha and Martinez-Alier 1997:
12).
59
The use of the term ‘roving’ was inspired by Mancur Olsen and Elinor Ostrom’s iconic
description of ‘roving bandits’ examined the behavior of, “fishing fleets that target valuable
marine species in coastal waters, deplete local stocks, and then move on to exploit stocks located
in other regions” (Ostrom 2007: 15184).
60
Sachs provides a succinct account of the imperial worldview: “this vision is imperial because
it claims the right to roam the world unhindered and to go grab whatever it fancies - exactly as if
there were no places, no communities no nations. The mechanisms of GATT, NAFTA and the
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autarkic61 communities (for ‘ecosystem peoples’). Per this taxonomy, the major difference
between the two groups is that roving imperialists predominantly depend on non-local sources of
subsistence (i.e., interregional or global supply-chains), which consequently decouples
producer(s) from consumer(s) (i.e., separating beneficiaries from first-hand and daily experience
of exploited areas); whereas, autarkic communities predominantly depend on engaging with the
immediate environment for subsistence.62
Relying on recent terminology from Glenn Albrecht’s book, Earth Emotions: New Words
for a New World, we can classify roving imperialists as terraphthoran (Earth destroyers) and
autarkic communities as terranascian (Earth creators) (Albrecht 2019: 1). According, to his
psychological analysis of peoples’ emotional orientation to the natural world roving imperialists
suffer from ecoagnosy, a term created to describe a state of environmental ignorance or
indifference to ecology (Albrecht 2019: 76).63 Whereas, autarkic communities have a strong
sense of endemophilia, which he describes as “the particular love of the locally and regionally
distinctive, manifest in the people of that place. It is what gives a particular sense of belonging,
an endemic sense of place, as opposed to a global sense of place” (Albrecht 2019: 126).
Hence, a recurrent cause of ecocide apparent in the case studies is roving imperialists’
spatiotemporal separation and removal from direct engagement with their ecosystem(s) for

WTO were born in the spirit of frontier demolition. They codify the world as a freely accessible
economic arena, in which economics enjoys the right of way” (Sachs 1999: 154).
61
Simply stated, ‘autarkic’ means a self-sufficient geopolitical entity.
62
Keep in mind that autarkic peoples are not necessarily native inhabitants (e.g., the AfroColombian villagers of Tabaco). Additionally, the use of the word ‘predominately’ emphasizes
that the division between these two groups exists on a spectrum, i.e., autarkic peoples may
maintain limited trade with outside communities and roving imperialists may partially rely on
their immediate habitat for subsistence purposes.
63
Ecoagnosy can even metastasize into “ecophobia” (i.e., David Sobel’s term to describe the
overwhelming fear, at times hatred, of ecology or the biophysical environment) and “biophobia”
(i.e., Stephen Kellert and Edward Wilson’s term to describe fear of life) (Sober 1996 and Kellert
and Wilson 1993).
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subsistence; since as these actors suffer from growing ecoagnosy and become less attuned,
concerned, comprehending, and impacted by resulting environmental harms, they are more prone
to commit them.64 Essentially, if actors are not dependent on a place for their survival, then they
are incentivized to exploit, degrade, and destroy habitat(s); consequently receiving lucrative
remunerative short-term benefits, while avoiding exacting long-term costs after moving on to the
next place.65 As Hughes Berkes describes, “roving banditry is different from most commons
dilemmas in that a new dynamic has arisen in the globalized world: New markets can develop so
rapidly that the speed of resource exploitation often overwhelms the ability of local institutions
to respond” (Berkes 2006: 1557).
Consequently, roving imperialists pose an acute existential threat to autarkic communities
when their lifestyles come in contact - as witnessed in the prior examples. The reason for this is
that since autarkic communities are endemophilic and lead a deeply embedded lifestyle within a
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As Sylvia Federici citing Maria Mies and Veronika Bennholdt-Thomsen’s critique of global
capitalism eloquently explains: “For the distancing of production from reproduction and
consumption leads us to ignore the conditions under which what we eat, wear, or work with have
been produced, their social and environmental cost, and the fate of the population on whom the
waste we produce is unloaded…In other words, we need to overcome the state of irresponsibility
concerning the consequences of our actions that results from the destructive ways in which the
social division of labor is organized in capitalism; short of that, the production of our life
inevitably becomes a production of death for others. As Mies points out, globalization has
worsened this crisis, widening the distances between what is produced and what is consumed,
thereby intensifying, despite the appearance of an increased global interconnectedness, our
blindness to the blood in the food we eat, the petroleum we use, the clothes we wear, and the
computers we communicate with” (Federici 2010 and Mies and Bennholdt-Thomsen 1999).
65
It is important to emphasize the placelessness of these people, i.e., their reliance on
cosmopolitan lifestyles. Obviously, to be wholly habitatless is impossible because to some extent
all humans are shaped by their environment. “Inhabitants, therefore cannot decide to change
community like they change their hat. The community has at least shaped part of their habits and
if they were to change habitation, or even to acquire new habits, the community that they have
‘left’ would still be part of them” (Ribo 2012: 67). But the frequency, ease, and readiness with
which roving imperialists transition from one place to another illustrates their willingness to
transcend their current state and represents a characteristic quality that defines them.
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long-inhabited place (“homeland”),66 they are not as readily able to adapt and move on if their
habitat is harmed or destroyed.67 Hence from a basic subsistence perspective, they are reasonably
and self-interestedly concerned with mitigating disruption(s) within their natural environment.68
As such, if widespread breakdown(s) of system(s) of natural relationship(s) occur within
an autarkic community’s habitat, such event(s) constitute failure(s) of safeguarding their most
vital objective.69 Consequently, success for autarkic communities is maintaining homeostasis in
their habitat by preserving the ‘commons’ for all cohabitants of the environment. Accordingly, as
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Ignasi Ribo describes such people as, “a community of individuals who share a way of being,
due to the confluence of genetically and socially acquired dispositions, as well as the set of
strategies, practices, and institutions that allow them to adapt to a given natural environment in a
sustainable manner, thanks to bonds of autonomy, reciprocity, and friendship” (Ribo 2012: 8).
67
Albrecht’s concept of solastalgia offers an insightful description of a psychological state that
members of autarkic communities likely experience after ecocide. He defines solastalgia as “the
pain or distress caused by the ongoing loss of solace and the sense of desolation connected to the
present state of one’s home and territory. It is the existential and lived experience of negative
environmental change, manifest as an attack on one’s sense of place, characteristically a chronic
condition, tied to the gradual erosion of identity created by the sense of belonging to a particular
loved place and a feeling of distress, or psychological desolation, about its unwanted
transformation (Albrecht 2019: 38-39).
68
Moreover, there is often a cultural and spiritual component as well, i.e., autarkic communities
generally presume that their habitat holds intrinsic value in-and-of-itself, independent of any
extrinsic (material) benefits it may bestow upon them. As such, they are grateful to the habitat
for the life sustaining assistance and services it provides; and thus, feel reciprocally responsible
for maintaining, protecting, and giving back to the natural environment that created and
continues to support their way of life. “They concern themselves with (and have based their
whole world-view on) the idea of learning how to give back to Creation, rather than taking
away” (McGregor 2004). Autarkic communities often emphasize that they live in a habitat with
many other cohabitants (people, animals, plants, etc.) and thus, they are part of something bigger
than themselves, i.e., the natural environment does not exist only for their use. “Humans are,
before anything else, beings-in-the-world. Not just ‘beings with a world’ or ‘beings within the
world’, but the constitution itself of being in a concrete, material, and temporal existence. Clearly
humans are not the only being-in-the-world” (Ribo 2012: 45-46). Consequently, they often care
deeply about the wellbeing and flourishing of their fellow cohabitants and desire to sustain their
continued coexistence, and, “may also sustain their natural environment out of a sense of
friendship, motivated by the intrinsic value of the biological community to which they belong”
(Ribo 2012: 95).
69
As Kyle Whyte explains, “indigenous environmentalists go further and claim that institutions
fail when they undermine the conditions that parties such as humans and non-human entities (for
example, water) require to carry out the mutual responsibilities they have to one another” (Whyte
2016: 5).
47

illustrated in each of the examples, the ongoing global environmental crisis brought about by
roving imperialism’s encroachment on native habitat(s), devastates autarkic communities’ core
values and way of life.70

B.

Ecocide and Socio-Cultural Collapse: Loss of Habitat Learning

Additionally, as witnessed in each of the case studies the breakdown of autarkic
communities can transpire rapidly with little prior notice. One reason supporting this is that
achieving long-term self-sufficiency in any local environment necessitates a broad-spectrum
lifestyle, capable of meeting subsistence needs by utilizing a wide variety of animals, plants,
minerals, and aquatic resources in order to avoid overburdening any one resource-component of
the ecological community’s intricate bio-socio-cultural stability.71 Maintaining this sort of
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It is important to remember that autarkic communities still make up a large portion of human
societies. As Albrecht reminds us, “about half of the world’s population still lives in a small
town or rural village and is mainly sustained by its hinterland. These people are already intensely
local in their survival orientation and will be highly motivated to protect their patch should the
need arise” (Albrecht 2019: 173). Thus, he believes that the battle lines of the 21st century have
been drawn and humanity faces, “a war where positive Earth emotions will have to directly
confront negative Earth emotions. Terraphthorans [roving imperialists] are out to destroy
themselves and the Earth, while Terranascians [autarkic communities] are out to nurture
themselves and the Earth” (Albrecht 2019: 177). Accordingly, environmental transformative
justice is meant to respond to ecocide by assisting those impacted, replacing negative emotions;
protecting, repairing, and revitalizing habitats, and transitioning ecocidal societies away from
these sorts of harmful practices as a way of justly waging and winning the war for the forces of
life.
71
Conversely, roving imperialists are less concerned with overburdening or depleting a resource,
since their worldview is tethered to the ‘substitution thesis’ that, “scarcity is not an immutable
problem because capital maybe substitutable for most physical resources” (Ayres 2008: 284).
Essentially, roving imperialists accept that if a resource becomes scarce, then technological
innovation, efficiency gains, and increased capital will facilitate the substitution of one resource
for another. Consequently, roving imperialists aim to monopolize a particular resource by
facilitating its commodification as rapidly and efficiently as possible (i.e., disregarding depletion
concerns because their increased profit will allow them to substitute the resource in the future)
before another competitor gains access.
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balanced lifestyle requires extensive knowledge of the systemic relationship between a local
environment’s parts and whole. To pass on such wide-ranging and detailed knowledge requires
autarkic communities to practice habitat learning72 whereby members of the group transmit
knowledge about the local environment to each other.73
But if roving imperialists disrupt the local environment, there is a chance that some of the
habitat learning will have become obsolete for the reason that it less accurately reflects the
current state of the habitat. Hence, as a rule, the greater the environmental disruption, then the
greater the chance that the information-rich cognitive capital (regarding the habitat) has been
corrupted and compromised. Consequently, the destruction of the habitat, not only leads to direct
resource depletion, but also generates more than a few cognitive-costs that diminish the survival
benefit of habitat learning.
As such, once the stable functioning of the ecosystem is undermined, it becomes
increasingly challenging for the autarkic communities to rely on habitat learning to maintain
self-sufficiency, which represents an unfortunate consequence in each of the case studies. Also,
troubling, is the tendency of the epistemic loss to carry over and amplify itself in the next
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Habitat learning as employed in this work is coextensively linked with the concept,
‘traditional ecological knowledge’ (TEK). Deborah McGregor defines TEK as the relations
between, “knowledge, people, and all Creation (the ‘natural’ world as well as the spiritual) … [it
is the] process of participating (a verb) fully and responsibly in such relationships, rather than
specifically as the knowledge gained from such experiences. For Aboriginal people, TEK is not
just about understanding relationships; it is the relationship with Creation. TEK is something one
does” (McGregor 2004: 145). Simply stated, habitat learning is the method of acquiring TEK.
73
Much of this sort of learning is cross-generational, in that children acquire skills through elderguided practice, tutorials, mimicry, lessons, play, and supervised trial and error. Moreover,
Sterenly astutely emphasizes the importance of the environment itself for facilitating learning,
“children get[ting] advice, instruction, and other information head starts from others, but they get
this support while engaged in exploratory learning in their environment” (Sterelny 2012: 28). In
this light, the environment itself contains an abundance of extended knowledge (i.e., information
that exists external to the mind) created, captured, and stored by current and deceased members
of the community engaging with the world around them.
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generation. Such a result is likely, since henceforward, students will have relatively fewer
models, both in terms of individual’s correctly performing/teaching habitat learning and
exposure to a properly functioning ecosystem that is necessary for garnering the ability to
recognize when the system is in harmony (i.e., knowledge is stored in the ecosystem itself, thus
if the ecosystem is harmed, then this extended knowledge is corrupted as well).74
Furthermore, habitat learning is often nontransferable to different ecosystems if autarkic
communities are forced to abandon their home. Consequently, after ecocide, formerly autarkic
communities that lose their habitat regularly become dependent on novel modes of subsistence
for survival and as such are compelled to invest time, energy and resources in acquiring and
employing nontraditional subsistence techniques. Learning, practicing, and mastering multiple
modes of survival is a difficult undertaking, which subsequently lessens opportunities for
traditional habitat learning.
For all these reasons, if the harm caused by ecocide is not repaired quickly, it may result
in cultural death, forever foreclosing viable avenues that might foster or maintain formerautarkic communities’ traditional ways of life.75 Thus, as the examples demonstrate, after
ecocide autarkic communities rapidly deteriorate and lose control of their vital interests.76 As Jeff
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Sadly, even if the initial harm did not raise to the level of ecocide (unlike in the examples) the
loss of richly aware and effective habitat learning increases the likelihood that autarkic
communities in degraded environments will themselves inadvertently cause further harm and
potentially total ecological collapse, i.e., there exists a vicious cycle in which inadequate habitat
learning diminishes the ability to protect and maintain the local habitat, which generates greater
environmental degradation; which in turn, makes it more difficult to acquire appropriate habitat
learning – so on and so forth until complete ecocide occurs and the community has lost its way
of life.
75
For our purposes the concepts of “social death” and “cultural death” can be used
interchangeably.
76
In the case studies and more generally, loss of vital interests refers to the adverse impacts on a
range of traditional activities, autonomous control of life-choices, socio-psychological wellbeing, and institutional and/or individual relations that autarkic communities suffer as a result of
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Corntassel aptly explains:
For indigenous peoples, sustainability is intrinsically linked to the transmission of
traditional knowledge and cultural practices to future generations Without the ability of
community members to continuously renew their relationships with the natural world
(i.e., gathering medicines, hunting, fishing, basket-making, etc.), indigenous languages,
traditional teachings, family structures, and livelihoods of that community are all
jeopardized. (Corntassel 118: 2008)
At this point in the narrative, once the autarkic communities collapsed and are unable to
self-sufficiently subsist in their post-ecocide habitats - we have reached the conclusion of the
case studies. Also, for the sake of conceptual clarity, such a result requires a new category of
human-ecological relations so as to cover the inhabitants of post-autarkic communities. As such,
the work will refer to people(s) living in environmentally degraded habitat(s), wherein their local
ecological systems are unable to sustain traditional lifestyles that are not productively or
consumptively integrated into the global supply chain(s) – as ecocide refugees.77
Essentially, the goal of environmental transformative justice is to assist ecocide refugees
and prevent autarkic communities from deteriorating in the first place - providing guidance for
achieving these objectives will be a core focus of subsequent chapters. But, to further
substantiate the need for redress for the victims of our case studies of ecocide it is helpful to
definitively demonstrate that the resulting harm actually constitutes oppression. Since as Cudd
states (and likely all political philosophers agree), “oppression claims are themselves prima facie

ecocide. “Such losses can include reductions in fishing, hunting, or trapping activity; losses of
identity through the curtailment of these activities; reductions in health, which may be linked to
contamination of traditional foods or adverse emotional and psychological impacts; and negative
effects on cultural, social, and economic relations that historically were based on these altered
activities” (Gregory and Trousdale 2009: 2).
77
The term is comparable to Norman Myers and Jennifer Kent’s description of ‘environmental
refugees’ as, “persons who no longer gain a secure livelihood in their traditional homelands
because of what are primarily environmental factors of unusual scope” (Myers and Kent 1995:
18). The major difference is that in the case of ‘ecocide refugees’ the ‘unusual scope’ is limited
to intentional human destruction of the ecosystem.
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moral claims for remedy [i.e., reparations] or redress [i.e., reconciliation]” (Cudd 2006: 129).

IV.

Ecocide as Oppression

Oppression is an often-employed socio-political concept that until recently has received
scarce analysis. As Iris Marion Young states, “while we find the term [oppression] used in the
diverse philosophical and theoretical literature spawned by radical social movement…we find
little direct discussion of the meaning of the concept as used by these movements” (Young 1990:
40). Fortunately, feminist philosophers have begun to thoroughly investigate, explicate, and
systematize theories of oppression (Frye 1983; Young 1990; Cudd 2006). As such, we will rely
heavily on this innovative scholarship by attempting to demonstrate that our paradigm cases and
idealized description of ecocide satisfy the conditions of two of the most canonical analyzes of
oppression: (1) Cudd’s definition of oppression in Analyzing Oppression (2006) and Young’s
categorization of oppression in Justice and the Politics of Difference (1990).

A.

Ann Cudd’s Definition of Oppression

After an informative historical account canvassing the use of the term “oppression” in
political philosophy Cudd offers a general description of the wrong designed to capture central
features of the various usages. Ultimately, she settles on an account of “oppression” with four
necessary and sufficient conditions:
1. The harm condition: There is a harm that comes out of an institutional
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practice.
2. The social group condition: The harm is perpetrated through a social
institution or practice on a social group whose identity exists apart from the
oppressive harm in (1).
3. The privilege condition: There is another social group that benefits from the
institutional practice in (1).
4. The coercion condition: There is unjustified coercion or force that brings
about the harm. (Cudd 25: 2006).
Using Cudd’s schema to prove that instances of ecocide are oppressive requires that the
act constitutes an institutional practice harmful to the member(s) of some social group (i.e.,
reduces members’ well-being and undermines their interests), that it benefits member(s) of
another social group (materially or psychologically), and that the harm was undeserved or unfair.
It is crucial to emphasize that Cudd’s theory of oppression does not require intentional harm, i.e.,
for a practice to be considered oppressive privileged group(s) do not have to necessarily aim at
harming disadvantaged group(s). “I have argued that we should define oppression by considering
the harm done to the victim rather than the intention of the oppressor or privileged group who
cause the harm” (Cudd 2006: 105). This is important because in seminal cases of ecocide under
consideration the harm to the autarkic community was unintended.
Clearly, the idealized account and each of these key cases of ecocide include social
group(s) that existed prior to the harm (i.e., autarkic communities - Cree, Anangu, Wayúu, and
Afro-Colombian villagers) that suffered (i.e., loss of vital interests) and social group(s) that
benefited (i.e., roving imperialists seeking potential benefits: Quebec-Hydro’s additional
revenue, British citizens’ increased security, El Cerrejon miners’ employment, etc.).78 Obviously,
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According to Cudd, “social groups” are defined as “collections of persons who share
something that is socially significant,” such as “collections of individuals who face common
constraints that are structured by social institutions” (Cudd 2006: 41 and 51). One may object
that this conceptualization is tautological in that it includes “social” in the definition, but for our
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the intruder’s act(s) (or institutional practices) prioritized roving imperial benefits over autarkic
communities’ harms.
Nevertheless, were the practice(s) favoring roving imperial interests over autarkic interests
coercive and unjustified? Unfortunately, in our attempt to answer this question, Cudd offers little
guidance; since, she eschews defining “coercion” or “injustice” beyond linking her use of the
concepts to a broadly Rawlsian notion of justice as fairness, in which social benefits and burdens
ought to be distributed impartially (i.e., practices that violated this fairness requirement are
unjust and coercive).79 As such, to establish that the coercion condition is met, we must
determine if roving imperialist’s treatment(s) of autarkic communities was unfair.80
Generally, practice(s) and act(s) are considered “fair” in two distinct ways: (1)
procedurally fair or (2) outcome fair. Procedural fairness focuses on the process (the means) of
normative decision-making; whereas, outcome fairness refers to whether or not the results (the
ends) are consistent with prevailing norms of merit, equality, desert, and need (Deutsch 1985).
John Thibaut and Laurens Walker’s iconic research uncovered that perception of fairness
increase, as all parties who are possibly impacted by an act are included in the decision-making

purposes such a criticism is ancillary as we are simply including her definition as a means of
illustrating how she employs the term.
79
The dissertation’s Third Chapter will further explore and develop the ways in which Rawls’s
constructivist theory of “justice as fairness” diagnoses the injustice of ecocide.
80
Philosophers have struggled defining “fairness” since the term applies to a multitude of
distinct and often-conflicting concerns oscillating between appeals to need, equality, merit, and
desert. For instance, Aristotle recognized that there is no universal standard of fairness. Since, as
he astutely observed determining if an act is fair requires contextualized analysis that embeds the
act within broader social structure(s), e.g., in a democracy it is fair to distribute political office by
lottery; whereas, in an oligarchy it is not (Aristotle The Politics: Book V, Chapter 1). As
Amartya Sen explains, even John Rawls employs a pre-theoretical understanding of the concept.
“In this [Rawls] approach, the notion of fairness is taken to be foundational, and is meant to be,
in some sense, ‘prior’ to the development of the principles of justice” (Sen 2009: 53-54).
Consequently, with these examples in mind, we can begin to grasp some of the difficulties
involved in defining the term.
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process (Thibaut and Walker 1975).81 Consequently, procedural fairness revolves around an
understanding that all stakeholders potentially affected by a decision ought to be afforded the
opportunity to provide input (i.e., express their voice) and influence the outcome (i.e.,
substantively participate to some degree) of the decision.
However, in reviewing the paradigm cases of ecocide, it seems clear that local inhabitants
were offered neither an opportunity to substantively alter the outcome (i.e., stop the harm from
occurring or mitigate the impact) nor a voice (i.e., they were excluded (Anangu), absent
(Wayúu), and ignored (Cree and Afro-Colombian villagers)) during the decision-making process.
Thus, it seems straightforward that norms of procedural fairness were violated as roving
imperialists intentionally destroyed autarkic community’s habitat(s) without their input or
involvement.
Moreover, roving imperialist’ acts of ecocide appear problematic from an outcome fairness
perspective as well. Since, one can argue that the consequences of the act(s) violated prevailing
norms of merit, equality, desert, and (most pertinently) need by allowing the lesser interests of
the invading group (i.e., enhancing profits, acquiring non-essential knowledge, commercial
development, etc.) to trump vital interests and needs of local inhabitants (i.e., maintaining the
cultural survival of their traditional way of life and preserving the habitat). This idea will be
developed in greater detail in subsequent chapters, when we demonstrate the injustice of ecocide
through both constructivist and comparative approaches to justice.
But at present the work will avoid undertaking the potentially intractable challenge of
devising a hierarchy of values and interests and instead simply highlight that there does appear to
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Thibaut and Walker investigated the perceived fairness of various legal processes and systems
using social psychological theories and methods. Their research generated the surprising
conclusion that parties care as much if not more about how matters are resolved, then the
ultimate outcome of the proceeding (even if it led to a worse result for the party) (Thibaut and
Walker 1975).
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be prevailing consensus (maybe more so in environmental philosophy) that existential needs
(e.g., continued existence of species, ecosystems, cultures, etc.) ought to take precedence over
non-survival related interests. As John Baird Callicott states, “having the bare necessities for a
decent life is a stronger interest then in the enjoyment of luxuries…but livelihood and lifestyle,
for both of which adequate substitutes can be found is a lesser interest than life itself” (Callicott
1999: 126-128).82
Callicott in an attempt to further develop and apply this norm analyzes a logging dispute
in the Pacific Northwest. He argues that from a normative perspective the old-growth forest
ought to be preserved because the existential interest and survival needs of Strix occidentalis (a
species of spotted owl) to inhabit the forest, takes precedence over the economic and labor
interests of loggers to fell trees:
The spotted owl is threatened with preventable anthropogenic extinction – threatened
with biocide, in a word – and the old-growth forest biotic communities of the Pacific
North-west are threatened with destruction. These threats are the environmental
equivalent of genocide and holocaust. The loggers, on the other hand, are threatened
with economic losses, for which they can be compensated dollar for dollar. (Callicott
1999: 128)83
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Peter Singer accepts a similar hierarchy of interests, values, and needs regarding our moral
obligation to assist others. “If it is in our power to prevent something bad for happening, without
thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it…an
application of this principle would be as follows: if I am walking past a shallow pond and see a
child drawing in it, I ought to wade in and pull the child out. This will mean getting my clothes
muddy, but this is insignificant, while the death of the child would presumably be a very bad
thing” (Singer 1972: 23).
83
Callicott in an attempt to further illustrate his perspective offers another example, in which he
analyzes Sartre’s classic dilemma regarding a son’s decision to go to war or stay at home with
his mother. Ultimately, Callicott determines that the son should go to war, since France’s
existential interest outweighs the mother’s potential interest in avoiding grief and sorrow, if her
son dies. “The very existence of France as a transorganismic entity is threatened. The young
man’s mother has a weaker interest at stake, for, as Sartre reports, his going off – and maybe
getting killed – would plunge her into ‘despair.’ His mother being plunged into despair would be
terrible, but nearly as terrible as the destruction of France” (Callicott 1999: 127).
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Callicott’s conclusion rests on the premise that existential interests are final and
irreplaceable (i.e. if the owls go extinct, they are gone forever), whereas lesser interests (e.g.,
financial, labor, aesthetic, recreational, etc.) are transitory and substitutable (e.g., if loggers lose
their jobs, they can be employed in another industry). As such, if we apply the above perspective
to the case studies, then it seems uncontroversial that allowing the economic, epistemic, and
lifestyle interests of roving imperialists to take precedence over the existential needs of autarkic
communities (i.e., preserving their habitat and traditional way of life) was an unfair and unjust
result that violates prevailing norms of need.
Thus, at this point in our analysis three out of four (the coercion condition, the harm
condition, and the privilege condition) of Cudd’s conditions of oppression have been
demonstrably met. As such, all that remains is to show that the harm resulted from social
institution(s) or practice(s) to satisfy the social group condition.
First, it must be noted that Cudd defines “social institutions” broadly to include,
“government, legal systems, schools, banks, gender rules and norms, rules of etiquette, media
outlets, stereotypical beliefs, class, caste systems, racial, or ethnic classification systems” (Cudd
2006: 50). Therefore, per Cudd’s account, the acts of ecocide covered in the case studies
constitute institutional practices, since they include government involvement or at least state
sanctioning, authorization, or legal approval.
One might object that establishing institutional practices require enduring, systemic,
pervasive, and recurring patterns of behavior; and therefore, the harm(s) of ecocide under
consideration (e.g., a nuclear explosion, constructing a dam, mining a mountain, etc.) are too
short-lived to count. But Cudd explicitly denies this claim and affirms the possibility of onetime
events constituting institutional cases of oppression, e.g., she cites the examples of war and
genocide, “although these are cases of oppression, they are typically not long lasting…war is an
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acute form of oppression” (Cudd 2006: 99). Consequently, if unjust wars or genocides are
institutional practices of oppression, then there seems to be no compelling justification for
excluding ecocide. Thus, the paradigm cases and idealized description of ecocide satisfy Cudd’s
four necessary and sufficient conditions for constituting oppression.

B.

Iris Young’s Categorization of Oppression

For Young oppressive circumstances are ones in which, “people suffer some inhibition of
their ability to develop and exercise their capacities and express their needs, thoughts, and
feelings” (Young 1990: 40). It is important to emphasize that Young agrees with Cudd that
oppressive harm does not require intent, “the conscious actions of many individuals daily
contribute to maintaining and reproducing oppression, but those people are usually simply doing
their jobs or living their lives, and do not understand themselves as agents of oppression” (Young
1990: 42). Once again, the reason this is important is due to the fact that the harm in the
propounded key cases of ecocide under consideration are largely incidental. Nevertheless, for
Young, as with Cudd, what matters is that another group benefits from the oppression, “for every
oppressed group there is a group that is privileged in relation to that group” (Young 1990: 42).
But Young, unlike Cudd, is less interested in defining a set of necessary and sufficient
criteria that apply across all cases of oppression and instead focuses on classifying forms of
oppression.84 Ultimately, she settles on dividing oppression into five categories: exploitation,
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The reason for this is that Young is weary of accounts of oppression that reduce down to a
common essence, which allows theorists or practitioners to prioritize consideration of one form
of oppression over others. “There is a double problem with considering each group’s oppression
a unified or distinct structure or system. On the one hand, this way of conceiving oppression fails
to accommodate the similarities and overlaps of oppression between different groups. On the
other hand, it falsely represents the situation of all group members as the same” (Young 1990:
64).
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marginalization, powerlessness, cultural imperialism, and violence (Young 1990). For the
remainder of the chapter, we will survey how the submitted key cases and idealized description
of ecocide fits these five categories.
But bear in mind, according to Young for a practice to be oppressive, it only needs to
satisfy one (not all five) of the forms. Nevertheless, for the sake of maximum conceptual
applicability this section will attempt to demonstrate that our cases of ecocide can potentially fit
each of the five categories of oppression. However as will become abundantly clear, some of the
categories are much better fits (i.e., marginalization and powerlessness), than others (i.e.,
exploitation, cultural imperialism, and violence).

1.

Violence

Violence is probably the most glaring and overt form of oppression, as violent behavior
constitutes a specific flagrant, direct, and immediate harm to victim(s). Young does not provide a
definition, but Cudd defines “violence” as, “the intentional, forceful infliction of physical harm
or abuse on one or more persons or their material or animal possessions” (Cudd 2006: 87). Cudd
defends her decision to include injuries and damages against possessions within the scope of
‘violence’ on psychological grounds, “it makes sense to include forceful abuse of property as a
kind of violence because forceful abuse of one's property, especially of animals, portends or
threatens forceful abuse of one's person. It threatens the victim through the show of force” (Cudd
2006: 87).
Obviously, such a definition of ‘violence’ is helpful for our purposes since in the case
studies harm was never intentionally inflicted upon people; nevertheless, their material and
animal possessions (i.e., the local habitat that they depended on for survival) were directly
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targeted for destruction. Also, pertinent for our commitments is Cudd’s insight that unintended
displays of force can be classified as violent. As Cudd explains, what matters for determining if
an act is violent is the psychological impact on the affected community:
It is important to consider the effect and not the intention here because what matters in
considering how violence constructs oppression is how it constrains social groups.
Constraints are transmitted through the perceptions of the people who would make up the
putative group. Thus, it is the perceptions of the affected, not the intentions of the violent
persons, that matter. (Cudd 2006: 88)
Accordingly, some of the examples of ecocide under consideration seem constitutive of
violence in that members of the affected communities expressed shock, fear for their safety and
wellbeing, and even terror from witnessing the widespread environmental destruction, e.g.,
during the Maralinga nuclear tests terrified Anangu elders thought the approaching black mist
from the fallout, “was an evil spirit and tried to use woomera (spear-throwers) to disperse it [for
their own and the communities protection]” (Sebag-Montefiore 2016).
Furthermore, one can hardly imagine autarkic communities’ sense of hopelessness and
impotence when confronted with the prospects of challenging a force powerful enough to level
mountains or stop rivers from flowing. As such, it seems plausible that some cases of roving
imperialists’ intentional destruction of autarkic communities’ ecosystems may constitute
instances of oppressive violence.

2.

Cultural Imperialism

Young defines “cultural imperialism” as, “the universalization of a dominant group’s
experience and culture, and its establishment as the norm” (Young 1990: 59). Simply, cultural
imperialism occurs when dominant group(s) render(s) oppressed group(s) cultural perspective
invisible or obsolete. This is comparable to what occurs when roving imperialists (the dominant
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group) alter habitats without considering, recognizing, or regarding impacts to autarkic
communities (“the other”) way of life. In such scenarios (e.g., those covered in the sample
seminal case studies and idealized description(s)), the autarkic communities experience rapid
cultural loss due to their invisibility, meaninglessness, and palpable irrelevance to the dominant
roving imperial culture.
In summary, roving imperialist values, goals, and achievements justify and enable the
destruction of ecosystems, which in turn undermine, weaken, and erase the values, goals, and
achievements of autarkic communities. “Often without noticing they do so, the dominant groups
project their own experiences as representative of humanity as such” (Young 1990: 59).
A justification explaining roving imperialists’ intentional disrespect of long-established
autarkic communities, is that by ignoring the value of such local cultures it becomes easier to
disenfranchise, dispossess, and displace these inhabitants (i.e., non-dominant groups who are
inconveniently dwelling upon “urgently” needed resources) from their habitat. Thus, by
constantly denying autarkic successes, while showing little interest in preserving their unique
way of life, autarkic habitats becomes easier to exploit both cognitively (i.e., less psychological
guilt) and financially (i.e., current use of land is poorly appraised). Accordingly, it benefits
intruders to feign disinterest or maintain willful ignorance of the life and culture of autarkic
communities, i.e., cultural imperialism may serve a material purpose.
Furthermore, once post-ecocide autarkic communities lose their ability to sustain
themselves through traditional cultural practices (i.e., loss of habitat learning), they assume
subservient dependent relationships with the dominant group for survival as ecocide refugees.
Obviously, such one-sided relationships allow the dominant group to impose their values,
experiences, and interpretation of social life on the oppressed, while concurrently devaluing,
denigrating, and ignoring the values, experiences, and interpretation of social life of the
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oppressed; and at the same time, the intruder extracts from the supplicant instrumental value.
Thus, we can clearly see ways in which the seminal cases and idealized description of ecocide
may generate and reinforce oppressive patterns of cultural imperialism.

3.

Marginalization

Young argues marginalization maybe the “most dangerous form of oppression” as it
constitutes a whole category of people being “expelled from useful participation in social life and
thus potentially subjected to severe material deprivation and even extermination” (Young 1990:
53). As is evident from our analysis, ecocide facilitates marginalization in that roving imperialist
destruction of ecosystem(s) renders once self-sufficient autarkic communities unable to support
themselves, contribute to their own wellbeing, or bolster their collapsing (or the broader) society.
In our case studies groups marginalized by ecocide (ecocide refugees) often become
dependent on state welfare for survival. Young explains that while welfare programs assist in
ameliorating the harm of material deprivation caused by marginalization, such practices may
generate additional injuries. “First, the provision of welfare itself produces new injustices by
depriving those dependent on it of rights and freedoms that others have.
Second…marginalization is unjust because it blocks the opportunity to exercise capacities in
socially defined and recognized ways” (Young 1990: 54).
Unfortunately, as Young forecast, ecocide refugees often remain stuck in dependent
positions unable to gain new capacities to improve their social status, achieve autonomy, or
promote their wellbeing. Thus, marginalized ecocide refugees are left with lives of boredom and
uselessness and lack self-respect and social-recognition. As the Canadian government’s report,
The Devastation of the Cree (1986), suggests such marginalized lifestyles have exceedingly dour
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prospects, “[with their] pride and self-reliance stripped away . . . [f]rom 1985 to 1987, there were
126 suicide attempts…[as] for the first time in centuries, band members realized there is no point
in teaching their children the traditions of hunting and fishing” (96-97). As such, it seems clear
that ecocide can lead to oppressive marginalization of affected group(s).

4.

Exploitation

Young relies on a broadened Marxist account of ‘exploitation’ that defines the concept as
any situation, “in which the labor and energy expenditure of one group benefits another and
reproduces a relation of domination between them” (Young 1990: 50). It is difficult to fit our
paradigm cases of ecocide within such a framework because the examples lack an ongoing
transfer of energy from autarkic communities to roving imperialists.85
Nonetheless, we can envision situations in which autarkic community’s past energy
expenditures enhanced their habits in ways that later benefited roving imperialists.86 In such a
scenario, the seeds (both literal and figurative) of autarkic communities’ labor to sustain, nurture,
and develop their habitat across generations are subsequently seized and harvested by roving
imperialists. Thus, these instances of appropriative resource-transfer, involving autarkic
communities’ historical labor as stewards who generate, maintain, and preserve the very
“natural” resources that roving imperialists seek to extract, can be viewed as constituting
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A generalized liberal conception of exploitation that avoids Marxist baggage (i.e., the labor
theory of value) can be expressed in Kantian terms as relationship(s) or interaction(s) that violate
the Humanity Formulation of the Categorical Imperative: “Act in such a way that you treat
humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never merely as a means to
an end, but always at the same time as an end.” (Kant 1785).
86
Or, desired resources were preserved haphazardly simply because autarkic communities placed
little or no value on those prized items or elements.
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exploitation. 87 Since, in such situations, roving imperialist(s) benefit from extracting
uncompensated value from labor, energy, and effort autarkic communities unwittingly supplied.
But a problem with such an analysis is that this form of resource exploitation, is not a
requisite feature of the case studies (e.g., it was not a harm experienced by the Anangu during the
nuclear tests at Maralinga). Furthermore, this sort of exploitation automatically ceases after
ecocide has occurred, in that the labor, energy, and effort autarkic communities invested into
their environment, which roving imperialists were taking advantage of, is lost once the habitat is
destroyed. As such, it makes more sense to categorize these cases as one-time thefts, rather than
instances of continuing exploitation.
Nevertheless, another way in which we might conceive of the case studies as related to
exploitation is by emphasizing their role in generating conditions ripe for exploitative practices.
To grasp the connection requires recognizing that after completing extractive project(s) (e.g.,
mountaintop removal mining) roving imperialists are left in an increasingly privileged position
having gained wealth; but also, they have furthered their relative social dominance vis-a-vis
destabilized autarkic communities. Hence, ecocide has generated unequal distributive outcomes
(regarding both good(s)/benefit(s) and bad(s)/harm(s)) between autarkic communities and roving
imperialists.
But more significantly as it applies to all the case studies, the environmental destruction
ruins autarkic communities’ traditional mode of subsistence, diminishes their material capital,
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Autarkic communities’ sustainable lifestyle requires the development of knowledge and
practices able to nurture their habitat across generations (Dowie 2009). Thus, it is through
complex human-environment interaction that these peoples have actively fashioned and
maintained what outsiders naively assume to be “naturally” functioning ecosystems. An example
of this is the importance of Baiga villagers in maintaining the Kanha tiger reserves in India. “It
might surprise people to know there's evidence that tigers thrive in the zones where tribal
villages remain - the people's small open fields encourage more tiger prey than in the enclosed
forest…In other words, if you want happy tigers, then it's much better to leave the tribal people
where they've always been” (Corry 2015).
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and as such increases their risk of being pushed into dependence relations as ecocide refugees.
Since, in such scenarios, roving imperialists have substantial negotiating leverage over ecocide
refugees (in that roving imperialists can offer ecocide refugees means of survival; whereas,
ecocide refugees can offer little in return) and as such, are more likely and able to take advantage
and coerce these vulnerable people into inequitable arrangements, e.g. exploitative wage labor
relations.
Thus, this sort of coercive power can lead to social relations and institutions that enable
roving imperialists to accumulate power, privilege, and control to the detriment of ecocide
refugees. Consequently, our case studies of ecosystem destruction produce social conditions ripe
for subsequent exploitative oppression, even if the ecocidal activity were non-exploitative inand-of-itself.

5.

Powerlessness

Young describes the plight of the powerless as, “inhibition in the development of one’s
capacities, lack of decision-making power in one’s life, and exposure to disrespectful treatment
because of the status one occupies” (Young 1990: 58). Thus, from our prior analysis, it appears
indisputable that in all of the selected key cases and our idealized description of ecocide that
autarkic communities experience powerlessness, because they were prevented from practicing
their cultural traditions and developing capacities necessary for preserving and sustaining their
subsistence lifestyle. Moreover, they never consented nor were they active participants during
the decision-making processes that led to their injury.
The above analysis has shown that our key examples and idealized description of ecocide
fit (at least to some degree) each of Young’s five categories of oppression. But to reiterate as
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Young explains, “the presence of any of these five conditions is sufficient for calling a group
oppressed” (Young 1990: 64). Moreover, prior analysis demonstrated that our case studies met
Cudd’s definition of oppression as well. Hence, a compelling case has been made that instances
of ecocide (e.g., those that satisfy our criteria) are fundamentally oppressive.
However, a response to oppression often times implies liberation (i.e., freedom from the
oppressor), instead of the kind of reparative and reconciliatory redress that Transitional Justice is
concerned with. Thus, to further link the harm of ecocide and the plight of ecocide refugees to
the discipline of Transitional Justice it is necessary to justify why reparative and reconciliatory
action is required in these situations -- which will be the focus of the final section of the chapter.

V.

Transitional Justice: A Response to State Oppression

The discipline of Transitional Justice represents a particular framework for understanding
and addressing widespread oppression and human rights violations. The United Nations
Secretary General defines Transitional Justice projects as, “the full range of processes and
mechanisms associated with a society’s attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale
past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice, and achieve reconciliation” (U.N.
2004). As Louise Arbour, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights expounds,
“transitional justice must have the ambition of assisting the transformation of oppressed societies
into free ones by addressing the injustices of the past through measures that will procure an
equitable future” (Arbour 2006).
Accordingly, based on the above descriptions of the discipline, we can summarize the
justification for Transitional Justice as resting on two premises. First, Ruti Teitel’s insight that,
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“legacies of state oppression do not simply go away on their accord” (Teitel 2000: 143).
Secondly, Jeremy Waldron’s belief that reparative and reconciliatory measures can be taken in
the present to alter relationships with the past. “There is a sense we can affect the moral
significance of a past event. Even if we cannot alter the action itself we may be able to interfere
with the normal course of its consequences” (Waldron 1992: 7). Thus, Transitional Justice
maintains that to overcome past histories of state oppression necessitates reparative and
reconciliatory redress.
Consequently, for the discipline of Transitional Justice to constitute a reasonably
coherent enterprise, practitioners must establish a set of wrongs under consideration and a set of
responses designed for moving away from these wrongs (i.e., correcting past injustices and
deterring future harms). As previously stated, the set of wrongs Transitional Justice has
traditionally focused on are human rights violations (e.g., genocide, ethnic cleansing, and mass
murder). Thus, to reiterate, Transitional Justice as currently practiced, excludes our paradigm
cases of ecocide, since they are not presently considered human rights violations.88
However, as previously argued, our examples result in the same harm (i.e., social death
and loss of control over vital interests) as traditional human rights violations (i.e., genocide).89
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It should be mention that there are efforts underway to include ecocide as a human rights
violation. For instance, Polly Higgins’ proposed amendment to the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court strives to make the Crime of Ecocide (i.e. “the extensive damage to,
destruction of or loss of ecosystem(s) of a given territory, whether by human agency or by other
causes, to such an extent that peaceful enjoyment by the inhabitants of that territory has been or
will be severely diminished”) the fifth recognized and prosecutable Crime Against Peace under
the International Criminal Court (the four currently covered by Article 5 of the Rome Statute are:
The Crime of Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity, War Crimes, and The Crime of
Aggression) (Higgins 2010).
89
Environmentalists may object that limiting the analysis to these harms is too anthropocentric,
in that it ignores environmental harms in-and-of-themselves, i.e., that instead of recognizing
nonhuman (environmental) value(s) directly (what many environmentalists would prefer), these
concerns only receive indirect consideration dependent on promoting human interests in
transitional settings. At present this criticism is fair, but the goal of the project is simply to take
the first step towards recognizing the need for environmental transformative justice. Ultimately,
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Thus, our next step in illustrating why Transitional Justice ought to concern itself with the
paradigm cases and similar instances of ecocide fitting our idealized description, is to
demonstrate that the injustice under consideration results from comparable activities to those
generating human rights violations. Essentially, the aim is to draw parallel(s) between activities
Transitional Justice has been traditionally concerned with and the acts causing harm in our
examples.
The analysis is motivated by the hope that comparable harmful activities (i.e., both in
terms of cause and result) ought to be receptive to similar reparative and reconciliatory
measures. In other words, it is not enough simply to show that the oppressive harm we are
considering is of the kind that engenders state responsibility for assisting their citizenry, but to
show that the states themselves behaved in such a way as to trigger the concerns of Transitional

the hope is that undertaking environmental transformative justice measures will illustrate the
centrality of the environment in maintaining ways of life (e.g., in the case studies, environmental
destruction caused cultural death). That may seem obvious, but modernity has traditionally
emphasized the separation of man from nature and the social from the ecological. Accordingly,
the work maintains that it is important to offer a framework of moral suasion designed to woo
non-environmentalists (e.g., traditional humanists) into embracing the moral need to correct
environmental harms. This is in part achieved by providing examples (such as the ones offered in
the preceding sections) that violate our moral sensibilities (i.e., acts that we find indecent,
impious, or repulsive). As Daniel Gilbert, borrowing from Hume, explains, “when people feel
insulted or disgusted, they generally do something about it, such as whacking each other over the
head, or voting…moral emotions are the brain’s call to action” (Gilbert 2006). Thus, in this light,
our examples are designed to trigger a moral response in non-environmentalists (i.e., generate a
sense of the moral wrongness of these sorts of activities), which will hopefully steer them
towards recognizing the centrality of ecosystems in our lives. This perspective change is vital,
since as will be demonstrated in subsequent chapters, a key feature of environmental
transformative justice is striving to prevent such harms from occurring in the first place (e.g.,
embracing Transitional Justice’s “never again” mantra). And it will be argued that realizing this
preventative aim, likely requires that the broader society accept an ecosocial (i.e. breaking down
the social and ecological divide by recognizing that all societies requires an ecological base)
understanding of communities’ relationship and place in the world. Thus, achieving
environmental transformative justice, in many ways depends on expanding the ecosocial
perspective to as many actors as possible (i.e., the environmental transformative justice process
requires winning over non-environmentalists). Finally, once/if the ecosocial perspective is fully
realized preventing ecological harm will be a matter of social concern in-and-of-itself (i.e., just
what traditional environmentalists wanted).
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Justice. As such, the goal is to demonstrate that case(s) of ecocide (e.g., those fitting our
idealized narrative) are caused by the type of state activity that Transitional Justice is concerned
with; which will hopefully, compel the discipline to involve itself in preventing, repairing,
mitigating, and correcting for these harms.
Consequently, the remainder of the chapter will attempt to prove that our paradigm cases
of ecocide are suitable candidates for Transitional Justice’s reparative and reconciliatory
measures. The dissertation intends to achieve this by demonstrating that traditional human rights
violations (e.g., those that represent the current focus of Transitional Justice) and injustices of
ecocide in our examples stem from comparable harmful activities.90
It is important to emphasize that Transitional Justice is a discipline that embodies a
radical departure from the history of inter-and-intrastate relations; in that for the first time there
exists concerted global effort and widespread recognition that state actors responsible for grave
injustices ought to be held accountable.91 Essentially, Transitional Justice’s range of concern
(i.e., the activities actors ought to be held accountable for) centers on state oppression
responsible for generating human rights violations.92
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Thus, the argument is rather straightforward: since Transitional Justice is concerned with these
types of state action; then situating the cases of ecocide under consideration within the
Transitional Justice framework requires that they also involve similar practices. Ultimately, to
assist the reader in following the argument, it is helpful to state upfront that the dissertation
settles on negligent state oppression as the problematic activity under consideration.
91
Vesselin Popovski and Monica Serrano rightly emphasize the paradigm shifting novelty of the
discipline. “Transitional justice is an unprecedented enterprise. In the age of oppression, one or
two visionaries imagined that the day of reckoning might one day come for omnipotent dictators
and tyrants, but millions died without any shred of consolation that justice would one day be
done to them. In previous geopolitical cataclysms, millions had also died on what Hegel –
thinking of the French Revolution – called the slaughter-bench of history, yet no one had ever
suggested that some kind of reparation be made to their memory and to the survivors” (Popovski
and Serrano 2012: 4)
92
It is conceivable to imagine scenarios that Transitional Justice is applicable, which exclude
state oppression, e.g., when human rights violations occur in ungoverned areas or after complete
state collapse (i.e., total breakdown of rule of law). But for present purposes, analyzing these
sorts of examples and determining if such instances can be framed, as state oppression, is
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However, in canvassing the field it becomes clear that there exist various forms of state
oppression, which in practice, have qualified as matters of Transitional Justice concern.
Nonetheless, for the sake of conceptual clarity, we can sort the varieties of state oppression that
Transitional Justice has considered germane into three distinct categories: (1) direct state
oppression; (2) state sanctioned, endorsed, and sponsored oppression, and (3) negligent state
oppression. Thus, do the acts generating ecocide in our case studies satisfy these levels of state
oppression?93

A.

Direct State Oppression

Transitional Justice early in its development focused on oppression perpetrated directly
by strong state actors. A clear example of this would be the Allies’ prosecution (e.g., the
Nuremberg Trials) of Nazi officials responsible for orchestrating the bureaucratized and
industrialized murder of millions during the Holocaust. Horowitz describes this sort of direct
state oppression as, “a systemic destruction of innocent people by a state bureaucratic apparatus”
(Horowitz 1976: 18).
Obviously, none of the examples of ecocide we examined include loss anywhere near the
magnitude of state-governed tragedies like the Holocaust or Stalin’s Great Purges (1936-1938).
Nonetheless, our research does include instances of direct state action responsible for harm. For
instance, it seems straightforward that the wrongs experienced by northern Cree in the wake of
the James Bay Damming Project directly resulted from state action, i.e., Quebec-Hydro is a

ancillary, since all of the case studies include clearly defined state actors (e.g., the Colombian,
Australian, Canadian, and British governments).
93
In the subsequent section, the work will definitively demonstrate that our cases of ecocide
satisfy classic theories of oppression, but for now we will simply assume that the harms in our
examples were oppressive.
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public utility (i.e., a state bureaucratic apparatus) whose actions (i.e., constructing dams) directly
caused the social death of indigenous northern Cree (i.e., systemic destruction of an innocent
people).
However, Quebec-Hydro did not intend to oppress the Cree. Accordingly, it seems
normatively hyperbolic to compare Quebec-Hydro’s activity (or the state activity in any of our
case studies; since, our criterion excludes environmental harms committed instrumentally to
further traditional crimes against humanity) to the atrocities committed by the Nazis or other
intentionally perpetrated state genocides. As such, we need to discern other form(s) of state
oppression, which Transitional Justice embraces as legitimate matter(s) of concern that better
mirror our examples of ecocide.

B.

Indirect State Oppression

With this aim in mind, it is important to highlight that Transitional Justice’s scope
extends beyond direct state action, to include indirect forms of state oppression. For instance,
examples of Transitional Justice’s expanded focus include the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda and Gacaca courts’ prosecution of the interahamwe (i.e., Hutu civilian groups that
killed Tutsi) after the Rwandan genocide or the International Criminal Court’s investigation of
atrocities committed by the janjaweed (i.e., nomadic Sudanese Arabs that targeted non-Arab
sedentary communities) in Darfur. In these and similar examples, Transitional Justice
practitioners and institutions exhibit responsiveness and concern with injustices perpetrated by
state sponsored militias, gangs, and civilian movements, rather than legally sanctioned state
bureaucratic apparatuses (e.g. military, police force, officially authorized agents, etc.).
Such instances of indirect state wrongs are somewhat comparable in form to acts of

71

oppression in our examples. For instance, the direct cause of Wayúu suffering was El Cerrejon
Mining (i.e., a fully privatized operation as of 2000) not the Colombian government.94
Nevertheless, just like with the janjaweed or interahamwe the government endorsed, applauded,
and permitted the non-state actor’s (e.g., El Cerrejon Mining) activities. Thus, the state (e.g., the
Colombian government) had an indirect role in perpetuating oppression.
However, the above analysis comparing our cases of ecocide to instances of Transitional
Justice concerned with indirect state oppression, runs into difficulty; first and foremost of which,
is the fact that in each of the cases of ecocide under consideration, state support was not designed
to endorse oppression, but instead, to further state interests (e.g., economic growth, development,
security, etc.). Thus, there appears to be a clear normative difference between state sponsored
activity deliberately planned to oppress group(s) (e.g., supporting violent militias) and accidental
harm (e.g., cultural loss) resulting from environmental destruction (i.e., what occurred in our
case studies). Consequently, these forms of indirect state oppression are ill suited for situating
our paradigm cases and idealized description of ecocide within the Transitional Justice
framework.

C.

Negligent State Oppression

Fortunately for our purposes, Transitional Justice concerns have expanded to include
negligent state activity (or inactivity) responsible for failing to protect citizens from grave harm.
For instance, a vivid example of state negligence constituting a matter of concern for
Transitional Justice is the Casino Royale fire (2011) that left 52 people dead (Rivera 2014).
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However, initially it was a joint venture between Carbocol (a Colombian state company) and
Intercor (a subsidiary of ExxonMobil) (Redner 2014: 54).
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In this case, the Human Rights Commission of the State of Nuevo ruled (relying on
Transitional Justice principles and jurisprudence from international tribunals, such as the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights) that the Mexican government did not meet its obligation to
guard its citizens from human rights violations:95
The Commission arrived at the conclusion that several human rights violations had taken
place (particularly regarding the rights to life, personal integrity and working conditions),
all of which were associated with the State’s duty to protect its citizens from human
rights abuses, including from those at the hands of non-State actors. (Rivera 2014: 72)
The court determined that the state’s failure to follow safety protocol made the cartel’s
illegal act of arson far more destructive than it otherwise would have been. Thus, the state did
not satisfy its due diligence to protect its citizens. Obviously, the Mexican government did not
intend any harm (either directly or indirectly). Nevertheless, the state was found culpable for
injuries resulting from breeching its duty to prevent grave injustices.
The Commission’s determination in the Casino Royale case, describes a type of state
injustice mirroring acts or omissions responsible for wrongs in our case studies of ecocide. For
instance, the Afro-Colombians, Anangu, Wayúu, and Cree all suffered grave harm because their
respective countries governments failed to consider these group’s special vulnerabilities to the
prescribed acts of environmental destruction, e.g., the state forgetting to post warning signs in the
indigenous group’s language; they failed to consider how ecosystem alterations might undermine
communities’ traditional way of life and subsistence practices; they failed to conduct adequate
surveillance to ensure all members of the community were out of harm’s way, etc.
Furthermore, the Commission’s response to the injustice offers insight into the range of
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The harm occurred when cartel commandos set fire to Casino Royale in Monterrey, Mexico
for not paying “protection fees” (Rivera 2014: 72). Ultimately, 52 people died in the fire from
smoke inhalation because they were unable to escape the (Rivera 2014: 72). “Expert analysis
later revealed that some of the emergency exits were in fact blocked and that safety measures had
not been implemented despite having obtained the corresponding permits from the Civil
Protection Office” (Rivera 2014: 72).
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reparatory and reconciliatory measures suitable for combating oppressive state negligence:
The Commission deemed it prudent to award economic reparation for lost earnings and
the subsequent damage (particularly funerary costs and medical and psychological
expenses), rehabilitation measures (including medical, psychological or psychiatric
treatment), satisfaction (including the verification of the facts and issuing a public
apology, starting the criminal and administrative procedures against the public officials
and other non-State actors whose acts or omissions contributed to the human rights
violation, and the construction of a monument in memory of the deceased and those
injured in the fire) and guarantees of non-repetition. This recommendation especially
focused on alleviating some of the victims’ suffering, which would be accomplished
through the recognition of public truth and bringing those directly and indirectly
responsible to justice. (Rivera 2014: 73-74)
The significance of the Commission’s recommendation in Casino Royale is that it
emphasizes that adequate responses to instances of pervasive state negligence resulting in human
rights violations require simultaneously confronting impunity, seeking redress, and preventing
recurrence of wrongs, i.e., pursuing Transitional Justice. However, the Commission could have
recommended dealing with the situation through more narrowly tailored measures (e.g., only
pursuing criminal proceedings or welfare assistance) instead of advocating a multipronged
approach.
Nevertheless, the Commission opted against implementing singular solutions because it
rightly concluded (at least per Transitional Justice) that enacting narrow measures would
forestall reconciliation and reparations, in that not all elements required of justice would be met
and the community would remain vulnerable to the reoccurrence of comparable harm(s).
Essentially, the Commission held that in cases of negligent state oppression resulting in human
rights violations, justice compels that the state examine what happened and why (e.g., using truth
commissions and/or social inquiries); propose plans and policy to stop similar violations from
occurring in the future (e.g., through legislation and/or constitutional amendment); acknowledge
the violations as a means of restoring socio-political commitment to important societal values
(e.g., undertaking public apology and/or memorialization); hold those responsible to account
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(e.g., pursing criminal proceedings, lustration, public censure, etc.), and aid victims (e.g.,
providing social services, compensation, and/or welfare assistance).
Accordingly, it seems plausible to conclude that similar responses mirroring the
Commission’s recommendation in Casino Royale are appropriate to our and similar cases of
ecocide, since the acts causing harm are comparable (i.e., negligent state oppression) and the
resulting harm is of equivalent magnitude (i.e., social death and loss of vital interests). For
instance, it seems uncontroversial that just as in the Casino Royale case, our victims (e.g., AfroColombians, Anangu, Wayúu, and Cree) deserve reconciliatory redress: i.e., compensation for
harms suffered to (re)affirm their dignity as human beings; exploration into why massive social
death was allowed to occur; assurance that actions are underway to prevent such harms from
happening in the future (i.e., a commitment to the safety of all citizens); retribution that negligent
actors (i.e., those that failed to meet their duty of care) are held to account, and assistance to
overcome trauma and resulting difficulties (i.e., losing their way of life and means of
subsistence).96
Consequently, after reviewing the above list of goals, it is easy to grasp why singularly
focused approaches (e.g., criminal proceedings or welfare assistance) would be inadequate for
achieving justice in our examples. For instance, focusing strictly on retributive censure of
negligent actors obscures the fact that the environmental harm(s) under consideration were
intentional, i.e., that the state (and more broadly mainstream society) tolerates and promotes
ecosystem destruction. Hence, such a limited response ignores the need to alter the root cause of
the problem (i.e., prevailing norms, values, and everyday practices) and realistically guarantees
that comparable harm(s) will occur in the future. Thus, only repudiating select actors for failing
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Exactly, what each of these measures entails will be explored in subsequent chapters.
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to meet their duty of care, while acquiescing and accepting environmental loss as “business as
usual” undermines Transitional Justice’s “never again” mantra.
Likewise, if practitioners were to take another narrow approach and focus strictly on
providing material aid to victims (i.e., ensuring survivors have adequate food, water, clothes,
shelter, medical care, etc.), then we can readily see that key components of justice will be
ignored. Obviously, victims should not be left destitute and starving in their ruined habitat, but
justice also requires considering why they are in this position in the first place.
Instead of simply alleviating immediate suffering and treating problematic symptoms,
justice entails understanding past mistakes and averting future complications, i.e., failing to
consider broader social structures may obscure effective means of mitigating, abating, and
correcting harms. Furthermore, social policy limited to material aid, treats victims as passive,
ignores their agency, and offers them little role in overcoming their difficulties, which may
further denigrate their autonomy and sense of self-respect.97
Nevertheless, determining the best course of action for navigating these various concerns
presents innumerable challenge. But at least at present, Transitional Justice offers the most
theoretically well developed and successfully employed paradigm for considering,
implementing, and balancing the above reparative and reconciliatory interests in the wake of
grave social wrongs. Consequently, there are prudential and substantive benefits validating the
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Thomas Shelby in his work, Dark Ghettos, offers a powerful critique against social policies
limited to material assistance (Shelby 2016). He argues that justice necessitates moving beyond
the medical model of “fixing” social ills (i.e., a technocratic approach that takes, “the background
structures of society as given and focuses only alleviating burdens…[in which sufferers] are
regarded as passive victims in need of assistance”) and instead must consider, recognize, and
alter, “the numerous ways in which the advantaged unfairly benefit from an unjust social
structure [to the disadvantage of the victims]” (Shelby 2016: 2-3).

76

claim that Transitional Justice offers the most effective framework for responding to the injustice
of ecocide, i.e., achieving environmental transformative justice.
Fortunately, the Commission’s determination in Casino Royale that human rights
violations produced through state negligence, require a multipronged reparative and
reconciliatory response, offers compelling support to the thesis that the Transitional Justice
framework can reasonably be applied to the types of state activity (or inaction) that led to harm
in our case studies. In fact, since our cases of ecocide lack a supervening malevolent actor (e.g.,
the cartel), it seems even easier to justify drawing a connection between negligent state activity
and resulting harms.

D.

Conclusion

The chapter has attempted to illustrate that there are instances of ecocide that occur
independently from the commission of intentional crimes against humanity, which nonetheless,
are comparable in normatively relevant ways to established, recognized, documented, and
accepted subjects of Transitional Justice concern; in that the acts causing the harm are
comparable (i.e., negligent state oppression) and the harm itself is comparable (i.e., social death
and loss of vital interests). Consequently in achieving this aim, a strong case has been presented
that to further justice (i.e., overcome injustice), victims of these and similar instances of ecocide
ought to receive reparatory and reconciliatory attention from within the Transitional Justice
framework.98 At least, it seems the burden of proof has shifted, so that those who wish to deny
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Since, the Commission’s response to unjust state negligence in the Casino Royale case,
demonstrates that Transitional Justice’s measures can (and ought to) assist in repairing and
reconciling oppression in our (and similar) cases of ecocide. Illustrating how Transitional
Justice’s reparative and reconciliatory measures (e.g., criminal tribunals, truth commissions,
public apologies, pardons, lustration, memorialization, reparations, constitutional change, etc.)
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including our paradigm cases and idealized description of ecocide within the Transitional Justice
framework need to provide justification for the exclusion.
In summary, here is the argument thus far. As Young, Cudd, and likely all political
philosophers agree, “oppression claims are themselves prima facie moral claims for remedy or
redress” (Cudd 2006: 129). Thus, normatively, once a practice has been established as
oppressive, the moral case for opposing, resisting, and correcting the wrongs has already been
made. Moreover, since the oppression results from similar practices (e.g., negligent state
activity) and causes comparable harm (e.g., social death and loss of vital interests) to traditional
topics of Transitional Justice, then it follows that our paradigm cases and idealized description of
ecocide represent suitable candidates for garnering Transitional Justice’s attention, i.e., that the
discipline ought to expand to cover the harm of ecocide (e.g., in these and similar cases); beyond
any instrumental role the environmental destruction may play in advancing genocide, ethnic
cleansing, mass murder, etc.
But before we can begin analyzing how Transitional Justice mechanisms can be enlisted
to repair and reconcile the injuries of ecocide (i.e., delineate the aims and methods for achieving
environmental transformative justice); we must first discuss the topics of responsibility,
culpability, and complicity to delineate who is morally obligated to contribute, assist, and further
post-ecocide environmental transformative justice. As such, exploring these topics will be the
subject of analysis in the next chapter.

can be applied in our examples will be the topic of analysis in subsequent chapters, but for now I
hope it seems plausible that such mechanisms can assist victims of ecocide.
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CHAPTER TWO
Who is Responsible for Ecocide? Conceptualizing Responsibility for Ecocide

I.

Overview Bridging Responsibility in Transitional Justice and Environmentalism

The last chapter recommended expanding the Transitional Justice framework to cover
cases of ecocide that were committed intentionally (i.e., with the aim of benefiting the acting
group) and resulted in the loss of vital interests (i.e., causing partial or complete social death) of
non-consenting cultural group(s). As argued, a key reason supporting the inclusion of these sorts
of grave environmental harms within the Transitional Justice paradigm is that they involve some
degree of state oppression (e.g., direct, indirect, or negligent). Accordingly, it seems
uncontroversial that the state must play a central role in providing reconciliatory redress for these
injustices.
However, limiting our conception of responsibility for ecocide to states or state actors
seems misguided, in that it would almost certainly exclude many relevant causal factors and
culpable actors from analysis.99 Such a result is problematic because (as will be argued)
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In an attempt to briefly illustrate inadequacies of focusing wholly on state responsibility for
ecocide, we can draw from Thomas Pogge’s critique of explanatory nationalism, i.e., the view
that the state is the relevant unit of moral responsibility. Since as he asserts, “explanatory
nationalism does not fit the real world … [in that] global factors are all-important for explaining
present human misery [for our purposes, environmental degradation]” (Pogge 2002: 144). The
reason for this, he argues, is that supra-state institutions (e.g., the IMF, World Bank, WTO, etc.),
international law, and globalized modes of interaction shape domestic policy and state outcomes
more so than internal decision-making. As he goes on to explain, “such [interstate] factors
crucially affect what sorts of persons shape national policy…what incentives these persons face,
what options they have, and what impact the implementation of any of their options would have
on domestic poverty and human-rights fulfillment [and for our purposes, environmental
protection]” (Pogge 2002: 144). Consequently, the problem with holding states exclusively
accountable for ecocide is that such a view fails to recognize the extent to which the globalized
and interdependent international order determines domestic proceedings. As Simon Caney states,
“existing international institutions (such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the
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establishing the full class of actors responsible for overcoming these wrongs bolsters the
prospects of achieving successful reparative and reconciliatory outcomes.100 In this light, the
work aims to avoid the mistake of overly or exclusively focusing on state responsibility at the
expense of ignoring other actors (e.g., individuals, corporations, intergovernmental
organizations, etc.) potential role in generating ecocide.101

International Monetary Fund (IMF)), by promoting economic growth, encourage countries to
engage in deforestation and the high use of fossil fuels, both activities which lead to climate
change [and environmental harms more generally]” (Caney 2005: 755). Moreover, another
problem with viewing states as the sole locus of responsibility for ecocide is that while it may
seem justifiable to hold states accountable for their self-governing decisions; it is nevertheless
true, that a substantial amount of environmental harm is committed by illegal and non-state
sanctioned activity perpetrated by individuals or corporations, i.e., harm(s) caused by rogue
actor(s) that the state did not endorse, support, approve, or authorize. Additionally, it is important
to recognize the role of multinational corporations, wealthy individuals, foreign powers, and
international institutions in shaping state policy through their ability to lobby, pressure, coerce,
capture, or control domestic legislation and regulatory processes. As such, all of these factors
express the diminishing role of state sovereignty; and thus, they offer insight into why focusing
only on state responsibility for ecocide is inadequate. In summary, such a state-centric framing
fails to account for at minimum two relevant levels of analysis. First, it ignores the impact of
international institutions and global systems that determine state policy at a macro-level.
Secondly, it fails to account for environmental harms resulting from the activities of non-state
actors (e.g., individuals and corporations) operating independent of or undermining state
authority at a micro-level.
100
The justification for determining who is responsible for environmental transformative justice,
prior to determining what is required, stems from an intuition that responsibility is the key
motivating precondition for justice, i.e., we have to first feel that an issue matters and pertains to
us, before we are motivated to act. As Furio Cerutti explains, “whatever our theories about
justice are, we tend to do justice to people only when we feel that we are responsible for their
survival, dignity, and well-being” (Cerutti 2009: 493). As such to prevent our proposed theory of
environmental transformative justice from being purely scholastic, it is essential that the view
adequately express a notion of responsibility capable of motivating and persuading the
appropriate parties to take action.
101
One of the challenges of undertaking an analysis of responsibility in Transitional Justice and
environmentalist is that defining a conception of ‘responsibility’ that covers all of our everyday
uses of the term has proven philosophically difficult. As David Miller states, “the concept of
responsibility ―has proved to be one of the most slippery and confusing terms in the lexicon of
moral and political philosophy” (Miller 2007: 82). For instance, H.L.A. Hart vividly explicates
some of the various uses in the following passage: “As a captain of the ship, X was responsible
for the safety of his passengers and crew. But on his last voyage he got drunk every night and
was responsible for the loss of the ship and all aboard. It was rumored that he was insane, but the
doctors considered that he was responsible for his actions. Throughout the voyage he behaved
quite irresponsibly, and various incidents in his career showed that he was not a responsible
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Consequently, this chapter endeavors to develop an expansive account of responsibility
that can be applied to our paradigm cases of ecocide. The goal is that an effective delineation
will assist subsequent chapters in apportioning actors’ requisite obligations (i.e., necessary aims,
measures, and mechanisms) for achieving environmental transformative justice.
Ideally, the conception of responsibility developed ought to be persuasive, politically
useful, reasonably acceptable to the parties involved, and serve to counter harmful and obscuring
ideologies that disguise accountability (both over-inclusively and under-inclusively) for ecocide.
To achieve these aims, the chapter will proceed in two sections: (1) summarize the conception of
responsibility traditionally employed in both Transitional Justice and environmentalism, so as to
discern a common understanding of responsibility that satisfies both disciplines;102 (2) offer a
hypothetical instance of ecocide that fulfills all our criteria (i.e., from the last chapter)103 as a
means of testing a proposed theory of responsibility designed to delineate classes of actors
answerable (e.g., morally, legally, politically, etc.) for repairing and reconciling the harm that
broadly meets the goals of both disciplines.
In many ways this work strives to serve as a bridge between Transitional Justice and
environmentalism; two disciplines that have hitherto not engaged and communicated with each
other. In this light, it is helpful to discern similarities and differences in each discipline’s

person. He always maintained that the exceptional winter storms were responsible for the loss of
the ship, but in the legal proceedings brought against him he was found criminally responsible
for his negligent conduct, and in separate civil proceedings he was held legally responsible for
the loss of life and property. He is still alive, and he is morally responsible for the deaths of
many women and children” (Hart 1968: 211). Thus, our initial use of the term relies on a roughand-ready folk conception, which will hopefully be further refined as we delve into the
respective disciplines’ employment of the concept.
102
The term ‘discipline’ is used loosely in the chapter; since, as will be discussed subsequently,
it is unclear if environmentalism represents a coherent discipline.
103
The need for greater conceptual freedom in stipulating details while examining theories of
responsibility, justifies why it is beneficial to analyze hypothetical scenario(s) instead
exclusively limiting ourselves to the actual facts of the real-world examples that we explored last
chapter.
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respective positions and practices regarding the allocation of responsibility.104 Ultimately, the
work contends that both disciplines (after having taken rather different routes) have each
developed comparable notions of responsibility.
Thus, the goal of this section is to illustrate key features undergirding the notion of
responsibility that both disciplines employ in achieving their desired objectives. The hope is that
greater conceptual integration will serve to facilitate each discipline’s ability to draw upon and
utilize potentially valuable conceptual insights and practical tools from the other when
confronting ecocide.
To summarize, the chapter aims to demonstrate that both disciplines have settled on an
understanding of responsibility that has three central components.105 First, the requisite notion of
responsibility must be both backward (retrospective) and forward (prospective) looking.
Backward looking in that it is able to hold actor(s) accountable (e.g., morally, politically, legally,
etc.) for their deed(s) that are broadly construed to include both action and inaction.106 Forward
looking in that it is able to discern actor/actors’ obligations towards particular object(s),
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Unfortunately, neither discipline has set forth a clear and systematic articulation of its
respective conception of responsibility. Thus, the work attempts to offer such an understanding
by analyzing historical trends, developments, proclamations, discussions, and practices within
Transitional Justice and environmentalism to highlight how each discipline approaches the
subject of responsibility.
105
There are undoubtedly more than three points of commonality between Transitional Justice
and environmentalism’s conception(s) of responsibility (e.g., responsibility for harms can track
across state borders, responsibility is not wholly determined by causal proximity, etc.).
Nevertheless, the justification for analyzing specifically these three components is that they are
important for devising a notion of responsibility that satisfies core aims of each discipline.
106
Joel Feinberg, in his work Doing and Deserving, canonically describes past-oriented blame
and the legal liability model of responsibility as both based in establishing contributive fault:
“First it must be true that the responsible individual did the harmful thing in question or at least
that his action or omission made a substantial causal contribution to it. Second, the causally
contributory conduct must have been in some way faulty. Finally, if the harmful conduct was
truly ‘his fault,’ the requisite causal connection must have been directly between the faulty
aspect of his conduct and the outcome” (Feinberg 1970: 222).
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relation(s), and end(s) (e.g., a referee’s responsibility is to call a fair game).107 Secondly, both
disciplines benefit from utilizing a conception of responsibility that is able to hold actors both
aggregately and collectively answerable and responsive;108 while concurrently, maintaining
mechanisms for distinguishing and differentiating degrees, levels, and kinds of culpabilities,
accountabilities, duties, and obligations between them.109 Finally, the notion of responsibility
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In this sense, for an actor to be responsible requires that: (1) an actor must be able to
knowingly cause a certain effect; (2) an actor must reasonably deem these effects beneficial, and
(3) an actor must have been able to act otherwise, i.e., not achieve the desired effects. For
instance, Kyle Whyte eloquently defines proscriptive responsibility as, “the reciprocal (though
not necessarily equal) attitudes and patterns of behavior that are expected by and of various
parties by virtue of the different roles that each may be understood to play in a relationship.
Elders may have responsibilities to mentor youth through passing on wisdom; younger
generations are, in turn, responsible for learning actively from their elders. A community may
have a responsibility to care for sturgeon habitat; sturgeon, in turn, may provide food and may
even be expected to protect wild rice and the fishery itself” (Whyte 2013: 519).
108
For clarificatory purposes it is helpful to briefly explain the difference between aggregative
(the concept is also sometimes referred to as shared, summative, or distributed responsibility in
the social ontology literature) versus collective (the concept is also sometimes referred to as
group or joint responsibility in the social ontology literature) responsibility. Essentially,
‘aggregate responsibility’ is an individualist notion that distributes responsibility to each of the
members that comprise the entity under discussion. So, saying “we are responsible” in this sense
is like saying, “we have red hair”; in that saying, “we have red hair” means that I have red hair
and you have red hair, just as “we are responsible” in this sense means I am responsible, and you
are responsible. Whereas, ‘collective responsibility’ is non-distributional, it is collective in a
stronger sense. For instance, saying, “we are responsible” in this sense is like saying, “we
surrounded the castle”; “we surrounded the castle” does not mean that I surrounded the castle
and you surrounded the castle; it is not distributive. And the same for “we are responsible” in the
collective sense. As such, in cases of collective responsibility, responsibility may not confer to
individual members, in fact sometimes collectives can be responsible for something, even though
none of the members comprising the collective bear any responsibility. For instance, imagine a
scenario in which a mine that a corporation excavated eighty years ago, presently collapses and
causes an avalanche. Furthermore, the corporation destroyed all their records and information
pertaining to the mine over sixty years ago. In such a scenario, none of the current employees or
stakeholders of the corporation are personally responsible for the avalanche because none of
them were involved with the initial excavation or destruction of the relevant information that
would have informed them of an impending crisis that required their intervention; but yet, the
corporation would still be held collectively liable for harm.
109
For instance, as stipulated all of our cases of ecocide must contain state oppression (e.g.,
direct, indirect, or negligent). Thus, with regards to the type of environmental harm we are
concerned with, the state is necessarily collectively responsible as a group-agent. But that does
not imply it is the only group-agent collectively responsible; since, multiple (yet separate) groupagents can be held aggregately responsible, if they each contribute to a harm (e.g., a corporation
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must be socially capacious, in that the categories and kinds of social-entities included as
potential bearers of responsibility is expansive (e.g., including individual(s), corporation(s),
agency(ies), community(ies), institution(s), state(s), interstate organization(s), global network(s),
etc.).110

that caused environmental destruction with state permission). Furthermore, holding a groupagent collectively responsible does not foreclose the prospects of piercing the group-agent itself
and concurrently allocating aggregative responsibility to individual members comprising the
group.
110
As will be discussed, entities can be held responsible in various ways. But for the purposes of
this work, only entities that constitute group-agents can be held collectively responsible. As such,
it is necessary to specify what distinguishes a group-agent from other socio-ontological
arrangements. Hence, below is a brief taxonomy of socio-ontological arrangements designed to
illustrate the difference between sets, amalgamations, collectives and groups. First, ‘sets’ are
non-morally relevant grouping of individuals, e.g., redheads, those born on May 26th, everyone
who sneezed within the past minute. Such groupings are not appropriate sites of collective or
aggregative responsibility. For a comparable conceptualization, see Peter French’s discussion of,
“mere collections of people” (French 1984: 5). Next ‘amalgamations’ are individuals in direct
contact with each other due to some immediate circumstance, e.g., the survivors of a plane crash,
people (customers, chefs, waiters, the owner, etc.) in a restaurant an hour before closing, patrons
in a movie theatre. Such groupings are not appropriate cites of collective responsibility. But,
under some circumstances the actors may share aggregative responsibility to organize
themselves into a ‘random collective’ to achieve some end. For instance, imagine an
amalgamation of random passersby coming upon a man stuck in an abandoned well, they realize
that he will drown if they do not help him up; but they disagree on how to achieve this. As they
stand around arguing about what to do, he drowns. In such a case it is obvious that something
ought to have been done. Nevertheless, we would not hold the amalgamation in-and-of-itself
responsible, but would instead, hold each actor responsible for failing to come together to assist.
For a comparable conceptualization, see Virginia Held’s discussion of, “random collectives”
(Held 1970: 471-481). Whereas, ‘collectives’ are collections of individuals that mutually enter
into an agreement to achieve some end, e.g., going on a walk together, playing tennis, helping a
friend move into a new apartment, etc. Essentially, at minimum collective formation requires A
and B to commit to E. Thus, there are two commitments: A committing to cooperate with B to
achieve E and B committing to A to achieve E. But importantly, collectives lack permanency and
dissolve once the commitment is satisfied. As such, the responsibility for harm caused during the
course of the commitment is shared in aggregate by both A and B, but such arrangements do not
generate collective responsibility – which unfortunately, is somewhat confusing because of the
name. For a comparable conceptualization, see Stephanie Collins’ discussion of, “end-oriented
groups” (Collins 2017: 588-590). Lastly, ‘groups’ are agents in their own right in that they are
group-agents that come into being when individuals intend to establish an ongoing institution
that can exist even if the composition of the members change, e.g., companies, corporations,
clubs. Essentially, ‘groups’ form when A commits to B to form an identifiable subject E that can
exist and operate independently of A or B’s involvement. In this case if a harm is caused during
the course of group activity, the individual members may share responsibility; but there emerges
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Before we delve into a summary of each discipline’s respective path to the above
conception of responsibility, it is helpful to emphasize that it is unsurprising that both have
settled on similar views. Since, as will be shown, they are both responding to comparable,
overlapping, and interrelated global trends and developments, e.g., greater interconnectivity
between peoples and places, weakening sovereignty of the nation-state, growing asymmetry
(diminishing parity) concerning particular peoples, institutions, and states’ worldwide influence.
But it is also important to highlight that in practice and theory, both Transitional Justice and
environmentalism have played roles in substantively and epistemically producing these shifts, in
that each has effectively advocated for changing our perception, understanding, orientation,
behavior, and relation to each other and the world.

A.

Responsibility in Transitional Justice

Historically, Transitional Justice focused predominately on individual responsibility. The
discipline’s nascent orientation becomes clear after observing the Allies’ decision at Nuremberg
and Tokyo War Trials to prosecute individuals for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and
crimes of aggression; instead of holding Germany, Japan, the NAZI regime, or the Japanese
Empire collectively responsible for the atrocities committed during WWII. As Britain’s Chief
Prosecutor at Nuremburg, Sir Hartely Shawcross advocated, “there can be no reconciliation
unless individual guilt for the appalling crimes of the last few years replaces the pernicious
theory of collective guilt on which so much racial hatred hangs” (Shawcross 1996: A17).

a sense of collective responsibility as well, which applies to the group itself as a single, unified,
moral agent. For a comparable conceptualization, see Margaret Gilbert’s discussion of “plural
subjects” (Gilbert 1989, 2000, and 2006). As Christian List and Philip Pettit explain, groups can
constitute moral agents if they, “have representational states, motivational states, and a capacity
to process them and act on their basis” (List and Pettit 2011: 162).
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It is significant to highlight that the Allies’ decision to pursue individual responsibility
was groundbreaking, as traditionally international law was regarded as limited to relations
between states as group-agents. For instance, James Brierly in his work, The Law of Nations,
classically defined international law as, “the body of rules and principles of action, which are
binding upon civilized states in their relations with one another” (Brierly 1963: 1).
Thus, pursuant to the classical model, states rather than individuals (i.e., natural persons)
would be held accountable for violations of international law, e.g., if a battalion from state-A
violated international law in state-B, state-B would seek redress collectively against state-A,
instead of proceeding against the individual members of the battalion.111 Essentially, this
example illustrates that while it is causally necessary that states act through individuals (e.g.,
their agents, representatives, and citizens); customarily, the legal notion of state responsibility
conveyed the perception that states act themselves as social bodies (group-agents), not through
the aggregated acts of individuals comprising them.
Nevertheless, in the aftermath of WWI this classical view of international law proved
problematic. To summarize at the Treaty of Versailles, the Allies employed the then orthodox
understanding of international law and held Germany collectively responsible for, “violation of
established laws and customs of war and the elementary laws of humanity” (1919).112 But this
decision proved costly, in that many historians believe that the “war guilt” clause, (i.e., decreeing
that Germany was responsible for the damages and losses suffered during the war) and the
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Additionally, under traditional international law, state-A may not do certain things to state-B
or any other state. Conversely, state-B or any other state may not do the same thing to state-A.
However, all these states may do whatever they want within their borders, i.e., the focus is
between states, not between states and individuals or between individuals themselves (Brierly
1963).
112
However, it should be noted that while the Allies themselves did not directly prosecute any
individual after WWI, the German Imperial Court of Justice at Leipzig tried twelve of the fortyfive individuals that the Allies had recommended but convicted only six (Bassiouni 1997: 20).
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imposition of levies and sanctions on the German people as retributive compensation for harm
suffered, contributed to the rise and success of the NAZI party precipitating WWII.113
Consequently, after WWII, the Allies wanting to avoid making the same mistake opted to
eschew collective guilt (i.e., declaring an entire state or people responsible) and instead
embraced a legal response centered on condemning the evils of the period by prosecuting
individuals for violating international law. For instance, at Nuremberg it was famously
pronounced, “crimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities”
(1945).
The Allies’ decision to target individual actors in the wake of the atrocities of WWII
instead of whole states or peoples proved successful, in that it is often credited as a key factor in
the rapid, effective, and lasting restoration and reintegration of Germany and Japan into the
international community. Thus, in light of this accomplishment, Transitional Justice
wholeheartedly advocated and implemented policy-approaches that remained dedicated to
pursuing individual responsibility as the preferred means of overcoming legacies of historical
injustice: As Saira Mohamed narrates in her highly informative work on the history of collective
responsibility in Transitional Justice:
In the trials confronting the legacies of repressive military rule in Latin America in the
1980s; the creation of the international tribunals addressing the crimes committed in the
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda in the 1990s; the establishment of South Africa's
ambitious and groundbreaking Truth and Reconciliation Commission in 1995; and the
adoption of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (‘ICC’) in 1998, jurists,
policymakers, and human rights advocates have emphasized the importance of focusing
attention on the actions of individuals, and have cautioned against assigning blame for
atrocities to groups or states. (Mohamed 2009: 328)
1.

TJ and the Return of Collective Responsibility

113

Elazar Barkan’s work, The Guilt of Nations: Restitution and Negotiating Historical Injustices,
provides an in-depth discussion illustrating that by, “forcing an admission of war guilt at
Versailles, rather than healing, the victors instigated resentment that contributed to the rise of
Fascism” (Barkan 2000: xxiii).
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However recently, the discipline’s hegemonic acceptance that grave injustices are best
overcome through focusing strictly on individual over collective responsibility has come under
scrutiny. Ruti Teitel succinctly problematizes the choice to ignore collective responsibility,
explaining that, “criminal justice primarily seeks to establish individual responsibility for
wrongdoing, but the tyranny of the modern bureaucratic state diffuses responsibility throughout
the polity; thus, the ordinary workings of criminal justice are inapposite” (Teitel 2000: 149).
Consequently, Teitel believes Transitional Justice ought to acknowledge that, “the massive and
systemic wrongdoing that is particularly characteristic of modern repression implies a
recognition of the mix of individual and collective responsibility” (Teitel 2000: 217).
Essentially, Teitel’s insight is that grave injustices are often systemic and pervasive; thus,
relying on a conventional understanding of individual responsibility is inadequate or unsuitable
for fully grasping, confronting, and remedying the scope and scale of the wrongs under
consideration. He argues that Transitional Justice can better overcome injustice by accepting a
more diffuse and comprehensive view of responsibility (i.e., one that is capable of capturing the
socio-political background and structural forms generating much contemporary oppression),
instead of limiting the analysis to individual agency.
Recently, Transitional Justice has heeded this insight and begun moving in precisely this
direction, as vividly evidenced by the International Court of Justice’s 2007 ruling that countries
as well as individuals could be prosecuted for genocide.114 Nevertheless, as Mohamed explains
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The 2007 decision was made pursuant to a 1993 claim filed by Bosnia and Herzegovina to the
International Court of Justice that Serbia and Montenegro was committing genocide (i.e., during
the breakup of Yugoslavia, Serbs were responsible for killing between 100,000 and 200,000
Bosnian Muslims, in what is widely regarded as the worst atrocity in Europe since WWII) (Ball,
Tabeau, and Verwimp 2007: 3). Ultimately, the court ruled that genocide had occurred (i.e., in
the small town of Srebrenica in which eight thousand Bosnian men and boys were massacred in
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there has been ample backlash against, “the ICJ’s conclusion that the Genocide Convention
obligates states not to commit genocide and that the ICJ has jurisdiction to decide the
responsibility of a state for committing genocide aroused significant criticism” (Mohamed 2009:
349).
Reservations against the Court’s decision, affirming that states can be found collectively
responsible, stem from the fact that not all citizens of even the most deplorable nation(s) engage
in morally reprehensible activity (e.g., murder, rape, torture, etc.).115 Thus, critics argue it would
be unjust to hold uninvolved actors that happen to reside in a state responsible for atrocities they
did not commit and maintain that it is wiser to remain focused on individual malfeasances (i.e.,
continuing the practice of determining guilt through traditional criminal trials), as means of
declaring the innocence of the remaining members of the society (i.e., those that did not partake
in the commission of grave wrongs).
The benefit of such an approach (i.e., stressing the need to delineate between the guilty
and innocent) represents a vital step in the transitional process in that removing, punishing, and
sanctioning bad actors can break cycles of violence, hatred, and animosity between groups by
diminishing the victimized group’s need for vengeance; while concurrently, increasing the
likelihood that the remaining members of the community can work together to heal.116 As Jane
Stromseth asserts, a core value and aim of individually focused criminal proceedings is that,

July 1995), but that there was not enough evidence attributing the genocide to Serbia despite the
fact that the Court confirmed that it was authorized to find states liable ((SaCouto 2007: 2).
115
For instance, during the Rwandan genocide it is estimated that there were around 200,000
perpetrators (i.e., “any person who participated in an attack against a civilian in order to kill or to
inflict serious injury on that civilian”) in a population of over seven million, in what is widely
considered the highest per capita perpetrator rate in modern history (Straus 2004: 87).
116
Additionally, prosecuting those responsible diminishes the need for vengeance from the
victimized group and as such can assist in breaking the cycle of violence between historical
antagonists. As Aryeh Neier states, “if those directly responsible are tried and punished, the
burden of blame will not be carried indiscriminately by members of an entire ethnic group.
Culpability will not be passed down from generation to generation” (Neier 1998: 211).
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“[they] remove the stain of impunity from traumatized societies” (Stromseth 2007: 253).
Despite these important goals, Transitional Justice scholars have begun to recognize
shortcomings (i.e., in regard to achieving justice) that arise from wedding the discipline to an
exclusively individualistic conception of responsibility. For example, Transitional Justice has
long emphasized the importance of truth and truth-telling as a vital aspect of the reparative and
reconciliatory process. But individual criminal trials are often unable to paint a complete picture
of events, produce shortages of truth, and limit truth-telling in part because their traditional
focus, design, and procedure, readily overlooks delving into the structural background elements
driving the actor’s motivation(s), decision-making process(es), and behavior(s).
For instance, individual trials fail to account for the actions (or inactions) of those who
stood by and watched while atrocities occurred or those who legally supported, abetted, and
elected leaders calling for the commission of such harms. As Laurel Fletcher and Harvey
Weinstein state, “individualized guilt may contribute to a myth of collective innocence”
(Fletcher and Weinstein 2002: 580).
Succinctly, Thomas Franck clearly expresses the central issue caused by maintaining
Transitional Justice’s restrictive focus on individual liability. “Genocide is a hydra-headed
monster. It warrants a multifaceted response. The heralded advent of individual liability should
not cloud our understanding of the continued importance of state responsibility” (Franck 2007:
573). Accordingly, Mark Drumbl bemoans moral-gaps resulting from ignoring the insight that
mass atrocities require mass action. “The deliberate choice by international criminal justice
institutions to selectively blame a handful of individuals . . . erases . . . the involvement of
ordinary [persons]…[thus] leads to a retributive shortfall, insofar as only a few people receive
their just deserts, while many powerful states and organizations avoid accountability” (Drumbl
2005: 1314).
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The above quotes express Transitional Justice’s growing recognition that pervasive and
systemic human rights violations generally involve state apparatuses, bureaucratic machinery,
and social resources necessary for their commission. Consequently, to better reveal the complex
bureaucracy, massive scale, and powerful organizational structures that facilitate widespread
human rights violations; it is often crucial to focus on collective responsibility of the state or
state-institutions, rather than limiting the analysis to individual guilt. Hence in this light, the
entire polity is directly accountable when states authorize, permit, or fail to prevent grave
atrocities from occurring – which was a key point of emphasis in the preceding chapter.
Additionally, because the commonly held democratic view that states no longer own
individual(s), but that individual(s) jointly own, manage, and operate states, there has been
growing recognition of the need for expanding aggregative responsibility for graves harms in
Transitional Justice settings. For instance, Michael Walzer endorses this insight, asserting that,
“citizenship is common destiny, and no one, not even [the regime’s] opponents...can escape the
effects of a bad regime, an ambitious or fanatic leadership, or an overreaching nationalism”
(Walzer 1977: 297).117
Or as Franck explains, while defending the need for greater shared responsibility in
Transitional settings, “when a state deliberately leads, helps, trains, arms, clothes, pays and
inspires those who do commit genocide, then, while the passive citizenry does not share the
perpetrators’ guilt, it does share responsibility for the enormity of what was done in the
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Cerutti vividly illustrates this point in regard to citizens from developed nations responsibility
for environmental harms. “We, the generality of citizens, are not as responsible for
environmental errors and crimes committed in the past by corporations and public
administrations as their leaders and managers are. However, in democratic countries we are
largely responsible because we elected politicians who were known for their inability and
unwillingness to regulate polluting activities in the economy and social life; not to mention our
consumerist attitude in everyday life and our unawareness of its environmental consequences”
(Cerruti 2009: 493).
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citizenry’s name and the citizens’ responsibility to help make amends” (Franck 2007: 572-573).
Thus, the argument maintains that it is in virtue of the privilege of citizenship and being a
member of a political community that all citizens share some aggregative responsibility for when
states commit egregious wrongs in their name.118
Accordingly, Transitional Justice has begun to appreciate that it will gain a more
complete understanding of the truth, provide more effective redress and reconciliation, and better
prevent similar harms from occurring in the future by embracing a model of responsibility that is
readily amenable to including the full range of actors and collective processes that generate grave
harms. Thus, there has been growing emphasis on the need to expand beyond a legalistic
conception of individual guilt and embrace models of shared and collective responsibility.119

2.

TJ and Common But Differentiated Responsibility

Obviously, incorporating collective and shared responsibility into the Transitional Justice
framework is not meant to replace or eliminate holding particular actors guilty for mass statesanctioned atrocities; instead, the inclusion of collective and shared responsibility ought to
function in conjunction with traditional individual liability to better support and facilitate the
discipline’s aims. As such, the notion of collective and shared responsibility employed by
Transitional Justice should not hold all actors equally accountable for grave injustices, i.e., the
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Jaspers in reference to the guilt of the German citizenry after WWII explicitly makes this
point, stating: “One might think of cases of wholly non-political persons who live aloof of all
politics, like monks, hermits, scholars, artists-if really quite non-political, those might possibly
be excused from all guilt. Yet they, too, are included among the politically liable, because they,
too, live by the order of the state. There is no such aloofness in modern states” (Jaspers 1947:
56).
119
How exactly states, peoples, or institutions ought to be held accountable is a matter of debate,
but at present we will proceed without discussing the topic, but it will be the focus of the
subsequent chapter.
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discipline requires mechanisms for differentiating degrees of culpability, blame, duties, and
obligations between perpetrators, abettors, supporters, spectators, dissenters, resistors, etc.120
Consequently, Transitional Justice’s growing acceptance and willingness to employ norms of
collective and shared accountability, while maintaining a strong tradition of prosecuting
individual actors, demonstrates that the field is moving towards embracing an understanding of
responsibility as both common, but differentiated (which will henceforth be abbreviated as
CBDR).
Furthermore, a key benefit arising from Transitional Justice’s embrace of CBDR stems
from the discipline’s dual aim of achieving reparation (i.e., past-oriented redress of past wrongs,
thereby obtaining justice for victims) and reconciliation (i.e., future-oriented restoration of civic
trust and social solidarity; seeking justice for social rehabilitation and progress) in response to
grave injustices. Essentially, an effective and just transition requires both backward- and
forward-looking considerations; and fortunately, a notion of CBDR assists in furthering these
aims, while diminishing points of conflict and contention between them.

3.

TJ and Backward and Forward-Looking Responsibility

For instance, the backwards-looking objective is deontic, in that it expresses
society/societies’ obligation to hold those responsible to account (i.e., do justice for victims). But
obviously, the stakes in transitional settings are high and the worry is that casting the net of
blame too widely may have troubling consequences, i.e., rekindle violence, instability, and
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But at present, Transitional Justice scholarship has not developed a framework for
differentiating levels and kinds of responsibility. Thus, a goal of subsequent sections will be to
offer such an account of CBDR in cases of ecocide, but at present I hope it seems intuitive that a
just model of responsibility for Transitional Justice settings requires distinguishing between the
various classes of actors.
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animosity between groups. Thus, focusing over zealously on past-oriented redress potentially
undermines the discipline’s consequentialist goal of stabilizing a volatile situation by achieving
peace, security, and reconciliation. However, if past wrong(s) are not given due consideration,
then such oversight(s) may jeopardize reestablishing the rule of law, promoting accountability,
signaling a “normative break” from past injustices, or uncovering the historical truth.
Discussing how to optimally balance these competing deontic and consequentialist
objectives in the wake of ecocide will be taken up in subsequent chapters.121 But for now, the
focus remains on demonstrating ways in which embracing an understanding of CBDR assists
Transitional Justice in overcoming some of the difficulties that arise from embracing the dual
(and sometimes competing) aims of backward-looking reparation and forward-looking
reconciliation.
For one, employing a notion of differentiated responsibility potentially diminishes
resentment from actors who never behaved outside of ordinary moral bounds (i.e., did nothing
egregiously wrong). Such actors would likely feel that they are being unfairly and arbitrarily
targeted - if they were held to account, while countless other actors around the world who acted
similarly, receive no condemnation.122

121

Thus, when determining how to deal with perpetrators of ecocide, an adequate approach must
be mindful of the competing and conflicting roles and values of criminal prosecutions. For
instance, there is a debate within Transitional Justice with some scholars and practitioners
arguing that criminal trials are necessary to send the message that there is no impunity for such
crimes; whereas, others argue that prosecution sends the message that everyone else bears no
responsibility for what occurred. Accordingly, how to justly balance these concerns will be the
focus of the next chapter.
122
This problem in many ways mirrors much of the debate surrounding moral luck. Why should
certain individuals shoulder greater moral blame depending on social contexts that are outside of
their control when each led similar lives and behaved comparably? As Thomas Nagel states, “it
is intuitively plausible that people cannot be morally assessed for what is not their fault, or for
what is due to factors beyond their control…without being able to explain exactly why, we feel
that the appropriateness of moral assessment is easily undermined by the discovery that the act or
attribute, no matter how good or bad, is not under the person's control. While other evaluations
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It seems psychologically intuitive that it is counterproductive to condemn actors who
behaved “normally” (i.e., within generally accepted, average, and everyday ways of being), since
such widespread blame would likely breed bitterness and dissatisfaction that might weaken
previously amenable actors’ incentive to assist in reestablishing victims’ wellbeing, restoring
social cooperation, and reconciling with past wrongs. Thus, for prudential and instrumental
reasons it is imperative to avoid holding all members of a society equally to account.
Furthermore, taking steps towards differentiating responsibility allows Transitional
Justice to reserve past-oriented blame (e.g., criminal punishment and social redress) to the worst
perpetrators (i.e., those who flagrantly violated moral conventions); which in turn assists in
isolating these actors’ guilt from tarnishing the rest of society (i.e., those who behaved in average
everyday ways). Nonetheless, the decision to hold states collectively responsible, while
expanding conceptions of aggregative responsibility, allows Transitional Justice to emphasize
that all the citizens still must take responsibility (i.e., they have a role to play, not that they are all
collectively guilty) for overcoming injustices and striving towards a better tomorrow (i.e., the
future-oriented betterment of the society).
Such an approach is justified because as Franck following Karl Jaspers and Michael
Walzer, explains, “it is both fair and right that the citizenry of every state that visits serious
injury on a people should have to bear at least significant parts of the cost” (Franck 2007: 571).
Thus, we can see how a notion of CBDR assists Transitional Justice in achieving both pastoriented reparation and future-oriented reconciliation and explains why in recent years the
discipline has moved in the direction of fostering a diversity of approaches (i.e., individual,
aggregative, and collective) that can work in conjunction to ensure nuanced responses demanded
of particular cases.

remain, this one seems to lose its footing” (Nagel 1979: 25).
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4.

TJ and a Socially Capacious Conception of Responsibility

Lastly, implied in the above discussion is the fact that Transitional Justice must employ a
conception of responsibility that is capable of including at least two distinct types of
metaphysical entities natural persons and state collectives. However, recent trends in the
discipline portend a shift towards further expanding the categories and kinds of social-entities
included as potential bearers of responsibility.
Transitional Justice’s extension of responsibility to novel types of actors is most clearly
pronounced in the discipline’s recent treatment of corporate accountability.123 As Greeta Koska
states, “consensus is building around the need for transitional justice to secure redress for
corporate human rights abuses” (Koska 2016: 41).124 For instance, the former UN High
Commissioner of Human Rights, Louise Arbor, supports expanding the scope of Transitional
Justice to include socio-economic rights and corporate responsibility:125
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Lisa Laplante explains, “it is not clear that the role of business was purposely excluded [in
Transitional Justice], as much as simply overlooked especially since the notion of non-state
accountability for human rights is a relatively new area of rights enforcement…certainly,
Transitional Justice offers a variety of tools that can be suited to deal with human rights
violations committed by businesses in the context of transitions complementing traditional
litigation” (Laplante 2016: 2).
124
For example, in 2011, a Colombian Peace and Justice Court judge requested that Colombia’s
Attorney General investigate Chiquita Banana and seize the company’s domestic assets because
of its role in paying protection money to right-wing paramilitary groups responsible for human
rights violations (Carranza 2015). Additionally, the ICC in 1998 agreed to expand its jurisdiction
to include legal persons (i.e., corporations) as possible perpetrators (Chiomenti 2006). But as of
yet, no corporation has been tried. Also, the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission
recommended a one time “wealth tax” on business that profited from apartheid (Nattrass 1999).
However, this proposal was never pursued.
125
The discussion of corporate accountability plays into a larger trend in Transitional Justice that
focuses on including socio-economic injustices beyond legal and political rights violations. As
Evelyne Schmid and Nolan Aoife explains, “scholars and practitioners increasingly question
transitional justice’s neglect of socioeconomic considerations. Over the past few years, an evergrowing number of authors have engaged in an important and increasingly complex debate about
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Transitional justice should take up the challenge that mainstream justice is also reluctant
to rise to: acknowledging that there is no hierarchy of rights and providing protection for
all human rights, including economic, social and cultural rights...A comprehensive
transitional justice strategy would therefore want to address the gross violations of all
human rights during the conflict and, I suggest, the gross violations [including corporate
wrongs] that gave rise or contributed to the conflict in the first place. (Arbour 2006: 14)
While it is true that at present no international trial has judged corporations responsible
for human violations;126 nonetheless, Transitional Justice scholars have begun to recognize
corporate complicity and involvement in past atrocities, i.e., through companies’ role in: (1)
directly taking part in violent activity to further corporate interests; (2) directly assisting human
rights violators (e.g., funding groups responsible for mass atrocities); (3) passively tolerating
human rights violations, and (4) facilitating socio-political corruption that may spark, justify, or

whether transitional justice should and/or can incorporate economic and social concerns”
(Schmid and Aoife 2014: 2). Expanding Transitional Justice’s scope to include socio-economic
harms is defended on the grounds that excluding these issues reduces the adequacy of any
narration of a conflict. The problem is that ignoring socio-economic inequality implicates a
particular story of the conflict, a narrowed discourse for discussing grievance, and a limited
vocabulary for gaining redress. As such, the worry is that the power of a Transitional Justice
mechanism to define injustice or violation should provoke careful examination of the story told
during transition because if we fail to adequately tell what happened, then a just transition may
be impossible. Thus, in this vein, one of the primary goals of this dissertation is to continue the
push for greater inclusivity by arguing that environmental harms ought to be included as relevant
narrative of concern for Transitional Justice.
126
As prominent legal scholar Leora Bilsky notes, “criminal law’s focus on individual intent has
persistently prevented it from addressing the collective nature of bureaucratic and corporate
wrongdoing. Hence no corporation has ever been charged with or convicted for an international
war crime or similar offense” (Bilsky 2012: 350-351). Roughly, the problem is that it is difficult
to establish legal liability. Since as previously mentioned, traditionally international criminal
courts (e.g., the ICC), prioritize prosecuting direct physically violent harm; whereas, businesses
often contribute to bodily harm only indirectly, i.e., corporations may have transported soldiers,
transferred monies, supplied goods to combatants, etc. But these acts are only indirectly linked to
physical violence, e.g., designer Hugo Boss designed and manufactured Nazi SS uniforms, but
drawing a reasonable legal connection between the clothing and acts of genocide is challenging.
It is important to point out that the Allies prosecuted a few board members and executives of
German companies after WWII (e.g., Krupp Steel was accused of preparing Nazis for aggressive
war; Flick of plundering and the use of slave labor, and I.G. Farben of supplying Zyklon B used
in gas chambers); but these trials only pertained to individual guilt, i.e., none of the companies
themselves were found collectively liable. For a thorough discussion of corporate accountability
and the Holocaust, see Anita Ramasastry 2002 and Matthew Lippman 1992.
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facilitate mass violence.127 Additionally, the discipline has recently emphasized the important
function corporations play in furthering reconciliation, social stability, and prosperity by
facilitating socio-economic growth and development favorable for preventing societies from
falling back into conflict.128
Essentially, the key insight is that if Transitional Justice strives to address the root causes
of conflict (i.e., establish a holistic narrative of injustice, while obtaining justice for the victims)
and prevent comparable harm from occurring again (i.e. achieve the discipline’s “never again”
motto), then it is beneficial to avoid excluding any actors connected to the atrocities (e.g.,
including corporations) from prospective consideration.129 Otherwise, the decision to ignore
relevant factor(s) and actor(s) may perpetuate impunity and generate accountability-gap(s) that
risk undermining the transitional process. As Ruben Carranza succinctly explains:
Corporate accountability, corruption, other economic crimes, violations of economic and
social rights and disputes involving access to land and natural resources are all part of a
broader set of grievances that many in the field of transitional justice simply regarded as
background but did not consider inherent to the work of truth commissions, reparations
programs or prosecutors. That has changed. There is now more pluralism and transitional
justice has evolved from being narrowly focused on physical integrity violations to
recognizing that armed conflict, political violence and repression cannot be de-linked
from their economic and social causes and consequences…Timor-Leste, Chad, Liberia,
Sierra Leone, Kenya and most recently Tunisia, were not dissuaded from turning to
127

Lawrence Cockcroft explains the link between corruption and human rights violations. “A
corrupt government, which rejects both transparency and accountability, is not likely to be a
respecter of human rights. Therefore, the campaign to contain corruption and the movement for
the promotion and protection of human rights are not disparate processes. They are inextricably
linked and interdependent” (Cockcroft 1998).
128
However, as is often the case in transitional settings, pursuing corporate accountability faces
the pervasive difficulty of balancing competing forward and backwards looking interests, i.e.,
whether to prioritize reconciliatory or reparative concerns. As Damiano de Felice explains:
“First, even though companies play a critical role in fostering the economic progress which is
needed to bring societies out of the risk of falling back into conflict and repression, this is not a
sufficient reason to barter contribution to economic recovery with immunity from accountability.
If one wants to address the root causes of conflict and repression, it is fundamental to consider
the role of all actors, including corporations” (de Felice 2015: 517). How to resolve this dilemma
in cases of ecocide will receive detailed analysis and consideration in the next chapter.
129
For a thorough analysis of the topic, see Sabine Michalowski’s Corporate Accountability in
the Context of Transitional Justice (Michalowski 2014).
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transitional justice as a way of extracting corporate accountability for the role of
businesses during dictatorship or armed conflict. In different ways, their truth
commissions and prosecutors examined ‘economic crimes’ alongside physical integrity
violations, and the role of corporations in both types of abuse. (Carranza 2015)
Accordingly, the above summary expresses Transitional Justice scholars and
practitioners’ mounting awareness and willingness to recognize corporate responsibility. But it is
important to emphasize that the same reasoning used to justify Transitional Justice’s inclusion of
corporations as potentially liable (i.e., emphasizing that to fully grasp and correct injustices, it is
beneficial to consider the role of all types of actors involved in and contributing to harm) is
readily applicable to any and all categories and kinds of actors capable of constituting groupagents (e.g., corporation(s), community(ies), state(s), non-governmental agency(ies), etc.).130
Basically, once corporations, states, state-institutions, and non-state actors (e.g., the
interahamwe and janjaweed mentioned last chapter) are considered collectively accountable in
transitional settings, then there appears to be no sound basis for restricting other types of legal
persons (defined as natural persons or group-agent) from being held collectively responsible
within the Transitional Justice framework. Limiting the potential kinds of actors responsible for
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Essentially, a socially capacious framing of responsibility entails that any entity capable of
being construed as a legal person (natural persons or group-agents) can be held accountable.
Thus, non-agential entities (i.e., non-persons, sets, amalgamations) would be excluded. One may
argue that this seems like an unnecessary distinction, since of course responsibility presupposes
agency. But it is important to bear in mind that many cultures have embraced norms of
responsibility that apply to inanimate objects and non-persons. As Feinberg explains, the early
Greeks, Romans, and Hebrews held “instruments of harm” in-and-of-themselves responsible,
“whether it were a tool, a weapon, a tree, an ox…was regarded as the immediate and - natural
object of vengeance. It was noxal, that is, accursed, and had to be forfeited to the victim, or his
family, to be torn apart or annihilated” (Feinberg 1970: 230). Thus, a socially capacious
conception of responsibility offers clear standards for excluding many types of entities. For
instance, in our attempt to discern responsibility for ecocide a socially capacious interpretation
stipulates that an oil tanker would not be responsible for ecocide after an oil spill, but the captain
that intentionally crashed it would be; a volcano would not be held responsible for the
environmental destruction its lava flows cause, but the state that failed to adequately warn,
protect, or assist a vulnerable population would be; cattle that destroy a grassland would not be
held responsible, but the agro-business that incentivized a policy of overgrazing would be, etc.
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grave atrocities unduly hampers practitioners’ ability to respond to complex and novel
circumstances. Thus, the discipline implicitly recognizes and benefits from embracing a socially
capacious notion of responsibility, i.e., one capable of holding any and all legal persons
potentially accountable.
In conclusion, this section has hopefully demonstrated that Transitional Justice currently
employs a notion of responsibility that is: (1) common, but differentiated, (2) both backward and
forward looking, and (3) socially capacious. Obviously there are many aspects of Transitional
Justice that will need to be explored to justify integrating “environmental transformative justice”
within the Transitional Justice framework, e.g., Transitional Justice focuses on the different ways
that perpetrators are held accountable, the sorts of reparations and amends making that are
required of them, the need for transformation of social and political structures, creating a
historical record to memorialize and acknowledge past events, navigate the possibilities and
perils of reconciliation, and stressing the importance of transitional regimes distinguishing
themselves from prior regimes that perpetrated or countenanced wrongdoing. Hence, to truly
make a compelling case for connecting Transitional Justice and environmentalism, the work will
have to take up how these and other issues find parallels in the case of justly responding to
ecocide – which, is the focus of the next chapter. But at this point, we can move forward and
begin analyzing environmentalism’s conceptualization of responsibility.

B.

Responsibility in Environmentalism

In many ways the history of environmentalism is a discussion focused on expanding our
responsibility towards previously ignored entities. For instance, at the turn of the 20th century
(i.e., the period often considered the birth of modern environmentalism) John Muir (the founder
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of the Sierra Club) famously advocated that we have a responsibility to preserve areas of pristine
nature and non-human life for their intrinsic value (i.e., an ecological responsibility); whereas,
Gifford Pinchot (the 28th Governor of Pennsylvania) promoted the view that we have a
responsibility to limit resource extraction to the maximum sustainable yield, so as to conserve
natural resources for future generations (i.e., an intergenerational responsibility).131
Nevertheless, attempting to provide a coherent narrative of the conceptual development
of responsibility in environmentalism, is hampered by the fact that there is disagreement among
environmentalists regarding essentially all the elements that would normally define a discipline,
e.g., the objective(s), mechanism(s), practice(s), subject matter(s), etc.132 Thus, unlike
Transitional Justice (an extremely broad discipline itself), it is unclear if one can even construe
environmentalism as a discipline at all.
Consequently, what this section aims to achieve is to offer a brief historical overview of a
few dominant strands in environmental thinking, which express shifts and tensions regarding
environmentalists’ broad understanding of responsibility. The hope is that this imperfect
summary, will at least illustrate that a comprehensive account of responsibility for environmental
harms (i.e., one encompassing a wide swath of often conflicting and competing environmental
considerations), ought to be: (1) common, but differentiated, (2) both backwards and forward
looking, and (3) socially capacious.
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This debate is often credited as the birth of modern environmentalism. For a thorough
discussion of the topic, see Bryan Norton’s Sustainability (Norton 2005).
132
The term ‘environmentalism’ is not capitalized in the dissertation, since it does not name a
proper discipline like Transitional Justice or Environmental Justice. Nevertheless, Joe Desjardin
provides an illuminating list of prototypical environmental concerns, “conservation of fossil fuels
and other natural resources, soil erosion and desertification, preservation of wilderness areas,
forests, and wetlands, preservation of endangered species, air and water pollution, agricultural
use of pesticide, chemical fertilizers, and genetically modified crops and livestock, moral
standing for animals and plants, global warming, the depletion of ozone layer, biodiversity,
urban sprawl, nuclear waste, and population growth” (DesJardins 1998: 825).
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1.

Origins of Environmental Responsibility

Humans like all other life forms must alter their environment to survive. But, in virtue of
our cognitive sophistication, behavioral plasticity, and dynamic sociability, we have proven
exceptionally adept at transforming the world around us. Unfortunately, as John Gray laments,
our species adaptive capacities have posed a problem for innumerable other organisms:
“Throughout all of history, and prehistory, human advance has coincided with ecological
devastation” (Gray 2002: 7).133
Hence the evidence of widespread ecological harm, coupled with the insight that early
man could simply relocate to greener pastures after depleting their current habitat of readily
accessible resources, allows us to plausibly suggest that many (if not most) prehistoric
communities would have had limited concern regarding their role in causing ecological
degradation.134 As Martha Macintyre contends, “the lack of a conservation ethic can itself be
explained in functionalist terms – they [i.e., prehistoric communities] did not need one and
therefore did not develop ideas about sustainability. The low populations and simple
technologies ensured that human impact was restricted” (Macintyre 2002: 5). As Thomas
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As Lynn White states: “Ever since man became a numerous species, he has affected his
environment notably. The hypothesis that his fire-drive method of hunting created the world's
great grasslands and helped to exterminate the monster mammals of the Pleistocene from much
of the globe is plausible, if not proved” (White 1967: 1203).
134
As such the property regime of early man was likely one of ‘open access,’ wherein it was
often the case that no one had the right to exclude anyone else from using a resource in
uninhabited land. Thus, if this anthropological hypothesis is correct, then prehistoric man’s
treatment of the environment can be analyzed using Garrett Hardin’s poorly dubbed concept,
“the tragedy of the commons,” which incongruously has nothing to do with common property;
but instead, illustrates the hazards of unrestricted ecosystem use arising from lack of
management system(s), absence of defined property right(s), and the inability to negotiate social
agreement(s) or convention(s) (Hardin 1968).
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Princen explains:
In an ecologically ‘empty world,’ a world in which human impact was minuscule relative
to the extent and regenerative capacity of resources and waste…being resourceful meant
getting the most from nature’s bounty…but not for long-term sustenance…[Since] one
just had to pack up and move on. There was always another frontier. (Princen 2005: 8)
Accordingly, the assumption is that conceptions of environmental responsibility would
likely not have arisen until after groups acknowledged that they had no available uninhabited
land to expand into (i.e., that they lived in a ‘full world’) and were compelled to settle their
current habitat.135 As Per Olsson, Carl Folke, and Fikret Berkes explain:
Investigators found that people moving from one area to another easily gained
detailed knowledge of particular resources and species, but peoples’ knowledge of
processes and functions of the underlying ecosystem that sustains those resources was
patchy and incomplete. It seems like knowledge and understanding relevant for
management of ecosystem dynamics takes a much longer time to develop. This suggests
that dwelling for long periods of time in specific places is helpful in generating an
understanding of ecosystem dynamics and sustainable management practice. (Olsson,
Folke, and Berkes 2004: 77)
Therefore, once pre-modern communities reach this saturation point (i.e., a “full earth”
when moving into a new territory required confrontation with another group), their only chance
of achieving a self-sufficient and peaceful existence (i.e., without invading another group’s
territory) was to develop ecologically sustainable practices, i.e., “self-interested, conserving
feedback that comes from attachment to place” (Berkes et al. 2006: 1558). As Berkes explains,
“[after] the hunters know that it is possible to deplete animals [or resources more generally] by
overhunting and that wastages do matter, their value systems change accordingly” (Berkes 1998:
123).
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This assumption rests on abundant research suggesting that humans in traditional societies
generally behave as “optimal foragers,” in that they seldom leave resources alone, unless they
have better options available (Borgerhoff-Mulder 1988). Furthermore, because of their small
population sizes, pre-saturation hunter-gathering bands would likely not need to or be able to
read the signs and signals from their lightly treaded upon habitat or separate their exploitative
impact from non-human (i.e., “natural”) fluctuations that would affect the available abundance of
resources.
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Hence in an attempt to achieve a sustainable lifestyle, there is much anthropological and
archaeological evidence to suggest that these communities embraced a notion of common
property, in which members of a community would share a resource but exclude nonmembers of
the community from accessing it (Bromley 1991). As Margaret McKean explains, “common
property regimes, used by communities to manage ecological resources for long-term benefits,
were once widespread around the globe” (McKean 1996: 5).136
Accordingly, our discussion of autarkic communities last chapter, vividly illuminated that
eco-social systems relying on notions of common property are an effective means of sustaining
resources and connecting peoples to a place.137 Essentially, autarkic communities develop and
embrace cultural norms supporting environmental stewardship, recognition of the group’s
embeddedness within their habitat, and internalization of the value of maintaining harmonious
ecosystem functioning.138 For instance, as Warwick Fox recounts, his conversation with a Nez
Percé Native American about potentially plowing the land, “Smohalla does not reply with a
closely reasoned explanation as to why the ground has intrinsic value but rather with a rhetorical
question expressive of a deep identification with the earth: ‘Shall I take a knife and tear my
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Elinor Ostrom throughout her illustrious career, worked tirelessly to demonstrate the
effectiveness of common property regimes (i.e., absent the need for state control or privatization)
in managing resources for which demand is too high to tolerate ‘open access,’ but for various
reasons, parceling the resource itself proves challenging. For a thorough analysis of the topic, see
her work Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (Ostrom
1990).
137
One of the solutions explored in the next chapter will be the possibility (re)establishing
common property regimes in response to ecocide.
138
Stella Tamang, an indigenous leader from Nepal, expresses the relationship thusly,
“indigenous peoples…have an intimate connection to the land; the rationale for talking about
who they are is tied to the land. They have clear symbols in their language that connect them to
places on their land…groups that only can achieve their spiritual place on the planet by going to
a certain location” (Henningfeld 2009: 117). Another example expressing indigenous societies’
internalization and deep recognition of their imbeddedness, integration, and dependence upon
natural system(s) is the Fijian concept of vanua, “which regards the land, water, and human
environment as a unit, one and indivisible” (Berkes and Folke 1998: 9).
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mother's breast?’” (Fox 1986: 76).139
As such, we have seen that autarkic communities foster rich notions of environmental
responsibility that allowed them to sustainably inhabit an ecosystem for generations. But for the
purposes of analyzing environmentalism’s notion of responsibility for environmental harm,
focusing on groups that successfully live in harmony with their surrounding habitat, offers
negligible insight. Consequently, it will be helpful to examine communities that rely on modes of
subsistence that overextend their ecosystem’s carrying capacity and generate environmental
degradation. In this light, we will now move on to discuss conceptions of environmental
responsibility developed in modern Occidental culture.

2.

Nuisance Law as Responsibility for Environmental Harm

Historically, at least in the English-speaking world, individual environmental
responsibility was limited to the avoidance of causing injury to other’s enjoyment of real estate
(i.e., their land).140 In early English common law, private property (i.e., land use and ownership)
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Carolyn Merchant emphasizes that one of the consequences of this shift of perspective, from
ceasing to view nature as a living, nurturing mother to instead viewing it as inert, dead, and
mailable matter (i.e., as expressed by Bacon, Descartes, Hobbes, Newton and other fathers of
modernity), is that an important constraint on exploiting nature was lost. Since as Merchant
states, “one does not readily slay a mother, dig into her entrails for gold, or mutilate her body”
(Merchant 2005: 43).
140
Of course there are older instances of what would today be considered environmental policy
legislation, e.g. in 676 Cuthbert of Lindisfarne enacts legislation protecting birds on the Farne
Islands (Okafor 2011: 277); in 1150 Sri Lankan King Nissanka Malla decreed that no animals
should be killed within a radius of seven gau from his capital city of Anuradhapura (Clifton
2007); in 11th century the Caliphate of Cordoba organized waste containers and waste disposal
facilities to prevent contamination (Artz 1980: 149); in 1366 Paris made it illegal for butchers to
dispose of animal within the city (Hoornweg 2015: 38); in the 14th century the Venetian Republic
passed legislation to limit deforestation in the surrounding hills to prevent erosion and silting
downstream (Grove 2003: 16); etc. But these and similar examples were all enacted to deal with
specific problems and singular issues; and thus, unlike the common law property protection
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was regarded as sacrosanct (Nolon 2006: 823). As William Blackstone, one of the first and most
preeminent legal scholars stated, “that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims over
the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the
universe” (1782).141 Thus, a plaintiff could file suit for environmental harms that deprived them
of their land (disseisina – deprivation), direct interference and entry on their land (transgressio –
trespass), and for indirect interference with the use of their land from outside their land
(nocumentum – nuisance) (Coquillette 1979: 765).
From an environmental perspective, the tort of nuisance appears to be the most relevant
and compelling cause of action, in that it represents the one area of common law that limits
landowner’s use of their property. Essentially, nuisance law prohibits private land usage(s) that
undermine and diminish the rights of other property owners to use and enjoy their land, i.e., sic
utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (“so use your own property as not to injure your neighbors”)
(Coquillette 1979: 776). Since, the available remedies of a successful nuisance claim include the
removal and abatement of the aggravation, the tort offers a legal means of stopping
environmental degradation, i.e., “in civilizing the cities and in protecting the countryside”
(Brenner 1974: 403). Hence, nuisance law in many ways represents the embryonic origins of
environmental protection of peace and quiet, clean air, sanitation, etc. (Brenner 1974: 403).
For instance, the King’s Bench ruling in Aldred’s Case (1610) is often considered the
birth of environmental law (Schoenbrod 2000: 5). In the case, the court held that operating an
odorous pigsty near a neighborhood was a nuisance. As such, Aldred’s Case specifically and
nuisance law more generally, established legal responsibility to abate noxious noises, smells,
sights, irritants, and pollutants provided their generation is not in line with the customary use of

framework, none of these policies articulate a comprehensive doctrine of environmental
responsibility.
141
See Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England (1782).
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the land (i.e., think contemporary zoning laws)142 (Epstein 2015: 6).
But from an environmental standpoint, an issue with the common law’s reliance on
customary usage, when determining if an activity is permissible or not, is that such a standard
neuters nuisance law’s ability to restrict or reproach environmental harm(s) occurring in already
degraded areas. Consequently, historically mistreated neighborhoods (i.e., those already
suffering under environmental hardship) will be further disadvantaged in receiving
consideration, compensation, and protection from new or ongoing harms. Hence, focusing on
customary use greatly impacts and impairs the possibility of achieving an equitable social
distribution of environmental bads and goods.
More generally, legally assenting to customary practice as appropriate hinders the
prospect of reducing pollution in societies with histories of environmental mistreatment – such as
our own. Since obviously, emphasizing the role of traditional use when determining if violations
have occurred, will reinforce, maintain, and protect current levels and patterns of
environmentally harmful activity.
Basically, accepting customary usage as legitimate renders the common law impotent
regarding the prospects of legally prohibiting conventional practices or indicting established
conditions within an area. Thus, an issue with limiting environmental responsibility to common
law standard(s) in the modern world (i.e., a world defined by mass consumerism, unmitigated
globalized production, unsustainable resource extraction, and widespread pollution) is that such
an approach fails at passing judgment against and restricting many environmentally harmful
practices, i.e., it is unable to compel actors to cease and desist from customary uses of the land
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For instance, New York City’s implementation of single-use zoning ordinances in the early
20th century that were initially implemented as urban planning measures to protect the interests
of high-end merchants on Fifth Avenue from the encroachment of garment factories and other
industrial operations in a retail area (Nolon 2006: 830).
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that are damaging to ecosystems. And unfortunately, since, industrial practices have been
pervasive for generations in many contemporary societies (e.g., during the last two hundred
years, the Industrial Revolution altered the landscapes of much of Western Europe and North
America), it is likely this standard would bar many opportunities for pro-environmental legal
recourse.
Hence, an appropriate method to prevent continued environmental degradation requires
taking responsibility to curb unsustainable production, consumption, extraction, and pollution,
i.e., proscriptively establish, follow, and enforce acceptable environmental standards. As David
Schoenbrod explains: “It is much easier to discern a custom against the existence of pigsties in a
certain neighborhood than a custom about how many pigsties there should be [in society more
generally]. A few refineries in a large metropolitan area may be fine, but not a dozen”
(Schoenbrod 2000: 6).
Essentially, the issue is that the common law framework is designed to focus on actual
harm(s) (i.e., a party must show damages). Thus, nuisance claims are inherently reactive and
backwards looking and as such are ill suited to motivate preventative measures to stop
environmental harms from occurring in the first place (i.e., beyond the threat of future litigation
causing actors to forgo or abate potentially tortious activity). Case in point, environmental
enforcement mechanism(s) based on custom(s) are limited to offering ex post facto judgments
and as such, are unable to determine if new technologies or social practices are acceptable prior
to implementation.
Also, traditionally, under the common law, only aggrieved private property owners could
bring nuisance claims. Therefore, private torts are unable to protect unowned or publicly owned
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natural objects.143 Furthermore, under common law property owners had no responsibility to
preserve their land (i.e., so long as no one else’s property was impacted, land owners had the
right to degrade or destroy their property as they saw fit). Thus, worrisomely for many
environmentalists, these standards entail that natural objects are only protected for their extrinsic
value to their owner, i.e., common law does not recognize the intrinsic value of nature in-and-ofitself or extrinsic value to the commons.
Moreover, many environmental nuisances have long gestation periods, e.g. the threat of
radioactive poisoning from Plutonium is minimum 24,100 years; arsenic, lead, and mercury can
contaminate water supplies for generations; one fifth of carbon molecules stay in atmosphere for
over a thousand years, etc. (Bell 2017: 280). As such, the long temporal scope of environmental
harms may foreclose opportunities to hold responsible parties to account, i.e., if those liable for
causing harm cease to exist (e.g., natural persons dying or corporations going out of business) in
the intervening period, between their noxious activity and the onset of resulting damages, then
those harmed may be left with no legal recourse.
Furthermore, litigation is costly (i.e., in terms of both financial, temporal, and social
capital); thus, the poor or socially disenfranchised may in practice lack the ability to investigate,
file, and pursue valid causes of action. Consequently, it is likely that limiting environmental
protection to the tort of nuisance disproportionally benefits wealthy and socially privileged
actors.
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Historically public nuisance was a crime, only enforceable by the Crown. “Indeed, until 1536,
private actions for public nuisance were disallowed on the grounds that only the king, and
certainly no common person could have a remedy because of a crime” (Hodas 1989: 884). Thus,
in the early common law period there were no mechanisms available for private citizens to file
suit against public environmental harms. Also, we can see that the state (i.e., the Crown) always
maintained the power to dictate and enforce environmental protection. Nevertheless, for much of
the modern period the state abstained from taking an active role in preserving and defending
non-human environmental objects and interests.
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Finally, the common law approach developed to handle situations in which a clearly
defined defendant harmed a clearly defined plaintiff. In such cases, the roles and responsibilities
are well defined, in that the plaintiff is the aggrieved party responsible for bringing the cause of
action and the defendant is responsible for compensating the plaintiff for their loss and/or
stopping the harm from occurring once guilt is established.
But much environmental harm in the modern world does not fit this narrative, in that
many suffer (hundreds, thousands, millions, even billions in the case of climate change) from
effects resulting from the cumulative and combined contributions of innumerably dispersed and
uncoordinated actors (potentially even the victims themselves). As such, common law is
ineffective in providing recourse for these sorts of cases.
As Schoenbrod wryly explains, the problem with pursuing complex systemic harm(s)
from within the common law framework is that, “enforcement maybe worthwhile [i.e., from a
social perspective], but worth no one’s while [from an individual perspective] (Schoenbrod
2000: 6).144 Thus, if the only available social response to environmental destruction is the
common law tort of nuisance, then many instances of pervasive, widespread, and systemic
industrial overproduction and waste (which much environmental harm is since the Great
Acceleration)145 may go unabated and unenforced. As Simon Caney explains, the problem with
such a position is that, “we should not [emphasis added] take pollution as a given and then act in
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Christopher Stone in his famous essay, “Should Trees Have Legal Standing,” explains the
problem with relying on common law approaches to protecting a stream from pollution, thusly:
“So far as the common law is concerned, there is in general no way to challenge the polluter’s
actions save at the behest of a lower riparian…[But] the lower riparian may simply not care
about the pollution. They themselves may be polluting and not wish to stir up legal waters. They
may be economically dependent on their polluting neighbors. And, of course, when they discount
the value of winning by the cost of bringing the suit and the chances of success, the action may
be simply not worth the undertaking” (Stone 1972: 462-463).
145
The Great Acceleration is demarcated as the post-WWII period, in which the human
“population doubled in just 50 years, to over 6 billion by the end of the 20th century and the
global economy increased by more than 15-fold” (Steffen et al. 2007: 617).
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a reactive fashion: rather, we should be pro-active and take steps to minimize the likelihood of
excessive pollution” (Caney 2005: 769).

3.

Statutory Expansion of Environmental Responsibility

Consequently, for all of these reasons modern states have pushed for statutory measures
aimed at proactively strengthening environmental protection by expanding our individual and
social environmental responsibility to avoid causing certain types of harms.146 According to
Holmes Rolston, the explanation, justification, and motivation behind the litany of environmental
legislation enacted during the second half of the 20th century stems from growing recognition
that, “a community nearing the carrying capacity of its resource base will have to curb short-term
self-interest for the long-term good of all (Rolston 2001: 351).
As Daneil Butt explains, “the [statutory] model…is…one where environmental
protection is thought to come about using the power of the state to align self-interest with
environmental good” (Butt 2017: 56). In other words, the legislation attempts to solve scenarios
in which, the activity of numerous people that would normally be fine (or even beneficial)
individually, collectively accumulates into social harm.
Thus, unlike the common law, which focuses on negative rights of non-interference, the

146

Rolston offers an extensive list of federally enacted environmental law in the United States:
“Clean Air Act (1955), Amendments (1963, 1965, 1969, 1977, renewed 1970, 1990); Wild and
Scenic Rivers Act (1968); Wilderness Act (1964) National Environmental Policy Act (1969);
Marine Mammal Protection Act (1972); Endangered Species Act (1973, 1982), Amendments
(1976, 1977, 1978, 1979, 1980); National Forest Management Act (1976); Federal Land Policy
and Management Act (1976); International Environmental Protection Act (1983);
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (Superfund) (1980),
Amendments (1986); Clean Water Act (1987); Emergency Wetlands Resources Act (1986)”
(Rolston 2001: 349-350). And, he explains that internationally, “there are over 150 international
environmental agreements registered with the United Nations” (Rolston 2001: 350).
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legislative act(s) aim at proactively promoting the public good. Accordingly, the laws often
afford citizens broad standing (whether directly harmed or not) to bring claims against actors in
violation of the statutory standards and requirements in the name of the public interest (public
weal).147
As such, 20th century environmental legislation represents a radical departure in social
engineering, away from laissez faire and retrospective consideration of environmental harm(s),
tacitly endorsed by the common law, to a statutory approach designed to proactively bring about
particular state(s) of affairs. For example, The Endangered Species Act aims at halting further
extinction and protecting maximum biodiversity; The Clean Air and Clean Water Acts aim at
ensuring safe drinking water and breathable air; Ozone Layer Protection Act aims at restoring
ozone layer to its preindustrial functioning, etc. Hence, the statutes emphasize a prescriptive and
forward-looking responsibility to achieve certain environmental targets and end states.
Consequently, the statutory measures facilitate an expansion of individual and social
responsibility regarding environmental harms. Previously, actors were legally limited to pursuing
claims regarding environmental harms occurring only on their own property and conversely
actors were only liable for causing such harm to others’ property. Under the contemporary
statutory framework all citizens can actively monitor and enforce environmental law(s) for the
common good and all actors are liable in virtue of violating the statutes, even if no party is
directly harmed. Thus, we can see that the statutory framework expands the subject matter of
environmental responsibility beyond the traditional common law concern of protecting private
land use.
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For a vivid example of the broad standing afforded by contemporary environmental law to the
general public, see the Supreme Court case Tennessee Calley Authority v. Hill (1978); in which,
Hiram Hill, a law student at University of Tennessee, successfully filed suit under the
Endangered Species Act (1973) to enjoin the construction of the Tellico Dam.
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However as previously stated, one of the key insights driving the proliferation of
environmental regulations was mounting awareness and recognition that human activity was
growing increasingly destructive to the environment.148 The concern was that the scope and scale
of industrial productive and consumptive practices had reached such intensity that the combined
effect of countless small acts, which in-and-of-themselves would normally be harmless (e.g.,
driving a car, taking a plane, using plastic, turning on air conditioning, fertilizing crops, using
aerosol spray deodorants, etc.), were when aggregated, producing grave environmental harms
(e.g., climate change, the sixth mass extinction, ocean acidification, etc.).149
Unfortunately, the statutory model faces many challenges in providing a conception of
environmental responsibility adequate for preventing, repairing, and responding to the above
crises. First and foremost, it is ill-designed for confronting the fact that many environmental
problems are international in nature, in that they do not respect or confine themselves to state
borders, i.e., harms (e.g., acid rain, chemical spills, ozone depletion, etc.) that are generated by
processes and practices in one (or many) state(s) that can readily cross interstate-lines (e.g., by
cycling through the atmosphere, waterways, groundwater, etc.) and negatively impact other
state(s).
The problem is that the statutory model offers a framework for stipulating impermissible
acts within state boundaries; but its intrastate focus, restricts state’s ability to command and
control actors outside of their territorial borders to cease and desist from noxious activity. Hence,
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Eileen Crist succinctly and evocatively describes, “the real [environmental] problem [as] the
industrial consumer-complex that is overhauling the world in an orgy of exploitation,
overproduction, and waste” (Crist 2007: 55).
149
Rachel Carson’s seminal work, Silent Spring, offers one of the first and most successful of
these types of accounts; in that she demonstrated, how the aggregated impact of non-coordinated
individual behavior(s) (i.e., farmers using DDT to protect their crops) caused widespread and
unforeseen environmental harm (i.e., the endangerment of bird species) (Carson 1962).
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if states lack authority to extradite and prosecute international actors for “spillover” harms, then
the statutory model’s limited domestic jurisdiction leaves citizens vulnerable to transnational
pollution and ecological resource depletion.
Thus, a fundamental limitation of the statutory model is that even if citizens take
maximum precaution for preserving and protecting their environmental wellbeing, i.e., enacting
the strongest environmental legislation and enforcement mechanisms possible within their
borders. They are nonetheless left vulnerable regarding environmental injury(ies) from abroad,
i.e., the only available recourse under the statutory model is campaigning, negotiating, and
persuading state(s) from which harm is emanating to enact policies aimed at outlawing or
regulating injurious activity within their sovereign territory or appealing (without further legal
backing or threat) to the responsible parties to cease and desist from the injurious activity.
However, if these negotiations and lobbying strategies fail, the statutory model is unable to
directly prosecute culpable parties or stop injuries from occurring.
Accordingly, the statutory model’s domestic framing, poses problems for tackling many
pressing environmental issues, in that it is quite restricted in its ability to hold actors responsible
for internationally generated harms to account.150 Essentially, the statutory model proves
inadequate because its intrastate framing is unable to confront the reality that, “bits of
populations [citizens] Ecological Footprint can be found all over the world” (Wackernagel and
Rees 1996: 53).151 As such, environmentalism requires a conception of responsibility capable of
confronting what Richard Falks calls, “endangered-planet problems” (Falks 1971).
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As Andrew Linklater explains: “If societies were largely self‐contained and incapable of
doing harm to one another then the boundaries of moral communities could converge with the
boundaries of actual political communities, but the reality is quite different, and societies are
inevitably drawn into complex dialogues about the principles of international coexistence”
(Linklater 1998: 85).
151
Mathis Wackernagel and William Rees define “Ecological Footprint” as, “the land (and
water) area that would be required to support a defined human population and material standard
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C.

Common, But Differentiated Environmental Responsibility

Recently in a response to the above challenges, the international environmental
community has moved towards developing and promoting a notion of ‘common, but
differentiated responsibility’ for environmental harm (CBDR) (Eckersley 2015).152 Essentially,
the international environmental community has opted to embrace CBDR because of the desire to
cast a wide net, in the hopes of maintaining the benefits of shared and collective responsibility,
while concurrently avoiding an overly condemnatory framework that draws socially insensitive
conclusions by blaming victims for environmental degradation.
Basically, the work contends that CBDR is a compromised position between two
competing strands of environmental thought – what I will broadly dub the ‘Anthropic
perspective’ (which aims at developing a notion of common responsibility by holding all of
humanity to account)153 and the ‘Environmental Justice perspective’ (which aims at developing a

indefinitely’” (Wackernagel and Rees 1996: 158). As Andrew Dobson explains the usefulness of
such a definition is that, “the ecological footprint then becomes a time‐slice indicator of a human
community’s metabolistic relationship with the goods and services provided by its natural
environment” (Dobson 2003: 100).
152
The concept of CBDR was famously expressed in the 1992 Rio Declaration: “States shall cooperate in a spirit of global partnership to conserve, protect and restore the health and integrity of
the Earth’s ecosystem. In view of the different contributions to global environmental
degradation, States have common but differentiated responsibilities. The developed countries
acknowledge the responsibility that they bear in the international pursuit of sustainable
development in view of the pressures their societies place on the global environment and of the
technologies and financial resources they command” (Principle 7, 1992).
153
For our purposes the Anthropic perspective is not strictly limited to the debate focused on
determining if human activity has pushed the Earth into new geological age (i.e., the
Anthropocene), but instead involves any environmental framework that blames humanity in toto
for environmental degradation – e.g., James Lovelock’s Gaia Hypothesis that views humanity as
disease that the Earth is combatting (Lovelock 2009); Simon Dalby’s Pyrocentric model that
views humanity’s reliance on fire as the source of environmental destruction (Dalby 2018);
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notion of differentiated responsibility attuned to historical realities that certain actors have played
a greater role in generating environmental harm than others).154 Thus in an attempt to justify why
environmentalism benefits from embracing CBDR, the remainder of the section will analyze
these conflicting strands of environmental thought; while concurrently, illustrating how each
perspective fails at conceptualizing an adequate notion of environmental responsibility.

1. The Anthropic Perspective

The Anthropic perspective arose as an attempt to effectively frame and confront the
problems presented by recognizing the growing (i.e., international and global) scope and scale
that human activity is having on biotic and abiotic ecosystem functioning. The view likely stems
from pessimistic strands of environmental thinking, which emphasize that humans necessarily
require the death and destruction of many living things in order to survive, i.e., walking, bathing,
clothing ourselves, eating, all necessitate harming other living things.
But more recently, the assessment that humanity in toto is responsible for environmental
degradation, began receiving increased attention, when many academics (mostly scientists)
started proposing that the Earth had entered a new geological era: the Anthropocene.

Edward Wilson’s Eremozoic drive, which contends that humanity is currently in the midst of a
civilizing frenzy to empty reality of everything that is non-human (Wilson 2006); Erich Fromm’s
Necrophilic orientation, which he believes pushes man to, “transform that which is alive into
something unalive” (Fromm 1973: 332), etc.
154
For our purposes the Environmental Justice perspective is a broad tent of various historically
and sociologically attuned environmental standpoints - e.g., environmentalism of the poor (see
Guha and Martinez-Alier 1997), climate justice (see Dawson 2010), sustainable selfdetermination (see Corntassel 2008), ecofeminism (see Mies and Bennholdt-Thomsen 1999),
environmental racism (see Bullard 1990); global environmental justice (see Grineski, Collins,
Ford, Fitzgerald, Aldouri, Velazquez-Angulo, and Lu), and the environmental justice movement
(see Shrader-Frechette 2002) – all of which concur in stressing the importance of recognizing
differentiated levels of responsibility for environmental harms.
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“Characterized by the fact that the ‘human imprint on the global environment has now become
so large and active that it rivals some of the great forces of Nature in its impact on the
functioning of the Earth system’” (Bonneuil and Fressoz, 2016: 4).155
Essentially, the Anthropic perspective places blame for transforming the environment to
such an extent as to alter Earth-system functioning(s) on the Anthropos (i.e., the whole of
humanity operating as a monolithic force). Thus, such an analysis can be interpreted as a
“doubling-down” and expansion of the totalizing, universalizing, and collectivist rhetoric that
had gained traction and credibility in the emerging corpus of environmental legislation.156 But
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The Anthropic perspective gained traction within the scientific community in the second half
of the 20th century as empirical evidence from multiple disciples (climatology, oceanography,
geology, biology, etc.) began mounting, demonstrating the dramatic effect of human activity on
the planet, i.e., we have entered the age of, “human dominance of biological, chemical, and
geological process on Earth” (Crutzen and Schwagerl 2011). Use of words such as ‘dominance’
in the above quote express much of the hyperbolic rhetoric that many criticize the Anthropic
perspective for. But for our purposes, refuting or supporting the veracity of these claims is
beyond the scope of the work; as we are simply concerned with the Anthropic perspective, as a
means of demonstrating the historical shift in environmental thinking away from intrastate
concerns found in the statutory model, towards a view of common and collective responsibility
focused on global environmental degradation.
156
We can see the Anthropic view expressed in the following quotes: “humanity…due to our
tinkering has given the world a low grade fever, which we need to quickly calm before it climbs”
(Ackerman, 2014: 42); “we have utterly changed our world; now we’ll have to see if we can
change our ways” (Ehrlich and Ehrlich 2008: 362); “as we destroy this planet…we have lost
sight of our role as stewards” (Higgins 2010: XII); “in the contemporary world the extinction of
the species Homo sapiens would be beneficial to the Earth’s Community of Life as a whole”
(Taylor 1986: 114), and “there is increasing evidence that humanity is affecting Earth system
functioning to a degree that threatens the resilience of the Earth system [more accurately the
quote could have stated ‘threatens the resilience of human society’]” (Steffen et al. 2015). All the
preceding quotes convey the message that humanity in-and-of-itself constitutes a culpable
singular agent engaged in uniformly destructive activities. Nevertheless, the reasoning found in
these and similar remarks are found regularly in environmental literature. The issue is that such
assertions illustrate a rhetorical jump from the premise – ‘that the aggregate and cumulative
impact of human activity is effecting the planet’ to the conclusion – ‘that all humans are at least
partially responsible for the current state of the global environment’. As such, a central problem
with the Anthropic perspective or other environmental theories that assert similar claim(s) is
their reliance on such a dubious argumentative move. It is unclear if the environmentalists
themselves actually endorse the view that all humans are culpable or if they are victims of being
captured by unreflective rhetorical hyperbole; but nonetheless, if the words are interpreted
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unlike the statutory model, which embeds responsibility for environmental harm within the
territoriality of sovereign states, the Anthropic perspective transcends these intrastate boundaries
by focusing responsibility for environmental degradation at the global scale.
An important feature of the view for our purposes is that it stresses the Anthropos’
common culpability, concern, and responsibility for preventing, mitigating, and repairing
environmental harms, i.e., the Anthropic framework emphasizes a form of non-differentiated
responsibility for all humanity. As Erle Ellis explains, while endorsing the view: “The Earth we
have inherited from our ancestors is now our responsibility…there is no alternative except to
shoulder the mantle of planetary stewardship. A good, or at least better Anthropocene is within
our grasp” (Ellis 2011). Diane Ackerman expresses the same sentiment, thusly:
But, for a change, we know the exact causes of the extinction, having created them
ourselves – climate change, habitat loss, pollution, invasive species, big agriculture,
acidifying the oceans, urbanization, a growing population demanding more natural
resources – and we’re in a position to stop them, if we set our collective mind to it.
(Ackerman, 2014: 154)
Much of the appeal of the Anthropic view stems from the fact that it may be true that
humanity has influenced the entire global environment. Since, as Rolston provocatively states,
“100% natural systems no longer exist on Earth, since there is DDT in penguins in Antarctica”
(Rolston 2016: 64).157 Nevertheless, there are numerous problems and challenges for framing an
adequate conception of environmental responsibility from within the Anthropic perspective.

literally, then the Anthropic perspective is clearly grounded in and built upon this faulty
assumption.
157
A worry regarding Rolston’s statement is it relies on the problematic dichotomy separating
Man from Nature. Many environmentalists have argued that it is precisely this view that Man is
separate from Nature that has led to our present environmental crisis. Thus, an important step for
improving our disastrous relationship with the environment is to push for greater understanding
and recognition that we are in fact part of nature and entirely natural ourselves. As such, one of
the hopes motivating this dissertation is that pursuing environmental transformative justice
measures will assist in reaching this realization.
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For one, the conclusion that all of humanity is responsible and complicit in causing
planetary environmental harm seems suspect and hastily drawn.158 It ignores the relevant fact
that certain segments of the human population (e.g., roving imperialists vs. autarkic
communities) are far more culpable than others (both historically and at present) for the general
deterioration of the global environment, “a new human being born on Earth will have a carbon
footprint a thousand times greater if she is born into a rich family in a rich country, than into a
poor family in a poor country” (Bonneuil and Fressoz 2016: 70). As Vaclav Smil calculated, “the
difference in modern energy consumption between a subsistence pastoralist in the Sahel and an
average Canadian may easily be larger than 1,000-fold” (Smil 2008: 259). As such, the
perspective is factually mistaken in emphasizing humanities’ undifferentiated and supposedly
aligned role in causing environmental harm.
Another problem with the view is that it offers a totalizing “grand narrative” that reduces
disparate environmental harms into an all-encompassing framework emphasizing radical changes
occurring to the entirety of the Earth-system. Accordingly, such an approach exceeds our
subjective awareness and obscures our ability to grasp the harms under consideration.159
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One might argue that from a purely technical and captious perspective it is possible to make
the argument that all humans are responsible - since at minimum we all release CO2 when we
exhale. As such, from our very first breath, we are actively contributing to climate change and
the litany of environmental crises generated by rising levels of atmospheric greenhouse gasses.
But the problem with this argument is that it has been empirically demonstrated that many
indigenous people lead net-carbon negative lifestyles (Tauli-Corpuz and Lynge 2008: 11-12).
Thus, these people actually assist in mitigating environmental harm instead of contributing to it.
159
Essentially, it is not that gathering, studying, learning, and acquiring intellectual
understanding of Earth-level changes is beyond our cognitive abilities. Obviously, we have these
capacities, or we would lack the litany of scientific evidence supporting the claim that we have
entered the Anthropocene. The disconnect stems from how we in an everyday sense, emotionally
experience and socially interact with the world. It is interesting to reflect on why these
breakdowns in processing may occur. One speculative reason explaining why we are unable to
emotionally process global rates of environmental degradation is that the knowledge may be too
overwhelming, frightening, depressing, or might trigger a sense of existential dread or
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The concern is that the Anthropic framework’s emphasis on planetary changes and global
solutions is potentially demotivating for individual human actors that are phenomenologically
embedded and exist within particular communities and habitats. Essentially, the problem is that
our subjective and localized experience limits our ability to grasp (i.e., in our everyday lives) the
Earth-level harm(s) under consideration (e.g., global temperature rise, ocean acidification,
biodiversity loss, etc.).160 For instance, knowing that at the planetary-scale, the Earth will
experience a three degrees-Celsius rise in temperature, offers little explanatory insight into what
the impact of this global change will mean at a local level (i.e., how it will change and alter the
immediate ecosystem(s) we engage with and rely upon in our everyday lives);161 which in turn,
makes it extraordinarily challenging to conceptualize from this information the local harm(s) that
will occur, what damages we are responsible for, or what action we can take to prevent, mitigate,

hopelessness. Furthermore, at a psycho-sociological level the problem with internalizing and
acting upon the knowledge is its propensity to alienate, i.e., such knowledge may foster a sense
of disconnect, discontentment, discomfort, and disdain for our own society’s unreflective naiveté
and blissful ignorance in proceeding according to the logic of “business as usual” in the midst of
an ever-growing environmental crisis.
160
Thus, while it is true that modern locomotion (e.g., planes, high-speed trains, cars, etc.)
allows us to rapidly traverse from one area of the globe to another and that modern modes of
communication (e.g., the internet, telephone, television, etc.) allow us to stay informed and even
instantaneously see far off corners of the globe; nonetheless, our daily lives are situated within
the specific location we currently inhabit. As such, we are restricted in our ability to gain a
vantage point, which allows us to grasp planetary change.
161
It is important to stress that this argument does not imply that because these planetary changes
occur at a scope and scale that humans are unable to grasp in our everyday lives that no harm is
occurring. The harms (e.g., flooding caused by rising sea levels, starvation caused by
biodiversity loss, heat strokes caused by increasing temperature) are no doubt real and injurious.
However, the point is simply emphasizing that the threshold limits of human perception (i.e., the
spatial and temporal scope and scale of phenomenological awareness) hinder our ability to
experientially track perceptible differences linking specific act(s), to global alteration(s),
resulting in localized harm. As such, these experiential limitations make it exceedingly
challenging to assign responsibility for the actual injuries caused by planetary changes that the
Anthropic perspective focuses on.
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or adapt to palpable environmental degradation.162
Consequently, if we tend to struggle with experientially discerning or affectively
internalizing the global trends that the Anthropic perspective is concerned with, then such an
orientation (i.e., focusing on planetary changes to frame our analysis of environmental
degradation) is likely to hinder responsiveness in our reactive emotional attitudes.163 Obviously,
such a result is worrisome in that the work endorses the idea that we rely heavily on our reactive
attitudes to compel action and allocate blame. Thus, if this analysis is correct, the Anthropic view
(contrary to its own aspirations) may foster an insensitivity to environmental harm and transform
us into the proverbial frog in a pot of gradually heating water numb and unable to respond to the
changing world around us.164
Also, in this vein of analysis, the Anthropic view can lead to a skewed understanding of
how environmental harms actually are brought about. For instance, after internalizing the
Anthropic perspective that the combined action of all humanity is causing environmental
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It seems intuitive that actor’s likelihood of involving themselves in preventing, repairing, or
reconciling an injury correlate with their proximity to the wrong, i.e., either in their role in
causing it or in the impact it has upon them. Basically, the worry is that the Anthropic
perspective’s extraordinarily coarse-grained analysis of responsibility (i.e., holding the entire
Anthropos responsible), forecloses the prospect of more intimately linking actors to harms;
which may in turn, demotivate actors from taking steps to redress specific environmental issues.
163
For a thorough discussion relating our reactive attitudes and emotional conditioning to our
values and behaviors, see Jesse Prinz’s The Emotional Construction of Morals (Prinz 2007).
164
If environmentalists fixate on the Anthropic perspective and exclusively emphasize our
responsibility to combat Earth-level harms, then it might undercut our motivation, drive, and
impetus to tackle more local and traditional environmental problems because it becomes
increasingly difficult to prove that local action will bear fruit in light of wider global trends.
Since as Michael Maniates explains, “when everything is connected to everything else, knowing
how or when or why to intervene becomes difficult; such ‘system complexity’ seems to
overwhelm any possibility of planned, coordinated, effective intervention” (Maniates 2001: 60).
Thus, in many ways the work’s focus on ecocide is an attempt to reemphasize the importance of
dealing with local ecosystems and the need to combat more traditional environmental harms (i.e.,
harms to specific habitats independent of their connection to and impact upon Earth-level
systems).
121

degradation, one may begin to believe that the world is running out of water because in
conjunction each individual human is drinking too much of it, taking too long of showers, or
watering their lawns in access, etc.165
Whereas, the reality is that it is industrial mass production, commercialization, and
reliance on global supply-chains that generates the bulk of the harm.166 As Kirkpatrick Sales
states, “the story has been the same every year: individual consumption – residential, by private
car, so on – is never more than about a quarter of all consumption; the vast majority is
commercial, industrial, corporate, by agribusiness, and government. So even if we all took up
cycling and wood stoves it would have a negligible impact on energy use, global warming and
atmospheric pollution” (Sale 2003)
Hence as we saw last chapter, human communities that subsist without relying on
rapacious institutions, structures, and processes (i.e., autarkic communities) are often able to
strengthen their habitat. As such, the Anthropic perspective functions to obscure the truth of
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For a thorough discussion of the problem with increased individualization of responsibility in
mainstream contemporary environmentalism, see Maniates’ “Individualization: Plant a Tree,
Buy a Bike, Save the World?” (2002). Furthermore, by focusing on humans in general (i.e., the
entirety of humanity) the Anthropic perspective has a tendency to be interpreted as implying a
certain view of human nature, in that it makes it seems as though it is something innately within
us all (e.g., greed, selfishness, shortsightedness, etc.) as members of the Anthropos that is
causing the problem. However, it must be pointed out that the Anthropic perspective does not
necessitate such a reading; nonetheless, it has a tendency to unwittingly engender such
sentiments. Hopefully, the dissertation’s portrayal of autarkic communities in the last chapter,
conclusively debunks this view and demonstrates that humans are not irreparably “hardwired” to
live unsustainably. In fact, it is not outlandish to speculate that the vast majority of cultures and
communities that have ever existed were likely sustainable and only collapsed after outside
interference and meddling (e.g., invasion, exploitation, corruption, domination, etc.).
166
The Climate Accountability Institute’s report detailing how, “over half of all emissions since
human induced climate change was officially recognized can be traced to just 25 corporate and
state producing entities,” has made it abundantly clear that often environmental degradation is
not a product of individual behavior (Griffin 2017: 8).
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environmental depredation, i.e., that not all humans and lifestyles inevitably harm the
environment, nor will all communities be harmed to the same extent.167
Nonetheless, despite these difficulties, the perspective seems motivated by the laudable
objective of stressing the fact that solving the present environmental crises requires a unified
global effort (i.e., the same realization that limited the success of a more traditional statutory
approach). Thus, a beneficial insight gleaned from the Anthropic framework is that it highlights
the reality that to effectively combat environmental degradation at a global scale, requires acrossthe-board cooperation, i.e., recognizing that we are all in this together. As Steven Vanderheiden
succinctly states, “it also reminds us that we are all citizens of the same finite planet, bound
together in relationships of interdependence and mutual responsibility” (Vanderheiden 2011: 83).
Consequently for our purposes, the Anthropic perspective effectively illustrates that
environmentalism benefits by incorporating a ‘commonality’ criterion (meaning everyone has a
role to play in combatting environmental harm) within its conception of responsibility.168
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The Anthropic view’s focus on Earth-level changes problematically fails to consider the
dramatic difference in vulnerabilities certain local communities face in comparison with others.
For instance, lost in its global perspective is the disparate impact of living on an island
ecosystem that is entirely washed away, versus living in a habitat that experiences a slight
increase in rainfall; which in turn, masks the fact that certain groups are in need of greater
assistance from environmental degradation than others.
168
It must be highlighted that the global reach of the ‘commonality’ criterion in many strands of
environmental thinking is at odds with the accepted range of responsibility in Transitional
Justice, in that Transitional Justice has only recently and reluctantly expressed a willingness to
expand collective responsibility to the intrastate-level; as such, nowhere in the field’s
mainstream literature (unlike in environmentalism) is it argued that blame for mass atrocities
ought to be allocated at a global-level. However, this work views the tension between the
disciplines’ respective scope(s) of common responsibility as unproblematic; in fact, the
conclusion is that the disagreement is helpful for illuminating a productive and insightful
“division of labor” for each discipline to focus on when confronting ecocide. Essentially, the
outlook is that Transitional Justice’s intrastate framing of ‘common responsibility’ is effective in
tackling the specific token instance of ecocide by providing meaningful insight and mechanisms
for tailoring reparative and reconciliatory response(s) suited to the need(s) of those impacted.
Whereas, environmentalism is able to offer guidance on preventing and understanding the
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Accordingly, while it might behoove environmentalists to move away from embracing the more
dubious elements of the Anthropic perspective, there are advantages to not abandoning the
critique entirely, as it has proven helpful in demonstrating the need for widespread cooperation
in combating pervasive environmental degradation.
Essentially, an important corrective to the political environmentalist consciousness of the
Anthropic perspective is recognizing that environmental destruction is not the fault of some
generalized mass of humans (the Anthropos), i.e., much of the harm is generated by a small
percentage of actors benefiting from environmentally unsustainable practices. Accordingly, we
need a notion of responsibility that will allow us to better differentiate and hold actor’s
environmentally bad decisions and mismanagement to account.169

2. Environmental Justice Perspective

Fortunately, in the decades immediately preceding the initial formulation of the
Anthropic perspective, new strands of environmental thinking arose that strove to confront
precisely the problem of developing an effective framework for conceptualizing disparate levels
of responsibility for environmental harms. As previously explained, we will capture these diverse
trends and movements by broadly classifying them all under the umbrella term of Environmental
Justice.

general type of harm ecocide embodies by explaining the global trends, policies, practices,
norms, and institutions that are causing environmental degradation in the first place.
169
One of the major goals of this project is to assist in more clearly illustrating how
environmental harms actually occur. The work endeavors to achieve this aim through providing
a model, which correctly represents the causes of ecocide by assigning the actors, actions, and
institutions their appropriate causal significance.
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As stated, Environmental Justice focused first and foremost on differentiating degrees of
responsibility for and victimization from environmental degradation. Notably, unlike the
Anthropic perspective that derives much of its support and credibility from the scientific
community; the Environmental Justice perspective gained traction and respectability from within
the social sciences, humanities, and various social justice movements. Thus, the disciplinary
origins, orientation, and training of practitioners and proponents of the perspective make it wellpositioned and conceptually equipped for considering historically differentiated responsibility for
environmental harms.
The overarching objective of the various Environmental Justice movements is to show
how certain segments of humanity have been treated unjustly in one or all of the following ways:
(1) distributive injustice – the inequitable sharing of environmental ‘goods’ (resources) and
‘bads’ (harm and risk); (2) procedural/participatory injustice – unfair ways in which social
decisions are made that exclude individuals or groups from controlling their own relationship
with their environment; and (3) lack of recognition – individuals, groups, and environments
being historically undervalued (Vandherheiden 2016). “Witness Katrina in black and white
neighborhoods of New Orleans, or Sandy in Haiti and Manhattan, or sea level rise in Bangladesh
and the Netherlands, or practically any other [environmental] impact…there will be lifeboats for
the rich and privileged” (Malm and Hornbord 2014: 66).
Hence, we can see that one of the key insights of the Environmental Justice perspective is
emphasizing that instances of environmental harm track, reinforce, and exacerbate social
inequities. Consequently, the goal of the Environmental Justice movement is to employ these

125

histories of injustice as means of recognizing, justifying, and achieving broad socio-economic
and environmental objectives.170
However, there is a problem with the view in that it seems to presuppose that the
environmental and social harms are distinct.171 Whereas, a central goal of this work is showing
that socio-cultural and ecological systems are linked, i.e., the project strives to further understand
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For instance, the EPA defines the movement’s core aims and aspirations as follows:
“Environmental justice is the fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all people regardless
of race, color, national origin, or income with respect to the development, implementation, and
enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and policies. EPA has this goal for all
communities and persons across this Nation. It will be achieved when everyone enjoys the same
degree of protection from environmental and health hazards and equal access to the decisionmaking process to have a healthy environment in which to live, learn, and work” (EPA 2012). As
Ashley Dawson explains: “These core tenets underlined that the movement was not just about
environmental issues, but rather that social justice goals such as economic equity, cultural
liberation, and the political participation of people of color at all levels of decision-making were
an integral part of the struggle” (Dawson 2010: 326).
171
An additional concern regarding the Environmental Justice perspective is that it appears to
rely on a (re)distributive model focused on the equitable (re)allocation of environmental ‘goods’
and ‘bads.’ The distributive paradigm famously received its canonical articulation in Rawls’ A
Theory of Justice, in which he states, “the principles of social justice... provide a way of
assigning rights and duties in the basic institutions of society and they define the appropriate
distribution of the benefits and burdens of social cooperation” (Rawls 1971: 4). Young argues
that a weakness of the distributive paradigm is that it leaves uncontested causally significant
social structures that give rise to distributive patterns in the first place (Young 1990: 14-16).
Thus, the Nozickian worry is that if Environmental Justice exclusively focuses on correcting
unequal ‘end-state patterning’ of environmental benefit(s) and harm(s), then the same injustices
may arise in the future, since the underlying processes that brought about the inequities are
ignored, overlooked, and unchanged. Consequently, Environmental Justice seems unwilling to
move beyond the traditional political discourse of distribution and as such fails to challenge
deeper socio-ecological issues responsible for generating harm, i.e., it seems wedded to a “shared
commitment to economic expansionism, a ‘subtheoretical’ belief that environmental conflicts are
issue-specific and thus can be rationally managed and accommodated to continued growth, a
concern to maintain a power base, and an antipathy to structural innovation that challenges these
intellectual foundations and perceptions of self-interest” (M’Gonigle 1999: 19). But for present
purposes, delving further into such criticisms is beyond the scope of the work, as we are simply
concerned with the Environmental Justice perspective, as a means of demonstrating the historical
shift in environmental thinking towards a model of differentiated responsibility for
environmental depredation. However, the topic will be broached again, as one of the goals of the
next chapter is attempting to offer innovative approaches for repairing and reconciling ecocide
that look beyond the narrow scope of the distributive paradigm.
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and communicate the complex interrelation, feedback, and embeddedness of people and their
habitat.172
However, despite the above criticism, the Environmental Justice perspective is useful for
our current purposes, in that the discipline by offering narratives of environmental injustice
assists in providing insight into methods of analyzing disparate levels of responsibility for
environmental degradation. Essentially, Environmental Justice effectively illustrates cases in
which some groups received or expected to receive none of the benefit from an environmental
harm, had little to no input in controlling the course of action that led to the harm, or went
unrecognized as a relevant actor in the events that caused the harm. Therefore, in these cases,
Environmental Justice rightly emphasizes that it seems strange to consider such groups
responsible for the harms; and as such, the discipline successfully articulates a need for a
conception of differentiated responsibility in environmentalism.
Accordingly, it is evident that the Environmental Justice approach (unlike the Anthropic
view) is attuned to historical and social realities, i.e., that certain classes of actors materially and
historically bear greater or complete responsibility for causing environmental harms. But the
downside of such a view is that it may foster a sentiment that groups or individuals who are not
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An early proponent of the link between ecological and social systems was the 19th century
Russian anarcho-communist Peter Kropotkin, who extolled the virtues of self-sufficient
agricultural communes that built up social traditions, environmental knowledge, and sustainable
practices by engaging on a daily basis with their local habitat for sustenance. The eco-social
connection was further explored in Murray Bookchin’s pioneering work, The Ecology of
Freedom, which maintained that social hierarchies and human domination produced
unsustainable and destructive relations with nature (Bookchin 1982). And recently, the
disciplines of political ecology and ecological economics have advanced and refined the study of
eco-social systems by developing mechanisms for, “merging the social (economic) sciences with
the natural (biological and physical) sciences…[that] explicitly situates human institutions within
their natural contexts and, in the process, challenges the tradition of domination over nature
inherent in both the natural and economic sciences [as currently practiced]” (M’Gonigle 1999:
21).
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responsible for the harms are absolved from assisting and joining in environmental movements,
e.g., Lawson explains how often, “African Americans feel no responsibility to join with
environmentalists to address environmental issues beyond their local issues” (Lawson 2008: 3).
Consequently as we have illustrated, a difficult challenge for framing an adequate
conception of environmental responsibility is navigating the divide between the aim of casting a
wide net, in the hopes of maintaining the benefits of shared and collective responsibility (i.e., the
goal of the Anthropic perspective), with the conflicting desire to avoid being overly inclusive
and drawing socially insensitive conclusions that blame the victim for the environmental
degradation (i.e., the goal of the Environmental Justice perspective). As previously stated, in
attempting to resolve this tension, the international environmental community has settled on
conjoining the two distinct and disparate goals by adopting the CDBR principle.

D.

Conclusion

Obviously, emphasizing CBDR for environmental degradation necessitates a view of
responsibility that is both backwards and forwards looking. Backwards looking, in that it is able
to hold those historically responsible to greater account (the Environmental Justice perspective
furthers this objective); but forwards looking, in that it is able to emphasize that we all must
work together to face the present environmental crises (the Anthropic perspective furthers this
objective).
Lastly, from the protracted analysis throughout this section, it should seem
straightforward that environmentalists are comfortable employing a socially capacious
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understanding regarding the kinds of entities that are potentially answerable for causing
environmental harm. This is evident from the fact that during the discussion, individuals,
corporations, states, interstate institutions, global systems, and collectively all of humanity have
at various points been blamed for generating environmental harm. Thus, many of the same
prudential and epistemic concerns that compelled Transitional Justice scholars and practitioners
to expand their notion of responsibility (i.e., to address the root causes of conflict by establishing
a holistic narrative of injustice; obtain justice for the victims, and prevent comparable harm from
occurring again), assist in explaining environmentalists’ willingness to hold all categories and
kinds of actors that contribute to environmental degradation responsible.173
In conclusion, this section demonstrated that environmentalism is amenable to and
benefits from adopting a notion of responsibility that is: (1) common, but differentiated, (2) both
backwards and forward looking, and (3) socially capacious. Thus, the expectation is that the
reader recognizes and accepts that Transitional Justice and environmentalism employ
conceptions of responsibility that have substantial overlap and considerable commonality.
As such the work will now move on to propose a theory of responsibility that satisfies the
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Furthermore, a pertinent feature for understanding responsibility for ecocide is the complex
and dynamic interplay between different kinds of agents at various levels of analysis. Since as
we have seen, narratives of responsibility often show the dynamic interplay between numerous
classes, kinds, and categories of actors at many levels of analysis, e.g., powerful states
influencing weaker states, wealthy individuals dictating state-policy, states regulating corporate
activity, corporations shaping individual consumer preference, etc. Thus, it seems clear that
ignoring this complex web of feedback(s) and interrelation(s) would leave pertinent causal
elements missing. Moreover, the above list expresses the reality that actors’ (as the term broadly
applies to individuals, corporations, states, interstate institutions, etc.) options and preferences
are at least partially constructed and constrained by forces beyond their control. As such, to
adequately evaluate actors’ decision-making and behavior requires considering these external
influences that construct the actor(s) and the setting(s) in which they interact. Hence as we have
consistently argued, it seems mistaken to believe that any one type of actor ought to be
environmentalists’ sole focus of consideration when determining responsibility for ecocide.
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above conditions and broadly meets the goals of both disciplines. Ultimately, the work contends
that Iris Young’s analysis of responsibility provides valuable insights for achieving this
objective. The next section will apply her understanding of responsibility to hypothetical and real
cases of ecocide that meets our four criteria from the preceding chapter.174
But before we begin our analysis of Young’s conceptualization of responsibility it is
important to highlight that our employment of her theory is unorthodox and may even contradict
her intended objective. The reason for this as we will see, is that Young vehemently contends
that simply existing in a society, institution, or global order that permits wrongs is not enough to
justify individual responsibility for the harm (i.e., for Young one must have a more tangible and
direct connection to the harm); whereas our project aims at developing a conception of
responsibility that is both common, but differentiated (i.e., a theory of responsibility capable of
including everyone, but in divergent roles and to various degrees).
Nevertheless, the gap between Young’s aims and our own is unproblematic, so long it
can be demonstrated (i.e., the intended purpose of the remained of the chapter) that her theory
can be reframed to express a notion of responsibility that is both common and differentiated,
even if such an interpretation was not her intention. Thus, with this caveat in mind we can begin
our analysis and application of Young’s model of responsibility to instances ecocide.

II.

Analyzing and Applying Iris Young’s Two-Tiered Model of Responsibility to Ecocide
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The four criteria of ecocide are that the harm was: (1) committed intentionally for supposed
benefit of acting group; (2) without consent of impacted group; (3) noninstrumental in the
commission of a traditional crime against humanity, and (4) undermined the vital interests of a
distinct cultural group, i.e., caused partial or complete social death to an impacted group.
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Young in Responsibility for Justice argues that the concept of ‘responsibility’ ought to be
separated into two distinct kinds of models: (1) liability and (2) social connection (Young 2011).
I will briefly summarize both of these models before applying them to the topic of ecocide.
Young maintains that the liability model is the traditional framework by which we
conceive of legal and moral responsibility. Such an understanding of ‘responsibility’ as guilt,
blame, and/or liability is, “indispensable for a legal system and for a sense of moral right that
respects agents as individuals and expects them to behave in respectful ways toward others”
(Young 2011: 99). Essentially, the goal of the liability model is to hold particular agents
accountable for specific acts or omissions by which they have harmed identifiable others, i.e.,
providing retribution for localized harm(s) that upset normal background conditions.
Nevertheless, Young recognizes that there are limits to the liability model because not all
injustices can be directly linked to specific wrongful acts of particular agents, i.e., there are some
harms (as we have seen throughout the work, many environmental harms fall into this category)
that are, “produced and reproduced by thousands or millions of persons usually acting within
institutional rules and according to practices that most people regard as morally acceptable”
(Young 2011: 95). Young defines these kinds of social harms, which transcend the customary
bounds of responsibility found within the liability model as structural injustices. “When we
judge that structural injustice exists, we are saying precisely that at least some of the normal and
accepted background conditions of action are not morally acceptable” (Young 2004: 378).
Thus, the social connection model expresses the requisite notion of shared political
responsibility necessary for engaging with these sorts of unjust background structures (Young
2011). Unlike the liability model, the social connection model is focused on bettering (future131

oriented) the situation, rather than allocating blame (past-oriented) (Young 2011: 108-109).
Accordingly, in cases of structural injustice the social connection model maintains that
individuals are not guilty of wrong(s); but are instead responsible for improving the background
social conditions in which they interact (Young 2011: 105).
Nevertheless, it is important to emphasize that Young does not think that the social
connection model ought to replace the liability model, but instead it is designed to supplement it
(Young 2011: 174). According to Young, the liability model and social connection model should
be pursued in tandem as a means of complimenting each other and reinforcing the goals of
repairing, reconciling, and preventing injustice. As such, the adoption of a two-tier model is the
initial step in Young’s exploration of delineating kinds, classes, and degrees of responsibility
depending upon actors’ relations to social injustice, i.e., establishing differentiated responsibility.
One of the benefits of such a framework is that it offers a clear method of distinguishing
responsibilities between the past-oriented responsibility considered within the liability model and
future-oriented responsibility considered within the social connection model. Thus, achieving
one of the goals of the preceding section.
It is helpful to highlight that Young undertook this differentiating project as an attempt to
challenge Hannah Arendt’s claim that all Germans are “collectively responsible” for the
Holocaust, “simply by virtue of membership in a community and not according to more concrete
social relationships and actions” (Young 2011: 81). Young instead contends throughout her work
that simply existing in a society that permits wrongs is not enough to derive responsibility for the
harm; one must have a more tangible and direct connection.175 Hence, with the goal of
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It is important to reemphasize that our project will challenge precisely this feature (i.e., her
antipathy towards collective and shared responsibility) of Young’s framework by demonstrating
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differentiation of responsibility in mind, the section will examine how Young’s two-tiered model
applies to the cases of ecocide delineated in the last chapter.

A. Outline for Applying Young’s Hierarchy of Responsibility to Ecocide

This section will explore Young’s attempt at differentiating responsibility for social
injustice to idealized cases of ecocide. In summary, relying on our previous analysis, it appears
there are four relationships that individual members of roving imperialist communities (i.e.,
unsustainable industrialized and post-industrialized societies that are productively and
consumptively integrated into global supply-chains) can have towards instances of ecocide: (1)
those who are guilty of ecocide; (2) those who are not guilty of ecocide, but who bear
responsibility because they participate in the society and provide guilty agents or harmful
background conditions with at least passive support that undergirds their capacity to cause
ecocide; (3) those who take action to distance themselves from the wrongs of ecocide, either
through efforts at privately preventing some of them or through forms of withdrawal from acts,
behaviors, habits, and institutions that generate environmental harm, and (4) those who publicly
oppose, resist, and alter the background institutions and practices that generate ecocide.176 Thus,

how her model can satisfy the standard of common (i.e., everyone – in a global sense - has a role
to play), but differentiated (i.e., to various degrees and in diverse ways) responsibility.
176
One might consider excluding the last group from our taxonomy of responsibility for ecocide,
since they are adequately meeting their obligation. However, the work has opted to include them
as a category of responsibility because while they are currently satisfying their obligations as
moral actors; the social connection model’s future oriented conception of responsibility, entails
that actors must continue to engage in public opposition to structures generating injustice, i.e.,
responsibility is never fully discharged unless the unjust structures and outcomes cease. As such,
they still have an ongoing responsibility; and therefore, ought to be included in our taxonomy.
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this section will investigate each of these relationships and examine how they impact agents’
responsibility for ecocide.
Afterwards, the work will explore some difficulties for achieving the ‘commonality
criterion’ by examining autarkic communities’ reparative and reconciliatory role in response to
ecocide. Essentially, there are two possible relations of autarkic communities to ecocide: (1)
victims of ecocide and (2) communities that have not experienced ecocide, i.e., they have not lost
their habitat due to environmental harm(s).177
The analysis of autarkic communities that have avoided being impacted by ecocide is of
significant interest, in that according to Young’s model, if classes of actors have no direct
connection to injustices, then they have no responsibility to discharge. As such, there is the
potential that the existence of communities that have no connection (either as victims or
perpetrators) to ecocide may undermine the ‘common, but differentiated’ notion of responsibility
(i.e., because they will have no role to play in the reparative and reconciliatory process). This
determination is problematic, in that the preceding section asserted that CBDR was a crucial
component for achieving the aims of Transitional Justice and environmentalism. Furthermore, as
Kristin Shrader-Frechette argues, it is imperative that, “everyone ought to assume responsibility
for the actions of those who pollute, develop and threaten either the land or the most vulnerable
people on it” (Shrader-Frechette 2002: 4)
As such, special attention will be paid to these above-stated examples. Once again, it is
helpful to highlight that the reason these cases warrant heightened consideration is because: if
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Former-autarkic communities that were complicit in the ecocide that destroyed their habitat
would be a third possible relation. However, since in these situations the communities have
adopted unsustainable relationships with their ecosystem, they would be treated as roving
imperialists for purposes of our analysis.
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Young’s model is incapable of integrating such groups into our conception of responsibility,
some may argue it bars the framework from satisfying the ‘commonality’ component of the
CBDR principle, i.e., such a failure could be construed as demonstrating that Young’s account is
inadequate for fully articulating all the elements of Transitional Justice and environmentalism’s
preferred conception of responsibility.

B. Roving Imperialists’ Responsibility for Ecocide

1.

Actors Guilty of Ecocide Under the Liability Model

Imagine a terrorist who hijacked and crashed a truck full of hazardous waste into a nature
reserve or a ranching tycoon who decided to illegally cut down a publicly protected rainforest to
expand his grazing acreage.178 Intuitively, it seems such actors ought to bear the highest level of
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The work has opted to use the gendered pronoun ‘his’ to describe the rancher to pay homage
to political philosophy’s long attempt to grasp the state of the world by identifying the party(ies)
most responsible for why things are the way they are, i.e., narrate how and why certain group(s)
achieved geo-political and socio-economic dominance. For instance, Karl Marx emphasizes the
present role of the bourgeois capitalists in controlling the means of production (1867); Carole
Pateman holds males and the sexual contract accountable (1988); and Charles Mills argues that
to understand the current state of affairs, it is necessary to recognize whites’ imposition of the
racial contract on the rest of the inhabitants of the world (1997). Each of these narratives lifts the
veil of the status quo and illustrates the contingency of the current global arrangement. Since,
environmental degradation is a major characteristic of the present state of affairs, one can
reasonably argue that whoever is actively answerable for establishing and maintaining this social
order, bears relatively greater levels of responsibility for the environmental degradation than
actors less actively involved, i.e., those that played a more passive role. As such, the above
narratives offer valuable insights regarding the likely demographic identity of those liable for
environmental harm, e.g., the wealthy are more responsible than the poor; men are more
responsible than women, and whites are more responsible than non-whites, etc. These degrees of
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responsibility for these acts of environmental harm.
Fortunately, Young’s account supports precisely these determinations. Since, per her
framework actors are afforded maximal responsibility and fall within the purview of the liability
model if they are: (1) “causally connected” to the harm, (2) they acted “voluntarily” and (3) with
“adequate knowledge of the situation” (Young 2011: 97).
As such, it seems uncontroversial in the two hypothetical examples above that all of these
conditions have been met. Hence, baring discovery of additional excusing fact(s), the above
cases seem like straightforward examples of agents maximally responsible for the resulting
environmental harm.179 Consequently, we are justified in blaming and/or finding such agent(s)
guilty of harm under the liability model, i.e., their responsibility for the wrong has been isolated
and they deserve to be subject to moral judgment, civil sanctions, criminal punishment, and/or
general social redress.180
Nevertheless, cases of rogue ranchers or environmentally destructive terrorists acting
outside the law and against the general will are not the central focus of environmental
culpability hold true at a general intergroup-level of cross-comparative assessment, even if a
finer grained analysis could expose instances of the reverse, e.g., that some poor/black/women
pollute more than some rich/white/men. Essentially, these counterexamples demonstrate that
intragroup (within the group) vertical-analysis may show levels of culpability equal to or greater
than the culpability found in intergroup (between the groups) horizontal-analysis. But such a
statistical realization does not disprove that there are meaningful differences in intergroup
responsibility, thus justifying that our hypothetical ‘rogue rancher’ ought to be described as
male.
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Per our examples from last chapter, the liability model of responsibility could be applied to
Saddam Hussien and other high-ranking Iraqi officials that ordered the destruction of the
Ma’dan’s wetland habitat.
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For example, Brazilian authorities arresting Ezequiel Antonio Castanha, (dubbed the “king of
deforestation”) for organizing gangs to clear large swaths of protected rainforest (i.e., it is
estimated that his activities account for upwards of 20% of all illegal deforestation in Brazil in
recent years) is a clear case of a state holding an actor accountable from within the liability
model for privately perpetrated environmental harm (Watts 2015).
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transformative justice (even if their acts destroyed the habitat of an autarkic community). Since,
so long as the state met its duty of care to prevent such harms from occurring and effectively
provided punitive justice (i.e., criminal proceedings and punishment) and distributive justice
(i.e., welfare relief and aid) for impacted communities, then there is no justification for
demanding broader socio-political changes (i.e., advocate for Transitional Justice) in response to
these atrocities.181 Essentially, in such cases the state and public institutions do not appear
responsible for or incapable of repairing or reconciling with these types of privately perpetrated
wrongs and thus, there is no pressing need for radical social transformation, i.e., these represent
instances in which current social system(s), practice(s), and institution(s) are capable of
achieving justice.182
Since as argued in the last chapter, the need for environmental transformative justice is
triggered when the state acted directly or indirectly in support of ecocide or was negligent in its
duty of care to prevent the environmental harm from occurring.183 Thus in the above examples,
the need for environmental transformative justice is not met because the state did not act or failed
to act.
As such, our analysis will benefit from moving to more pertinent cases. For instances
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Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that corrupt state actors can be directly
responsible for these types of harm. For instance, in 2008 the Brazilian Environmental Minister
found that the government’s Land and Agrarian Reform Agency (INCRA) was the worst
perpetrator of illegal deforestation (responsible for clearing 544,000 acres from 2005-2008) and
that criminal charges would be filed against the heads of the agency (Balakrishnan 2008).
182
That is unless there have been recurring instances of such harms and the state has taken no
action to prevent them from occurring. In which case an argument can be made that the state has
failed in its obligations to promote social welfare or that it is complicit and thus, socio-political
change is necessary to prevent these injustices from occurring in the future.
183
The next chapter will rely on insights gleaned from Transitional Justice and discuss the
importance of states’ proactively codifying laws against ecocide instead of pursuing a policy of
ex post facto criminalization (i.e., retroactively charging actors for crimes for acts that were legal
during their commission) that may challenge and undermine the rule of law.
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when: the state contracted the rancher to clear the land; the state passed laws that permitted the
rancher to clear the land; the state failed to adequately enforce laws restricting these sorts of
harms; the state underfunded agencies setup to monitor, supervise, and restrict access to
protected lands; the state failed to respond to such harms in the past, etc.
Importantly according to Young’s model, guilt in each of these cases would not be
limited to the rancher because state actors involved in perpetuating the injustice would be liable
as well. For instance, if the rancher were a direct government contractor or employee, the rancher
and government official(s), who voluntarily approved the project with adequate knowledge of
the resulting harms, would be guilty of ecocide per the liability model.184 As such in this
example, responsibility would be spread diffusely throughout the state’s decision-making
apparatus.
Young emphasizes precisely this point when discussing Adolf Eichmann, arguing that it
is possible that even if an actor is not the direct physical cause of harm, they can still be held
responsible under the liability model. “Because many of those farther away in the causal chain
made the decisions and gave the orders that drove the crimes, and their not having done so would
have meant that hundreds of thousands of people might have lived” (Young 2011: 82).
Accordingly, in this light, the rancher or official, who never lifted an ax or chainsaw, are
still liable as authors of injustice even if it was their employees and underlings who performed
all the physically destructive labor. What matters for the liability model is that the agent is a
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For instance, if anti-ecocide legislation had been enacted prior to the occurrence of
environmental destruction in our case studies, it would be possible to hold the high-ranking
government officials and corporate executives to account (e.g., the parties that authorized
damming the La Grande, approved nuclear testing at Maralinga, and decided to mine Cerrejon
Mountain) under the liability model.
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primary party (i.e., causally and intentionally paramount) that could have acted otherwise to
prevent the harm(s), i.e., the rancher or official could have decided against ordering to cut down
the forest (Young 2011: 84). As such, the liability model offers an effective framework for
holding the decision-makers (i.e., those who craft, determine, and execute policies) of roving
imperialist communities accountable for ecocide.
Consequently, the notions of volition and control are extremely important for determining
responsibility using the liability model.185 For instance, if an official who authorized the project
to clear the land acted under duress because the mafia was threatening to murder her kidnapped
children unless the project was approved, then the official can be excused from responsibility
under the liability model because her act does not seem voluntary.186 Nonetheless, such a
conclusion seems unproblematic and is supported by the fact that moral and legal codes are filled
with a litany of excusing principles, which can be used to absolve actors (even if they are the
proximal physical cause of the harm) of liability for wrongs, e.g., if the act was an accident,
mistake, or inadvertent; if the act occurred as a result of reflex or unintended body movement; if
the actor was restrained or pushed to act through external physical interference; or if the act was
forced under threat, coercion, duress or necessity; etc., then the actor can be excused from blame
(Strawson 1962).
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We will define ‘volition’ broadly as the ability to have reasonably chosen to act otherwise.
The example of the mafia intimidating a government official for the sake of logging rights
may seem farfetched to some readers; but it is important to point out that in many areas of the
world, the “timber mafia” is a powerful criminal element. In fact, a 2012 U.N. report, Green
Carbon, Black Trade, estimates that 90% of all deforestation in the tropics is perpetrated by
crime syndicates and that the value of this illegal activity is worth between $30-100 billions
dollars (editor Nellemann 2012: 6). As such, it is unsurprising that these criminal groups have
been known to intimidate, threaten, injure, and even kill opposition to gain and maintain control
of these lucrative resources, e.g., Qureshi a Pakistani environmental activists recounts that his,
“father and brother were killed for raising voices against the timber mafia” (Malik 2018).
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Accordingly, it is possible that the rancher’s employees whose actions are the proximal
cause of the destruction of the forest, may nevertheless, be excused of responsibility under the
liability model, i.e., if it can be shown that the workers had a restricted range of options to
choose from. For instance, imagine a situation in which the rancher is the only available
employer in the area, the workers’ meager wages are the sole means of providing for their
families, and they are so destitute that they are unable to afford to relocate.187 Under such
conditions, in which their options are limited to either: (1) follow the rancher’s orders or (2) be
fired and unable to earn enough to survive; a strong argument can be made that the workers’ lack
of viable options excuses them from guilt under the liability model.188
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Sadly, such circumstances are common in poor rural communities, e.g., as CNN reported
during a 2017 expose investigating how thousands are forced to work as slaves on cattle ranches
in northern Brazil, “if you want a job, you have to head to one of the nearby cattle ranches, [but
once there] you can’t leave because you owe money for the food [the rancher] has given you,
you have a debt…and don’t receive any form of salary because…food and tools are deducted
from wages” (Darlington, Charner, and Castro 2017). Furthermore, it is estimated that over
60,000 laborers are trapped in similar systems of bondage slavery in the Brazilian cattle ranching
industry alone (Maisonnave and Gross 2017).
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Obviously, moving to the topic of ‘whether or not the agent could act differently’ (i.e., if they
had alternative possibilities) opens the door to an immense metaphysical debate between free
will and determinism. I hope to avoid wading in on this topic as much as possible, by simply
agreeing with Peter Strawson’s famous insight (as I believe Young did) that the importance of
responsibility is not contingent upon the metaphysical dispute of whether or not we could have
acted otherwise; instead what matters is that our social practices are dependent on employing the
notion of responsibility, i.e., we structure social institutions and cultural norms of responsibility
around the fact that humans necessarily have reactive attitudes towards others’ acts (Strawson
1962). As Strawson maintains, these practices do not depend on the truth or falsity of
determinism; they are just a fact of human life and as such, “it is useless to ask whether it would
not be rational for us to do what it is not in our nature to (be able to) do” (Strawson 1962). With
this in mind, I think Daniel Dennett’s account of “elbow room” provides a helpful
conceptualization of what it means for an agent to “have been able to do otherwise” – i.e., being
able to make decision from a range of options, which inevitably occurs within constraints
(Dennett 1984). Thus, per the above metaphysical sketch, responsibility is dependent upon the
commonsense folk-understanding that in most normal situations, actors have the ability to decide
between a range of options; and thus, if they choose to do something wrong (per our reactive
attitudes), then the agent is blameworthy.
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Thus, per the Youngian framework, this and similar cases move the analysis in the
direction of the next level of responsibility for ecocide, i.e., actors who are not guilty or
blameworthy of ecocide, but who bear responsibility because they participate in the roving
imperialist society and provide the guilty agents or harmful background conditions with at least
passive support that undergirds their capacity to cause ecocide. But before we move on to the
next level of analysis it is helpful to highlight, regarding the discernment of responsibility for
ecocide, that the liability model effectively captures that decision-makers (i.e., actors
intentionally pursuing, advocating, and commanding environmentally destructive operations and
policies) are most causally accountable (i.e., they are the but for cause); and thus, deserve the
greatest degree of blame for resulting harms.

2.

Actors Not Guilty of Ecocide But Responsible Under the Social
Connection Model

Once again consider the ‘rogue rancher’ example, in this case there are many potential
actors whose participation played a role in providing the rancher with the ability and capacity to
destroy the forest; nevertheless, it may seem strange to consider them blameworthy or guilty of
ecocide. For instance, we have already mentioned the destitute laborer that was compelled to
follow the rancher’s orders to clear the forest as a matter of economic survival. But there are
many other potential upstream actors, e.g., chainsaw and ax manufacturers; the overworked
police force that was unable to monitor the property; the ranchers’ family who provided him with
unconditional support and confidence to act outside the law; the banker who loaned him the
capital to buy a new bulldozer that was necessary to clear the dense forest, etc. Also, there exist
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potentially countless downstream beneficiaries who maybe entirely unaware of the rancher’s
nefarious deed, e.g., the consumers who can buy cheaper beef; the owner of the industrial
refrigeration company that was able to make a profit by storing the meat; the slaughterhouse
employees that were able to keep their jobs because of increased inventory; the finance minister
who was applauded for increased exports; the shipping and packaging companies’ shareholders
who saw a slight uptick in their respective investment portfolios, etc.
Obviously, there are borderline cases, wherein it will be difficult to determine whether or
not an actor is complicit in the harm. But roughly for our purposes, an actor is considered
complicit and falls within the liability model if they intended the consequence of the action, e.g.,
a neighbor who volunteers to help the rancher by providing room and board to the workers in
exchange for a share of the illicit profits. Whereas, an actor is not complicit if they simply
intended to participate in the group activity unconcerned with the outcome, e.g., a neighbor who
offers room and board to the workers strictly out of loneliness.
Nevertheless, it is evident from the ‘rogue rancher’ example that there exists a multitude
of potential actors that ought to be excused from guilt under the liability model even though it is
unambiguous that they contributed and benefited from processes that produced ecocide (Young
2011: 100).189 Furthermore, in this situation it is plausible to imagine that many of the actors
never intended to cause ecocide or might even regret and wish to undo their contribution if they
knew the role they played caused harm.
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For example in our case studies of ecocide, it seems reasonable that many of the actors that
contributed and/or benefited from the harm should not be held to account under the liability
model, e.g., the scientists who were employed to study the impacts of nuclear fallout at
Maralinga; the consumers that received lower energy bills because of mining Cerrejon Mountain
or damming the La Grande; the pilots that were ordered to drop the atomic bombs, etc.
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The preceding section analyzed a scenario where the rancher acted at the behest of the
state, in which liability for the environmental harm circulated beyond the rancher to include state
official(s) who authorized and requested the rancher’s services. This section will focus on
analyzing instances in which the rancher acted within socially and legally acceptable parameters
(i.e., only clearing his private property), but the state was not directly involved.190
We can imagine a scenario in which the rancher legally cleared his own land, with no
intention of destroying an autarkic community’s habitat; but unfortunately and unbeknownst to
him, the ecological toll of his and numerous other legal and commonly taken actions (other
ranchers legally clearing their private property) led to the total ecological collapse of the
surrounding forest (i.e., the ecosystem inhabited by an autarkic community). In many ways, this
revised example represents the quintessential case of structural injustice; in that no one (not even
the rancher) intended the negative outcome to the autarkic community; but yet the confluence of
background conditions and the actors’ socially acceptable behavior caused ecocide.191
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Nevertheless, the state can be considered indirectly involved, in that it established the laws
that permit such harm.
191
It is somewhat difficult to fit this example into our paradigm framework of ecocide because
while the environmental harm was intentional with regards to the rancher’s own property, the
resulting downstream environmental collapse that destroyed the autarkic community’s habitat
was unintended. But if the rancher’s activity was common practice throughout the society and
the ripple effect (i.e., injuries to one area of an ecosystem may spread to impact others) of
environmental harms were widely recognized, then we can infer that the environmental
degradation of the autarkic community’s habitat was a foreseeable and accepted loss at a
societal-level. As such, we are justified in stretching our delineation of ecocide to include such
cases. It is important to point out that this example is conceptually distinct from ecological loss
generated by broader Anthropic (Earth-level) environmental harm(s) (e.g., rising sea levels
sinking an island community) because in this case the intended activity (i.e., clearing a forest) is
the same as the resulting harm (i.e., forest loss); whereas, with regards to Anthropic harms, the
intended activity (e.g., burning fossil fuels) causes completely different and more attenuated
unintended harm(s) (e.g., sea-level rise). Essentially, the argument for including the ‘structural
rancher’ case within our analysis of ecocide is that there is a close causal and conceptual link
between the intended activity (i.e., clearing a forest) and the resulting harm (i.e., forest loss),
which differentiates this example from other instances of structural environmental harm (i.e.,
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Young explains that the failure of the liability model in these and similar cases of
structural injustice, “is that structures are produced and reproduced by large numbers of people
acting according to normally accepted rules and practices, and it is in the nature of such
structural processes that their potentially harmful effects cannot be traced directly to any
particular contributors to the process” (Young 2011: 100).
The fact that structural injustices are such a pervasive feature of the modern world
(particularly with regards to environmental harm) makes it exceedingly problematic that the
liability model is unable to delineate responsibility for correcting them. Unfortunately, it seems
entirely likely that structural injustices will continue to occur indefinitely unless we adopt a more
inclusive conception of responsibility that makes actors feel obligated to alter behaviors that
generate background conditions that perpetuate these harms.192
As such, it is vital that we devise a framework capable of delineating responsibility for
actors who are not guilty of ecocide; but who nevertheless, bear responsibility because they
participate in the society and provide the guilty agents or harmful background conditions with at
least passive support that undergirds their capacity to cause ecocide. Fortunately, Young’s social
connection model provides a perfect account for delineating responsibility in these cases.
As previously demonstrated, many of the actors in the various ‘rancher examples’ are not
liable for the ecocide, but they do bear some responsibility in that they benefited and contributed

climate change) in which the activity (i.e., burning fossil fuel) has no obvious similarity to the
harm (e.g., sea-level rise, desertification, etc.).
192
As Roman writer, Publilius Syrus, famously stated, “we tolerate without rebuke the vices with
which we have grown familiar” - if this is true, then turning a blind-eye to endemic harms is
tantamount to passive acceptance of injustice. Thus, as a means of overcoming this worry, the
work is striving to develop a conception of environmental transformative justice to awaken us to
the injustice of ecocide.
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to the harm, i.e., they are relevantly connected to the problem. Young contends that moral-actors
upon recognizing their proximity and relation towards a wrong will feel compelled to answer for
the harm (Young 2011: 121). As such, this sense of ‘responsibility’ functions as a virtue, i.e., as
a personal desire to, “carry out activities in a morally appropriate way” motivated by the
sentiment that “all who dwell within the structures must take responsibility for remedying
injustices they cause” (Young 2011: 104-105).
Succinctly, the social connection model attempts to establish a virtue-theoretic
conception of responsibility (whereas, the liability model relies on a deontic conception of
responsibility), in which actors feel an internal motivation, desire, and disposition to better the
institutions and practices in which they partake. But before proceeding, it is important to
highlight that the social connection model’s reliance on a virtue theoretical approach to
responsibility is pertinent to the work’s later attempt to demonstrate that Young’s account
satisfies the ‘commonality’ criterion of the CBDR principle.
In summary, the social connection model emphasizes that individuals who benefit or
contribute to institutions or social practices that cause ecocide have a responsibility to work
towards alleviating the problem. This sense of ‘responsibility’ is not isolating, in that finding out
that countless other actors are involved in causing the harm does not discharge an agent whose
actions contributed to the outcome from taking responsibility (Young 2011: 106). As such, the
social connection model calls for common responsibility, “it follows that all those who contribute
by their actions to the structural processes that produce injustice share responsibility for those
harms” (Young 2011: 109).
Furthermore, the social connection model is not focused on blame (past-oriented); it is
instead oriented towards improving the future (Young 2011: 109). Finally, ‘responsibility’ under
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the social connection model can only be discharged through shared public action (meaning
working together, not in the sense of necessarily having to form a group-agent, even though that
would be a viable option). As Young explains, “thousands or even millions of agents contribute
by our actions in particular institutional contexts to the processes that produce unjust outcomes.
Our forward-looking responsibility consists in changing the institutions and processes so that
their outcomes will be less unjust. No one of us can do this on our own” (Young 2011: 111).
Ultimately, the social connection model’s notion of ‘responsibility’ as future-oriented,
non-isolated, and only dischargeable through political action is incredibly important for
combatting environmental harm. The reason for this is that many of the contributing factors (e.g.,
climate change, ocean acidification, biodiversity loss, etc.) causing environmental injury
worldwide are unintended consequences from generations of diverse actors maintaining and
expanding social dependence on unsustainable industrial mass production and consumption.
Thus, no current set of actors is wholly to blame (per the liability model) and continuing to point
fingers will only result in greater resentment, defensiveness, and animosity; when instead, what
we need is a united and sustained cooperative effort to combat the problem(s).
As we have seen, the social connection model’s inclusion of actors who are not guilty of
harm, but who still bear responsibility because of their participation in or benefit from actions
that caused the harm, creates a spectrum of responsibility exceeding the liability model’s binary
account of guilt or innocence. As such, in the ‘structural injustice rancher’ example (i.e., where
no actor intended the destruction of the autarkic community’s habitat) no one is guilty under the
liability model, but many parties have a responsibility to discharge per the social connection
model.
Thus, to show how the two models work together, it is illustrative to once again return to
the ‘rogue rancher’ example. In this case, the rancher would be guilty of ecocide under the
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liability model and ought to face punitive and retributive justice measures (i.e., criminal
punishment and social sanction). Nevertheless, as discussed, there are countless upstream and
downstream actors that are connected as beneficiaries and/or enablers of the rancher’s ecocidal
activity; but yet, are not guilty under the liability model because they lacked ‘elbow room’ to
have acted differently or they had no intention or knowledge of causing harm. But fortunately,
the social connection model offers a framework capable of justifying why these upstream and
downstream beneficiaries and enablers ought to take responsibility for repairing and reconciling
the wrongs.
Thus, the social connection model allows us a fuller recognition of the ubiquitous
responsibility for ecocide in roving imperialist societies; since the culture, modes of subsistence,
and way of life rely heavily on activities that degrade and destroy autarkic communities’
habitats.193 And as Young states, “beneficiaries of the process, have responsibilities. Their being
privileged usually means, moreover, that they are able to change their habits or make extra
efforts without suffering serious deprivation” (Young 2011: 145). Consequently, one can
reasonably argue that whoever is actively answerable for establishing, maintaining, benefiting,
and/or participating in the roving imperialist social order (i.e., the vast majority of actors in
industrial or post-industrial societies) bear some responsibility under the social connection model
for correcting and preventing ongoing environmental injustices.
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If we look at specific cases (i.e., the ‘rogue rancher’ example), it is easy to imagine a plethora
of roving imperialists with no connection to the specific harm or even any recognition or
awareness that an injustice is occurring. However, if we shift perspective(s) away from the
specific (token) instance of ecocide and instead focus on analyzing ecocide as a general (type) of
phenomenon, one may contemplate if it is possible for any roving imperialist to be entirely
unconnected from each and every instance of ecocide worldwide. Case in point, since roving
imperialists’ culture (i.e., the current dominant social order defined by unsustainable globalized
industrial mass production and consumption) is structurally destructive to the environment
(which seems uncontroversial), then members of groups that disproportionately benefit from or
contribute to the system (both historically and at present) have a responsibility to consider their
connection(s) to ongoing environmental injustice(s).
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More specifically, if it is true that globalized industrial mass production and consumption
is damaging to the environment (which seems certain),194 then actors relying on the large-scale
supply-chains and non-sustainable practices to satisfy their needs, are at least partially
responsible for environmental degradation. With that being said, we can move on to analyzing
the next level of responsibility for ecocide, i.e., individuals living in roving imperialist societies
who take action to distance themselves from the wrongs of ecocide, either through efforts at
privately preventing some of them or through forms of withdrawal from acts, behaviors, habits,
and institutions that generate environmental harm.

3.

Actors Distanced From Wrong But Responsible Under the Social
Connection Model

Returning to the ‘structural injustice ranching’ example, in which the rancher had no
intention of causing ecocide, but unfortunately and unbeknownst to him, the ecological toll of his
and numerous other legal and commonly taken actions led to the complete ecological collapse of
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As Fred Magdoff and John Bellamy Foster state: “Most of the critical environmental
problems we have are either caused, or made much worse, by the workings of our economic
system. Even such issues as population growth and technology are best viewed in terms of their
relation to the socioeconomic organization of society. Environmental problems are not a result of
human ignorance or innate greed. They do not arise because managers of individual large
corporations or developers are morally deficient. Instead, we must look to the fundamental
workings of the economic (and political/social) system for explanations. It is precisely the fact
that ecological destruction is built into the inner nature and logic of our present system of
production that makes it so difficult to solve” (Magdoff and Bellamy 2010: 7). They defend this
claim by examining the systemic causes of environmental destruction stemming from the fact
that the current dominant mode of production and consumption is based on continuous growth,
which they rightly argue is impossible to maintain as the Earth has finite resources (Magdoff and
Bellamy 2010). Additionally, they assert the system’s profit motive captures and controls the
political, judicial, and social systems, which undermines the means of potentially curbing the
drive for perpetual growth and capital accumulation, i.e., interests in short-term profit (for the
global corporate elite) determine social policy decision-making, at the expense of long-term
wellbeing for the people and the planet (Magdoff and Bellamy 2010).
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the surrounding forest. In such a case, we can imagine actors taking steps to distance themselves
from the harm, e.g., an owner of a slaughterhouse deciding not to purchase cattle from ranchers
that graze on newly cleared land; an environmental activist writing letters to ranchers explaining
and condemning the environmental impact of their activities; employees recognizing the
potential environmental harm and conscientiously objecting by quitting their job rather than
following the rancher’s order, etc.
In all of these examples, we see actors taking morally laudable steps to privately distance
themselves from the harm, but the problem is that in-and-of-themselves none of these actions
will likely prevent the present (or similar future-cases of) ecocide from occurring. The failure
stems from the fact that none of these acts alter the underlying background structure(s) that
enabled the harm to occur in the first place, e.g., the rancher will be able to make a profit selling
his cattle to another slaughterhouse, in spite of the one abstaining owner; the rancher can ignore
the letter and the destruction will continue unabated; even if employees quit, the remaining
excess labor force can be hired to carry out the task, and lastly, at least in the ‘structural injustice
rancher’ example, even if the rancher does stop clearing the land, the combined impact of other
ranchers’ activity will still cause ecological collapse (but this would not necessarily be the case
in the ‘rogue rancher’ example).
Thus, as illustrated, private acts while commendable from a moral standpoint, achieve
little in terms of stopping, preventing, or diminishing structural harms. As Arendt states, such
acts, “practically speaking, did nothing” as they leave the offending structures in place (Arendt
1963: 104). Interestingly, if an actor was powerful enough to independently prevent the
structural injustice (i.e., alter the background condition) via their own private action, then a case
could be made that their failure to do so implies guilt under the liability model. Thus, for our
purposes we can assume that in the above example none of the actors (or potentially any actor)
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are powerful enough to stop the structural injustice on their own (as the definition of ‘structural’
implies).
As such, the evident failure of private action justifies the social connection model’s claim
that what is necessary to prevent structural injustices from occurring is shared public action, e.g.,
the slaughterhouse owner could try and convince the slaughterhouse industry to unite in
boycotting the processing of cattle grazed on newly cleared land, in the hopes of undercutting the
profit motive driving the ranchers’ decision to clear the land in the first place; the activist could
work towards convincing bulldozer manufacturers to stop selling to ranching operations; the
employees could campaign to increase public funding for scientific research, education, and
awareness regarding the environmental impact of ranching activities, etc. Thus, these and similar
combined public
activities that change the socio-political practices, institutions, and norms in roving imperialist
societies would have a greater chance of successfully preventing ecocide.
Intuitively, it seems correct that if an actor recognizes something as wrong; then
distancing oneself from the harm does not seem to discharge responsibility, i.e. if we view
something as unjust, our responsibility ought to be to prevent it from occurring instead of simply
removing ourselves from contributing to the problem. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong highlights this
point in his discussion of environmentalists’ personal responsibility regarding climate change:
Some environmentalists keep their hands clean by withdrawing into a simple life where
they use very little fossil fuels. That is great. I encourage it. But some of these escapees
then think that they have done their duty, so they rarely come down out of the hills to
work for political candidates who could and would change government policies. This
attitude helps nobody. We should not think that we can do enough simply by buying fuelefficient cars, insulating our houses, and setting up a windmill to make our own
electricity. That is all wonderful, but it neither does little or nothing to stop global
warming, nor does this focus fulfill our real moral obligations, which are to get
governments to do their job to prevent the disaster of excessive global warming.
(Sinnott-Armstrong 2005: 312)
Sinnott-Armstrong insightfully illustrates and supports the social connection model’s

150

assertion that discharging responsibility necessitates shared public action designed to alter
background social structure(s) in an attempt to prevent or ameliorate injustice(s) from occurring
in the future. Since as Derrick Jensen and Lierre Keith insightfully assert, “the role of an activist
is not to navigate systems of oppressive power with as much integrity as possible, but rather to
confront and take down these systems” (Jensen and Keith 2012: 424).195
Accordingly, agents who engage in this kind of shared public activity represent the final
and least culpable relational-level of responsibility towards structural injustices. Thus, in the case
of roving imperialist societies the only individuals adequately discharging their responsibility for
ecocide are those that publicly oppose, resist, and alter the background institutions and practices
that generate environmental harm.196

4.

Discharging Responsibility Under the Social Connection Model

But what level of political engagement is required of an actor to adequately discharge
their responsibility? For instance, does an actor discharge their responsibility if they take part
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However, it is worth mentioning that acts traditionally considered wholly in the private sphere
(i.e., family management, production and consumption of goods and services within the
household, etc.) can occasionally embody forms of public expression when they are enacted in
the spirit of changing social norms, conventions, and practices. For instance, the decision to stop
using plastic straws can be considered a public act, if abstention is undertaken (at least partially)
as a form of political expression, i.e., as a means of impacting the social conversation,
normalizing nonuse, undermining the industry’s profitability, demonstrating that prohibition
would not be overly burdensome, etc.
196
With regard to environmental harm more generally (i.e., not specific instances of ecocide) the
responsibility of individuals living in roving imperialist communities per the social connection
model is to advocate for socio-political change that will alter the hegemonic acceptance of
unsustainable globalized mass production and consumption as the principal mode of subsistence.
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only once in a public protest resisting the social structures, institutions, practices, and policies
that are generating ecocide? Young would likely hold that this meager level of engagement is
inadequate and instead argue that what is required is for actors to take part in ongoing and
consistent shared public efforts to alter and end practices that they participate in that generate
injustice. As she states, “one has the responsibility to do whatever it takes to bring about specific
ends or purposes” (Young 2011: 143).
However, one might object that in the case of an injustice as widespread and pervasive as
ecocide it seems outlandish, farfetched, unrealistic, and absurd to claim that actors are
responsible for altering the systems causing the harm, especially considering the current global
dominance of industrial mass productive and consumptive societies. Nevertheless, Young
accepts that many of our moral obligations may appear daunting, “some people might take this
line of discussion as a reductio ad absurdum. If your theory of responsibility faces me with tasks
bigger than I can fathom, then your theory must be wrong” (Young 2011: 143). However, she
does not acquiesce and rebukes such criticisms by asserting, “that in a very unjust world [such as
ours, with regard to ecocide], such an attitude is overly conservative and allows most of us to tell
ourselves complacently that we are doing what we can and all that can be expected of us to
improve things” (Young 2011: 123-124).197
Additionally, she defends her position by claiming that the social connection model’s
virtue theoretic, commonly shared, and forward-looking features make it more manageable than
one might have first presumed (Young 2011: 142-144). She argues that while actors do bear
responsibility for altering unjust systems that they participate in; they nevertheless, do not bear
this responsibility alone, in that all actors involved share similarly in responsibility.
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It is precisely this sort of complacency and deference to the status quo regarding
environmental degradation that environmental transformative justice aims to alter by bringing to
light the injustice of ecocide.
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Also, since the social connection model does not hold actors guilty or blameworthy of
past wrongs, they have no putative duties or required acts of penitence. As such, they have
greater discretion to decide how to conduct themselves with the aim of publicly combating the
injustice given their abilities, circumstances, and competing moral concerns.198
Finally, because the model recognizes that it is always uncertain if actors will be able to
achieve their objectives. The framework accepts that good intentions, aspirations, and efforts to
work together to alter unjust social practices are morally laudatory and efficacious in-and-ofthemselves, regardless as to whether the projects lead to imperfect results. Consequently, failure
to end an injustice is not necessarily tantamount to shirking one’s moral responsibility, so long as
good faith attempts to rectify and redress the problem continue to be made.
As discussed, the social connection model arouses actors’ sense of responsibility to
combat injustice by appealing to their desire to be morally virtuous and their concern for the
plight of others.199 But as such, it leaves much of the normative decision-making up to the actors
themselves to determine what level of participation appeases their conscience. Nevertheless, the
framework is not entirely self-motivated in that it allows for and endorses criticizing actors for
not adequately involving themselves or being ineffective and counterproductive in their efforts to
improve or end unjust systems they are connected with. As Young says, “we have a right and
obligation to criticize others with whom we share responsibility” (Young 2011: 144).200
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For instance, it would be appropriate for actors to prioritize redressing injustices resulting
from a specific token case of ecocide that they acknowledge and recognize an intimate
connection with; rather then, focusing their efforts on the more daunting task of changing social
structures that are causing ecocide as a type of harm more generally.
199
Essentially, the social contract model functions as a tool of moral persuasion to motivate
actors to accept future obligations to improve unjust social systems with which they are engaged
(i.e., it concerns internally embracing responsibility); whereas, the liability model functions as a
means of justifying the impositions of moral censure on actors in virtue of their past wrongs (i.e.,
it concerns externally mandating responsibility).
200
The next chapter will explore at length what the target objectives and reasonable levels or
involvement ought to be when we examine the sort of social principles, structures, and
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At present, it is unnecessary to delve further into determining what levels of involvement
are adequate for discharging responsibility for ecocide. Since, the next chapter will explore the
topic at length, as the work examines the sort of social principles, structures, and institutions that
actors should strive to publicly promote in order to prevent, mitigate, and repair the injustices of
ecocide, i.e., discuss the content of environmental transformative justice.
Thus, in conclusion, we have seen that Young emphasizes actors’ “social position” in
relation to injustice(s) as the central criterion by which her model accounts for differentiated
responsibility. Nevertheless, is it possible for an actor to have no relation to the harm of ecocide
and as such, no responsibility to discharge? As we have argued it seems unlikely that any
individual member of roving imperialist society would satisfy this condition (as their basic way
of life intrinsically generates environmental destruction), but what about autarkic communities
that have never participated, benefited, or have any interest in maintaining processes of nonsustainable industrial mass production and consumption – do these groups still have
responsibility to discharge regarding ecocide?
This question is of significant concern for the CBDR principle because if an actor has no
responsibility to discharge, then one can argue that Young’s model does not satisfy the criterion
of ‘commonality’ (once again meaning everyone has a role to play) embraced in contemporary
environmentalism.201 Thus, to foreclose this argument the work will endeavor to prove that the
model of responsibility endorsed is maximally broad, in that it has the capacity to include all
actors.

institutions actors should strive to publicly promote in order to prevent, mitigate, and repair the
injustices of ecocide, i.e., discuss how to achieve environmental transformative justice.
201
To reiterate, Young would likely conclude that autarkic communities that bear no relation to
ecocide would have no responsibility to discharge. But our work seeks to show how her theory
can be employed (i.e., contrary to her own objective) to draw the opposite conclusion as a means
of satisfying the ‘commonality’ criterion of the CBDR principle.
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Nevertheless, some may worry that it is overly ambitious, unnecessary, and controversial
to argue that the ‘commonality’ criterion of the CBDR principle entails potentially including all
actors and that it would make more sense to limit the criterion’s applicability to groups of
individuals that are causally linked to ecocide. However, while such an undertaking maybe
burdensome, if it proves successful, we are rewarded with a model of responsibility that
forecloses the objection that the ‘commonality’ criterion has not been met. Additionally, such an
inclusive framing of responsibility for ecocide is capable of appealing to and satisfying the
popular and pervasive environmental sentiment that each of us has a role to play in confronting
environmental degradation. Thus, to explore this topic we will investigate the responsibility of
autarkic communities to combat ecocide.

C. Autarkic Communities’ Responsibility for Ecocide

Referring back to last chapter, we can imagine autarkic communities’ whose habitat were
destroyed through no fault of their own by ecocide (e.g., the Anangu, Wayúu, and Cree and
Afro-Colombian villages). Obviously in these scenarios, the autarkic communities are victims of
ecocide having lost their traditional way of life and ancestral home. Yet nonetheless, per the
social connection model, victims have a responsibility to discharge.

1.

Autarkic Victims and Responsibility
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After instances of victimization one might find it strange to claim that the members of
autarkic communities have a responsibility to discharge.202 But Young’s theorization of the
social connection model draws exactly this conclusion. She argues that even if victims did not
contribute to the injustice, they still have an interest in the issue (i.e., their own well-being) and
that interest in-and-of-itself constitutes a relation to the harm that ought to be discharged through
shared public action. “Even if they don't [contribute to the harm], victims of injustice should
take some responsibility for challenging the structures that produce it. It is they who know the
most about the harms they suffer, and thus it is up to them, though not them alone, to broadcast
their situation and call it injustice” (Young 2011: 146).
Therefore, in the case of victimized autarkic communities (i.e., situations in which they
are entirely innocent and contributed nothing in causing the environmental injustice), they still
have an interest in ameliorating the harm; and thus, Young argues they should take shared public
action to discharge this responsibility. Understandably, in these situations there exist potentially
immense practical challenges inhibiting the autarkic communities’ ability to undertake political
action to redress ecocide; in that they have lost their habitat, way of life, and lack connection to
and knowledge of domestic, international, and global power structures.
Nevertheless, victims do have first-hand experience of the environmental damages(s)
they suffered and thus, can best understand their specific grievance(s) and appreciate their
particular reparative and reconciliatory need(s). It is for this reason that the social connection
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It is important to keep in mind that Young’s social connection model employs an unorthodox
proscriptive notion of responsibility that is focused on motivating actors to strive for a better
tomorrow, instead of on allocating blame for past injustices (which is instead the concern of
Young’s liability model). Thus, one may argue that to avoid conceptual confusion, a new
concept such as responsivity ought to be adopted to capture the apportionment of future oriented
moral demands. However, in keeping with Young’s work we will eschew adopting a new term
and continue to employ a notion of responsibility that covers both discussion of what one has
done in the past and what one can do moving forward.
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model maintains that even victims who contributed (created, maintained, participated, and/or
benefited) nothing to an injustice still have a responsibility to take action, i.e., to bring the harm
to public consciousness.203 But what about autarkic communities that were able to avoid
suffering ecocide, do they still have responsibility to discharge per the social connection model?

2.

Non-Harmed Autarkic Communities and Responsibility

Unlike in the prior ‘victimization’ case, unaffected autarkic communities are not even
connected to ecocide as victims. Furthermore, we can envision scenarios in which, their
traditional way of life has successfully enabled them to protect, maintain, and preserve their
habitat in spite of the ongoing and growing global environmental crises. Hence, in these
‘ecological stewardship’ cases it is possible that the autarkic communities are unaware of the
threat of ecocide or of their role in protecting their habitat from harm. Thus, for these reasons,
‘ecological stewardship’ cases involve situations in which actors are living as far removed as
possible from non-sustainable modes of subsistence (i.e., systems of unsustainable globalized
industrial mass production and consumption) and thereby are maximally disconnected from
environmental wrongs.
Hence, cases of ‘ecological stewardship’ present the social connection model with actors
least responsible for discharging responsibility for ecocide, in that these successful autarkic
communities did not contribute, benefit, nor were they even harmed by environmental
degradation. As such, is it possible for the social connection model to justify that these
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Also, such a determination is beneficial in that it returns a sense of agency to victimized
groups that previously had been ignored.
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communities have forward looking responsibility to discharge in the absence of any relation to
environmental injustice?
To answer this question, we must analyze the four forward looking parameters that
Young provides to justify actor’s responsibility to redress injustices occurring within the “global
society” – power, interest, privilege, and collective ability (Young 2011: 144). We can quickly
disregard the last parameter - ‘collective ability’ - as it is dependent on pairing with at least one
of the other parameters to motivate the group’s involvement in redressing injustice. As such, the
rest of the section will briefly apply the three remaining parameters (‘power’, ‘privilege’, and
‘interest’) to the ‘ecological stewardship’ case (i.e., the most challenging example for
demonstrating actors responsibility for redressing environmental harm) in an attempt to
determine if the social connection model has the potential to justify a common responsibility for
combatting environmental ills that can be applied to all, i.e., conclusively confirm that the model
satisfies the ‘commonality’ criterion of the CBDR principle.
The first parameter to evaluate is power, which Young defines as, “influence over
processes that produce outcomes” (Young 2011: 144). Since, by definition autarkic communities
are uninvolved in global mass industrial production or consumption, they are epistemically and
practically distanced, lacking knowledge and involvement with the processes and procedures
producing environmental harm and as such are ill-suited to influence and shape them. Thus, the
parameter of ‘power’ is unable to provide a necessary connection between the autarkic
communities and environmental injustice(s) requiring redress.
One might be tempted to argue that the autarkic communities have the power to protect
their own habitat, thus they have a responsibility to continue their traditional lifestyle. But this is
not an expression of ‘power’ per the model, since the group’s maintenance of their customary
traditions and practices does not directly alter or influence the background processes and social
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structures generating environmental harm.
The second parameter to consider is privilege, which Young describes as an actor’s
ability, “to change their habits or make extra efforts without suffering serious deprivation”
(Young 2011: 145). Since, autarkic communities lead highly habituated lifestyles committed to
preserving their customary relationship with their local environment they clearly lack ‘privilege’
per Young’s account, in that any alteration to their way of life (i.e., changes to their traditional
patterns of behavior) could result in serious loss of wellbeing. Accordingly, autarkic
communities do not occupy a ‘privileged social position’ and therefore, in this case the
parameter does not foster responsibility for redressing environmental harms.
Finally, regarding the parameter of interest, we have already stipulated that in the
‘ecological stewardship’ case it is conceivable that autarkic communities may be unconcerned
(or more likely unaware) regarding environmental harms that do not impact their local habitat.
Nevertheless, one might be tempted to assert that autarkic communities have an interest in
altering social structures, relations, and institutions causing environmental harm tout court.
Essentially, the argument relies on an assumption that if environmental degradation is
permitted to continue unabated, then it will eventually impact the autarkic communities’ habitat.
But this claim is dubious, (leaving aside the fact that autarkic communities might be unaware of
the crises) in that their traditional engagement with their habitat has already proven to be
resilient. As such, the premise – ‘that autarkic communities’ habitat will inevitably be affected
by external environmental degradation’ - seems uncertain.204 Accordingly, if it is the case that
such groups can independently sustain their habitat and way of life, then it is possible that they
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Essentially, the point is that an autarkic community’s sustainable and resilient lifestyle may
prove so effective in preserving their habitat that it successfully outlasts roving imperialists’
unsustainable mode of subsistence, i.e., the industrial and post-industrial globalized system may
collapse before the autarkic communities experience social death due to ecocide.
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would have little interest in altering their behavior or concern for broader environmental harms
to which they are wholly unconnected or affected. Furthermore, if they were unable to continue
to preserve their ecosystem, then by definition they would no longer be ‘ecological stewards’ and
as such, could easily be situated within Young’s model as either victims, beneficiaries,
contributors, or perpetrators depending upon their involvement in the environmental degradation
impacting their habitat - as our previous discussion has illustrated.
Consequently, the above analysis of ‘ecological stewardship’ cases offers a hypothetical
class of actors with no relationship to ecocide per Young’s interpretation of the social connection
model. Hence in the potentiality that such communities exist, Young would likely assert that the
social connection model would be unable to link these peoples to environmental harms and as
such, they would be exempt of responsibility (even from within her rather expansive conception
of responsibility) for redressing these injustices.
Immediately, one might argue that this result is unproblematic and does not violate the
‘commonality’ criterion of CBDR principle because at least at present, these communities (if
they exist) represent such a small minority of the people inhabiting the planet that it makes no
substantive difference (in that they do not cause or are impacted by ecocide) if they are excluded
from responsibility. However, this retreat is conceptually unsatisfying, since the stated objective
is to show that the theory of responsibility under consideration is flexible enough to demonstrate
that all people potentially have a role to play in response to environmental injustice.205
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This argument may seem somewhat pedantic, especially if it is shown that no unconnected
ecological stewards exist. Nevertheless, it is conceptually important because it illustrates that
Young’s framework can satisfy a maximally expansive reading of the ‘commonality’ criterion of
the CBDR principle, i.e., it offers a framework of responsibility able to fully articulate the folk
environmentalist understanding that we must all work together to confront environmental
degradation.
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Consequently, and contrary to Young’s stated application of her theory, the work
contends that unconnected ecological stewards can be integrated into her model of
responsibility. Once again, the reason such a conclusion is of interest is because it demonstrates
that the framework is able to unconditionally satisfy the ‘commonality’ component of the CBDR
principle in cases of ecocide. Essentially, the work argues that unconnected ecological stewards
have an important responsibility (i.e., have a role to play) in redressing environmental injustices
per the social connection model in their role as environmental heroes.
The key insight necessary to reach this conclusion is recognizing that Young failed to
fully consider or articulate the virtue theoretic aspect(s) of her account. As previously explained,
the social connection model is virtue-theoretic, in that it relies on actors’ motivation and
disposition to strive for moral excellence by embracing their responsibility to improve
institutions and practices in which they partake. But as Linda Zagzebski explains, the process of
identifying and developing virtuous motivations and dispositions requires moral exemplars. “We
do not have criteria for goodness in advance of identifying the exemplars of goodness”
(Zagzebski 2004: 41). Hence, the social connection model tacitly relies on the existence of heroic
actors displaying qualities, behaviors, and habits that others can admire and emulate, i.e., the
model requires commendable acts and actors that push social boundaries and transcend the
established status quo.
As such, unconnected ecological stewards by continuing their traditional lifestyle
represent exemplars of environmental heroism, in that they demonstrate (potentially
unbeknownst to them) sustainable ways of life, which are far less environmentally destructive
than extractive and exploitative materialism practiced by roving imperialists (i.e., the currently
dominant mode of subsistence). Autarkic communities’ customary engagement with their habitat
offers a tangible reimagining of social structures and modes of sustainable subsistence, i.e., they
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provide a concrete vision for devising innovative practices and institutions to prevent, mitigate,
and repair environmental harms that are severely lacking in contemporary society.
Heightening the need for unconnected ecological stewards to play the role of
environmental heroes (even if it is unbeknownst to them) is the fact that there is a dearth of
environmentally sustainable ways of life within the dominant global order. Therefore, without
unconnected ecological stewards, the social connection model would be lacking in virtuous
exemplars (i.e., communities living sustainably within their habitat) to inspire, demonstrate, and
guide change to the social practices, behaviors, institutions, norms, and values generating
environmental harm. Thus, in this sense, even unconnected ecological stewards in their role as
potential environmental heroes play an important part in the application of the social connection
model’s virtue-theoretic approach to redressing ecocide.206 Furthermore, there is no undue
burden placed upon these communities, since their responsibility is discharged simply through
maintaining their sustainable way of life.207
Consequently, emphasizing the virtue-theoretic aspect of Young’s account illuminates a
path by which the model satisfies CBDR’s criterion of ‘commonality’ even in the ‘ecological
stewardship’ case, in that it establishes a way in which all peoples and communities have a role
to play in combatting ecocide. The hope is that this discussion has demonstrated that Young’s
model represents a coherent articulation of the principle of CBDR, in that it satisfies both the
‘common’ and ‘differentiated’ criteria.
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It is unclear that this feature would apply to other sorts of injustices, but at least for our
purposes of analyzing responsibility for ecocide per the social connection model, unconnected
ecological stewards play an essential role as exemplars of environmental heroism that likely no
other community could satisfy as effectively.
207
However, if the group’s lifestyle becomes unsustainable, then they would by definition be
connected to environmental degradation and thus, straightforwardly fit within Young’s model of
responsibility.
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Therefore, at this point, we have demonstrated that Young’s theorization of responsibility
meets both the ‘common but differentiated’ and ‘backwards and forwards looking’ criterion that
broadly meets the goal of both environmentalism and Transitional Justice. As such, the last
element necessary for confirming that Young’s account is capable of satisfying the aims of both
disciplines is to prove that her conception of responsibility is capable of including a broad set of
social entities.

D. Young’s Model as a Socially Capacious Conception of Responsibility

Throughout the section, we have focused on individual responsibility, but conceptually it
seems rather straightforward that the liability and social connection model are both readily
amenable to including any sort of legal person (i.e., natural persons and group-agents) within
their respective frameworks; which, as discussed in the preceding section, is required for an
adequate and effective conception of responsibility capable of satisfying the aims of both
Transitional Justice and environmentalism.
For instance, instead of focusing on the guilt of the rogue rancher, we can concurrently
stipulate that his company, Rogue Ranching Inc., was collectively liable for the illegal clearing
of the forest, and thus, ought to face punitive and retributive social sanctions (e.g., fines,
mandatory reforms, forced closure, etc.). Moreover, the liability model of responsibility applies
to states, in that when states violate international law they can be blamed, held accountable, and
sanctioned for illicit activity by the international community (which we saw in our analysis of
Transitional Justice). Accordingly, once corporations, states, and individuals are considered
accountable per the liability model, then there appears to be no sound basis for restricting other
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types of group-agents (e.g., NGOs, municipalities, social clubs, etc.) from being blamed for past
wrongs.
Additionally, the social connection model is capable of integrating corporations, states,
NGO’s, etc., in that the same virtue-theoretic motivations that applies to individuals (i.e., to
strive for moral excellence by embracing their responsibility to take steps to better institutions
and practices in which they partake), can be applied to group-agents. However, one might argue
that the virtue-theoretic ‘motivations’ of group-actors are products of collaborative efforts and
sentiments of the individuals comprising the group, i.e., that agency in collectives reduces down
to the individual agency of the individual actors making up the collective.
Therefore, such an analysis stipulates that fundamentally, the social connection model is
limited to individual responsibility, since the governance and decision-making of collective
organizations always reduces down to the choices of individuals within them. But as has been
discussed, such a view is discredited, in that social ontology and rational choice theory have each
demonstrated that group-agents often take on a causal life of their own, i.e., their prior decisions
may dictate courses of action that are contrary to the subjective preferences of the individuals
that make them up.208 Thus, there are situations in which the group-agent’s aims and aspirations
diverge from the subjective wishes of the group members, i.e., sometimes groups demonstrate
emergent behavior that is irreducible to the individual preferences of the members compromising
them. Accordingly, it is possible that the group-agent - itself - may decide to strive for moral
excellence by taking action to better the institutions and practices in which they engage; thus,
satisfying the virtue-theoretic aims of the social connection model.
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See the Condorcet paradox (Condorcet 1785) and Arrow’s impossibility theorem (Arrow
1950), both of which formally explain (i.e., using rational choice theory) ways in which
collective preferences can be contrary to the wishes of the subjective individuals comprising the
group.
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Obviously, the actions, policies, and changes group-agents ought to take in response to
ecocide per the social connection model are distinct from those required of individuals (i.e.,
natural persons). For instance, holding Exxon responsible for an oil spill, does not mean that
individual employees (in-and-of-themselves), should begin cleaning up the spill regardless of
their role in the company, e.g., the accounting department should don HAZMAT suits, wade into
the impacted area, and start scrubbing oil off plants and animals.209
Essentially, group-agents must act as morally unified plural-subjects and we will delve
into precisely what this obligation entails in the next chapter. But for now, it is important to
stress that we have demonstrated that Young’s account is amenable to a socially capacious
conception of responsibility that meets the goals of both Transitional Justice and
environmentalism. Hence, the section has illustrated that Young’s account can be interpreted as
(1) common, but differentiated, (2) both backward and forward looking, and (3) socially
capacious; and as such, it offers a framework for satisfying the requisite elements stipulated in
the preceding section as necessary for both disciplines’ conception of responsibility.
Thus, in conclusion, the work has offered an adequately developed conception of
responsibility for ecocide, i.e., one that is persuasive, politically useful, reasonably acceptable to
the parties involved, and counters harmful and obscuring ideologies that disguise accountability
(both over-inclusively and under-inclusively) for environmental harm. Furthermore, the notion of
responsibility has been designed to satisfy the needs of both Transitional Justice and
environmentalism, as a means of seamlessly facilitating each discipline’s ability to draw upon
and utilize potentially valuable conceptual insights and practical tools from the other when
confronting ecocide.
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To act collectively, the agents that take part in the cleanup must be authorized in a certain
sense by Exxon. Individual employees acting out of their own sense of moral obligation would
not constitute a collective act but would instead be an instance of individual beneficence.
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With these objectives met, a subsequent topic of consideration is analyzing what is
required of those responsible for repairing and reconciling the injustice of ecocide? In other
words, the next chapter will work towards developing a conception of environmental
transformative justice for post-ecocide states.
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CHAPTER THREE
Why is Ecocide Unjust? A Constructivist Approach to Diagnosing the Injustice of Ecocide

I.

Introduction to Constructivist Approaches to Justice

At this point in the text, it would be helpful to the reader to delineate a précis-overview,
recounting exposition within the preceding chapters, elucidating their strategic aims and
objectives. The first chapter considers paradigm cases and an idealized description of ecocide,
illustrating normatively relevant ways that these wrongs fall within the purview of Transitional
Justice due to the harm suffered (i.e., social death and loss of vital interests) and the manner in
which the harm occurred (i.e., direct, indirect, or negligent state action). Essentially, the first
chapter established the circumstance of environmental transformative justice, in that it delineated
the particular social settings that trigger the normative concerns to which environmental
transformative justice is responsive.210
The second chapter amplified insights gained in the first chapter and attempted to
establish the full class of actors that have a role to play in overcoming the injustice of these
circumstances. Essentially, the second chapter sought to develop a conception of responsibility
that was persuasive, politically useful, and reasonably acceptable to the parties involved, while
assisting in countering detrimental and obscuring ideologies that disguise accountability (both
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The work accepts what Colleen Murphy categorizes as a Humean approach to justice, in
which, “instead of theorizing about justice in the abstract as Plato did, we should approach the
question of what is just in a given case by identifying the problem of justice that is at issue in a
set of circumstances…these conditions explain why justice is an issue in the first place, that is,
why a problem of justice exists and what the contours of that problem are” (Murphy 2017: 41).
Basically, the view involves recognizing that there are different types of justice (e.g.,
distributive, corrective, retributive, etc.) that are each responsive to particular sets of
circumstances.
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over-inclusively and under-inclusively) for ecocide. A core insight of the second chapter was that
in order to adequately discharge responsibility actors would be required to take part in shared
public activity (i.e., political action) to oppose, resist, and alter the background institutions and
practices generating each case of ecocide under discussion.
Accordingly, at present the dissertation has established the circumstances in which
environmental transformative justice is operative and who is responsible for engaging in
environmental transformative justice. Thus, what remains is to determine what ought to be done
in these situations. What objectives should actors be striving to achieve? And what must occur to
in order to fully obtain justice for the victims of ecocide? Most simply, what are the principle
aims of environmental transformative justice?
As such, the focus of the third and fourth chapters will be investigating how
environmental transformative justice can work towards repairing and reconciling the injustice of
ecocide. An important aspect of this analysis is demonstrating that the goals, procedures, and
mechanisms for achieving environmental transformative justice are compatible with,
complement, and simultaneously further those of both Transitional Justice and environmentalism
respectively. Ultimately, establishing links between Transitional Justice and environmentalism
strengthens and reaffirms a goal of this project, i.e., to rationally enlist and join both disciplines
as allies against ecocide.
After decades of analyzing and reviewing the real-world successes and failures of
societies attempting to overcome grave historical wrongs, the objectives of Transitional Justice
are fairly well established. Murphy succinctly summarizes how the discipline aims at
transitioning societies away from pervasive structural inequality, ending normalized political and
collective wrongdoing, establishing legitimate authority, and promoting social stability (Murphy
2017). As she emphasizes, achieving this kind of social transformation requires furthering the
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rule of law, developing relational capabilities, and establishing political trust (Murphy 2017:
120-135). Accordingly, justice for victims of severe political injustice involves
acknowledgement of past wrongs, recognition of victims’ status as members of the political
community, reparations paid to victims, and holding perpetrators accountable for their role in
enacting grave wrongs (Murphy 2017: 172-186).
Conversely, as discussed last chapter, it is exceedingly difficult to neatly summarize the
broad and differentiated aims of environmentalism. Nevertheless, the work maintains that from
an environmentalist perspective there are two main objectives that arise when confronting the
cases of ecocide under consideration. First, steps must be taken to move towards an
environmentally sustainable state (what exactly ‘sustainability’ entails will be explored later in
the chapter) in which social practices, structures, and norms generating ecocide are no longer
tolerated and accepted. Secondly, the state, in conversation with affected communities, must
consider the possibility of restoring or constructing (i.e., in the same or different geographic
location) the lost habitat by attempting to renew biological, structural, and ecosystem
functioning.

A. Employing Constructivist and Comparative Approaches to Justice

But before we can begin analyzing how environmental transformative justice can work
towards meeting the goals of Transitional Justice and environmentalism, it is helpful to see if it is
possible to construct a general theory of environmental transformative justice by relying on
established conceptions of justice.211 Such an undertaking will hopefully lend support and
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It is important to point out that the dissertation is not trying to offer fundamental principles of
justice which, “transcends the facts of the world” that would quiet the philosophical demands of
Plato or G.A. Cohen (Cohen 2008). Instead the project is striving to provide reasonable (all
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normative justification for the above mentioned goals of Transitional Justice and
environmentalism when confronting ecocide and assist in forging a disciplinary alliance capable
of challenging such injustice.
Thus the third and fourth chapters of the dissertation will explore what I contend to be the
two major approaches for articulating, legitimating, and applying conceptions of justice in
political philosophy: (1) a constructivist approach that attempts to delineate ideal distributive
principles, rules of regulation, and institutional structures that if enacted with strict compliance in
favorable conditions would generate a just state – e.g., Rawls, Dworkin, Scanlon, and Gauthier;
and (2) a comparative approach interested in examining the actual world and asking how it can
be made more just by observing what lives are like and what people are capable of achieving by
making comparisons between persons and groups – e.g., Sen and Nussbaum.
As such, we will begin by working through both of these approaches’ respective
methodology for determining what justice requires concerning the paradigm cases and idealized
description of ecocide. The assumption is that these methodologies can play a complementary
role (i.e., each approach’s particular weaknesses, deficiencies, and limitations can be assuaged
by relying on the strengths and insight of the other) in our attempt to develop an adequate
conception of environmental transformative justice.212

things considered) rules of regulation for responding to the fact-sensitive circumstances of postecocide societies. Thus, the dissertation can avoid having to engage with Cohen’s criticism of
constructivist methodology (i.e., that constructivism derives and justifies principles of justice
from non-moral facts in a way that distorts our understanding of justice) because it already
admits it is undertaking a pragmatic approach aimed at reaching overlapping consensus for
responding to a specific set of harms (coping with reality), instead of striving to reach an
absolute final judgement (copying some immutable Truth). In other words, there is no need for
us, when conceptualizing environmental transformative justice, to embrace Cohen’s strategy of
theorizing strictly fact-independent principles of justice that eschew engaging with how things
work in practice.
212
It is important to keep in mind that the practices, methods, and policies for adequately
responding to ecocide will likely improve as the process of environmental transformative justice
is repeatably undertaken. The reason for this stems from the fact that if practitioners have access
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Accordingly, the purpose is not to defend one approach over the other, but to
pragmatically utilize and adopt insights from each in the hopes of developing a conception of
environmental transformative justice able to offer societies meaningful guidance and assistance
for combating legacies of ecocide.213 In due course, if such approaches are able to justify and
reaffirm the aims of Transitional Justice and environmentalism, then it strengthens the work’s
goal: to demonstrate the interdisciplinary nature of environmental transformative justice.
By building a theory of environmental transformative justice from within a pluralist
account of mainstream conceptions of justice, the work seeks to bolster the possibility of
achieving general agreement via ‘overlapping consensus’ (i.e., differing normative doctrines
agreeing on particular policy objectives despite advancing generally inconsistent conceptions of
justice) as to what needs to occur in order to justly respond to cases of ecocide. As Steven
Vanderheiden states, “even if the differences among approaches [to justice] are of theoretical
interest, such differences should not obstruct consensus around practical measures to lessen (if
not fully rectify) the injustice in question (Vanderheiden 2016: 398). For instance, approaching
the issue of how to respond to ecocide by appealing to multiple theoretical frameworks, assists in
demonstrating potential diagnostic convergence regarding the harms suffered and prescriptive

to a growing body of empirical evidence (i.e., from past attempts), then they will be more readily
able to learn valuable lessons from prior successes or failures. Hence, it is reasonable to assume
that the conception of environmental transformative justice currently on offer, may change as it
is applied. It is helpful to recognize that anytime a new conception of justice is proposed,
practitioners should embrace a ‘learn-by-doing’ approach, in which the goals, means, evidence,
and values of policy-making are all open for constant (re)examination.
213
In many ways the answer to the question regarding how best to proceed in such circumstances
will greatly depend on the values and goals of the affected community. As Bryan Norton stresses
when making environmental decisions the procedure is often more important than the absolute
substantive conclusion. He asserts that the process must be, “democratic…it must be iterative, it
must be open to all voices in the community, and it must be receptive to multiple values and
varied formulations of these values” (Norton 2005: 273). Nevertheless, it is reasonable to assume
that it would be beneficial for post-ecocide communities’ decision-making process, if theorists
can offer guidance regarding the objectives of environmental transformative justice.
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convergence regarding potential remedies.214 Furthermore, such an endeavor will serve as an
effective diagnostic tool to further capture and clarify the injustice of ecocide and in so doing
strengthen the case for action by demonstrating robust consensus around core normative
judgements.

B. Overcoming a Preliminary Issue with Applying Rawls’s Ideal Constructivist Theory
to Ecocide

Constructivists assert that the fundamental objective and principal method of advancing
justice is to delineate ideal principles and basic social structures that are necessary and sufficient
for achieving a just state under reasonable conditions. As Cohen succinctly explains,
constructivists determine the principles of justice by relying on a “privileged selection process”
in which, “the fundamental principles of justice are the outcome of an idealized legislative
procedure whose task is to select principles that will regulate our common life” (e.g., Rawls’s
original position or Scanlon’s requirement of rules that no one could reasonably reject) (Cohen
2008: 282).
Thus, in an attempt to determine the ideal principles of environmental transformative
justice, we will begin by applying John Rawls’s theory of “justice as fairness” to ecocidal
states.215 The justification for focusing on Rawls is that his seminal theory is the preferred (or at
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As Cass Sunstein emphasizes, “sometimes people can agree on individual
judgements even if they disagree on general theory” (Sunstein 2007: 4).
215
Once again, “ecocidal states/societies” are defined as states that directly, indirectly, or
negligently allowed intentional environmental harm to occur, which undermined the vital
interests of a distinct cultural group without the group’s consent; whereas, the term “post-ecocide
states/societies” refers to states/societies that are in the process of enacting environmental
transformative justice after ecocide (see 1).
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least most widely discussed) constructivist account in contemporary political philosophy.216
Furthermore, situating our discussion regarding how to justly respond to ecocide within the heart
of the mainstream liberal tradition is beneficial, since as Charles Mills expounds: “The
importance of liberalism is that it is the most successful political philosophy of modernity and is
now globally hegemonic. Liberalism provides the most developed body of normative theory for
understanding the rights of persons and the conceptualization of social justice” (Mills 2017:
203).
Lastly, a benefit of looking at Rawls, is that his theory’s emphasis on respecting
pluralism of values and fraternity between citizens makes it well suited for incorporating and
recognizing the interests of autarkic communities in liberal societies.217 Such a theoretical
contribution is important because at present scholars often rely on importing principles of
sovereignty and noninterference from international relations theory to make sense of these
‘outsiders within.’218 Such a perspective is discouraging for our present moment, in that we are
in desperate need of encouraging ecologically sustainable self-sufficiency (like those practiced
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There are prudential reasons for conducting our inquiry of environmental transformative
justice through a Rawlsian perspective, in that such a framing offers the greatest likelihood of
uptake, traction, and understanding with regards to the mainstream liberal political philosophy
community, i.e., the currently dominant paradigm of political thought. But additionally, I have
no qualms working within the Rawlsian framework because I still feel it offers the best
constructivist account of justice in contemporary philosophy.
217
Moreover, the investigation is informative from a purely academic perspective, in that
employing “justice as fairness” to diagnose the injustice of ecocide can help clarify and illustrate
some interesting features, tensions, and limitations of the theory. For instance, some questions to
consider during the analysis are: (1) Is it possible to find the fair terms of social cooperation for
citizens who are not integrated into society in the ways Rawls would have imagined, in that they
live in separate cultural and economic spheres?; (2) Providing opportunities is very important for
Rawls, but how can this objective be satisfied for communities whose interests do not align with
the broader society?, and (3) Is there a point at which a disregard for economic efficiency in the
name of fairness encroaches on justice itself?
218
See Jeff Corntassel’s work “Towards Sustainable Self-Determination: Rethinking the
Contemporary Indigenous-Rights Discourse” that advocates for noninterference and increased
sovereignty for self-sufficient communities” (Corntassel 2008).
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autarkic communities) as a realizable goal.219 Accordingly, the chapter hopes to demonstrate how
Rawls’s theory of “justice as fairness” can further the goal of incorporating autarkic interests into
“well ordered” societies.220
Famously, Rawls in a Theory of Justice constructed an idealized social arrangement
designed to maintain equal liberties, maximize fair opportunity, and minimize inequality (Rawls
1971). But can these principles apply in cases of ecocide? Can Rawls’s ideal constructivist
theory provide guidance regarding how to justly grapple with the injustice of ecocide?
The initial answer is that Rawls’s ‘ideal theory’ will obviously prove inadequate because
repairing past injustices, such as ecocide, falls under the purview of what Rawls himself calls
‘non-ideal theory’ (Rawls 1971 revised edition 1999: 8).221 To briefly explain the distinction,
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In other words, autarkic communities’ way of life should not be viewed as something
necessarily foreign, alien or carved-off from our mainstream political community but should
instead be championed as realizable, as evidenced by the fact that it already exists within our
society. Essentially, what is needed is not a hands-off approach, which emphasizes noninterference and treats autarkic communities as foreign actors best left to their own devices; but
instead, efforts ought to be made to embrace and advocate for these communities, so as to
support their ability to maintain and reproduce their traditions, practices, cosmologies, and
relationships with their ancestral land, not only for their benefit, but for the benefit of society as a
whole. As David Schlosberg and David Carruthers explain: “In movements against coal mining,
oil and natural gas drilling, industrial use of scarce water, and numerous other threats to local
resources, much of the indigenous response is related to the capacity for communities and
cultures to thrive” (Schlosberg and Carruthers 2010: 30).
220
The goal of increasing social fraternity and cooperation between groups is in part why the
preceding chapter of the dissertation defended the ‘commonality’ criterion of the CBDR
principle.
221
The reason that Rawls’s approach is ahistorical, and thus not fully adequate in non-ideal
situations, stems from his initial philosophical prescriptive, since the veil of ignorance and the
original position are designed to render irrelevant socio-personal considerations that are morally
extraneous to the establishment of just principles: “No one knows his place in society, his class
position or social status; nor does he know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and
abilities, his intelligence and strength, and the like” (Rawls 1971 revised edition 1999: 11). Thus,
the very objective of Rawls’s thought experiment neutralizes individuals’ ability to consider their
past and present conditions during deliberation. But the past is an inextricably relevant concern
for societies in the wake of ecocide, in that the community necessarily contains at a minimum
two dissimilar historical social groups victims (former-autarkic peoples – current-ecological
refugees) and perpetrators (roving imperialists). As will be argued, there is a strong intuition that
these victims of ecocide ought to be afforded distinct moral attention. Thus, for environmental
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‘non-ideal theory’ focuses on identifying injustices of the present and investigating how societies
can move away from these injustices, towards achieving a just future (as defined by ‘idealtheory’).
However, it must be emphasized that presently we are not attempting to consider how
post-ecocide societies ought to achieve the ideal; but are instead, undertaking the constructivist
project of determining what the ideal is when determining the objectives of environmental
transformative justice prior to the actualization of these goals. Thus, while we are in the midst of
developing a constructivist framework for responding to the injustice of ecocide, we must
initially proceed as ‘ideal theorists’ before moving to problems of implementation, which are
considered the purview of ‘non-ideal theory’.222
Broadly, the constructivist method prioritizes the need for clear and distinct principles of
justice and stipulates that social progress can only reliably occur after ideal objectives have been
identified (Simmons 2010). As Rawls states, “the reason for beginning with ideal theory is that it
provides the only basis for the systematic grasp of more pressing problems [non-ideal theory]”
(Rawls 1971 revised edition 1999: 8).
Obviously, many non-ideal theorists contend that Rawls’s view is mistaken, and that ideal
theory is too detached from reality to help guide social progress or even worse that it facilitates
greater injustice (Mills 2005, 2007, 2012, 2015 and 2017). They instead presume that social

transformative justice settings the specific identity and historical experience(s) of a group or
individual are relevant factors for consideration when meting out social justice. No purely futureoriented, ahistorical, normative framework will adequately assuage the moral requirement of
remedying past wrongs.
222
Nevertheless, it is important to highlight that a general problem with engaging with Rawls in
matters of non-ideal theory is that it is not clear what the status of his own principles should be.
Are they applied in conjunction with (hypothetical) principles of non-ideal theory? Or is there a
temporal sequence by which you do corrective justice first and only then seek to apply Rawls’s
principles? Thus, in proceeding we will assume that we can appeal to Rawls’s principles even
under the radically non-ideal conditions of ecocidal societies, but only as a means of illustrating
how these societies are non-ideal.
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progress requires detailed attentiveness to the present state of the actual (‘non-ideal’) world;
starting with an understanding of current political and economic systems, as well as social
institutions, which necessitates applying a dynamic psychological picture of how people actually
behave in addition to sociological attunement to the societal conditions that we wish to improve.
As such, non-ideal theorists believe that only by earnest diachronic consideration of the
current state of affairs will we be able to make just decisions that improve society (Fatima 2014
and Tobin 2009). Accordingly, the non-idealist approach to justice (i.e., one that takes seriously
past and present circumstances, relations, conditions, processes and social interactions), seems
rather appropriate for analyzing the (in)justice of ecocidal and post-ecocide societies, in that past
histories and present circumstances of victims (former-autarkic peoples – current-ecological
refugees) and perpetrators (roving imperialists) are of relevant moral concern.223
However, because we are working from within a constructivist framework, we can table
these criticisms for the present and assume that the constructivists are correct in the view that
non-ideal theorists would themselves require ideal normative standards to be able to offer
guidance and insights in non-ideal settings (see Rawls 1993, Buchanan 2004, Valentini 2009,
and Simmons 2010). As Lisa Herzog explains:
“Ideal theory, as understood here, is not about what is right and wrong per se, without any
consideration of the context in which its principles are to be applied but aims at being actionguiding. It can therefore be reasonably limited by limitations of what it is possible to do. If
one does not accept this principle, ideal theory loses the ability to provide the guidance it is
supposed to deliver.” (Herzog 2012: 276)
Hence, if Rawls and other ideal constructivists are correct (as we are assuming needs to be
the case in order to devise coherent principles of environmental transformative justice), then his
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For instance, our normative evaluation of a situation will likely vary if we believe the harm
was self-inflicted or instigated by another. In other words, non-ideal theory tracts onto the moral
sentiment that proper analysis of (in)justice requires knowledge of the processes that brought
about the state of affairs.
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and their theories ought to be able to provide some insights and guidance even in non-ideal
settings, (e.g., ecocidal societies) as defenders of ideal theory argue it must. As Mills eloquently
reminds us: “Ideal theory is not supposed to be an end in itself but is instrumental to the goal of
more adequately dealing with injustice” (Mills 2017: 155). Thus, to satisfy this requirement, this
work intends to demonstrate that a Rawlsian constructivist approach can offer insights regarding
what justice requires of post-ecocide communities and as a means of diagnosing the injustice of
ecocide.
To advance this line of inquiry the chapter will proceed in two phases. First, it will engage
with a canonical reading of Rawls’s theory and attempt to analyze how his famous two principles
of justice can be applied to cases of ecocide, i.e., employ an orthodox account of the theory to
begin fleshing out the tenets of environmental transformative justice. Secondly, the work will
rely on recent scholarship by Moises Vaca and Juan Espindola (2014) and Charles Mills (2017)
that convincingly argues that Rawls’s theory of “justice as fairness” requires an additional
principle of reparative justice; and then analyze how this augmented Rawlsian account can be
applied to cases of ecocide. Thereby we can further develop a theory of environmental
transformative justice by relying on an unorthodox, yet supposedly consistent reading of Rawls’s
theory. The hope is that this constructivist analysis will provide plausible (i.e., mainstream
liberal) principles of environmental transformative justice to reasonably guide the process of
rectifying and reconciling with the wrongs of ecocide.

II.

Conceptualizing Justice Post-Ecocide: An Orthodox Rawlsian Approach

Rawls’s constructivist approach from “behind the veil of ignorance” in the “original
position” endorses two principles of justice:
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(First Principle) Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system
of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.
(Second Principle) Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are
both:
(a) To the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings
principle, and
(b) Attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of
opportunity (Rawls 1999: 266).224
These principles are supposed to regulate the “basic structure” of society, i.e., the full set of
constitutional, political, legal, economic, and social institutions operating within a state. Rawls
defines the “basic structure” as, “the main political and social institutions and the way they fit
together as one scheme of cooperation” (Rawls 2001: 4). Therefore, in order for a society to be
just, its basic structure must satisfy the two principles of justice.
In this sense, Rawls’s constructivist theory is ideal in a non-technical sense in that it
proposes an ideal society that we should aim for as a model (Valentini 2009 and 2012). As
Rawls states in Political Liberalism, his theory strives to show, “how the social world may
realize the features of a realistic utopia…[that] provides a long-term goal of political endeavor,
and in working toward it gives meaning to what we can do today” (Rawls 1993: 128).
When we examine ecocidal societies on these terms, it is abundantly clear that they fall
far short of the “realistic utopias” that Rawls championed, in that they egregiously fail at
satisfying his two principles of justice. To explain their shortcomings, the work will briefly
describe the central discrepancies between these societies and one that would be considered
“well-ordered” in that it is in line with Rawls’s principles of justice.
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I have opted to quote Rawls’s final formulation of the two principles from A Theory of Justice
the revised edition from 1999; which as the final formulation in the work, represents the clearest
articulation of his thought emerging after decades of careful, pondering, analysis, scrutiny, astute
judgment, and refinement.
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For simplicity’s sake regarding Rawls’s understanding of well-ordered societies, the
work will proceed by specifying the miscarriages of justice occurring in ecocidal states by
examining each principle pursuant to Rawls’s stated lexical priority, in that basic liberties can
never be sacrificed to promote fair equality of opportunity or the difference principle; fair
equality of opportunity can never be undermined to promote the difference principle, and the just
savings principle is an intergenerational constraint on the difference principle.225 Thus, we will
begin by examining the first principle, which henceforth shall be referred to as the basic liberty
principle, which defends personal freedom and develops a system of legal and political rights;
next we will move on to the second clause of the second principle, which henceforth will be
referred to as the fair equality of opportunity principle (FEO), which ensures fair and equal
prospects of achieving attractive social positions; next we will move on to the first clause of the
second principle, which henceforth will be referred to as the difference principle, which
establishes solidarity with the least advantaged group, and finally, we will consider the restrictive
condition of the first clause of the second principle, which henceforth will be referred to as the
just savings principle, which establishes intergenerational fairness.

A. Ecocidal Societies’ Failure to Respect Basic Liberties
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It is important to point out that there is controversy over whether or not Rawls’s lexical
prioritization of the principles of justice is defensible. For instance, Thomas Pogge argues that
certain basic economic goods (second principle) are more important than civil and political
freedoms (first principle) (Pogge 1989: 132-134). And Taylor provides an extensive list of
theorists opposed to Rawls’s lexical prioritization, which includes, “Brian Barry, Kenneth
Arrow, H.L.A. Hart, Russell Keat and David Miller, Henry Shue, Joseph DeMarco and Samuel
Richmond, Ricardo Blaug, and Norman Daniels” (Taylor 2003: 247). But wading into these
debates, will take us too far afield from our analysis. Also, since we are presenting a canonical
interpretation, it makes sense to proceed according to Rawls’s favored ordering to avoid
misrepresenting how the principles are supposed to cohere in support of the overall theory of
justice. Furthermore, the lexical priority of the principles is somewhat irrelevant for our present
purposes because each will be analyzed on its own terms.
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Rawls’s first principle of justice communicates the basic rights and liberties that are to be
distributed equally to all citizens. As he explains, the “intuitive” idea behind the basic liberty
principle is, “to generalize the principle of religious toleration to a social form, thereby arriving
at equal liberty in public institutions” (Rawls 1999: 180 Note 6). Helpfully, Rawls offers a list of
the basic liberties, stating:
Important among these are political liberty (the right to vote and to hold public office)
and freedom of speech and assembly; liberty of conscience and freedom of thought;
freedom of the person, which includes freedom from psychological oppression and
physical assault and dismemberment (integrity of the person); the right to hold personal
property and freedom from arbitrary arrest and seizure as defined by the concept of the
rule of law. (Rawls 1999: 53)
As we saw in our paradigm cases of ecocide in the first chapter, the environmental
destruction of autarkic communities’ habitat directly violates many of the basic liberties.226 It
seems incontrovertible that members of the victimized group suffered psychological oppression
caused by the loss of their means of subsistence, their ancestral traditions, and meaning in their
lives.227 Furthermore, as documented, it is often the case that the environmental destruction is
precipitated by the expulsion of communities from their ancestral land (e.g., the Australian
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It is necessary to reemphasize that in the paradigm cases of ecocide under discussion, the
members of autarkic communities had either full, dual, or plural citizenship in the state at issue.
This is important because Rawls’s conception of “justice as fairness” is limited to intrastate
relations, in that he makes a simplifying assumption that the societies under consideration are
self-contained, i.e., “closed system[s] isolated from other societies” that citizens only enter and
leave by birth and death (Rawls 1999: 7). Thus, ensuring that the victims effected by ecocide are
citizens precludes possible complications arising when attempting to analyze the mistreatment of
communities that do not fall under the state’s jurisdiction. But these complications may hinder
the application of our framework to cases in which sovereign autarkic communities were
subjected to ecocide by foreign powers, which is/was a common occurrence, especially during
colonialism.
227
For instance, a recent psychological study found that after an Ecuadorean indigenous village
lost their ancestral land due to a mining operation, 42% of the villagers suffered from mental
health problems, especially children traumatized by being exposed to the noise of industrial
processes (Brown 2017).
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government forcibly relocating the Anangu off their reservation), which likely constitutes
physical assault and violates the right to hold personal property, against either intentional or
arbitrary seizure.
But one might question if ecocide could potentially occur without basic liberties being
infringed? It is certainly true, that many instances of environmental destruction occur without
transgressing basic liberties, e.g., natural disasters or when all actors involved voluntarily agree
to destroy the habitat. However, the cases that fall within our conception of ecocide are narrower
in scope, in that the environmental harm must have (1) been intentionally enacted, (2) absent
consent from an impacted community, which (3) undermined their vital interest(s).
Since the ecosystem had previously constituted such a vital interest, that its destruction
caused partial or complete “social death” of the impacted community, it seems clear that the
victimized community must have had or deserved some title to the land.228 At minimum, Rawls
would consider the destruction of these ecosystems without the impacted communities’ consent, a
violation of their personal property rights. Since for Rawls, personal property is a basic liberty that
includes, “at least certain forms of real property, such as dwellings and private grounds,” i.e.,
housing, shelter, and personal items (Rawls 200: 114 note 36).
Essentially, Rawls couches his defense of personal property in Hegelian terms, as a means
of securing, “a sufficient material basis for personal independence and a sense of self respect, both
of which are essential for the adequate development and exercise of the moral powers” (Rawls
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In fact, this conclusion has been adopted into international law, pursuant to Article 5 of the
United Nations Declaration of the Rights of Peasants and Other People Working in Rural Areas,
which states that “Peasants and other people working in rural areas have the right to have access
to and to use in a sustainable manner the natural resources present in their communities that are
required to enjoy adequate living conditions” (UN 2018) and Article 26 of the UN Declaration
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which states that “Indigenous peoples have the right to the
lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used
or acquired” (UN 2007).
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2011: 114).229 Therefore, because of the reality of how intimately linked these communities were
(materially, culturally, and psychologically) to their habitats all cases of ecocide (i.e.,
environmental destruction that satisfy the above criteria) appear to engender violations of their
basic right to personal property.
Furthermore, beyond these glaring human rights abuses, the spirit of the basic liberty
principle is violated in ecocidal states. The goal of basic liberties is to ensure all citizens have the
maximum freedom to develop their respective capabilities and engage with others in cooperative
social ventures. As Rawls states, “the basic rights and liberties and their priority are there said to
guarantee equally for all citizens the social conditions essential for the adequate development
and the full and informed exercise of their two moral powers - their capacity for a sense of
justice and their capacity for a conception of the good” (Rawls 1999: xii).230
Thus, ecocidal societies undermine the core aspiration of the basic liberty principle by
inhibiting members of impacted autarkic community’s purposeful self-development, i.e., “[the]
necessary conditions for realizing the powers of moral personality” (Rawls 1982: 162).231 Since
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For a thorough discussion of Rawls’s defense of the right to personal property, see Katy
Wells’ article, “The Right to Personal Property” (Wells 2016).
230
It is important to underscore that purposeful self-development is not a basic liberty in its own
right, such a loose construal would push the concept beyond its standard usage. But the goal of
the basic liberty principle is to establish the basis of a society that allows citizens to advance
their purposeful self-development. Accordingly, if citizens are not attaining or furthering their
purposeful self-development there is reason to believe that basic liberties are being violated.
231
There are other liberal frameworks, proceeding from radically different premises, which are
also able to justify how ecocide violates basic rights. For instance, pursuant to Robert Nozick’s
libertarian entitlement theory (based on Locke’s labor theory of value) the state’s involvement in
ecocidal activities unjustly infringes upon members of autarkic communities’ legitimate right to
their private property. In the sense that, since these communities first labored on the land and
developed these natural resources, they are entitled to these goods as justly acquired property to
the exclusion of others and any infringement of these rights (e.g., third party destruction of the
goods) demands compensation pursuant to Nozick’s principle of rectification (Nozick 1974).
However, such a reading is complicated by the issue, going back to Locke himself, of whether
autarkic communities’ mode of appropriation establishes property rights in the sense libertarians
would acknowledge.
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ecocide destroys these peoples’ traditional way of life, hampers their ability to meet their basic
needs, and uproots their social connections, it severely curtails their ability to achieve their
higher interests, e.g., forging stable social unions, developing their self-governing powers, or
articulating conceptions of justice using public reason.
However, one might argue that these former autarkic community members (i.e., ecocide
refugees) could still have their basic liberties satisfied in another location. While it is true that
after the harm, the impacted citizens may be placed in a situation, in which they can pursue their
purposeful self-development. However, such a result is unlikely because of the significance that
connecting to a particular place plays in these citizens’ self-conception (e.g., they are unable to
conduct religious ceremonies that were tied to a specific geographic location or natural entity
that has been destroyed or made inaccessible). As such, uprooting autarkic citizens from places
to which they have deep ties, likely forecloses important aspects of their self-development.
Moreover, the act of causing, instigating, or allowing ecocide to occur (per our technical
definition) always constitutes a violation of the impacted citizens’ rights because of the reality
that they never consented. The reason for this is that, since ecocide occurs without consent, it
necessarily undermines victimized autarkic citizens’ “social basis of self-respect” because it
demonstrates the contempt and indifference the state has towards the “conception of the good”
and “social arrangements” on which these peoples rely to govern their lives. It makes it seem as
though their way of life, concerns, and well-being are valueless or at least unworthy of
consideration, protection, or preservation, which is anathema to the basic liberty principle’s goal
of fostering a sense of self-worth throughout the citizenry. Thus, the violation has already
occurred, even if the victimized citizens are subsequently placed in a situation in which their
basic liberties are respected.
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Furthermore, it is true that ecocide may occur because other segments of the populations
are acting in accordance with their basic liberties (e.g., industrial farmers or cattle ranchers using
their property rights). The issue is that ecocidal states err by pervasively privileging roving
imperialists’ ‘comprehensive doctrines’ over that of autarkic communities (e.g., prioritizing
growth rather than sustainability; integrating into global-supply chains rather than maintaining
local subsistence; viewing man as dominant and separate from nature rather than viewing man as
having a reciprocal, mutual, and integrated relationship with nature; faith in disciplinary
experimental science and technology rather than faith in traditional cultural knowledge, learning,
and practices, etc.), which is in direct opposition to the basic liberty principle’s objective of
compelling states to remain neutral and to not favor or prioritize the merits of reasonable
“conceptions of the good” over other legitimate views. As Rawls states: “The principles not only
specify the terms of cooperation between persons, but they define a pact of reconciliation
between diverse religions and moral beliefs, and the forms of culture to which they belong. If
this conception of justice now seems largely negative, we shall see that it has a happier side”
(Rawls 1999: 194).
Additionally, one may object that basic liberties do not apply to autarkic communities
because these communities exist outside of and independent from the modern liberal states that
Rawls is considering. Rawls, however, recognizes that modern states contain numerous diverse
communities and advocates cultural pluralism (which is a central justification for basic liberties
in the first place). “It is a serious error not to distinguish between the idea of a democratic
political society and the idea of a community. Of course, a democratic society is hospitable to
many communities within it, and indeed tries to be a social world within which diversity can
flourish in amity and concord” (Rawls 2001: 21).
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Since modern liberal societies are designed to tolerate and respect a wide array of
cultures and communities, there seems to be no conceptual justification for assuming that
autarkic communities would be entirely absent from within their borders. In fact, our case studies
prove that such an assumption is false, since some of our paradigm instances of ecocide occurred
within prototypically modern liberal states (e.g., the Cree in Canada and the Anangu in
Australia).
Nevertheless, despite the above endorsement of pluralism, one may pursue the argument
that the basic liberties do not apply to autarkic communities by claiming that their members’ way
of life and subsistence practices do not meet Rawls’s idealized conception for citizenship – i.e.,
“fully cooperating members of the political society” (Rawls 1999: xiii). The argument relies on
endorsing the assertion that to be afforded basic liberties, individuals must be contributing
members of society; since, for Rawls, “society” entails “a system of cooperation designed to
advance the good of those taking part in it…a cooperative venture for mutual advantage” (Rawls
1999: 4). As Jeppe von Platz explains:
At the heart of the Rawlsian idea of democratic society as a system of social cooperation
between free and equal citizens is the idea that all citizens participate in and contribute to
the production of the social goods; citizens are and ought to be part of the cooperative
system and play a productive role in the economy. In short—and the broad sense I
specified in the introduction—citizens work (Platz 2016: 291).
Hence, Rawls maintains that to be granted the rights and advantages of citizenship
requires contributing to the statewide system of cooperation for mutual benefit. But the issue, per
this line of reasoning, is that autarkic communities’ subsistence practices, cultural achievements,
and way of life fail to adequately contribute to the wellbeing of the broader society.232 As non-
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In fact, what the work proves is in many ways the opposite, in that autarkic citizens are
cooperative members of ill-ordered societies. Mills defines “ill-ordered societies” as, “coercive
rather than cooperative ventures, characterized by exploitation and systemic disrespect for
subordinated groups” (Mills 2017: 208).
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reciprocators, they are not fully engaged members of the society; and thus, the state has no
obligation to consider them citizens nor grant them the advantages (i.e., basic liberties) of social
cooperation.
Unsurprisingly, such an argument is immediately dismissed by Rawls because according
to his theory, achieving citizenship only requires the “capacity” to contribute (which we can
construe broadly as engaging in “socially beneficial activity”): “the only relevant feature of
persons is…having the normal capacities to be a cooperating member of society over a complete
life” (Rawls 1993: 79). As Platz clarifies, “the status, rights, and obligations of citizenship are
predicated on the capacities, not on their proper actualization, so (a bit paradoxically), anyone
who can be a citizen is a citizen.” (Platz 2016: 292).
Accordingly, since there is no doubt that members of autarkic communities have the
capacity to contribute social benefits, then they must be considered citizens deserving of basic
liberties. However, a pressing point for our analysis is demonstrating that autarkic communities’
traditional way of life does in fact bestow benefits to the wider society.
Such a confirmation is unnecessary to show that autarkic citizens are deserving of basic
liberties. But it is nevertheless worthwhile to demonstrate ways in which autarkic communities
do in fact generate social benefits because without this assurance, there is the risk that too narrow
a conception of social cooperation will hinder some communities from recognizing their value
and receiving the full esteem and respect they deserve for their effort.233
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Historically (and worrisomely at present), a common form of propaganda that fascist regimes
engaged in is to ‘scapegoat’ some segments of the society as unproductive, as a means of
justifying their marginalization, mistreatment, or extermination as enemies of the state. For
instance, Hitler stated that the Nazi Party supported bodenständigen Kapitalismus (“productive
capitalism”) that was based on profiting from one's own effort but condemned “unproductive
capitalism” such as loans and financial speculation, which he villainized the Jewish community
for engaging in (Freidman 2011: 24). Accordingly, because of these ties to horrific legacies of
oppression we ought to be extremely wary of arguments that seek to label a given population as
unproductive.
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Essentially, the worry is that if the conception of “socially beneficial activity” is not
construed broadly enough to include autarkic communities’ subsistence practices and cultural
achievements, then it may increase the difficulty of theorizing the injustice of ecocidal societies
from within a Rawlsian or other framework(s) of justice. Since, if localized subsistence and
cultural practices are viewed as bereft of value, it could support and justify the state’s decisions
to honor, esteem, and privilege roving imperialist productive lifestyles over those of autarkic
communities, perceived as otiose and incongruous.
Undoubtedly, such a conclusion is anathema to the basic liberty principle’s aim of
maintaining a pluralistic conception of society, i.e., one that is amenable and hospitable to
various communities and cultures pursuing their own “conceptions of the good” and ways of life.
Thus, to prevent these issues from arising, it is important to construe “socially beneficial
activity” (i.e., work or productive labor) broadly or else risk illiberally prioritizing certain “social
arrangements” and “conceptions of the good” over others.
Fortunately, it should seem fairly obvious that such a circumscribed interpretation of
productive labor is flawed. For instance, if the meaning of work is limited to commodity
production or marketable labor (as often happens in the discipline of Economics), key aspects of
value creation that are undoubtedly necessary to maintaining and reproducing a functioning
society are obscured, e.g., child rearing, benevolent aid and assistance, maintaining ecosystem
functioning, production for direct consumption. Case in point, feminists have long decried the
view that laboring in competitive markets (i.e., working subjects driven by their acquisitive
desire for more, imposing form and order on objects) constitutes the paradigmatic model of
social contribution because it makes invisible and dismisses women’s traditionally non-market
involvement in society (e.g., household labor, child rearing, birthing, etc.) (Schwarzenbach
1987).
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Analogous to the feminist criticism above, it is important that autarkic communities’
contribution to society be recognized. Fortunately, as discussed in the preceding chapters,
autarkic communities’ subsistence practices are undoubtedly beneficial to the broader society, as
they promote ecosystem functioning, protect biodiversity, preserve in-depth knowledge of local
habitats, and provide outsiders the opportunity to learn sustainable and environmentally friendly
practices.234 Accordingly, while autarkic communities may not produce marketable commodities
or bolster the ranks of wage labor, it is clear that their way of life certainly benefits the broader
society. Thus, we have shown that not only do autarkic citizens have the capacity to contribute:
they actually do contribute.
At present, it is unnecessary to push the debate further and defend the view that autarkic
communities’ subsistence practices are in fact more socially beneficial than those of roving
imperialists because, as stated earlier, liberal societies ought to remain agnostic on these matters
(if possible) or risk privileging some “conceptions of the good” over others.235 Hence, as has
been shown, autarkic subsistence practices do meet the standard of “social cooperation” within a
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For instance, a great example of environmentally beneficial practices that autarkic
communities can disseminate to the wider society is their in-depth knowledge of agroecology
(i.e., applying ecological processes to agricultural production). For a thorough discussion of
indigenous communities’ role in preserving, developing, and promoting agroecology, see Josep
Gari 2000, Sara Scherr and Jeffery McNeely 2008, and Shiva 2016. All these authors emphasize
that preserving traditional agroecological practices, not only allows particular cultures to survive,
but also increases the output, sustainability, and resiliency of our food production worldwide. As
Vandana Shiva explains, “when one recognizes that small farms across the world produce greater
[70% of food comes from small scale farms] and more diverse outputs of nutritious crops, it
becomes clear that industrial breeding has actually reduced food security” (Shiva 2016: 163).
Accordingly, it is a goal of this dissertation to highlight that in many ways autarkic communities
are not obsolete historical relics, but actually represent the vanguard of ecological rationality, in
that they employ highly sensible and epistemologically sophisticated techniques and methods for
sustainably adapting to complex environments. As Thomas Princen explains, “such resource
users, far from being at the margins of modern life, are actually at the forefront, especially when
‘modern’ includes the contemporary ecological predicament” (Princen 2005: 47).
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One of the goals of the work is to at least make the reader confront the possibility that
autarkic communities may in fact create more societal benefit, then the currently dominant
roving imperialist lifestyle.
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Rawlsian state, which must construe socially productive contribution (work) broadly or risk
illiberally prioritizing one way of life over another.236 Therefore, this analysis has dismissed the
argument that inhabitants of autarkic communities should not be afforded the advantages of
citizenship (i.e., basic liberties) because they are non-reciprocating members of society.
Lastly, there is one final argument that one might proffer to deny members of autarkic
communities’ basic liberties. It is important to state upfront that this argument seems rather
farfetched, however it is occasionally worth rebuking potentially misguided objections before
they arise to help clarify the overall analysis.
Basically, the argument proceeds by assuming that because these communities violate the
basic liberties of their own members, they have forfeited the right to these protections
themselves. Before we continue, it is necessary to point out that nothing in our analysis so far has
shown that autarkic communities do not respect the basic liberties of their members. As such, the
burden would fall on those wishing to make this claim to provide compelling evidence
supporting their assertion, because there is nothing inherent to the structure of autarkic
communities necessitating that they violate some of their members’ basic liberties.
Nonetheless, we will simply stipulate that for argument’s sake there is in fact a particular
community that restricts some of its members’ basic liberties, e.g., they prevent certain members
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Also, as Platz explains, a broad understanding of “social cooperation” is consistent with
Rawls’s own view that brought together diverse Humean, Marxian, and Kantian insights: “The
Humean insight is that societies exist (descriptively and normatively) because societies produce
the goods and services that make for good human living: security (of person and property),
stability (of rules and relations), and the supply of desirable goods and services (learning and
education, culture and science, healthcare and housing, technology and the means of
commodious living - agriculture, heating and cooling, plumbers and plumbing, and so on).
Society is the cooperative venture by which we together produce all these goods. The Marxian
insight is that these goods are produced by the work that the members of society do together. The
Kantian insight is that social cooperation should be seen as taking place between free and equal
moral persons, which implies that the terms of cooperation by which goods are produced,
distributed, and consumed must be agreeable (fair) to all members as free and equal moral
persons” (Platz 2016: 291).
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from voting or forbid them from interacting with outsiders. The somewhat curious argument
relies on the intuition that since these communities violate their members’ basic liberties, they
ought to lose their own. Or as Rawls rhetorically quips when considering the limits of toleration
for intolerant groups in liberal society, “it seems that an intolerant sect has no title to complain
when it is denied an equal liberty…[since] a person’s right to complain is limited to violations of
principles he acknowledges himself” (Rawls 190: 1999).
This sentiment may have some intuitive plausibility in cases where the right at issue is of
the same kind as the right that the group is internally restricting, e.g., when a group censoring its
own members complains of outside censorship from the state. It is farfetched, however, to
imagine a scenario in which the autarkic community’s internal violation of their members’ basic
liberties resembles with the type of wrongs under consideration in ecocidal societies. One
potential instance might be an autarkic community that destroys some of its members personal
property but complains when the state destroys their collective habitat.
While this argument seems highly tenuous, we will continue the analysis because, even in
this absurd example, it still does not entail that the state can violate the community’s basic
liberties. Since, as Rawls explains, basic liberties can only be violated in the situations where it is
necessary to preserve liberty itself, “freedom should be restricted only when the tolerant
sincerely and with reason believe that their own security and that of the institutions of liberty are
in danger. The tolerant should curb the intolerant only in this case” (Rawls 1999: 193).
Therefore, since the autarkic community’s destruction of some of its members’ personal
property seems unlikely to rise to the level of posing an existential threat to the institutions of
liberty themselves, the state lacks justification for intervening and violating the community’s
basic liberties beyond standard criminal proceedings. In summary, the state could never justify
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violating the autarkic citizens’ basic liberties because of the community’s internal injustices,
unless the response was necessitated to preserve the institution of liberty itself.
The work has now shown that ecocidal societies have acted unjustly by not protecting the
basic liberties of members of autarkic communities within their borders. Consequently, to satisfy
the standards of “justice as fairness,” it is necessary that these states cease acting in ways that
directly, indirectly, or negligently generate ecocide that violates the basic liberties of their
citizenry. Next, the work will explore how ecocidal societies also commit injustices by violating
the fair equality of opportunity clause of Rawls’s second principle of justice.

B. Ecocidal Societies’ Failure to Respect Fair Equality of Opportunity
The goal of the fair equality of opportunity principle (FEO) is to regulate citizens’ ability
to attain differing social positions and achieve personal development, while still insuring that
“these offices and positions are open to all under fair equality of opportunity” (Rawls 1971).
Essentially, all citizen with comparable talents should have an equal chance of realizing their
socio-economic objectives.237
Thus, in order to further FEO, it is necessary that, regardless of background or social
origins (e.g., rich or poor, majority or minority race, ethnicity, male or female, etc.), that all
citizens have equal opportunity to develop their talents and achieve their aspirations. As Rawls
states, “those with similar abilities and skills should have similar life chances…who are at the
same level of talent and ability, and have the same willingness to use them, should have the same
prospects of success regardless of their initial place in the social system” (Rawls 1999: 63). But
FEO maintains that social positions throughout all sectors of society must be attainable in a

The goal is to limit the impact of contingencies (i.e., facts about persons over which they
exert no control and appear arbitrary from a moral point of view) on citizen’s life prospects.
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“substantive” sense beyond mere “formal” openness, “there should be roughly equal prospects of
culture and achievement for everyone similarly motivated and endowed” (Rawls 1999: 63).238
In order to ensure comparable access to “substantive” opportunity, it is vital that, for
instance, the education or health care systems should be designed to level social barriers and
foster the prospects of equal life chances (Rawls 1999: 63). To illustrate what “substantive
opportunity” (i.e., that each citizen has equal prospects of developing their natural talents as any
other) entails, it is helpful to provide an example.
Consider two people Alex and Sam, both of whom are equally motivated to go to law
school and become lawyers. Alex has wealthy parents who are able to afford hiring tutors,
whereas Sam’s family is poor and cannot afford tutors. Consequently, Alex excels in school and
is admitted to a prestigious law school and after graduation is hired to a competitive position as a
lawyer; whereas Sam did comparatively worse in school and was not able to gain admittance to
law school. Thus, Sam’s prospects of becoming a lawyer were unsuccessful.
This example violates fair equality of opportunity because Alex and Sam lacked
comparable substantive prospects of developing their abilities to attain competitive social
positions, while they nevertheless still had the same formal chances, in that there were no legal
restriction or discriminatory practices that overtly barred either from attempting to pursue a
career in law. Nonetheless, it is obvious that Alex was in a better position to become a lawyer
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Robert Taylor provides a helpful summary of Rawls’s conception of fair equality of
opportunity: “FEO has two discrete components. First, FEO demands formal equality of
opportunity or ‘careers open to talents,’ that is, it forbids arbitrary discrimination (on grounds of
race, gender, etc.) by either the state or private agents and condemns all monopolistic privileges
(including barriers to entry in labor markets, like closed-shop unionism and exclusionary
occupational licensing). Second, FEO requires substantive equality of opportunity: all citizens
must be guaranteed a fair chance to compete for offices and positions in the basic structure of
society, regardless of social circumstances (e.g., class status or family background)…More
specifically, the state might impose inheritance and gift taxes, restrict the right of bequest, and
subsidize education (whether directly through public schools—including so-called charter
schools—or indirectly through vouchers, tuition tax credits, loans, etc.)” (Taylor 2009: 480).
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because of luckily being born to a wealthy family that provided extra resources and advantages
for winning competitive social positions.239
Accordingly, the injustice stems from the fact that initially Sam had equal motivation and
could have been as proficient a lawyer as Alex, if given the same resources. As such, it is clear
that FEO goes beyond simply prohibiting discriminatory laws and policies that formally restrict
access to social positions and personal development and instead mandates substantive equality of
opportunity aimed at affording all citizens the chance to actualize and develop their abilities.240
Hence, it is supposed to combat and level undeserving advantages that certain segments of the
citizenry may receive by virtue of birth, accident, or structural inequity.
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As Thomas Nagel explains in his discussion of Rawls’s view on affirmative action: “Those
born poor cannot compete as effectively as the well-off for desirable positions, because their
families can't give them the same level of education, the same network of support, the same
cultural advantages, health care, and so forth. They are also likely to have less motivation to
succeed. This means that they don't have fair equal opportunity even if they are not formally
discriminated against” (Nagel 2003: 84).
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However, it is important to highlight that Rawls is not asserting the implausible position that
justice requires that everyone be afforded the same chance at achieving a prestigious social
position. For one, Rawls maintains that FEO is not intended to erase the effects of natural
endowment because the difference principle is designed to play such a role in his theory. As Lars
Lindblom explains: “Even if the more talented would have a better chance of attaining some
coveted position, the gains that they would have from this would be constrained by the difference
principle. If there are people who have better prospects of becoming, say, judges, due to their
innate talent, then FEO says that they should have better chances to occupy such a position than
those who have less native talent for it. The difference principle then regulates the structure of
salaries and wages in society (as well as the tax system)” (Lindblom 2018: 241-242).
Accordingly, Rawls accepts that natural aptitudes are relevant when determining if a person
should have the opportunity to advance in a given field (e.g., it is not unjust if a society
consistently rejects applicants that are naturally ill-equipped to perform fine motor skills from
becoming emergency room surgeons). Or as Darrel Moellendorf succinctly states, “with respect
to those who are unequal in the specified way, equality of opportunity does not equalize at all”
(Moellendorf 2006: 301). Hence, Rawls is endorsing the view that every citizen should have the
right to pursue any career, but not the right to expect that opportunities will be equalized
irrespective of their actual degree of talent. Essentially, everyone deserves access to a reasonable
education, regardless of socio-economic status, race, ethnicity, comprehensive view, or
geographical location; however, the state may have different obligations to persons based on
their desires, motivation, and abilities. Consequently, the state does not need to subsidize
everyone who thinks it would be exciting to go to law school, but entrance exams must be fair to
all in determining whether one has the aptitude for a certain field of study.
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Do ecocidal states therefore violate members of autarkic communities’ FEO by failing to
provide these communities with equal life chances for individuals with equal talent?
Immediately, one might think not necessarily in all cases. For instance, in some instances these
citizens may be equitably compensated for the loss of value caused by the destruction of their
ancestral home, even if they did not consent to the tradeoff; and moreover, one may argue that by
forcibly being integrated into the broader society, they may be better situated to satisfy FEO after
the harm.241
But such an argument seems implausible for many reasons. For one, ideal theory requires
that every citizen is entitled to FEO, i.e., when ‘the veil’ is lifted we can discern whether FEO is
in fact realized by looking at each individual members of the society. Thus, it is rather unlikely
that each and every former autarkic citizen will have the material, psychological, and epistemic
resiliency to adequately compete pursuant to FEO after the destruction of their habitat.
For example, it is likely the case, that these citizens experienced psychological trauma
(e.g., depression, post-traumatic stress, anxiety, etc.) stemming from their experience and
impotence in being unable to prevent the destruction of their home and loss of their way of life.
Secondly, ecocide leaves them vulnerable to cultural marginalization, in that they are likely
disadvantaged by the fact that they have been hurled into a situation in which they have to

241

For instance, Jeffery Sachs argues that the best way to end poverty (i.e., increase FEO) is for
states to undertake widespread infrastructural development (e.g., build roads and expand the
electrical grid), comparable to the type of state activity discussed in our paradigm cases of
ecocide (e.g., the Canadian government damming the La Grande in the hopes of opening up the
“wilderness” of James Bay to “civilization”). For example, he asserts that a key element of the
economic success of China was dependent on, “how the [Chinese] government has taken pains to
ensure that the power grid and transportation network reaches every village in China” (Sachs
2007). Obviously, throughout our analysis we have seen how such development projects will
likely result in ecocide. However, Sachs as a proponent of developmentalism is unperturbed by
these worries, since he views the resulting environmental harm as necessary consequences of
ending poverty and increasing FEO through the process of integrating the rural poor into the
global economy (Sachs 2005).
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compete in a society with vastly different norms, values, and expectations than their own. Lastly,
the destruction of their local ecosystem deprives them of material resources and one of their
greatest epistemic advantage, i.e., their habitat learning.
As such, destroying the autarkic community’s habitat, practically ensures that some of
these citizens lack the requisite tools to develop their capacities in comparison with other
members of the society. Essentially, these psychological, cultural, epistemic, and material
barriers represent additional hindrances, undermining autarkic citizens’ ability to strive for social
advantage, develop capacities, and achieve well-being in a way that non-impacted citizens do not
face. Thus, for these reasons, it is unlikely that ecocidal states satisfy FEO with regard to all their
autarkic citizens harmed by environmental destruction (i.e., ecocide refugees).
Nevertheless, we can stipulate that despite all these impediments, enough compensation
of ‘primary goods’ has been allocated to empower all of these citizens and ensure that they can
compete for privileged social positions (e.g., become doctors, lawyers, engineers, judges, etc.).
Thus, if these conditions are met, one may argue that it is not necessarily true that ecocide
violates FEO.
However, drawing such a conclusion is presumptuous, because it fails to consider the fact
that FEO has a “motivation” component, in that the social roles or prospects for personal
development must be substantively open to, “similarly endowed and motivated [emphasis
added]” citizens (Rawls 1999: 243). This ‘motivation component’ mandates that to ensure FEO
is being satisfied, it is necessary to consider the social roles or achievements that agents are
actually interested in pursuing.242
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However, it is important to emphasize that the ‘motivation component’ is bounded by the
social roles that actually exist in the society. In other words, FEO necessitates that all citizens
have the right to pursue whatever is available to some. But that caveat does not give states the
freedom to end preexisting forms of social contribution, since such restrictions and denials would
violate citizens’ basic liberties.
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Thus, we must undertake our analysis of FEO by contemplating the social roles and
achievements that former autarkic citizens desire for themselves. As such, the inquiry into
whether or not these citizens have been placed in a position, which allows them to compete for
the privileged positions coveted by the broader society is irrelevant with regards to FEO, in that
pursuant to FEO it does not matter if these citizens are now in a position to become doctors,
lawyers, engineers, and judges, if they are unmotivated towards pursuing these social positions.
Accordingly, Rawls’s stipulation that FEO requires that, “there should be roughly equal
prospects of culture and achievement” means that the autarkic community’s own cultural
achievements and aspirations are the relevant locus of consideration (Rawls 1999: 63). In other
words, the issue is that if ecocidal states assume that former autarkic citizens desire to be
integrated into the dominant culture, then they are illiberally prioritizing certain “conception of
the good” and “comprehensive doctrine” over others -- which as discussed is a violation of the
basic liberty principle.
As such, the relevant question is if ecocide refugees have equal prospects and abilities to
gain social positions or personally develop in ways that they are actually interested and
motivated after ecocide (within the range of social positions actually open to others)? Hence, we
must consider what social roles or personal achievements ecocide refugees would want and
aspire to for themselves.
As specified in the first chapter, “successful living” for autarkic communities is
maintaining homeostasis in their habitat (see 44-47). Accordingly, it is likely the case that these
citizens would wish to return to their traditional, self-sufficient, and sustainable way of life,
rather than integrate into the dominant culture.
Hence, one such social role that we can reasonably assume they might desire, is to return
to subsistence farming. Thus, if this assumption is correct, then a way to see if ecocide
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undermines FEO, is to analyze if the environmental destruction hinders former autarkic citizens’
prospects of becoming subsistence farmers, so long as it is a social role available to others in the
society.243
It is apparent from our prior analysis that the effects of ecocide may impede former
autarkic citizens’ prospects of succeeding as subsistence farmers. For instance, the habitat
learning they had accrued was exceedingly specialized and possibly nontransferable to
ecosystems that differ from their local habitat’s ordinary functioning. Hence, in these scenarios,
ecocide refugees are likely at an undeserved epistemic disadvantage when competing with other
farmers after their local habitat has been compromised.
Accordingly, in such scenarios (i.e., where ecocide refugees are at a disadvantage in
becoming subsistence farmers when compared with other citizens trying to achieve this social
role) it is incumbent upon states to assist ecocide refugees in overcoming the difficulties
presented by the changed environment; and thus, if such aid is not forthcoming, then FEO has
been violated. For instance, three solutions states may pursue to satisfy FEO, would be to: (1)
provide training to educate ecocide refugees regarding how to cope with the changed
environment; (2) grant ecocide refugees access to a functionally identical ecosystem (i.e.,
relocate them to a comparable ecosystem), or (3) restore the degraded ecosystem and allow the
ecocide refugees to return. A problem with all of these policy proposals, is that the state may
lack the requisite knowledge, resources, or ability to provide such assistance. For one, how can
one determine if another ecosystem is functionally identical or know how to fully restore a
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However, it would not be a violation of FEO in societies where subsistence farming is no
longer an available social position. In other words, FEO is only operative in regard to actually
available social positions that others can attain. Hence, it is not the case that each and every
society has to have subsistence farmers to satisfy FEO, but if a society does have such a social
position, then per FEO the prospects of attaining such a position have to be equally available to
all comparably talented and motived citizen.
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severely degraded habitat? Moreover, even if such determinations and undertakings are
practically possible, they may nonetheless prove exceedingly expensive and divest funds from
other FEO-promoting ventures.
Furthermore, even if the assistance projects prove successful, ecocide refugees are
nevertheless at a competitive disadvantaged in the interim. As such, the temporal-gap between
the ecocidal act and the completion of the assistance project, entails a period in which ecocide
refugees’ FEO is violated.
Accordingly, regardless of whether ecocide refugees decide to attempt to return to their
traditional subsistence lifestyle or integrate into the broader society, the additional material,
psychological, epistemic, and cultural obstacles mentioned before remain FEO-reducing factors.
As such, these impediments must be overcome, since they place undue burden on the effected
citizens, which leave them at a substantive disadvantage regarding their ability to compete for
social positions and further their personal development -- whatever those aims entail.
Obviously, such reparative measures may prove exceedingly costly; and as such, they
will undoubtedly divert social resources away from other FEO-promoting undertakings. Thus,
with respect to the prospects of efficiently achieving a well-ordered society that satisfies FEO, it
is almost certain, that it would have been better, if ecocide had never occurred in the first
place.244 The reason for this is that ecocide, displaces citizens from communities, in which FEO
is being satisfied (i.e., living in self-sufficient autarkic communities); and instead, creates
conditions in which these citizens will likely require aid and assistance to achieve FEO.
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Undoubtedly, we would always prefer that injustices are prevented, that harms never occur,
and that citizens are treated fairly. However, one of the focuses of this dissertation is to
emphasize that given the non-ideal nature of the actual world, we must work to develop
strategies aimed at preventing the harms caused by ecocide and devising principles and
mechanisms for responding to cases where such harms have already occurred.
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Hence, we can see that unless widespread FEO-promoting measures are enacted to
support the victims of ecocide, it is exceedingly difficult to maintain that ecocidal states are
“cooperative ventures for mutual advantage” with regard to their autarkic citizenry. Accordingly,
destroying autarkic community’s habitat, practically ensures that these citizens lack the requisite
tools to develop their capacities in comparison with other members of society. Thus, with the
analysis of FEO complete, the chapter will move on to investigate if ecocidal societies also
commit injustices by violating the difference principle clause of Rawls’s second principle of
justice.

C. Ecocidal Societies’ Failure to Respect the Difference Principle

The difference principle holds that “social and economic inequalities are to be arranged
so that they are to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged” (Rawls 1999: 72). It is designed to
secure a just distribution of social resources by aiming to benefit all segments of society, but
most importantly to assist the least fortunate. As Derek Bell helpfully explains:
For Rawls, we cannot maintain social and economic equality because labor specialization
is unavoidable, and citizens should not be expected to be pure altruists willing to accept
equal rewards for unequal contributions to the overall level of society’s resources.
However, unequal division can only reflect the equality of citizens if it is to everyone’s
advantage. (Bell 2004: 297)
Hence, the difference principle’s distributive requirement is designed to align the interest
of all groups in a society through a “’close-knit’ mutual chain-connectedness” that facilitates
improvement in the socioeconomic conditions of the least advantaged and fosters fraternity
across society (Rawls 1999: 70-73). Basically, the goal of the difference principle is to ensure
that the worst-off in society should not distrust or feel alienated from other groups because they
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understand that all socioeconomic institutions and policies are designed to promote their best
interest.
Consequently, the immediate question to ask is, are members of former autarkic
communities that have had their habitat destroyed the least advantaged? Since, if they are, then
the difference principle mandates that ecocidal societies must be maximally concerned (without
violating FEO, the just savings, and basic liberty principles) with raising the socioeconomic
status of these citizens to enable them to become, “normal and fully cooperating members of
society” (Rawls 1999: xiii).
It is necessary, however, to highlight that this discussion is not exploring if autarkic
communities constitute the least advantaged prior to ecocide – which, as will be shown, is
unlikely. As such, the work is not trying to prove that the initial act of ecocide violates the
difference principle because it harms the least advantaged group; but instead, is trying to
establish that members of former autarkic communities (i.e., ecocide refugees) ought to be
considered the least advantaged. If this is confirmed, then it necessitates that post-ecocide states
have an obligation to optimally raise the socioeconomic standing of ecocide refugees (without
violating FEO, just savings, and basic liberty principle or lowering another group’s wellbeing
below ecocide refugee’s current standard of living) and that failure to do so constitutes a breach
of the difference principle.
In other words, autarkic citizens are not the least advantaged before the ecocide, but after
the ecocidal event transforms them into ecocide refugees, then they are the least advantaged.
Thus, the argument is that ecocidal states can violate the difference principle in two ways: the
very act of ecocide creates least advantaged persons and the states might fail to raise the socioeconomic status of these least advantaged persons.
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However, as Rawls acknowledges, “the serious difficulty [with the difference principle]
is how to define the least fortunate” (Rawls 1999: 83). Thus, to establish whether ecocide
refugees are the least fortunate, it is necessary to begin by exploring Rawls’s methodology for
determining and defining relative social position.
Initially, he proposes two potential approaches. First, he argues that the least advantaged
refers to social position: “Choose a particular social position, say that of the unskilled workers
and then to count as the least advantaged all those with the average income and wealth of this
position, or less” (Rawls 1999: 84). Secondly, he defines the least advantaged in terms of relative
income and wealth with no reference to any social position. “All persons with less than half of
the median income and wealth may be taken as the least advantaged segment” (Rawls 1999: 84).
Rawls acknowledges that these definitions of the “least advantaged” are somewhat
arbitrary. “Any procedure is bound to be somewhat ad hoc. Yet we are entitled at some point to
plead practical considerations, for sooner or later the capacity of philosophical or other
arguments to make finer discriminations must run out” (Rawls 1999: 84).
Nevertheless, it is helpful to recognize that both of these formulations indicate that Rawls
was at least partially attracted by the prospects of determining the least advantaged by virtue of
strictly economic considerations, in that he proposed correlating lack of primary goods with
reduced economic income, wealth, and employment. Ultimately, however, Rawls found both
approaches inadequate because primary goods constitute a comprehensive index of rights,
liberties, opportunities that transcend mere economic calculations of income, wealth, and
employment. As Rawls clarifies, “primary goods are now characterized as what persons need in
their status as free and equal citizens, and as normal and fully cooperating members of society
over a complete life” (Rawls 1999: xiii).245
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Rawls viewed this reconfigured definition as an improvement on his prior conception of
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For Rawls, equating the determination of the “least advantage” with possession of
economic resources is inadequate because all primary goods should be included in the
evaluation. “The serious difficulty is how to define the least fortunate group. To fix ideas, let us
single out the least advantaged as those who are least favored…with the relevant measures based
on primary goods” (Rawls 1999: 83).
Consequently, Rawls’s decision to determine relative social position based upon
measures of primary goods in toto allows for an expanded interpretation of the “least
advantaged” because, per his theory, “the social bases of self-respect” is the primary good of
utmost significance (Rawls 1999: 478). As Rawls states, “the most important primary good is
that of self-respect…it includes a person's sense of his own value, his secure conviction that his
plan of life, his conception of his good, is worth carrying out…implies a confidence in one’s
ability, so far as it lies within one's power, to fulfill one's intentions." (Rawls 1999: 386)
Hence, now that the discussion regarding how to determine the least advantaged is
complete, the work will briefly explore all three formulation to see if citizens displaced from
autarkic lifestyles by ecocide ought to be considered amongst the worst-off members of society.
It is necessary to remind the reader that in practice the determination of the least advantaged
would have to occur on a case-by-case basis, since each situation is different, and the relative
social position of certain groups may change in a given context. Nevertheless, the forthcoming
analysis should provide enough evidence to make it eminently clear that ecocide refugees will be

“primary goods” as, “things that every rational man is presumed to want…goods [that] normally
have a use whatever a person’s rational plan of life” (Rawls 1999: 54). He was unsatisfied with
the older conceptualization because it seems as though what constituted a primary good was
dependent upon “natural human psychology” instead of on, “a moral conception of a person that
embodies a certain ideal” (Rawls 1999: xiii). Clearly, it is the latter conception that is required
for developing “higher order interests” and becoming “free and equal” cooperating members of
society as Rawls’s theory intends (Rawls 1999: xiii).
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among the worst-off members of a society. Lastly, it is important to appreciate that the least
advantaged group is not a small or fine-grained category, but a significant social group, e.g., the
“less than half of the median income and wealth” criterion entails that any citizen or social group
falling within the bottom third of society in regard to wealth and income is a member of the least
advantaged.
First, it seems likely that after ecocide (barring state intervention), former members of
autarkic communities have few other prospects than to become unskilled laborers. The reason for
this, as has been explained, is that the traditional habitat knowledge they possess is exceedingly
specialized and likely nontransferable. The destruction of their local ecosystem thus rendered
their greatest source of expertise and specialized skillset obsolete. Furthermore, it is unlikely that
they would have trained or attempted to acquire abilities to compete for employment positions in
the broader society because learning, practicing, and mastering multiple modes of survival is a
difficult undertaking, and it would have seemed unwarranted to develop excess skills while their
traditional way of life successfully met their needs. Consequently, it seems rather likely that
upon being forced into engaging with the broader society to meet their needs that ecocide
refugees would only be considered qualified for unskilled laborer positions, in which case they
constitute the least advantaged under the “unskilled labor” formulation.
Additionally, regarding the “less than half of the median income and wealth” formulation
of determining the least advantaged, it seems apparent that, due to the same factors mentioned
above, members of former autarkic communities will live in impoverished conditions well below
this threshold. For one, they just lost their greatest source of wealth and income, in that their
collective lands used for agriculture, livestock rearing, water, hunting, fishing, gathering herbs,
building material, and fuel have been destroyed.
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Secondly, because their closest relations (friends and family) likely suffered the same
fate, they lack well situated social connections that can offer material assistance and stability in
times of hardship. Also, the lack of social connection and cultural marginalization is problematic
because even when they are able to acquire education and job training, their impoverished social
network makes it difficult to convert these skills to greater earning potential, as seen in the
discussion of FEO.
Finally, there is the real possibility of conflict, animosity, hostility, and violence between
the ecocide refugees and the communities to which they are forced to relocate. These tensions
are a predictable outcome, if the local communities view the ecocide refugees as “outsiders”
competing for their resources and straining the carrying-capacity of their social institutions. As
such, these conflicts can result in diminishing opportunities because local communities will be
less inclined to offer support, encouragement, and opportunities; and, furthermore, if violence
does erupt, then the wealth the ecological refugees may have accumulated could be stolen or
destroyed.246
Thus, for all the above reasons, it is eminently reasonable to assume that, in most
scenarios, ecocide refugees will constitute the least advantaged, per the “having less than half of
the median income and wealth criterion” criterion. Nevertheless, a developmentalist (for a
canonic example of developmentalism, see Sachs 2005) may argue that development projects
aimed at integrating the autarkic communities into the global economy would work to their
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One might object that such crimes could not occur in a well-ordered society, thus they are not
relevant concerns when engaged with analyzing ideal principles of justice. However, Rawls
himself admits that ideal theory mandates “strict compliance” only at the level of social
institutions, not with regard to the behavior of individual actors. This is evident from the fact that
he includes punitive measures as a feature of his ideal society. “It is clear from the preceding
remarks that we need an account of penal sanctions however limited even for ideal theory. Given
the normal conditions of human life, some such arrangements are necessary” (Rawls 1999: 212).
Thus, individual actors could fail to comply with the principles of justice, meaning that such
forms of theft or violence could occur even in a well-ordered society.
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benefit by increasing their wealth and income; and as such, lift them out of the least advantaged
position.247
We will subsequently take up the developmentalists’ challenge. However, to avoid
arguing against a “strawman” it is beneficial to first consider Rawls’s preferred conception of
“the least advantaged” that focuses on the distribution of a broader set of primary goods beyond
the purely economic concerns of income, wealth, and employment.
Thus, are ecocide refugees still the least advantaged, if the criterion is weighing
individuals’ ability to develop into purposeful selves (i.e., ones driven to actualize a reasonable
way of life, develop one’s moral capacities, and engage with others in the public sphere)? In
answering this question, it is important to remember that, per the broadened conception of the
difference principle, the most important primary good for society to distribute is the “social bases
of self-respect” – accordingly, citizens lacking in this resource are the least advantaged.
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Developmentalism has been the hegemonic ideology driving international affairs at least since
Harry Truman’s 1949 inaugural address, in which he announced the U.S.’s aspiration of
delivering a “fair deal” for the entire world, aimed at “uplifting” the “underdeveloped areas” of
the globe (Escobar 1995: 3). As Arturo Escobar explains, “the dream [i.e., economically
developing the underdeveloped areas of the world] was universally accepted by those in power”
(Escobar 1995: 4). But they recognized that such development came at a price, as the United
Nations, Department of Social and Economic Affairs stated: “There is a sense in which rapid
economic progress is impossible without painful adjustments. Ancient philosophies have to be
scrapped; old social institutions have to disintegrate; bonds of cast, creed and race have to burst;
and large numbers of persons who cannot keep up with progress have to have their expectations
of a comfortable life frustrated. Very few communities are willing to pay the full price of
economic progress” (U.N. 1951: 15). But despite recognizing these concerns, the goal of
“development” has proceeded unrelentingly ever since. In many ways, a central aspiration of this
dissertation is to challenge the developmentalist credo by highlighting some of the eco-social
benefits that arise from not forcing autarkic communities to integrate into the prevailing
neoliberal global order. Furthermore, by challenging the developmentalist narrative, we can see
how environmental transformative justice aligns with and supports core aspirations of
“environmentalism of the poor,” in that both movements advocate for, “the defense of the right
to place and territory and the right to stay without being displaced” (Anguelovski and MarinezAlier 2014: 173).
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As such, it seems rather straightforward from the preceding analysis to accept that
ecocide refugees are severely deprived of “the social bases of self-respect,” in that the society
treats these citizens as though they are undeserving of fundamental rights and liberties by
destroying their traditional way of life in blatant displays of contempt, indifference, and
disrespect for their values and aspirations. Clearly, such acts demonstrate that the society views
these citizens’ goals and life projects as unworthy of pursuit.
Essentially, through the act of ecocide, the state publicly expresses that it views these
peoples’ concerns and well-being as valueless or at least unworthy of consideration, protection,
or preservation, when weighed against the interests of other segments of society. The resulting
material, psychological, and cultural harms clearly undermine ecocide refugees’ ability to foster
stable social unions, develop their self-governing powers, or engage with others as equals in the
public realm, which are all vital components for achieving self-respect.
Because of all of these compounding injuries, there are compelling reasons justifying
why ecocide refugees would likely constitute the least advantaged. Thus, the very act of ecocide
placed these citizens in this vulnerable position in violation of the difference principle.
Moreover, if ecocide refugees are the least advantaged and ecocidal states’ basic structures are
not setup in such a way as to improve these citizens’ absolute social standing and strengthen their
prospects for developing self-respect, then these states are further in violation of the difference
principle.
However, as previously stated, developmentalists may argue, that the best way to
improve autarkic citizens’ social standing and develop their self-respect, is to integrate them into
the broader society. As we will show such an argument rests on the faulty premise that members
of functioning autarkic communities are the least advantaged and in need of assistance. For
instance, a pro-integration theorist may highlight the fact that, The World Bank estimates that in
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China between 1978 and 2010, over 20 million peasants a year have abandoned their rural
subsistence lifestyles in search of higher paying industrial jobs in urban centers; and that, this
migration has resulted in over 500 million people being lifted out of poverty (World Bank 2012).
Hence, developmentalists can argue in defense of ecocidal activity that the economic
gains generated by ecocidal development could outweigh the losses to autarkic citizens. In other
words, ecocidal development places these citizens in a better socio-economic position, than they
would have been otherwise. Accordingly, the developmentalist is arguing that ecocidal states do
not violate the difference principle because their basic structures are setup in such a way as to
improve these citizens’ absolute social standing and strengthen their prospects for developing
self-respect.
Essentially, developmentalists rely on empirical evidence to support the claim that
ecocidal development and forced integration does not violate the difference principle because it
places autarkic citizens in better socio-economic position. However, even if it is demonstrably
true that such activity does increase these citizens social capital (which is dubious), these
arguments still fail to satisfy “justice as fairness” because ecocidal development and forced
integration, nevertheless violate autarkic citizen’s basic liberties. Thus, pursuant to Rawls’s
framework, the resulting socio-economic gains are not acceptable, if the tradeoff entails
sacrificing certain citizens’ basic rights. Since, according to Rawls, preserving basic liberties,
takes precedence over all other ideals, including FEO and the difference principle.248
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As Taylor states: “The Priority of Liberty treats these liberties as paramount and prohibits
their sacrifice for the sake of efficiency, utilitarian and perfectionist ideals, or even other
principles within Justice as Fairness (e.g., FEO and the Difference Principle) (Taylor 2003: 246).
Nevertheless, as we have previously stated, many theorists have criticized Rawls’s lexical
prioritization, but because we are undertaking a canonical reading, it is important to avoid
misrepresenting how the principles are supposed to cohere to avoid distorting the overall theory.
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The reason for prioritizing basic liberties over other ideals, stems from Rawls’s disdain
for the view that, “all human interests are commensurable, and that between any two there
always exists some rate of exchange in terms of which it is rational to balance the protection of
one against the protection of the other” (Rawls 1993: 312). Accordingly, persevering the priority
of basic rights over other ideals is of paramount importance, because without this constraint
political liberalism risks lumping the value of all primary goods together and losing what makes
it distinct from utilitarianism or intuitionism.
However, to further challenge developmentalists’ contention (i.e., that economic and
structural development that aims at integrating autarkic communities into the global economy is
beneficial to the impacted communities), it will be helpful to briefly explore, why it is unlikely
that members of functioning autarkic communities should be considered the least advantaged, in
the first place. First and foremost, functioning autarkic communities allow inhabitants to develop
their higher-level capacities. As we have seen, these communities take great pride in leading
environmentally sustainable lifestyles that foster materially rich and spiritually fulfilling
connections to their habitat and ancestors (see 48-52). While they may not have a lot of wealth in
a purely monetary sense (i.e., the benchmark developmentalists are focused on), they still have
more than enough resources to meet their basic material needs, while forging a stable social
union that allows them to develop their self-governing powers and organize their lives around a
conception of the good.
As discussed, monetary wealth is an inadequate proxy for primary goods. Rawls
highlights this fact by stipulating that voluntarily idle surfers, who may have little monetary
wealth, are still not entitled to social welfare as the least advantaged: “Those who are unwilling
to work would have a standard working day of extra leisure and this extra leisure itself would be
stipulated as equivalent to the index of primary goods of the least advantaged. Those who surf all
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day off Malibu must find a way to support themselves and would not be entitled to public funds”
(Rawls 1988: 257). For this reason, it seems exceedingly unlikely that individuals from
functioning autarkic communities ought to be considered the least advantaged.
Consequently, while ecocide may not harm (or might even help) the least advantaged
(e.g., imagine a scenario in which the least advantaged are the urban poor that actually benefit
from the ecocidal act of damming a river because it provides them electricity), it nevertheless
violates autarkic communities’ basic liberties and likely their fair equality of opportunity. Thus,
developmentalists’ claim that economic growth and structural development benefit autarkic
communities is dubious, especially from a Rawlsian perspective that prioritizes the protection of
basic rights above all else.
Also, as we will now discuss, Rawls’s constructivist approach establishes a “just savings
principle” that further constrains arguments relying on the difference principle, which seek to
justify sacrificing natural resources for greater economic growth. But before moving on to
analyze the “just savings principle,” it is important to emphasize that it seems clear that, after
ecocide, the resulting refugees (i.e., former inhabitants of autarkic communities) are likely
members of the least advantaged (at least in the short term) and that it was the ecocidal activity
itself, which placed them in this vulnerable position. Moreover, to avoid further violating the
difference principle, ecocidal states and post-ecocide state must be maximally concerned
(without violating FEO, the basic liberty principle, and the just savings principle) with raising the
socio-economic status of these citizens to enable them to develop their higher capacities and
become cooperating members of society.

D. Ecocidal States’ Failure to Respect the Just Savings Principle
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Rawls maintains that his constructivist approach (relying on the hypothetical thought
experiment of the original position) can establish a sufficient level of intergenerational savings
(i.e., living people’s obligation to future peoples) to preserve a just society across time (Rawls
1999: 251-262). The reason for this is that the representatives in the “original position” know
that they will belong to a specific generation, but from “behind the veil of ignorance” they are
ignorant about which particular generation that will be.249 Thus because of their unbiased
positionality, Rawls argues that the representatives would agree to a just savings principle,
stipulating that, “the members of any generation (and so all generations) would adopt as the one
their generation is to follow and as the principle they would want preceding generations to have
followed (and later generations to follow), no matter how far back (or forward) in time” (Rawls
1993: 274 and 2001: 160).250
Essentially, Rawls stipulates that the difference principle distributes social resources
“within generations” whereas, the just saving principle allocates social resources “between
generations” (Rawls 2001: 159). Accordingly, he views the just savings principle as a constraint
on the difference principle that determines, “how far the present generation is bound to respect
the claims of its successors” (Rawls 2001: 159).251
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Representative persons are not actual persons, but representative a type of person. As such,
they are unable to provide social resources to particular individuals, since such a fine-tuned
distribution would be impossible to accomplish from the original position.
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To explain why presently living people would agree to concern themselves with the wellbeing
of future generations, Rawls initially argued for a “motivational assumption” that representatives
care for their descendants and as such, they will voluntarily save to benefit them (Rawls 1971:
144). But he later withdrew this motivational assumption seemingly in part because it
presupposed a comprehensive doctrine of the good.
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Here is Rawls’s longer explanation regarding how the balancing between the just savings and
difference principle functions: “This is done by supposing that this principle is defined from the
standpoint of the least advantaged in each generation. It is the representative men from this group
as it extends over time who by virtual adjustments are to specify the rate of accumulation. They
undertake in effect to constrain the application of the difference principle. In any generation their
expectations are to be maximized subject to the condition of putting aside the savings that would
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Importantly, Rawls’s conception of the difference principle (including the just savings
clause) is sufficientarian, in that there are fixed limits to its application.252 For one, it is
impermissible to disrupt basic liberties or FEO when furthering the aims of the difference
principle (Rawls 1999: 258). Since, as Rawls states, “each person possesses an inviolability
founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override” (Rawls 3: 1999).

be acknowledged. Thus, the complete statement of the difference principle includes the savings
principle as a constraint” (Rawls 1999: 258).
252
To understand sufficientarianism it is helpful to compare it with the two other popular
proposals for establishing requirements of intergenerational sustainability: (1) aggregative and
(2) equalitarian. Essentially, aggregative theorists argue from a utilitarian perspective and
maintain that society ought to aim towards maximizing intergenerational resources. As Axel
Grosseries explains, it requires “earlier generations to adopt a positive savings rate” (Grosseries
2001: 313). Whereas, equalitarian theorists (e.g. Solow, Hartwick, and Arneson) argue “we
should equalize the capacity to achieve welfare across generations” (Wolf 2018: 58). As Robert
Solow maintains, “[sustainability entails] an obligation to conduct ourselves, so that we leave to
the future the option or capacity to be as well-off as we are” (Solow 1993: 181). The immediate
problem with an aggregative saving rate is that, in the case of infinite generations, there is never
ending sacrifice that results in no generation’s benefit and, in the case of finite generations
(which we can assume), the worst off-generation (i.e., the earliest generation) is made worse-off
than they would have been without the aggregative saving requirement (Grosseries 2001: 313314). Such a result seems unjust in that it inverts the maximin principle (i.e., to maximally
benefit those in the worst position) and instead makes the worst-off even more worse off; while
ironically, maximally benefiting the most well-off later generation. Whereas, the problem with
an equalitarian saving rate is that its aim of preserving a non-diminishing stock of social
resources is either too demanding or too lenient. For instance, in the case of a growing
population, maintaining the same resource base across generations seems inadequate, in that it
will lead to increased suffering. As Clark Wolf explains, “a sustainability criterion that requires a
nondecreasing supply of consumable resources or nondecreasing aggregate welfare will imply
increasing want and deprivation or decreasing per-capita well-being from one generation to the
next, if population size is increasing rapidly from one generation to the next” (Wolf 2018: 60).
Whereas, in the case of a shrinking population, an equalitarian saving rate, asks the current
generation to sacrifice more than is necessary to ensure that the next generation’s needs are
adequately met. A sufficientarian approach to sustainability avoids these worries by specifying
some sufficient threshold to be met, which defines currently living peoples’ obligation to future
generations. For Rawls that threshold is to maintain “the conditions needed to establish and to
preserve a just basic structure over time” (Rawls 2001: 159). As such, once this threshold is met,
it avoids the aggregative worry of requiring too much of the worst-off earlier generations and
avoids the equalitarian worry of either over or under sacrificing for equality’s sake and instead
focuses on reaching and maintaining long term human interests (e.g., establishing just
institutions, protecting basic liberties, maintaining FEO, allowing citizens to develop their moral
powers).
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Accordingly, per “justice as fairness” the state would never be justified in sacrificing its
citizen’s basic rights to benefit the worst off or assist future generations. Such a conclusion is
important for our purposes because it preempts an ecocidal state from arguing that destroying an
autarkic community’s habitat (which as we have argued violates their basic liberties) was just
because the resulting economic gains and development advantaged the less fortunate and/or
future generations substantially enough to normatively outweigh the autarkic community’s loss.
The just savings clause is sufficientarian in other respects.253 As Rawls explains in The
Law of Peoples the just saving requirements change as societies progress:
(a) The purpose of a just (real) savings principle is to establish (reasonably) just basic
institutions for a free constitutional democratic society (or any well-ordered society)
and to secure a social world that makes possible a worthwhile life for all its citizens.
(b) Accordingly, savings may stop once just (or decent) basic institutions have been
established. At this point real saving (that is, net additions to real capital of all kinds)
may fall to zero; and existing stock only needs to be maintained, or replaced, and
nonrenewable resources carefully husbanded for future use as appropriate. (Rawls
2001: 107)254
Therefore, the aim of the just savings principle shifts once society reaches a certain level
of social development. As Wolf explains, “in the first stage, before just institutions have been
established, the purpose of saving is to ensure that later generations have it better than earlier
ones” (Wolf 2018: 65). Whereas, in the second stage, after just institutions have been achieved,
all intergenerational justice requires is for current generations to continue saving enough so that,
“the required institutions must meet needs and protect fundamental rights and liberties” (Wolf
2018: 65). Grosseries classifies these two stages as an accumulation stage, “where net saving is

253

The sufficientarian features of Rawls’s theory are often overlooked, but they are deserving of
greater consideration as a radical corrective to the growth-oriented neoliberal perspective
promoting roving imperialism around the world.
254
Also, this insight is helpful for our purposes because it shows that Rawls acknowledges that
just societies are unlikely to arise within a generation. Accordingly, it is reasonable and
reassuring for us to recognize and expect that transforming ecocidal states to environmentally
sustainable and just societies will likely take generations of effort, activism, and perseverance.
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required from each generation” and steady-state stage, “where the saving rate can fall to zero
(but not below)” (Grosseries 2001: 317).
It is important to reemphasize that, at neither stage, can basic liberties or FEO be
sacrificed to increase the savings rate (Rawls 1999: 258). Thus, because of ecocidal states’
failure to meet these higher-level priorities of protecting their autarkic citizenry’s basic liberties
and FEO, the just savings principle has unequivocally been violated. But, as we will now
demonstrate, ecocidal states additionally fail the just savings principle by improperly pursuing
the tradeoff between economic development and environmental protection.
As we have seen, Rawls’s two-staged sufficientarian just savings principle offers helpful
insights for establishing a sustainable society, in that it undercuts the aim of economic expansion
and development as an end-in-and-of-itself and instead maintains that growth is strictly a means
to the end of establishing and maintaining just institutions needed to foster citizens’ equal basic
liberties and ability to exercise their moral powers (Henderson 2011: 11-17). To grasp this point,
it is imperative to recognize that Rawls eschews a view of the difference principle which
maintains that justice requires an ever-expanding stock of social resources to continue to increase
the absolute position of the least advantaged in perpetuity.
For instance, Rawls is actually suspicious of great material wealth and argues that,
“beyond some point [wealth] is more likely to be a positive hindrance, a meaningless distraction
at best if not a temptation to indulgence and emptiness” (Rawls 1999: 258). He also asserts the
sufficientarian position directly by stating that once “the correct minimum has been reached, the
difference principle is satisfied, and no further increase is called for” (Rawls 1999: 252).
Thus, with the above sufficientarian perspective in mind, we can better understand
Rawls’s motivation behind advocating a steady-state (that is, once just institutions necessary to
foster citizens equal basic liberties and ability to exercise their moral powers has been
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established) requiring no increased savings (i.e., capital growth). Since, as Gail Henderson
explains, Rawls’s theory “involves a shift away from the current paradigm of continuous economic growth as an end or good in itself—a paradigm which is both environmentally and
economically unsustainable” (Henderson 2011: 4).
Therefore, the problem for our purposes (as we have seen throughout the work) is that
ecocidal societies promote a roving imperialistic worldview (i.e., the currently dominant
neoliberal perspective), which holds that continuous economic growth and development ought to
be a chief goal of the state. As Henderson eloquently expounds:
Consumerism and progress therefore are inextricably linked, and the level of
consumption enjoyed by a population is the criterion on which government ought to be
judged. This rhetoric reinforces individual behavior that treats the accumulation of wealth
as an end in itself. All of this makes it difficult to address the problem of future
environmental harm. (Henderson 2011: 10)
Hence, ecocidal states under the sway of roving imperialist ideology fail to adopt the
sufficientarian insights of Rawls’s just saving principle and instead pursue environmentally
destructive and non-sustainable aggregationist practices and policies in the mistaken hope of
open-endedly maximizing capital accumulation. A model that Nick Hanley, Jason Shogren, and
Ben White insightfully recognize “pushes increasingly against environmental constraints,
threatening the operation of the joint economic-environmental system” (Hanley, Shogren, and
White 2007: 15).
Consequently, Rawls defends a theory of justice that challenges the currently dominant
roving imperialist social order by fostering appreciation that economic growth ought to be
viewed as a means to an end, rather than as an end-in-and-of-itself.255 As such, Henderson hopes
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John Stuart Mill was also dissatisfied with the unconstrained growth-oriented capitalism he
experienced in his lifetime, as he vividly articulates he saw individuals spending their lives
“struggling to get on” and “trampling, crushing, elbowing, and treading on each other’s heels” in
the pursuit of wealth (Mill 1848: note 65). Thus, to escape this state of affairs, he argued for a
“steady-state” that by removing the pursuit of wealth and the “art of getting on” would instead
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that Rawls’s insight will garner greater awareness and appreciation for the environmentalist
insight, “[that] slower economic growth is not a ‘sacrifice’ by the present for the sake of the
future, but rather reveals what current generations are sacrificing for the sake of increased
wealth, such as a greater amount of leisure time and the health benefits of improved
environmental quality” (Henderson 2011: 14).256 Princen echoes this sentiment, stating:
“Members of so-called advanced societies…where unending economic growth is an
unquestioned ‘good thing’ essential for progress, cherished for its ability to solve all
problems, even those of growth itself, that even here [some] people have learned to say

develop the “art of living” (Mill 1848: note 65). John Maynard Keynes in his optimistic essay,
“Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren” also believed that humanity would reach a
steady-state of “economic saturation” in which people would be free from the toil of capital
accumulation after solving “the economic problem” that is “the struggle for subsistence”
(Keynes 1930). But the tradition of predicting that humanity would eventually achieve a steadystate has an even older intellectual pedigree. Even Plato in Laws argued that the ideal state would
be a “static agrarian community” in which, “the number of households, or ‘hearths’ must be kept
constant [he later offers a figure of 5040], to ensure that no grave social revolution shall arise
from either over-population or under-population. Over-population would lead to unrightful
expansion at the cost of neighbors, and under-population to inadequacy of national defense”
(Taylor 1934: XXX VII). Furthermore, in the Republic, the Kallipolis (i.e., ideal state) is
sufficientarian in that it ceases further capital accumulation upon reaching a level of prosperity in
which it can defend itself and support and reproduce the Guardian class (i.e., the Philosopher
Kings and auxiliaries). Thus, we can see there is a long history of sufficientarianism in the
Western intellectual tradition.
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Henderson offers an additional compelling prudential reason for adopting Rawls’s
sufficientarian just savings framework, stemming from the time-delay between cause and effect
of environmental harms, “[in that] by the time the effects on the environment of present-day
economic activities are realized, it will be too late to do anything about them” (Henderson 2011:
15). As such, “preventing serious reductions to the environmental quality that will be
experienced by future generations may mean slowing down economic development in the
present in order to avoid the unforeseeable harms of economic activity…[it] is also necessary in
order for regulatory institutions to be able to keep up with and effectively prevent or mitigate the
predicted environmental impacts of which we are presently aware” (Henderson 2011: 15). And
while advances in science may facilitate better predictions regarding how our practices and
policies will impact the environmental, the complexity and dynamic nature of ecosystems
practically forecloses the prospects of ever making completely accurate assessments of the
consequences and repercussions of our actions on the environment. Thus, justifying the need to
build slack, redundancy, and resilience into our ecological-economic social system, which the
currently dominant roving imperialist/neoliberal global system fails to do.
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enough. And they need to know that saying enough need not be a matter of sacrifice…is
not just a means of surviving. It is a means of thriving” (Princen 2005: 5).257
But could ecocidal states justify their destruction of autarkic communities’ habitats on the
grounds that they are in the accumulation phase; and thus, such activity is necessary to achieve
just institutions? This question raises a core difficulty regarding our goal of constructing
principles of environmental transformative justice from within a Rawlsian framework, in that
defining precisely what is supposed to occur when economic development and environmental
protection come into conflict is a tension never explicitly resolved in Rawls’s body of work.
Nevertheless, by drawing conclusions based on the basic liberty principle and FEO, we can show
that in a traditional Rawlsian account, ecocidal states fail to make the right determination in this
important trade-off.
To demonstrate this, it is important to remember Rawls maintains that a central objective
of the just saving principle is to “preserve the gains of culture and civilization” (Rawls 1999:
252). Hence, as mentioned, according to his theory, each generation ought to pass on to the next
“a fair equivalent in real capital as defined by the just savings principle” (Rawls 1999: 256).
Notably, Rawls defines “real capital” broadly as “not only factories and machines, and so
on, but also the knowledge and culture, as well as the techniques and skills, that make possible
just institutions and the fair value of liberty” (Rawls 1999: 256). Since autarkic communities rely
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Princen argues for the importance of promoting sufficientarian ideals by explaining that: “In
an ecologically constrained world, people need the rhetorical and political means for turning a
silencing hand to the barkers and boosters, to the marketeers, to the spinmeisters and political
handlers, all of whom tell us that the good life comes from purchasing goods, and that because
goods are good more goods must be better” (Princen 2005: 6). Therefore, while efficiency and
continuous growth might have served us well in the past, Princen maintains this was under
favorable conditions (i.e., when the earth had abundant resources and waste-sinks), whereas now:
“Under other conditions - namely, environmental criticality - a different set of [sufficientarian]
principles are needed, a set that embodies social restraint as the logical analog to ecological
constraint, a set that guides human activities when those activities pose grave risks to human
survival” (Princen 2005: 19).
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on certain ‘cultural knowledge, techniques, and skills’ in relation to a specific habitat for
maintaining their traditional way of life, it is imperative that states do not harm these ecosystems
because, as previously discussed, the basic liberty principle bars basic social institutions from
prioritizing one reasonable way of life over another. As has been demonstrated, ecocidal states
would be violating autarkic citizens’ basic liberties, if they permitted the destruction of vital
resources necessary for pursuing their conception of a good life, developing their moral powers,
and becoming cooperating members of society.
In summary, the just savings principle mandates that these habitats must be saved in
order to preserve the choices available to future generations of autarkic citizens, or else the state
risks illiberally violating these citizens’ basic rights.258 As Henderson explains:
Maintaining a particular degree of environmental quality is necessary to preserve the
range of choices available to future generations. For instance, depleting resources can
‘narrow diversity’, which in turn could limit future generations’ options in addressing
future problems…The ability to benefit from the environment would include
opportunities to fish, farm and hunt, to breathe clean air and drink clean water, to have
access to a variety of species and breeds of plants and animals and to contemplate nature.
(Henderson 2011: 18)
To situate this discussion in terms that readers may be more familiar with, the just
savings principle does not adhere to a strategy of weak sustainability, meaning that not all social
resources are substitutable, even under conditions stipulating that all conversions must maintain
or increase society’s total resource pool.259 Basically, per the just saving principle, it is not the
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We can use Ronald Dworkin’s work to show the injustice of destroying habitats on which
autarkic communities rely on for their survival from within another famous liberal constructivist
paradigm. According to his theory, such action would be wrong in that it violates the “grounds of
neutrality” to allow “a way of life that has been desired and found satisfying in the past, to
become unavailable to future generations, and indeed to the future of those who now seem
unaware of its appeal” (Dworkin 1985: 202).
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Weak sustainability stems from the work of two neoclassical economists: Robert Solow
(1974; 1986; 1992; 1993) and John Hartwick (1977; 1978; 1990). Weak sustainability maintains
that it is possible to substitute man-made capital for natural capital (Neumayer, 2003).
Interestingly, one of the goals of this work is to provide justification for proceeding in the
opposite direction and occasionally substituting natural-capital for man-made capital.
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case that manufactured, human, social, financial, and natural capital are all interchangeable. As
such, a problem with interpreting the just savings principle through a weak sustainability lens is
that it would illiberally prioritize certain conceptions of the good (roving imperialists’
worldview) over others (autarkic communities’ worldview).
Accordingly, the best way to respect citizens of autarkic communities’ basic liberties and
FEO is to ensure that certain natural entities are exempt from being exploited by processes of
capital accumulation that would cause their destruction, under the auspices of generating greater
manufactured, human, social, or financial capital. “Justice as fairness” therefore requires that at
least a limited set of natural resources (i.e., those that are essential for enabling certain citizens to
pursue their own conceptions of a good life, develop their moral powers, and become
cooperating members of society) ought to be protected by norms of strong sustainability.260 Such
a conclusion ensures that certain natural resources are non-fungible and must be preserved – that
is so long as the protection of these resources does not cause comparable or worse injustice, i.e.,
violating other citizens’ basic liberties or FEO.261
Essentially, autarkic communities’ lifestyle and “comprehensive doctrine of the good”
require strong sustainability measures aimed at preserving their specific habitat. As such, a just
Rawlsian state has an obligation to preserve these resources or it will fail to respect these
citizens’ way of life.
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See Konrad Ott’s “Institutionalizing Strong Sustainability: A Rawlsian Perspective” for a
more detailed defense regarding why a Rawlsian constructivist approach requires adopting a
rule-based variant of strong sustainability (Ott 2014).
261
Strong sustainability arose as an environmentalist response to the notion of weak
sustainability utilized in neoclassical economics. It maintains that certain forms of natural capital
cannot be substituted for man-made capital (Dobson 1998). Thus, the natural entities under
consideration must be preserved because there are no man-made entities capable of performing
the same function.
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It is important to highlight that the state disallowing roving imperialists from accessing
these resources does not trigger comparable justice concerns, because these citizens’ can satisfy
their subsistence needs and promote their way of life by drawing upon resources from
elsewhere.262 Therefore, since they are not dependent upon these specific resources in any
substantive way, their basic liberties are not at risk of violation by being barred from exploiting
these resources -- especially when compared with the difficulties facing autarkic communities if
these resources are destroyed. Thus, the state by preserving these resources pursuant to the just
savings principles is not prioritizing one “conceptions of the good” or “comprehensive doctrines”
over another.
Remember, Rawls’s ideal constructivist theory recognizes the importance of allowing
opportunities “for individuals and associations to be attached to their particular culture and to
take part in its common public and civic life” (Rawls 2001: 111). As such, a virtue of Rawls’s
approach is that it requires us to pay attention to peoples’ particular present and future interests,
preferences, and needs, instead of strictly prioritizing the unconditional aggregation of social
resources.263
To achieve this necessitates that the just savings principle be interpreted as a constraint
on resource-use, which ensures that resources are not destroyed unless such use is unavoidable
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As Henderson explains it is often important to, “ask whether it is possible to achieve the
growth necessary to establish and maintain just institutions in a less environmentally harmful
manner and whether further exploitation of currently untouched natural resources is really
necessary to achieve this goal” (Henderson 2011: 15). For Henderson, the reason behind asking
this question is that our, “obligation is to avoid, to the greatest possible extent, actions that would
preclude future generations from endorsing our traditions and values” (Henderson 2011: 23).
263
Ott clearly captures this feature of Rawls’s theory: “Reasonable people behind the veil of
ignorance may know that nature provides several types of services, such as provisioning,
regulating, and cultural services, but do not know what role such services of nature may play in
their individual concept of the good. If so, they cautiously might opt for more conservation and
restoration since they, as real individuals, may be benefitted highly by the cultural values of
nature (such as beauty or recreation) (Ott 2014: 904).
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for achieving or maintaining the principles of justice (Wissenburg 1999: 193-196).264 In other
words, the just savings principle should be viewed as a safeguard that each generation leaves
society no worse than when they inherited it, without losing anything essential. As Marcel
Wissenburg, explains such an interpretation of the just savings principle, “puts the onus of proof
for the legitimacy of environmentally harmful acts on the bad guys” (Wissenburg 1999: 198).
Accordingly, the constraints placed on society by the just saving principle guarantee that
present-and-future citizens will have access to the natural entities (i.e., habitats, animals, plants,
landmarks, etc.) they need in accordance with their “comprehensive doctrine of the good,” that is
so long as such access does not undermine present-and-future citizens’ basic liberties, FEO, or
the difference principle. Such an interpretation of the just savings principle affirms Henderson’s
assertion, “that while communities and their cultures change over time, this does not justify
[from within a Rawlsian framework] precluding future generations from participating in
traditional practices because of environmental mismanagement by previous generations”
(Henderson 2011: 22).
We have demonstrated in our paradigm cases and idealized model of ecocide that
ecocidal societies fail in their obligation to preserve the fair and equal opportunity of future
generations of autarkic citizens to participate in their traditional cultural practices and way of
life.265 As Brian Barry explains, “the requirement is to provide future generations with the
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Wissenburg argues that the “restraint principle” undergirding the just savings principle
requires that, “no good shall be destroyed unless unavoidable and unless they are replaced by
perfectly identical goods; if that is physically impossible, they should be replaced by equivalent
goods resembling the original as closely as possible; and if that is also impossible, a proper
compensation should be provided” (Wissenburg 1999: 193). Furthermore, he defends the view
that the “restraint principle” is a “necessary condition of liberal democracy” because of its role in
fostering social stability and intergenerational cooperation (Wissenburg 1999: 197).
265
As we have discussed, the destruction of these communities’ territories and livelihoods force
these citizens into the role of ecocide refugees struggling to survive and meet their needs in an
alien and often hostile culture and society. Furthermore, the loss of these citizens’ ability to pass
down to their descendants their traditional subsistence skills and cultural practices can
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opportunity to live good lives according to their conception of what constitutes a good life”
(Barry 1999: 104). Hence, ecocide violates this requirement in that it forecloses autarkic
communities’ choices in the future, in that it prevents impacted citizens from being able to
continue their traditional subsistence practices on their ancestral on their ancestral land.
Moreover, it seems unlikely that the economic growth and development necessary to
achieve just institutions can only occur by destroying autarkic communities’ habitat. Since as
Rawls states, “it is a mistake to believe that a just and good society must wait upon a high
material standard of life” (Rawls 1999: 257).
Consequently, it appears that ecocidal states violate the just savings principle even if the
harm occurs during the accumulation phase because their consistent prioritization of economic
growth and development over environmental preservation unjustly favors certain “conceptions of
the good” and “comprehensive doctrines” over others, e.g., roving imperialism over autarkic
ways of life, weak sustainability over strong sustainability, etc. Unless the state can definitively
demonstrate that the only way to achieve (during the accumulation phase) or maintain (during
the steady-state phase) just institutions is to pursue ecocidal activity, which seems extremely
unlikely.266 In other words, eliminating ecocide in a society, almost certainly places the society
in a better position to realize “justice as fairness” in both the present and the future.
Nevertheless, at present we are unable to provide a complete theorization of how
sustainability (i.e., developing a standard to satisfactorily limit how our actions and decisions can

profoundly affect current and subsequent generations self-esteem, pride, autonomy, and selfrespect.
266
Essentially, relying on Rawls’s categorization of states in Laws of Peoples, we can place
ecocidal states into categories. First, if a state is unable to pursue or maintain just institutions
without enacting ecocide, then such a state ought to be considered a “burdened society,” in that it
is too immiserated to achieve or preserve just institutions (Rawls 1999b). Whereas, a state that
engages in ecocidal activity superfluous to the pursuit or maintenance of just institutions ought to
be considered an “outlaw state” (Rawls 1999b).
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constrain the opportunities of future generations) ought to be conceptualized when vital interests
come into conflict, other than gesturing towards Norton’s theory of adaptive environmental
management as a promising schema (Norton 2005, 2009, and 2015).267 The reason for endorsing
Norton’s framework is that he embraces a pluralistic account of ‘multiple’ and ‘varied’
environmental values that is sensitive to local human communities’ wants and needs in a manner
conducive to maintaining a liberal ecological-economic social system, i.e., one that is able to
respect a diverse set of environmental perspectives; while concurrently, fostering mechanisms
for achieving overlapping consensus regarding how to proceed in environmental decisionmaking when competing interests arise (Norton 2005, 2009, and 2015).268
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Essentially, Norton stresses the procedure of environmental decision-making over fixed and
absolute substantive conclusions. He asserts that the process must be “democratic” in that “it
must be iterative, it must be open to all voices in the community, and it must be receptive to
multiple values and varied formulations of these values” (Norton 2005: 273). The ultimate aim
of his schema is to optimize the ratio of environmental opportunities to constraints for present
and future generations (Norton 2009: 41). This is comparable to Barry’s classic articulation of
sustainability, that the present generation ought to preserve at minimum the current “range of
opportunities” for future generations: “What justice requires, I suggest, is that the range of
opportunities open to successor generations should not be narrowed. If some openings are closed
off by depletion or other irreversible damage to the environment, others should be created (if
necessary, at the cost of some sacrifice) to make up” (Barry 1978: 243).
268
Whereas monistic accounts of environmental values (e.g., Economism or Intrinsic Value
Theory) illiberally prioritize some “comprehensive doctrines” and “conceptions of the good”
over others. Thus, while Norton’s adaptive ecological management is anthropocentric (i.e.,
strictly concerned with the opportunities and constraints placed on present and future human
beings), it does not do so in an illiberal way, because it can incorporate actor’s non-instrumental
reasons for preserving a specific environmental entity through recognizing that these interests are
opportunities that hold value both at present and for posterity’s sake. Furthermore, Wolf
assuages concerns over the fact that Norton’s schema frames sustainability through the lens of
furthering anthropocentric opportunities, by explaining that: “We live in an era of swift
environmental change and, in many instances, destruction that threatens the most serious
imposition of constraints, and deprivation of opportunities for later generations…[thus]
advocates of different value theories are likely to converge in their judgments about most of the
pressing environmental policy and environmental management decisions we presently face”
(Wolf 2018: 57). Hence, while there are different possible motivations for promoting the idea of
environmental sustainability, e.g., autarkic communities will want to protect ancestral lands from
industrial development, while industrialists will want to ensure the continuous revenue stream or
impose eco-modernizing costs on their competitors. Nevertheless, these disparate motivations all
advocate to a greater or lesser extent the same commitment to environmental sustainability.
222

III.

Augmenting Rawlsian Constructivism with a Rectificatory Principle of Justice

This work has demonstrated several reasons why ecocidal societies are unjust, illordered, and uncooperative ventures that act in direct violation of Rawlsian principles. But the
problem is that such a traditional Rawlsian framework appears to only offer guidance regarding
how societies ideally ought to structure themselves moving forward, in that it requires them to
respect all citizens basic rights, foster a system that engenders fair and equal life prospects,
maximally assist the downtrodden, and ensures that future generations can meet their needs.
Thus, it is reasonable to assume that traditional Rawlsian principles can effectively
achieve many of the Transitional Justice objectives (i.e., ending pervasive structural inequality
and normalized political and collective wrongdoing, while establishing legitimate authority and
promoting social stability) and environmentalist objectives (i.e., achieving sustainability and
ecosystem preservation). Nevertheless, the principles are clearly future-oriented and as such
prove inadequate for achieving the past-oriented aims of Transitional Justice (i.e., requiring the
acknowledgment of past wrongs, restoring victim’s moral status and equal social standing in
relation to others across time) and of environmentalism (i.e., justifying the restoration or
(re)construction of lost habitats). As Mills rightly acknowledges in his criticism of Rawls:
“Preemptive precautions to prevent injustices entering the ‘basic structure’ of a society are not

Thus, it seems fair to argue that the idea of environmental sustainability can be reached through
an “overlapping consensus” of varied interests, positions, and perspectives. As David Miller
states, “to put this back into Rawlsian terms, untouched natural products are to be seen as
primary goods for persons regardless of their particular, subjectively held, conceptions of the
good” (Miller 1999: 164).
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the same as rectificatory measures aimed at correcting them once they have already occurred.
Prevention generally differs from cure” (Mills 2017: 140).269
Accordingly, such a future-oriented framework is problematic because there is a strong
intuition in both Transitional Justice and environmentalism that past wrongs require specifically
tailored forms of redress.270 Recent scholarship by Vaca and Espindola convincingly argues that
Rawls’s ideal constructivist theory requires an additional principle of reparative justice (Vaca
and Espindolda 2014).271 Furthermore, Mills offers a method for augmenting Rawls’s
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It must be pointed out that the failure to consider issues of rectificatory justice is not
particular to Rawls. As Mills highlights: “The under theorization in the tradition of corrective
justice for subordinated groups, despite the subordination of most of the population nominally in
the theory’s ambit, is itself a manifestation of this complicity. Contemporary political
philosophy’s post-Rawlsian focus on ‘ideal theory’ is thus not aberrant but completely
continuous with this long history of moral evasion” (Mills 2017: 209).
270
As discussed, one of the core intuitions driving Transitional Justice is that forgetting the
wrongs of the past and moving forward as though nothing transpired constitutes a grave
injustice. In brief, a reason supporting the need for reparative justice and forgiveness in
transitional settings is the abundance of empirical evidence confirming that the decision to forgo
correcting grave injustice(s) increases the rate of recurrence of harms in the future (Laplante
2008). David Bloomfield highlights the concern that forgetting the past and moving forward, as
though nothing occurred, would be a grave injustice, which may lead to further conflict in the
future: “One of the biggest obstacles to transition is that, because of the violence of the past, their
relations are based on antagonism, distrust, disrespect and, quite possibly, hurt and hatred. It is
hardly a recipe for optimism, no matter how effective or perfect those new structures may
be…there is a pressing need to address the past” (Bloomfield 2003: 11). But beyond these sorts
of instrumental arguments, there is a long tradition of normative thought arguing that
overcoming injustice requires rebalancing the moral scale for its own sake, simply because it is
the right thing to do, i.e., it is morally important to try and give people what they deserve. As
Kant famously argued: “Even if a civil society were to be dissolved by the consent of all its
members (e.g., if a people inhabiting an island decided to separate and disperse throughout the
world), the last murderer remaining in the prison would first have to be executed, so that each
has done to him what his deeds deserve and blood guilt does not cling to the people for not
having insisted upon this punishment; for otherwise the people can be regarded as collaborators
in this public violation of justice” (Kant 1996: 333).
271
As a reminder we defined “reparations” broadly as past-oriented redress of past wrongs,
thereby obtaining justice for victims. It is important to emphasize that reparative justice in this
sense includes punishment of perpetrators, which as will be discussed is a vital feature of
Transitional Justice.
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constructivist approach, so as to be able to establish past-oriented reparatory principles of justice
(Mills 2017).
The chapter will now analyze these insights in an attempt to see if an augmented, yet
inherently Rawlsian constructivist account can justify and develop the need for rectifying past
wrongs to fully satisfy the previously stated aims of Transitional Justice and environmentalism
for responding to ecocide. Once again, the ultimate goal of this constructivist undertaking is to
devise a theory of environmental transformative justice that satisfies both disciplines.272

A. Compatibility of Traditional Rawlsian Approach with Unrectified Injustice

Vaca and Espindola begin by showing that a conventional Rawlsian framework is
compatible with not rectifying past injustices, if these harms are no longer contributing to current
injustices (Vaca and Espindola 2014: 236-240). They demonstrate this by imagining a wellordered society that, despite past injustices, is currently able to satisfy the two principles of
justice without taking active corrective measures. Effectively, such a state achieves an
institutionally fair and equitable society by ‘drawing a line in the sand’ requiring that,
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Immediately, one might object that even if it can be shown that there is a current injustice that
needs to be repaired (i.e., restoring lost habitat that was destroyed), that does not necessitate
invoking the notion of Transitional Justice. However, as previously shown because of the type of
harm suffered (i.e., social death and loss of vital interests) and the manner in which the harm
arose (i.e., direct, indirect, or negligent state action), the state is reasonably obligated to take
action to ensure that such wrongs never occur again. Accordingly, it would be inadequate to only
repair the harm done (i.e., restore the status quo) because the underlying system(s), practice(s),
norm(s), and social relation(s) that generated the harm would likely remain intact. Thus, an
appropriate response in our paradigm cases of ecocide entails altering and replacing the
structures generating the harm. In other words, such wrongs demand the sort of social
transformation that Transitional Justice is designed to achieved, i.e., transitioning societies away
from pervasive structural inequality, ending normalized political and collective wrongdoing,
establishing legitimate authority and promoting social stability.
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henceforth, the society would operate exclusively in accordance with Rawls’s future-oriented
principles of justice.
For our purposes, imagine a society that engaged in ecocide in the recent past, but has
since ceased these harmful practices. Additionally, in this hypothetical society, every citizen is
aware and accepts the fact that the basic liberties of all are now being respected, the well-being
of the least advantaged is being maximized, social resources are being justly conserved for future
generations, and because of tremendous psychological resilience and unrestrained ability, the
citizens of former autarkic communities are able to fairly compete as equals for all social
positions.273
In such a scenario, Vaca and Espindola correctly surmise that, per a traditional Rawlsian
account, “justice as fairness” has been satisfied, in that the society is not violating any principles
of justice. As they explain, such examples illustrate how Rawls’s theory is amenable to the
possibility that: “Ideal liberal justice requires [only] ensuring the prerogatives of justice from the
present on. It does not require providing means of historical rectification” (Vaca and Espindola
2014: 240).
To summarize, they are arguing that such examples prove that, according to a traditional
Rawlsian account, there is no need for adopting a further principle of reparatory justice from
“behind the veil” in the “original position” because the current principles are sufficient for
correcting historical injustices; and, as such, any additional principle of justice is unnecessary.
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Obviously, per the discussion in the last section regarding FEO, it is highly likely that the
psychological disadvantages and other obstacles to a healthy self-respect and the ability for
victims to compete as equals against the rest of society would be insurmountable, without
rectifying historical injustices. Accordingly, a Rawlsian could maintain that such a scenario is
quite unrealistic: past injustices linger on in current injustices, e.g., the unjust treatment of blacks
in the United States today has its origins in the injustice of slavery.
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However, they believe such a conclusion is misguided and inadequate for capturing the
normative significance of rectifying historical injustice.

B. Proving a Just Rawlsian Approach Requires a Rectificatory Principle

Initially, one may argue that Vaca and Espindola cannot rely on the abundant
psychological and sociological evidence that has already been mentioned (i.e., showing that
victims of past wrongs need reparative assistance to effectively compete for social positions in
accordance with FEO) because, as stipulated, in these scenarios the former victims, due to their
tremendous psychological resilience and unrestrained ability, are not impeded by the past. Such a
conclusion, however, would be a misapplication of Rawls’s ideal theory, in that, as previously
explained, he was striving to articulate “how the social world may realize the features of a
realistic utopia” (Rawls 1993: 128).
Thus, it would be misguided to imagine or presuppose that victims can be reasonably
expected to overcome the type of grave historical harms under consideration (e.g., genocide,
ethnic cleansing, ecocide, etc.), when there are countless studies to the contrary. As Briton Lykes
and Marcie Mersky explain, “there is a general sense among mental health and psychosocial
researchers and practitioners that all of these forms…of reparations programs… can have
important effects on psychosocial conditions at the individual and national or collective level”
(Lykes and Marsky 2006: 591).274

274

These reparations programs include measures that focus on material well-being, restoration of
legal rights or property, promoting equal standing before the law, all of which seem directly
achievable through the two principles of justice. But they also include the truth-seeking
processes, apologies, commemorations, memorialization that are not necessarily justified through
the two principles.
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Hence, there is ample empirical evidence supporting Vaca and Espindola’s position that,
“the aspiration to come to terms with an unjust past is a permanent feature of normal human
psychology” (Vaca and Espindola 2014: 231) Accordingly, it is reasonable to assume that
victims of grave political harms (such as the instance of ecocide in our case studies) would have
great interest and need for the state and society to recognize and strive to come to terms with the
harms they have suffered, which as Transitional Justice has repeatedly proven, requires separate
reparative measures.
Importantly, Vaca and Espindola emphasize that victims’ psychological need for
recognition and mending of past wrongs committed against them is in line with other
psychosocial regularities that Rawls considers applicable to determining principles of justice
(Vaca and Espindola 2014). For instance, even a well-ordered society requires coercive and
punitive measures because, despite “strict compliance” at an institutional level, not all
individuals will act in accordance with the principles of justice. As Rawls states, “it is reasonable
to assume that even in a well-ordered society the coercive powers of government are to some
degree necessary, [since] even under reasonable ideal conditions, it is hard to imagine, for
example, a successful income tax scheme on a voluntary basis” (Rawls 1999: 211) Furthermore,
he continues this line of reasoning by admitting, “that we need penal sanctions however limited
even for ideal theory, given the normal conditions of human life, some such arrangements are
necessary” (Rawls 1999: 212) .
Hence, Vaca and Espindola rightly acknowledge that for Rawls, “the ‘normal conditions
of human life’ include the psychological fact that moral considerations alone cannot motivate
ordinary persons to endorse and comply with a conception of justice … [and therefore] Rawls’s
theory takes into account a psychological fact about human motivation” (Vaca and Espindola
2014: 232). Therefore, based on this insight, they conclude that victims’ interests “in coming to
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terms with the past is similar to other human psychological regularities that Rawls’s ideal theory
is sensitive to” (Vaca and Espindola 2014: 232).
In summary, the argument presents a challenge, questioning the view that Rawls was fine
with excluding the possibility of voluntary tax schemes or that people will never break the law as
“normal” feature of human psychology, yet believing he was willing to disregard the
psychological actuality that some victims of grave political wrongs would require society to
recognize and strive to come to terms with the harms they have suffered. Essentially, they argue
that if Rawls admits some of these psychological regularities, then there appears no clear reason
why he would exclude others.
One may argue that the psychosocial regularity that Vaca and Espindola are considering
ought to be excluded because the type of “well-ordered” society Rawls has in mind would not
have legacies of grave injustices. For instance, Janna Thompson claims we must drop “Rawls’s
assumption that there is strict compliance with justice in order to consider how representatives of
family lines would regard claims for reparation for historical injustice” (Thompson 2001: 129).
Vaca and Espindola, however, argue that Thompson is mistaken in her claim that
Rawlsian “strict-compliance” makes it impossible to tackle past wrongs from within ideal theory
because her view leads to the strange conclusion that the “well-ordered” societies Rawls is trying
to illustrate must always have been just (Vaca and Espindola 2014: 233-234). Essentially, the
oddness stems from the realization that if ‘historical strict compliance’ is mandatory, then
Rawls’s theory could only be applied to societies that are and always have been just.
The problem is that such an interpretation is idealistic in the ‘bad sense’, in that it
forecloses the prospects of any state ever achieving “justice as fairness” because all societies
have historical injustices – especially if ecocide, as construed throughout the work, is included as
a grave political injustice. In which case, Rawls’s ideal theory would fail in its goal of providing
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a “realistic utopia” that can offer guidance to “non-ideal” theory, as defenders of the ideal/nonideal divide argue it must.275 As Rawls states, “the idea of a well-ordered society should also
provide some guidance in thinking about non-ideal theory, and so about difficult cases of how to
deal with existing injustices” (Rawls 2001: 13).
Furthermore, maintaining that societies have always been just is not a necessary
“favorable condition” to ensure “strict-compliance,” since all that is required is that once a “wellordered” society is established, reasonably normal social functioning would foster and promote
the stability of the socio-political regime across generations (Rawls 2001:13). As Rawls explains,
“[strict compliance] probes the limits of the realistically practicable, that is, how far in our world
(given its laws and tendencies) a democratic regime can attain complete realization of its
appropriate political values” (Rawls 2001: 13).
Moreover, Vaca and Espindola correctly express that, from “behind the veil of
ignorance,” the society’s “historical record” is closed to the representatives (Vaca and Espindola
2014: 235). Hence, actors in the “original position” cannot know or assume the society’s past,
i.e., whether or not grave historical injustices have occurred. Vaca and Espindola thus
insightfully argue that this requirement provides “a very good reason for the parties to ensure
provisions for coming to terms with the past: for all they know, it may be the case that their wellordered society includes historical injustices as part of its past” (Vaca and Espindola 2014: 235).
Furthermore, even if it is discovered upon “lifting the veil” that the society has no legacy of
injustice, there is no obvious drawback to having had included vestigial provisions for coming to
terms with past in the society’s basic structure.
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As Rawls himself states: “We view political philosophy as realistically Utopian: that is, as
probing the limits of practicable political possibility. Our hope for the future of our society rests
on the belief that the social world allows at least a decent political order, so that a reasonably
just, though not perfect, democratic regime is possible (Rawls 2001: 4).
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Accordingly, since Rawls’s goal is to offer a “realistic utopia” (i.e., one that is practicably
possible and stable over time), it is essential that citizen’s “normal” motivation and interests (i.e.,
as supported by an abundance of psychosocial evidence) would necessitate the prospect of taking
steps to correct past injustices. Essentially, the problem is that, if Rawls’s theory does not include
a principle for rectifying historical wrongs, then the theory fails at offering a “practical
possibility” of maintaining a well-ordered society because at least at present all societies have
committed grave injustices in their past (especially if ecocide is included), and empirical data
shows that victims of grave political injustice ‘reasonably’ require social recognition and
reparations for attaining psychological wellbeing and social functioning.
Hence there is ample support for Vaca and Espindola’s conclusion that “the interests in
coming to terms with an unjust past must be conceptualized as part of ideal theory…[since], as
we have seen, this interest is analogous to other psychological regularities that are already central
to Rawls’s ideal theory” (Vaca and Espindola 2014: 236). What they have demonstrated is that it
is too much to ask of victims of grave historical injustice (like ecocide) to move forward without
receiving social recognition and reparations.
Importantly, this conclusion holds even in cases in which psychologically resilient
victims’ FEO is not in jeopardy, since the state’s obligation to maintain the moral status of
citizens as fully equal applies to their life as a whole. Because “political violence is an
institutional way of undermining the equal moral worth of persons,” then recognition of past
wrongs is needed to restore victim’s moral status and equal social standing in relation to others
across time (Vaca 2013: 300).276 As Vaca and Espindola explain:
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Furthermore, states’ obligation to guarantee the dignity of all citizens across time is no more
farfetched a requirement than the need to accept that citizens will have diverse and competing
conceptions of the good or recognizing that citizens will occasionally fail to act in full
compliance with the principles of justice. Furthermore, it is precisely the political nature of the
injustice that engenders the need for public response and acknowledgment.
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Without the public expression of such condemnation, it is simply not clear whether such
society in fact respects the status of victims as equal citizens; if it did, why would it
remain silent about acts that undermine that status? Failing to acknowledge recent past
wrongdoing amounts to suggesting that there are major and sensitive parts of the shared
life of victims and the rest of society that are irrelevant to the moral. (Vaca and Espindola
2014: 238)
It is important to keep in mind that rectifying wrongs does not pertain strictly to instances
in which victims of grave political injustices are still alive. Since, as Vaca emphasizes, “Rawls
assumes that a liberal society is a continuum in time, his theory is still to show concern for the
problems of interacting generations” (Vaca 2013: 316). This insight is most pronounced in
Rawls’s rejection of time preference as a legitimate concern for “justice as fairness” because as
he states:
In the case of the individual [as a representative in the original position], pure time
preference is irrational; it means that he is not viewing all moments as equally parts of
one life. In the case of society, pure time preference is unjust: it means (in the more
common instance when future is discounted) that the living take advantage of their
position in time to favor their own interests (Rawls 1999: 260).
While Rawls admits that the most common case is for actors in the present to prioritize
their needs and interests over those of future generations (thus, necessitating his stipulation of a
‘just savings’ requirement), the intergenerational nature of liberal society would also apply
retroactively and consider the interaction of present and future generations with their ancestors.
Rawls’s theory thus obliges concern regarding the present generation’s treatment of both its past
ancestors and future heirs (Vaca 2013: 312-316).277
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Duncan Ivison succinctly clarifies societies’ obligation to their past: “A political community
is constituted not only by the actions of those in the present, but also by those in the past, through
the construction and maintenance of its identity over time…[thus] when we identify with a
nation or state we often associate ourselves with its past as much as its present, not only in terms
of things about which we take collective pride, but also those for which we may feel a sense of
shame or regret” (Ivison 2008: 519). Basically, the argument is that members of states have
obligations to rectify past injustices because, if citizens presently accept the privileges of residing
within their political community, then they must also take responsibility for the historical harms
that have been committed by the norms, interactions, institutions, and social structures
generating these benefits.
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Accordingly, the problematic compatibility of traditional Rawlsian theory with
embracing the possibility of ‘drawing a line in the sand’ and proceeding as though nothing had
occurred to overcome grave historical wrongs clarifies the need to augment the theory with a
principle of rectificatory justice. Consequently, Vaca and Espindola have shown that an ideal
constructivist approach supports the conclusion that environmental transformative justice
requires a principle of rectificatory justice -- one that can repair and reconcile the illicit
advantages ecocidal states have received at the expense of their autarkic citizens.

C. Devising a Rectificatory Principle from a Rawlsian Constructivist Approach

As has been argued, a properly augmented Rawlsian constructivist account requires the
acknowledgment of past wrongs, restoring victim’s moral status and equal social standing in
relation to others across time. But Vaca and Espindola offer little guidance regarding how such
ground can be gained. Fortunately, Mills offers a schema for establishing rectificatory principles
via an augmented Rawlsian constructivist framework.
Mills proposes that to begin the process of determining how to proceed in correcting
legacies of injustice, we should rely on an augmented “Rawlsian apparatus that is explicitly
modified to adjudicate matters of non-ideal theory” (Mills 2017: 215). Essentially, his approach
dictates that we ought to include a “device of representation” to craft a “different thoughtexperiment” that makes us sensitive to historical injustices and the need to “dismantle an already
existing unjust basic structure” (Mills 2017: 212-213).
Thus, for our purposes, we would acknowledge that we will emerge into a society whose
basic structure tolerates environmental destruction that unjustly prioritizes some citizens’ way of
life over others (to the extent that it actually causes social death and ends their way of life). As
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such, the question from the “original position” becomes “What measures would you select to
correct for these histories of environmental injustice?” while not knowing if one might be an
autarkic citizen or ecocide refugee when the veil lifts.278
After engaging with the thought-experiment, I propose (and hope that it seems intuitively
plausible) that we would agree to four principles: (1) adopt sustainable environmental practices –
so long as such practices do not violate Rawls’s traditional principles of justice; (2) respect
multiple ecological-economic systems and cultures – so long as they do not violate (1); (3)
acknowledge, repair, and rectify past wrongs, and (4) work to restore or construct impacted
ecosystems and communities (restoration ought to be preferred to construction, if possible – if
neither is possible greater emphasis must be placed on victims’ reparative compensation in [3]).
As such, these four principles constitute the aims of environmental transformative justice.
At present, hopefully, the intuitive logic of accepting these principles from a modified
Rawlsian constructivist position is clear. Additionally, the next chapter aims to bolster the
plausibility of accepting these principles by illustrating the ways in comparative approaches to
justice reach comparable conclusions regarding how to justly respond to ecocide.279
But before moving on to analyzing comparative approaches to justice, it is necessary to
highlight that a virtue of the preceding investigation is that it demonstrates the ways in which a
modified Rawlsian constructivist approach is capable of providing normative justification for all
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Mills in applying his methodology to the subject of correcting legacies of white supremacy
proposes three principles: (1) end racially unequal citizenship; (2) end racial exploitation, and (3)
end racial disrespect (Mills 2017: 214). Interestingly, enacting environmental transformative
justice measures will likely assist in promoting Mills’ objectives of diminishing racial
exploitation and furthering racial equality and respect because, as we have seen in our case
studies, autarkic communities are often inhabited by non-whites, whereas roving imperialists
have historically been white.
279
The differences between constructivist and comparative approaches to justice appear
significant from a theoretical perspective, but from a substantive policy perspective they reach
many of the same prescriptive conclusions and have much in common in critiquing the current
status quo global order.
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the aims of Transitional Justice. Additionally, since the harm at issue in cases of ecocide pertains
to ecological destruction, it seems reasonable to assume that the appropriate attempts at
reparation, rectification, and acknowledgment of past wrong ought to include environmental
features – which will be discussed in the final section of the next chapter.
Moreover, from a folk perspective, it is common-knowledge that environmentalists are
often concerned with restorative projects aimed at repairing or reconstructing lost or damaged
ecosystems. Also, from a technical theoretical standpoint, Norton in his famous theory of
environmentally sustainable decision-making appears to recognize and endorse the importance of
past-oriented environmental reparative measures. For instance, as he states in his canonical work
Sustainability, “we can harm the future by failing to create and maintain a culture and a
community respectful of its past, including both the human and the natural history of the
common heritage” (Norton 2005: 339). Furthermore, he champions Edmund Burke’s definition
of society as “a partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are
living, those who are dead and those to be born” (Norton 2005: 337).280 Hence, we can
reasonably assert that since environmentalism often focuses on correcting environmental harm,
that the discipline (broadly construed) would endorse restoring the local habitat to its pre-injury
functioning in cases of ecocide.281
As such, a traditional Rawlsian framework, which strictly focuses on future-oriented
sustainability, preservation, and conservation of natural entities is inadequate from an
environmental perspective. However, our augmented Rawlsian constructivist account is able to

280

Nevertheless, Norton fails to discuss past-oriented environmental values, despite these robust
pronouncements. Thus, the work endeavors to close this apparent conceptual-gap by including an
account of past-oriented environmental reparative measures within his adaptive ecological
management framework.
281
Furthermore, it must be highlighted that restoration entails autarkic communities should be
allowed to return to their ancestral land, because their traditional subsistence practices play a
vital role in maintaining the ecosystems’ proper functioning.
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satisfy environmentalism’s restorative and corrective aims. As well as capture the transformative
justice insight, that it is not enough to simply restore the status quo, instead justice requires
repairing past harms while changing relations, structures, practices, and institutions generating
the harm, so that it will not occur in the future, i.e., the aim of Transitional Justice.
Unfortunately, due to the nature of the harm, functional restoration may prove
impossible, e.g., the Anangu’s land is radioactive, the Cree’s land is inundated, and Wayúu land
is mined out.282 Nevertheless, the present point is simply to highlight that environmentalism
(broadly construed) likely supports the need for restorative or reconstructive practices in cases of
ecocide; and that, fortunately, an augmented Rawlsian constructivist approach (comparable to
the one offered by Mills) can justify these sorts of past-oriented environmental measures.
Thus, we have demonstrated that an augmented Rawlsian constructivist approach can
justify the aims of both Transitional Justice and environmentalism and have ascertained
reasonable parameters regarding the aims of environmental transformative justice. But a litany of
problems still lingers.
First and foremost, our analysis offers little guidance in determining how to proceed to
combat the injustice of ecocide in the actual world. Even after establishing the above ideals, we
still face application issues. For instance, how should the competing reparative (past-oriented 3
and 4) and reconciliatory (future-oriented 1 and 2) principles of environmental transformative
justice be prioritized? Or why should a society with limited resources (all societies thus far)
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As Wissenburg explains, “[environmentalism] demand[s] that an object should not be
destroyed unless unavoidable, that if it must be destroyed it should be replaced by an identical
object, that if this is impossible an equivalent object should be made available, and that if the last
is also impossible, a proper compensation should be provided” (Wissenburg 1999: 193). Thus,
from an environmental justice perspective, there remain two non-ideal potential options: (1)
reconstructing the ecosystem in a comparable location and granting it to the impacted
community or (2) attempting to provide comparable compensation. However, as will be
discussed, both of these options are flawed.
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divert funds towards restoring a destroyed ecosystem, when there are other pressing societal
concerns?283 Or why should a society respect traditional land uses that are less efficient, when
modern technological practices could increase resource aggregation to assist those in need?
Most simply, the issue is whether theorists and practitioners can provide guidance to
communities regarding how to balance the diverse requirements of environmental transformative
justice when the plurality of aims and ends come in conflict with each other or other social
values. Fortunately, the comparative approach of articulating, legitimating, and applying
conceptions of justice offers a robust method of social evaluation based on examining
the actual world and asking how it can be made more just, by observing what lives are like and
what people are capable of achieving, by making comparisons between persons and groups. The
next chapter will thus seek to develop guidelines for how to implement environmental
transformative justice after ecocide, by relying heavily on insights from Amartya Sen and Martha
Nussbaum’s innovative capabilities-based theorization of comparative justice.
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For one, such a decision may require massive resource allocation to even begin approaching
the ecosystem’s prior functioning and any attempt to substantively repair victims’ habitat might
require such drastic resource apportionment that it would begin undermining the availability of
primary goods to other deprived demographics. Jeremy Waldron eloquently highlighted this
concern: “The present circumstances are the ones that are real: it is in the actual world that
people starve or are hurt or degraded if the demands of justice in relation to their circumstance
are not met. Justice, as we say, is a matter of the greatest importance. But, the importance to be
accorded it is relative to what may actually happen if justice is not done, not what might have
happened if the injustice of the past had been avoided” (Waldron 1992: 27).
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CHAPTER FOUR
How Should We Respond to Ecocide? Using a Comparative Approach to Overcome the Injustice
of Ecocide

I.

Introduction to Comparative Approaches to Justice

The comparative approach eschews constructivists’ transcendental attempt at determining
an ideally just society. As Amartya Sen explains, “justice-enhancing changes or reforms demand
comparative assessments, not simply an immaculate identification of ‘the just society’” (Sen
2009: 401). The reason for this, as Sen argues, is that even a fully-articulated description of an
ideally just society would still be unable to offer guidance regarding how to make comparative
assessments necessary for real-world policy making.
To illustrate this point, Sen uses an example from art and explains that, in arguing for the
aesthetic superiority of Van Gogh over Picasso, it is superfluous to identify the most perfect
painting in the world in that, “there would be something deeply odd in a general belief that a
comparison of any two alternatives cannot be sensibly made without a prior identification of a
supreme alternative” (Sen 2009: 101-102). Hence Sen, generalizing from the aesthetic example,
maintains that it is neither necessary nor sufficient to have a transcendental ideal for making
comparative judgments.284 In fact he maintains that “there is no analytical connection there at
all” (Sen 102: 2009).
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Sen’s longer explanation regarding the insufficiency of pursuing an ideal account of justice is
that there are various incongruent elements involved in evaluating distance between diversions
from an ideal: “(1) disparate domains of imperfection, (2) distinct dimensionalities of
transgressions and (3) diverse ways of weighing different infractions. The identification of
transcendence, which is what a transcendental theory does, would not yield any means of
addressing these problems to arrive at a relational ranking of departures from transcendence”
(Sen 2009b: 50).
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We have seen in our own analysis that idealized constructivist principles fall short in their
ability to offer guidance regarding how to balance and select between a plurality of competing
concerns that arise when confronting real world transgressions of the ideal. For instance, the last
section of the preceding chapter was unable to answer if post-ecocide states in the process of
transitioning from their unjust past should prioritize restoring impacted ecosystems or adopt
sustainable practices in order to prevent comparable harm from occurring in the future?285
The comparative approach is helpful in that instead of attempting to illustrate an ideally
just society, it focuses on the evaluative space and practical reasoning underlying the decision
process of combatting injustice. In this way, the view embraces “imperfect,” “partial,” and
“limited agreements” for addressing injustice and improving the lives of those in need (Sen
2009). As will be demonstrated, the benefit of such an approach is that it can readily provide
immediate guidance on how to proceed when confronting pressing and difficult situations (i.e.,
when actual claimants are competing over limited resources in less than ideal settings), in ways
that appealing to a distant, theoretical, and potentially unrealizable ideal cannot.
Thus, to examine how the comparative approach can be applied to overcoming injustice
in our cases of ecocide, we will first explore Sen’s work Idea of Justice because it is the most
complete and developed articulation of the approach. Afterwards, we will explore Martha
Nussbaum’s formulation of the capabilities approach because it offers helpful clarification and
highlights definitive aspects of wellbeing that seem pertinent for effectively responding to
ecocide. The hope is that both perspectives can play a complimentary role (i.e., each approach’s
particular weaknesses, deficiencies, and limitations can be assuaged by relying on the strengths
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For a vivid example illustrating the inescapable plurality of competing justice concerns, see
Sen’s “Three Children and a Flute” (Sen 2009: 12-15).
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and insight of the other) in our attempt at determining how to implement environmental
transformative justice after ecocide.

A. Sen’s Comparative Approach

Sen’s career as an economist, decision theorist, and political philosopher has consistently
focused on the plight of the poor, impoverished, and downtrodden, especially those residing in
developing nations that have limited access to resources necessary for sustaining minimally
decent lives. Accordingly, he is interested in conceptualizing deprivation as a form of injustice
and is motivated to develop frameworks for guiding humanitarian aid and intervention assisting
those in need.
In order to further these aims, Sen argues that normative sociopolitical theorizing should
begin from an Aristotelian perspective, which asks, “What is required for human flourishing?”
(Sen 2009: 253-254). He contends that answering this question will help in developing effective
guidelines for evaluating ‘quality of life’ and determining individual and group needs. In this
light, he maintains that the greatest shortcoming of the Rawlsian approach is that exclusively
focusing on institutional fairness impairs the theory’s ability to consider individual or group
‘well-being’ directly.286 Essentially, Sen argues Rawls was concerned with designing a society
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Sen argues that Rawls’ approach is unable to adequately respect inter-individual differences
because it fails to take into account the wide variation in actors’ ability to convert primary goods
into well-being. For instance, he offers the example of disabled persons or pregnant women to
justify the need to move away from focusing on the distribution of primary goods, to instead
assessing freedom and capability directly: “[A] disabled person can do far less with the same
level of income and other primary goods than can an able-bodied human being. A pregnant
woman needs, among other things, more nutritional support than another person who is not
bearing a child” (Sen 2009: 66). Ingrid Robeyns insightfully explains that there are three factors
influencing conversion rates (i.e., the relation between ‘a good’ and achieving a certain ‘being or
doing’) of at any given moment: “First, personal conversion factors (e.g. metabolism, physical
condition, sex, reading skills, intelligence) influence how a person can convert the characteristics
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that would promote the means of satisfactory living, but neglected to consider the pressing issue
of achieving the end goal of ‘good living’ itself (Sen 2009: 254).287
Hence, Sen believes that those concerned with reducing injustice should focus on very
specific aspects of the lives of persons and communities as the relevant metrics for analyzing the
success or failure of policy decisions. Thus because of the problems of transcendental theorizing
mentioned above, Sen argues that combatting injustice is better served by utilizing realizationfocused comparative reasoning found in economics and social choice theory over the
arrangement-focused contractarian reasoning that has dominated political philosophy since
Hobbes (Sen 2009: 8).288
Basically, the comparative approach maintains that the best method for figuring out what
justice requires in a given situation is to focus on actors’ ranked-preferences as a means of
reaching consensus regarding which outcomes are preferable. But, obviously, strictly focusing on
preferences (i.e., actors’ subjective utility/satisfaction) could lead to greater injustice, as actors

of the commodity into a functioning. If a person is disabled, or in a bad physical condition, or
has never learned to cycle, then the bicycle will be of limited help to enable the functioning of
mobility. Second, social conversion factors (e.g. public policies, social norms, discriminating
practices, gender roles, societal hierarchies, power relations) and, third, environmental
conversion factors (e.g. climate, geographical location) play a role in the conversion from
characteristics of the good to the individual functioning” (Robeyns 2005: 99).
287
Sen relates this distinction to two conceptualizations of justice found in classical Indian
jurisprudence -- niti and nyaya. “The former idea, that of niti, relates to organizational propriety
as well as behavioral correctness, whereas the latter, nyaya, is concerned with what emerges and
how, and in particular the lives that people are actually able to lead” (Sen 2009: xv).
288
Sen explains that both lines of reasoning were developed in the Enlightenment: “One
approach concentrated on identifying perfectly just social arrangements and took the
characterization of ‘just institutions’ to be the principal – and often the only identified – task of
the theory of justice. Woven in different ways around the idea of a hypothetical ‘social contract’,
major contributions were made in this line of thinking by Thomas Hobbes in the seventeenth
century, and later by John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Immanuel Kant, among
others…[While] a number of other Enlightenment philosophers (Smith, Condorcet,
Wollstonecraft, Bentham, Marx, John Stuart Mill, for example) took a variety of approaches that
shared a common interest in making comparisons between different ways in which people’s lives
may be led, influenced by institutions but also by people’s actual behavior, social interactions
and other significant determinants” (Sen 2009: xvi).
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are likely to promote their biased interests or make imprudent assessments because they have
internalized and been influenced by corrupting ideologies.289 As Nussbaum states, in applauding
Sen’s contribution to exposing inequalities based on sex: “But utility, Sen argues, is inadequate
to capture the heterogeneity and noncommensurability of the diverse aspects of development.
Because it fails to take account of the fact of adaptive preferences, it also biases the development
process in favor of the status quo, when used as a normative benchmark” (Nussbaum 2003:
34).290
Hence, to overcome these difficulties, the decision-making process must be imbued with
impartiality. For instance, Rawls relied on the original position, to eliminate information that
might bias implicated stakeholders in their deliberation. But the comparative approach offers a
different method for achieving impartiality by focusing on maximally informing (with the
relevant available information) impartial spectators (i.e., actors having no stake in the outcome,
unlike social contract theorists’ implicated stakeholders), instead of decreasing the informational
access of invested parties. As James Konow explains:
The impartial spectator…is not denied any information…Indeed, the spectator is
encouraged to acquire all information that might be relevant to reaching moral decisions,
including possibly from his own experiences and circumstances. Impartiality in this
model is achieved by considering only evaluations of individuals who have no stake in
the situation they are judging. (Konow 2009: 105)291
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As Milton Friedman opined: “There is no objective standard of ‘fairness.’ ‘Fairness’ is strictly
in the eye of the beholder… To a producer or seller, a ‘fair’ price is a high price. To the buyer or
consumer, a ‘fair’ price is a low price. How is the conflict to be adjudicated?” (Friedman 1977
290
Robeyns similarly endorses Sen’s methodological contribution to unveiling inequalities based
on sex. She explains his insight thusly: “Sen argues against a utility-based evaluation of
individual well-being because such an evaluation might hide important dimensions and lead to
misleading interpersonal or intertemporal comparisons. A person may be in a desperate situation
and still be contented with life if she has never known differently. A utilitarian evaluation will
only assess her satisfaction and will not differentiate between a happy, healthy, well-sheltered
person, and an equally happy, but unhealthy and badly sheltered person who has mentally
adapted to her situation” (Robeyns 2003: 63).
291
See Konow’s research empirically testing and confirming the viability of the informed
impartial spectator as a means of eliciting moral consensus and agreement during distributive
decision-making (Konow 2009).
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The existence of truly impartial spectator(s) is a conceptual fiction that is realistically
impossible to actualize because even the most materially indifferent and causally far removed
spectator may nevertheless take an interest in a matter or feel invested in an outcome. As Konow
elucidates: “For example, spectators with no material claim might still interject their interests
into a situation by vicarious identification with the one stakeholder or the others. Even if selfinterest plays no real or imagined role, spectator judgments can be biased by biased information
or biased experiences that impact processing of even complete information” (Konow 2009: 106).
Sen acknowledges that a truly impartial spectator is a conceptual fiction. He nonetheless
argues that the heuristic device offers insights that the idealized contractarian line of reasoning is
unable to accommodate. First, he claims it is “better at dealing with comparative assessment and
not merely identifying a transcendental solution” (Sen 2009: 70). In this way the comparative
approach is able to offer guidance on the actual choices on offer, instead of remaining,
“engrossed in an imagined and implausible world of unbeatable magnificence” or paralyzed by
the “inescapable plurality” of competing justice concerns (Sen 2009: 106).
Furthermore, such an approach is able to take “note of social realizations and not only the
demands of institutions and rules” (Sen 2009: 70). In part, this methodological advantage stems
from the fact that by invoking the ‘impartial spectator’ the comparative approach is able to
consider a diverse set of “distant voices” guided by various types of reasoning and normative
understandings capable of transcending a particular society’s institutional norms (Sen 2009: 108109).
As Sen explains, the use of the ‘impartial spectator’ helps the comparative approach
“avoid parochialism and local perspectives” dominated by the status quo acceptance of resident
rules and regulations (Sen 2009 108-109). Thus, the thought-experiment of the ‘impartial
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spectator’ assists policy makers in opening unforeseen avenues of social improvement by
escaping the indoctrinating effect of en vogue modes of reasoning:
[O]nce the principles [institutions and rules] are formulated in unconstrained terms,
covering inter alia a great many cases other than those that motivated our interest in those
principles, we can run into difficulties that were not foreseen earlier, when we signed up,
as it were, on the dotted line. We then have to decide what has to give and why. Some
may find social choice theory to be too permissive and indecisive…but the alternative,
well illustrated by mainstream theories of justice…of inflexible insistence on exacting
and highly demanding rules does not give the idea of justice its due. (Sen 2009: 207)
Additionally, the use of the ‘impartial spectator’ enables the comparative approach to
permit “incompleteness in social assessment,” while still providing “guidance in important
problems of social justice, including the urgency of removing manifest cases of injustice” (Sen
2009: 70). Essentially, by focusing on preferences on a case-by-case basis, the comparative
approach is able to buildup priority rankings outlining how best to combat injustice, while
remaining tentative and acknowledging that new information and further examination could
result in favoring different decisions (Sen 2009: 107).
Thus, because the comparative approach eschews determining what constitutes ideal
justice and instead focuses on changing the world based on assessing how lives are really like,
the method allows practitioners and theorists to advance justice directly by fighting existing
oppression “like slavery, or the subjugation of women…or protest against systematic medical
neglect…or repudiate the permissibility of torture…or reject the quiet tolerance of chronic
hunger” (Sen 2009: xii). Accordingly, Sen’s analysis (i.e., comparing how individual and groups
are actually fairing) commences in full view of the kinds of challenging circumstances (e.g., our
paradigm cases of ecocide) that Rawls would have excluded from his ideal theorizing.
Nonetheless, at this point, one might ask, what exactly does it mean to compare wellbeing? How is an impartial spectator (or we for that matter) supposed to evaluate the quality of a
human life? Fortunately, in order to answer these questions, Sen has developed a framework for
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making interpersonal and intergroup comparisons, by relying on tracking potential and actual life
achievements. This has been dubbed the capabilities approach.
Sen relies on a fourfold classification schema based on two distinctions for assessing
human advantage. First, he considers the promotion of individual well-being (i.e., objective
flourishing) as distinct from the pursuit of individual agency goals (i.e., any subjective end the
agent is interested in achieving even if it is detrimental or has nothing to do with improving their
objective well-being).292 Second, he considers achievement as distinct from the freedom to
achieve. Thus, as Sen explains, “the two distinctions together yield four different categories of
advantage, related to a person: (1) ‘well-being achievement’, (2) ‘agency achievement’, (3)
‘well-being freedom’, and (4) ‘agency freedom’” (Sen 2003: 35 and 2009: 287).
Essentially, Sen is endorsing the view that policy-makers should rely on evidence
gathered by comparing various segments of the population along these four categories of
advantage to inform social decision-making. He believes the benefit of such a realizationfocused approach is that it provides actual information regarding the feasibility of achieving
alternative social arrangements, in that if certain groups have greater functionings or capabilities,
then it seems within the realm of possibility that comparable social benefits could be achieved by
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A vivid example Sen uses to illustrate the difference between the ‘agency goal versus wellbeing distinction’ is an individual on a hunger strike, who promotes their agency goals (e.g.,
Gandhi fighting for Indian independence) at a great personal sacrifice to their well-being (e.g.,
their health and nourishment) (Sen 2009: 287-290). In this instance, the actor weighs their
agency goals more highly than their personal welfare. Hence, because of these sorts of cases, Sen
recognizes the need to avoid viewing well-being as always more important than personal agency.
Nevertheless, he also recognizes that sometimes agency goals should not take priority over
welfare concerns, in that in some cases the state has a valid interest in promoting well-being over
allowing individuals to engage in objectively harmful, reckless, or negligent activities (e.g.,
cannibalism, drunk driving, vaccinating children, etc.). Essentially, Sen’s distinction between
agency goals and well-being is an attempt to bridge a core tension in liberalism that of balancing
the public interest in collective welfare versus the private interest in self-development. In other
words, the distinction seeks to offer societies insight regarding how to adjudicate the contentious
border of the public-private divide, i.e., between promoting collective well-being versus
individual self-creation (Rodeiro 2018).
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less fortunate segments of society. Sen argues such informational benefits are unavailable to
constructivist approaches (i.e., those focused on identifying the structure of a fully just society)
because even if such a transcendental determination was successful, it would not entail that the
demands of an idealized society could necessarily be realized (Sen 2009: 105).
Moreover, a related reason that Sen defends the realization-based informational focus of
the comparative approach over the transcendental focus of constructivism, is that it readily
allows social theorists to track the advancement or retreat of (in)justice by referring to alterations
in groups’ functionings and capabilities over time (Sen 2009: 8). In other words, Sen argues that
constructivism is unable to offer reliable guidance regarding whether a policy is advancing
justice if it falls short of the ideal.
Accordingly, Sen maintains that the comparative approach’s attention to actual
functionings and capabilities between various segments of the society is vital for discerning how
to feasibly advance justice in non-ideal situations, i.e., the actual world. But before we can begin
applying his schema in order to evaluate the comparative disadvantages caused by ecocide, it
will be helpful to clarify two key concepts in the capabilities approach: functionings and
capabilities.

1. Functionings

“Well-being achievement” and “agency achievement” are both functionings. According
to Sen, “functionings” are the most basic notion in the capabilities approach, “represent[ing]
parts of the state of a person–in particular the various things that he or she manages to do or be in
leading a life” (Sen 1993: 31). The ‘doings or beings’ he includes as functional achievements are
rather broad in that they include basic necessities, like having adequate access to food, water, and
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shelter; to extremely multifaceted types of success, such as receiving social recognition and
developing a sense of self-worth (Sen 1993: 31).
Essentially, functionings include valued achievements. Therefore, it is obvious that the
relative weight of the value of a functioning is both subjectively and culturally relative.
Nonetheless, Sen holds that some functionings are “more basic” than others, insofar as they are
shared widely, both individually and cross-culturally because they play such a central role in
human life; and as such, a just society requires bringing these “crucially important functionings
up to a certain minimally adequate level” (Sen 1993: 41).
Hence, he seems to assume that depriving actors of attaining these “crucially important”
functionings constitutes a grave injustice, which requires amelioration. Nevertheless, Sen has
remained vague and avoided specifying what these “most basic” functionings are and instead
defended the view that such evaluations ought to occur via democratic processes of general
social discussion and public reasoning (Sen 2005: 158). As Robeyns explains: “One important
aspect of Sen’s capability approach is its underspecified character. The capability approach is a
framework of thought, a normative tool, but it is not a fully specified theory that gives us
complete answers to all our normative questions. It is not a mathematical algorithm that
prescribes how to measure inequality or poverty” (Robeyns 2003: 64).
The reason why Sen’s interpretation of the capabilities approach is underdetermined is
that he embraces social choice theory’s perspective that each decision is context specific and
requires actors involved to engage in their own comparative assessment. He embraces this
method over philosophy’s tendency towards universal absolutism, which seeks to establish a
‘one-size-fits-all’ standard applicable in all cases. Sen holds this view essentially due to his
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desire to promote agency, which entails taking actors seriously and affording them the
opportunity to participate and be involved in the evaluative process.293
The pros and cons of Sen’s underdetermined approach will be explored when we
compare it to Nussbaum’s more definitive interpretation, which endorses a specific list of
capabilities that must each be satisfied to a threshold-level or else the society under consideration
will “[fall] short of being a fully just society, whatever its levels of opulence” (Nussbaum 2006:
75). But before moving on to this analysis, it is necessary to specify what constitutes a
capability.

2. Capabilities

According to Sen “capabilities” are the “alternative combinations of beings and doings
[i.e., functionings] the person can achieve” (Sen 1993: 29 and 37). Thus, “well-being freedom”
and “agency freedom” express an actor’s capabilities because, in conjunction, they list all of the
functionings (sometimes called “functioning vectors”) a person can potentially achieve (e.g.,
good health, an exciting career, a loving family, a fulfilling social life, etc.).
As such, a “capabilities set” captures the full permutation of opportunity and potential
(but not actual, achievement) that an actor has in their life. Each capability set includes an
extensive number of functionings (i.e., what the actor actually achieves), but it is through
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Also, he is wary that the act of proffering a list, will itself distort public reasoning and bias
social decision-making. As he states, “It also points to the absurdity of the argument that is
sometimes presented, which claims that the capability approach would be usable – and
‘operational’ – only if it comes with a set of ‘given’ weights on the distinct functionings in some
fixed list of relevant capabilities. The search for given, pre-determined weights is not only
conceptually ungrounded, but it also overlooks the fact that the valuations and weights to be used
may reasonably be influenced by our own continued scrutiny and by the reach of public
discussion” (Sen 2009: 242).
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evaluating an actor’s available capability set that we make determinations about their freedom.
Since even if the actor chooses not to pursue a capability, having the potential to pursue it
indicates freedom, which should be valued. As Sen rhetorically remarks, “if freedom had only
instrumental importance for a person’s well-being, and choice had no intrinsic relevance, then
this [i.e., functionings themselves] could indeed be the appropriate informational focus for the
analysis of capability” (Sen 2009: 236).
Hence, according to Sen, even though functionings are important, capability sets are the
site of policy concern in the capabilities approach. The justification for this stems from the fact
that public policy is effectively unable and normatively should not dictate exactly what people
will actually choose to do in their lives (i.e., because freedom is valuable in-and-of-itself). Public
policy should nonetheless try to ensure that the options available are plentiful, abundant, and
allow actors to lead lives worthy of making choices according to their subjective values. As Sen
explains:

There is also a policy-related question that makes the distinction between capabilities and
achievements important for a different reason…In considering the respective advantages
of responsible adults, it may be appropriate to think that the claims of individuals on the
society may be best seen in terms of freedom to achieve (given by the set of real
opportunities) rather than actual achievements. For example, the importance of having
some kind of a guarantee of basic healthcare is primarily concerned with giving people
the capability to enhance their state of health. If a person has the opportunity for socially
supported healthcare but still decides, with full knowledge, not to make use of that
opportunity, then it could be argued that the deprivation is not as much of a burning
social concern as would be the failure to provide the person with the opportunity for
healthcare. (Sen 2009: 238)
Essentially, the above quote explicates that policy-makers should be less focused on
individuals actualizing certain opportunities and more concerned with ensuring that individuals
have a litany of worthwhile opportunities to choose from. Accordingly, Sen is emphasizing that
the range of choices must include multiple appealing options for a decision to be considered free,
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i.e., freedom requires that the options under consideration are actually choice-worthy.294 If
someone is presented with only a single viable option and a number of objectionable ones, the
opportunity aspect of freedom is violated insofar as the actor’s deliberation in choosing a course
of action is restricted. For instance, if we look at the choice facing the Anangu of either risking
their health and lives to return to their still radioactive ancestral land or abandon their traditional
home to avoid radiation poisoning, we can clearly see that an actor facing this predicament is
unable to make a truly free choice, because neither option is appealing.
However, the problem with focusing on capabilities is that as unrealized potentialities,
capabilities cannot be observed directly. Hence, since only human behavior can be observed
directly, individuals or groups’ capability sets must be supposed and indirectly assessed through
their functionings and a multitude of inferences from the social sciences and common-sense
reasoning.
As such, Sen relies on the relationship between achievement (functionings) and freedom
(capabilities) to assess and improve overall quality of life for persons and groups. With this
conceptual clarification complete, we will now proceed in applying Sen’s evaluative schema to
the harm of ecocide.

B. Applying Sen’s Comparative Approach to Evaluating the Harm of Ecocide

As previously discussed, Sen relies on four broad criteria for exploring how actors and
groups are faring. Hence, to evaluate the harm of ecocide, we must explore how it hinders
individuals and groups’ (1) well-being achievement, (2) agency achievement, (3) well-being
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Sen’s assertion, that a truly free decision requires the decider having a range of worthy
options, mirrors Daniel Dennett’s discussion of “elbow room,” which we applied in the last
chapter to the topic of delineating responsibility.
250

freedom, and (4) agency freedom. Once again, the goal of this analysis is to illustrate how the
comparative approach can offer guidance regarding how to reconcile and repair the harm of
ecocide.

1. Ecocide’s Hindrance to Well-Being Achievement

Surveying our case studies should make it abundantly clear that ecocide undermines
autarkic communities’ well-being achievement (i.e., the ability to act and to be in an objective
state of flourishing). For instance, as we have recounted at length, autarkic actors in ecocidal
situations suffer mental trauma (e.g., post-traumatic stress, depression, addiction, etc.), physical
deprivation (e.g., lack of adequate food, water, and shelter), cultural loss, and even death
resulting from the environmental destruction. And while it is true that the specific goals valued
by an actor or community are relative, the above injuries uncontrovertibly challenge human wellbeing.295
As such, focusing on the reduced well-being achievements of post-ecocide communities
illustrates the degraded and undesirable conditions in which these actors have been placed and
underscores what must improve in order to afford these actors the prospects of a good human
life. Hence, comparing autarkic communities’ well-being achievement before and after ecocide
assists in ascertaining the extent of harm suffered and establishing reasonable baselines for
pursuing corrective justice, i.e., returning impacted actors to their pre-injury level of objective
functioning. Furthermore, comparing impacted citizens well-being achievement to other

295

In order to determine whether a particular achievement rises to the level of an “important
functioning” (i.e., one that if absent challenges actors’ prospects of well-being), depends on
empirical research and ‘common sense’ reasoning confirming that the achievement is one with
widespread cross-cultural and intersubjective appeal.
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segments of the population offers a method for adjudicating how best to prioritize competing
distributive justice claims.296

2. Ecocide’s Hindrance to Well-Being Freedom

Ecocide does not only undermine well-being achievement, it also limits the range of
options available to actors and communities to achieve well-being. For instance, imagine two
actors from autarkic communities that both leave their ancestral home. Actor A made the
decision to depart to pursue the prospects of greater economic opportunity in a more profitable
area of the country (i.e., Actor A is a migrant). Whereas, Actor B was forced abandon their home
because environmental destruction made continued subsistence in the region impossible (i.e.,
Actor B is an ecocide refugee).
In terms of achievement both actors are equally situated having left their ancestral home
– and we can stipulate that each is adapting approximately as well as the other in their new life.
In such a scenario, the actor’s respective well-being achievement is the same.
In terms of freedom, however, there does seem to be a palpable difference between the
two. Case in point, Actor A (the migrant) still has the opportunity to return home and continue
their traditional way of life. Accordingly, such a decision remains an option in the migratory
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It is important, however, to highlight that these sorts of comparisons are not attempting to
compile a complete ranking, but instead are designed to establish minimal thresholds of wellbeing, which, if not met, constitute patent injustices deserving of correction. For instance, if we
look at two impacted communities regarding important functionings (e.g., access to clean air and
water) and discern that one community is significantly worse off than the other, this does not
entail that the community with better conditions is unworthy of assistance. Minimal standards
help in creating helpful boundaries for justifying intervention and determining need, while
allowing practitioners and policy makers to recognize that there may frequently be individuals
and groups worse off than the one under consideration; and yet, such findings do not diminish
the normative importance of assisting both communities, if each fall below agreed upon
threshold(s).
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actor’s capability set. Whereas, for Actor B (the ecocide refugee) the choice to pursue their
traditional way of life is foreclosed, which likely affects their well-being (e.g., increase stress,
sadness, anxiety, and depression) and freedom (i.e., less range of options to choose from).
Hence, the actor’s respective well-being freedom is unequal, in that Actor A has the option of
satisfying their basic needs (i.e., meeting their well-being achievement) in ways unavailable to
Actor B – which remains true, even if Actor A never considers or acts upon the capability.
We can thus see how ecocide undermines actors and communities’ well-being freedom,
in that it limits the range of meaningful capabilities available for them to exercise. Such being
the case, post-ecocide states must aim to preserve and reestablish a wide array of reasonable
options for achieving welfare, i.e., enact policies that allow a maximally diverse set of citizens
and communities to decide how to subsist, flourish, and prosper.
Accordingly, for the sake of expanding well-being freedom, it is important that states
pursing environmental transformative justice carefully consider and avoid enacting reparative or
reconciliatory measures that foreclose viable pathways for aggrieved citizens, and society more
generally, in choosing how to meet their welfare needs. For instance, policies that indefinitely
allocate resources to impacted communities for meeting their basic needs may be problematic
from a well-being freedom perspective, in that such one-dimensional measures could diminish
opportunities for the recipients to (re)achieve self-sufficiency, by creating a situation in which
their well-being achievement becomes exclusively dependent on the state’s allowance, instead of
fostering exploration and development of their own autonomous subsistence practices. It is vital
for post-ecocide states to recognize that environmental transformative justice not only concern
itself with improving citizens and communities’ actual welfare after ecocide (e.g., if they have
adequate food, shelter, water, work, health, education, relationships, etc.), but also consider the
range of opportunities available for satisfying basic needs.
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3. Ecocide’s Hinderance to Agency Achievement

Agency achievement involves actors actually satisfying their subjective ends – the
“beings and doings” actors judge as valuable for their self-development and actualization,
independent of their role in contributing to more objective aspects of human welfare. Obviously,
ecocide directly undermines autarkic citizens’ ability to achieve their aims and express their
values. For instance, our paradigm cases of ecocide involve destruction of sacred sites or entities
(e.g., spirit animals and totem species) which autarkic citizens hold in reverence. These sacred
sites or entities may hold little value to outside observers, and it might be the case that they
provide no resources capable of satiating basic material or cross-culturally accepted needs;
nevertheless, they may still hold great subjective value to certain citizens, in that their destruction
may diminish these individuals’ ability to develop into the type of people they desire to be.
Clearly, a life where agency achievement is impeded is significantly impoverished. But
since agency achievements are subjective, it is difficult for states to know how to promote them.
For this reason, it is paramount that states avoid interfering in people’s lives without their
consent, so as to avoid taking action that may undermine the conditions for their agency
achievement – which sadly was a recommendation ignored in our paradigm cases of ecocide.297
Hence, to avoid limitations of agency achievement, states must allow potentially affected
parties to participate in decision-making processes and endow them with the power to influence
policy.298 For instance, it seems reasonable to speculate that ecocide would have been less likely
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For our purposes, a useful guiding principle would be mandating, that if the potentially
impacted community does not voluntarily consent, then the state must reconsider engaging in or
allowing environmentally destructive activity.
298
Essentially, Sen is incorporating a view defended by deliberative democratic theorists (e.g.,
Joshua Cohen and Jurgen Habermas), that stakeholders need the opportunity to be involved in
254

in our paradigm cases, if states had pursued a public decision-making process that offered
members of potentially impacted autarkic communities a substantive chance to voice their views
and contribute to shaping policy. Protecting agency achievement thus requires that the pursuit of
environmental transformative justice rely on inclusive reparative and reconciliatory measures, as
both an end (in-and-of-itself) and as a means of fostering extensive participation and equitable
distribution of power to all the parties involved.

4. Ecocide’s Hinderance to Agency Freedom

Agency freedom entails actors having a wide range of options available to them
regarding what to value in their lives. As demonstrated, ecocide undermines this because it
destroys distinct ways of life. Each time a community or culture dies an entire way of being (i.e.,
the hopes, dreams, values of a people) is lost with it. Hence, all instances of ecocide that satisfy
our criteria entail diminishment of a society’s collective agency freedom; since, in each case,
members of the impacted autarkic community have undoubtedly been deprived of pursuing many
of their subjective desires (e.g., communing with the same habitat as their ancestors, building
reciprocal relationships with the local flora and fauna, and teaching their practices to future
generations).

open discussions aimed at voicing/hearing concerns and engendering widespread consent. As
Cohen succinctly explains: “The deliberative conception of democracy is organized around an
ideal of political justification. According to this ideal, to justify the exercise of collective
political power is to proceed on the basis of a free public reasoning among equals. A deliberative
democracy institutionalizes this ideal. Not simply a form of politics, democracy, on the
deliberative view, is a framework of social and institutional conditions that facilitates free
discussion among equal citizens—by providing favorable conditions for participation,
association, and expression—and ties the authorization to exercise public power (and the
exercise itself) to such discussion—by establishing a framework ensuring the responsiveness and
accountability of political power to it” (Cohen 1997: 412-413).
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It is thus imperative that post-ecocide states in their quest for environmental
transformative justice strive to prevent further social death. But they must also work towards
increasing awareness and memorialize what has already been lost, since, without preservative
measures, alternative modes of being will disappear forever. Accordingly, steps taken to promote
cultural preservation, awareness raising, and memorialization must aim to inspire present and
future generations to believe that there are a multitude of environmentally friendly modes of
being which they may pursue as a means of finding meaning in their lives.
If an actor’s dreams, hopes, goals, desires, and aspirations are unactionable, then they
cannot be said to be part of their capability set; and thus, are not included as part of their agency
freedom. Expanding agency freedom therefore requires that the actors be afforded practicable
education opportunities and adequate resources: at least enough so that enacting and developing
environmentally friendly practices, institutions, and modes of being is actually feasible.
Due to the lack of environmentally friendly practices in mainstream contemporary
society, one can reasonably argue that effectively pursuing environmental transformative justice
requires post-ecocide states to consider far ranging policy proposals designed to push social
boundaries and transcend the established status quo in their attempts to maintain and expand
agency freedom. The extent of social transformation required will be discussed in the remainder
of the chapter. For now, it will be helpful to analyze Nussbaum’s interpretation of the
capabilities approach, because much of the proceeding discussion of Sen’s work has been rather
vague in offering concrete policy objectives that specify ways the comparative approach can
guide the pursuit of environmental transformative justice.

II.

Nussbaum’s Interpretation of the Capabilities Approach
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As previously discussed, Sen delineates the relevant categories of importance for
comparing individuals’ and groups’ quality of a life as: their well-being, agency, freedom, and
achievement. Nussbaum agrees with Sen regarding the significance of these four factors but
asserts the need to adopt a more definitive list.

A. Nussbaum’s Disagreement with Sen

She identifies a weakness of Sen’s approach, claiming that without a definitive list of
capabilities, the framework will be unable to assist practitioners and theorists in answering a key
question: “Is a society minimally just?” (Nussbaum 2011: 193).299 She maintains that to answer
the question of determining threshold levels of justice requires a definitive list of basic human
capabilities. Thus, without such a list, it is impossible for Sen’s theory to specify what conditions
or states of affairs are patently (un)just. In other words, Nussbaum argues that if Sen’s approach
is going to be able to substantively guide social policy, then it requires endorsing a particular list
of capabilities:
Either a society has a conception of basic justice or it does not. If it has one, we have to
know what its content is, and what opportunities and liberties it takes to be fundamental
entitlements of all citizens. One cannot have a conception of social justice that says,
simply, ‘All citizens are entitled to freedom understood as capability.’ Besides being
wrong and misleading in the ways I have already argued, such a blanket endorsement of
freedom/ capability as goal would be hopelessly vague. It would be impossible to say
whether the society in question was just or unjust. (Nussbaum 2003: 46-47)
Nussbaum claims that Sen’s insistence on refraining from adopting a definitive list of
capabilities rests on two fundamental errors. First, that he is wrong in his view that “freedom” is
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As Nussbaum states: “I shall argue, however, that the capabilities approach will supply
definite and useful guidance…only if we formulate a definite list of the most central capabilities,
even one that is tentative and revisable, using capabilities so defined to elaborate a partial
account of social justice, a set of basic entitlements without which no society can lay claim to
justice.” (Nussbaum 2003: 36)
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an all-purpose political good. Secondly, he erroneously believes that pluralism is incompatible
with adopting a definite list of capabilities.
She argues against Sen’s position that “freedom” is always intrinsically good, claiming it
is mistaken and incoherent because, obviously, “some freedoms limit others” (Nussbaum 2003:
44). For instance: “The freedom of rich people to make large donations to political campaigns
limits the equal worth of the right to vote. The freedom of businesses to pollute the environment
limits the freedom of citizens to enjoy an unpolluted environment” (Nussbaum 2003: 44).300
Furthermore, she claims that Sen is wrong in asserting that respecting cultural pluralism
requires underspecification of capabilities; because, as she explains, such a conclusion rests on
the faulty premise that adopting a definite list of capabilities undermines actors’ ability to be
heard and respected throughout the social decision-making process. In fact, she arrives at the
opposite conclusion, arguing that respecting other cultures and listening to a multitude of
perspectives requires a definitive list of capabilities:
Real respect for pluralism means strong and unwavering protection for religious freedom,
for the freedom of association, for the freedom of speech. If we say that we are for
pluralism, and yet refuse to commit ourselves to the nonnegotiability of these items as
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Nussbaum formalizes this critique, stating, “the very idea of freedom involves the idea of
constraint: for person P is not free to do action A unless other people are prevented from
interfering” (Nussbaum 2011: 148). Furthermore, she argues that not all “freedoms” are good:
“For example, the ‘right’ to have intercourse with one’s wife whether she consents or not has
been understood as a time-honored male prerogative in most societies, and men have greatly
resented the curtailment of liberty that followed from laws against marital rape – one reason why
about half of the states in the US still do not treat nonconsensual intercourse within marriage as
genuine rape, and why many societies the world over still lack laws against it. The freedom to
harass women in the workplace is a tenaciously guarded prerogative of males the world over: the
minute sexual harassment regulations are introduced, one always hears protests invoking the idea
of liberty. Terms like ‘femi-nazis’ are used to suggests that feminists are against freedom for
supporting these policies. And of course, in one sense feminists are indeed insisting on a
restriction of liberty, on the grounds that certain liberties are inimical both to equalities and to
women’s liberties and opportunities” (Nussbaum 2003: 45). She also argues that not all freedoms
are normatively important nor matters of justice, “for example the freedom of motorcyclists to
drive without helmets, a society can say, these freedoms are not very important; they are neither
very bad nor very good” (Nussbaum 2003: 45).
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fundamental building blocks of a just political order, we show that we are really halfhearted about pluralism. (Nussbaum 2003: 48)
It is important to emphasize that Sen and Nussbaum’s theoretical disagreement on these
issues likely stems from their different disciplinary backgrounds. As Robeyns states, “Sen’s roots
lie in the field of social choice, and he therefore believes that we should search for fair and
consistent democratic procedures to draw up the list” (Robeyns 2003: 68-69). Whereas
“Nussbaum has done a lot of work on the philosophy of the good life and, more recently, on
constitutional design, and in this context, it is much more important that a scholar proposes and
defends a fully-fleshed out list of capabilities” (Robeyns 2003: 69).
Due to these disciplinary differences, Sen emphasizes the importance of democratic
deliberation to reach consensus about the relevant capabilities, whereas Nussbaum relies on a
method of Socratic reasoning to establish the basic preconditions required for living a flourishing
human life.301 As she explains, “like Rawls, I view my arguments as essentially Socratic in
character: I appeal to the interlocutor to ponder what is implicit in the notion of human dignity
and a life in accordance with it” (Nussbaum 2011: 160).
Unlike Sen, she maintains that philosophical reasoning, on its own, is capable of
discerning the complete list of capabilities required for leading a life worthy of dignity that
resonates with members of our species the world over. As she states, her method involves
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Nussbaum worries that a wholly democratic approach to social decision-making (what Sen
seems to occasionally endorse) could result in outcomes that sacrifice central capabilities. As she
states: “Suppose a majority of people in India, meeting and deliberating in ways that meet the
moral constraints of the best informed-desire conceptions, desire to replace their pluralistic
constitution by one declaring India a Hindu state…This should not lead us to conclude that equal
freedom of conscience is a negotiable item for a decent pluralistic democracy. We ought to say,
‘What the majority desires here is wrong’” (Nussbaum 2004: 201). Thus, in her account, the
conclusions of philosophical moral reasoning take priority over democratic decision-making
when central capabilities are at stake.
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making “intuitive arguments about what a good outcome is, in the form of an account of a
minimally decent and just society” (Nussbaum 2004: 197).302
Although the debates between Sen and Nussbaum involve vexing theoretical questions, it
appears we can avoid taking a side and instead strive to incorporate insights from each
depending on the topic under examination. For instance, since we are interested in attempting to
respond to ecocide from within a Transitional Justice framework (i.e., a discipline that has long
endorsed constitutional conventions, reform, and amendments as a means of fostering social
transformation to overcome grave injustice – which will be discussed further in the final
chapter), there is a strong justification for employing Nussbaum’s interpretation, which focuses
on fundamental constitutional entitlement.
Therefore, there are prudential reasons for preferring Nussbaum’s account, which
supposedly offers a complete list of capabilities, when considering the constitutional principles
that citizens can demand of post-ecocide states.303 Nevertheless, favoring Nussbaum’s approach
when attempting to provide a list of inalienable capabilities that states must afford their citizenry
is not necessarily a repudiation of Sen’s approach, which may still be the choice method for
evaluating how individuals and groups are faring more generally. In other words, Nussbaum’s
approach can provide the minimum thresholds that states must satisfy to be considered just,
whereas, Sen’s approach can assist in evaluating comparative well-being and justifying social
policy after those minimum thresholds have been met.
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Breena Holland succinctly describes Nussbaum’s method as, “Endeavoring to walk a nuanced
line between ‘informed-desire’ conceptions of the good and intuitive arguments emerging from
empirically informed reasoning about what it means to lead a good human life, Nussbaum
specifies a modest ancillary role for people’s desires and preferences” (Holland 2007: 9).
303
As Robeyns states, “Nussbaum explains her work on capabilities as providing citizens with a
justification and arguments for constitutional principles that citizens have a right to demand from
their government” (Robeyns 2005: 105).
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Ultimately, Nussbaum declares that there are ten Central Human Capabilities (life; bodily
health; bodily integrity; senses, imagination and thought; emotions; practical reason; affiliation;
other species; play; and control over one's environment), which states must afford their citizenry
in order to be just (Nussbaum 2000: 70–77; 2003: 42-43; 2006: 78–81; 2001: 78-81). We will
proceed by showing how ecocidal states often weaken and destabilize Nussbaum’s Central
Human Capabilities.

B. Applying Nussbaum’s List of Central Human Capabilities to Injustice of Ecocide

Once again, the goal of this investigation is to specify key social problems that postecocide societies must overcome in order to be just. However, since many of these capabilities
have already been discussed throughout this work, the present analysis will be brief.
Furthermore, because of the pivotal role ecological conditions play in enabling all ten of the
Central Human Capabilities, much of the analysis may seem rather obvious.
In fact, illuminating scholarship by Holland proposes that “Sustainable Ecological
Capacity” ought to constitute a “meta-capability” to be added to Nussbaum’s list because such a
capacity is necessary for all the other capabilities.304 As Holland states, “functioning ecological
systems create the physical conditions that are necessary for human life, conditions that enable
the very possibility of human life” (Holland 2007: 6).305
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Nussbaum seems receptive to Holland’s proposal, stating, “it is important to develop
anthropocentric positions like Holland’s as effectively as possible” (Nussbaum 2011: 318).
305
Holland goes so far as to argue that “sustainable ecological capacity” is the only metacapability, in that, “unlike social, political, and economic systems, the functioning of ecological
systems is always necessary for the exercise of human capabilities…[since] it is possible to
exercise at least some of the central human functional capabilities outside or independent of
social, political, and economic systems, while it is not possible to exercise the central human
capabilities outside or independent of functioning ecological systems” (Holland 2007: 6).
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Holland’s notion of a “meta-capability” is rather confusing, and it is unclear how
“Sustainable Ecological Capacity” is a capability that is applicable to the “beings and doings” of
humans’ individual lives.306 We can nevertheless, accept a more modest claim that functioning
ecological systems are a prerequisite for achieving central human capabilities, in that these
systems maintain biochemical background conditions necessary for human flourishing. For
instance, functioning ecosystems facilitate food production, waste absorption, and maintaining
the appropriate chemical compositions of air and water, which all humans depend on for
survival.
Thus, it may seem self-evident or redundant to highlight the negative impact
environmental harm has on human wellbeing, since functioning ecological systems are necessary
producers of the conditions that make human life possible. Nevertheless, it is still worthwhile to
conduct the analysis in order to allow the reader to consider the myriad of ways that ecocide can
impede the capabilities of autarkic communities, as well as its injurious role in reducing the
human flourishing of citizens in ecocidal states more generally.
A further justification for discussing the ways in which ecocide undermines all ten of
Nussbaum’s Central Human Capabilities is that such an analysis provides support for Holland’s
conclusion that sustainable ecological capacity is essential for achieving all the capabilities.
Moreover, it is important to validate such a position, in that it allows this dissertation to argue
that preserving and restoring ecological functioning ought to be considered the primary aim of
environmental transformative justice, since ecological functioning produces conditions
supporting all vital capabilities.
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A problem with construing “Sustainable Ecological Capacity” as a capability is that unlike
Nussbaum’s other Central Human Capabilities, which are constitutive of human wellbeing, an
individual can choose to live unsustainably and nevertheless flourish at a personal-level, as
evidenced by the prevalent preference for roving imperialist lifestyles in the modern world.
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1. Life

Nussbaum defines the capacity of “life” as “being able to live to the end of a human life
of normal length; not dying prematurely, or before one's life is so reduced as to be not worth
living” (Nussbaum 2011: 77). While there is no metadata regarding the average life expectancy
of ecocide refugees worldwide (or environmental refugees more generally), there is a relevant
study from Australia documenting how members of displaced indigenous communities are: two
times more likely to die as children; three times more likely to die of avoidable causes; seven
times more likely to die of diabetes; nineteen times more likely to die from rheumatic fever and
rheumatic heart disease, and their life expectancy is ten to fifteen years less than non-displaced
Australian aboriginals (Woodman and Grig 2015: 6). In general, the study showed that over 66%
of displaced indigenous Australians died before 65, compared with under 20% of the general
population dying before 65 (Australian Government 2011).
Furthermore, a Canadian study from the Centre for Suicide Prevention revealed that
indigenous groups who were removed from their land had suicide rates eleven times higher than
the national average, as compared with no suicides in indigenous groups who remained on their
own land (Canadian Centre for Suicide Prevention 2003). Another particularly striking case is
that of the Guarani-Kaiowa indigenous people of southern Brazil, whose suicide rates have risen
34 times above the national average (between 2005 and 2015) as agribusiness displaced them
from their ancestral land via the felling of large areas of rainforest (Hershaw 2016).
Accordingly, these research findings and the examples of ecocide found in our case
studies empirically demonstrate the impact of environmental dislocation on the lives and life
expectancy of former autarkic citizens. As Woodman and Grig state, “forcing development on
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tribal peoples [i.e., autarkic communities] never brings a longer, happier life, but a shorter,
bleaker existence only escaped in death” (Woodman and Grig 2015: 1). Hence, post-ecocide
states must strive to return former autarkic citizens to their pre-harm life expectancy and work
towards making amends for this tragic loss of life.

2. Bodily Health

Nussbaum defines “bodily health” as “being able to have good health, including
reproductive health; to be adequately nourished; to have adequate shelter” (Nussbaum 2011: 77).
Once again, the treatment of the Guarani-Kaiowa in Brazil paints a vivid picture of how ecocide
undermines bodily health. As agribusiness spread throughout the southern region of Brazil over
the past 30 years, the indigenous territory shrunk to such an extent, that currently 12,000
Guarani-Kaiowa are forced to live in a region that used to sustain three hundred members of the
tribe (Woodman and Grig 2015: 14). Furthermore, because of the diminishing access to land and
food, at least 86 Guirani-Kaiowa children have died of malnutrition from 2005-2015 (Hershaw
2016).
Moreover, as we have seen, there is a long history of autarkic communities being placed
on reservations in response to ecocide (e.g., the moving of the Anangu off their ancestral range
to the Yalata reserve). We can thus rely on the ample empirical evidence illustrating how
relocating indigenous communities to reservations results in poor bodily health. For instance, in
the United States, the Office of Minority Health reports that “insufficient access to fresh and
healthy food options continues to be an issue on at least 60 reservations and this grim fact has an
inordinate impact on the long-term health outcomes of those residents” (Olif 2017). Case in
point, in Arizona’s federally recognized Pima reservation, more than half the adults over the age
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of 35 are obese, which is far higher than the 10% rate of obesity of those living a more traditional
lifestyle in the Sierra Madre Mountains of Mexico (Schulz and Chaudhari 2015).
Additionally, by extrapolating from research regarding displaced indigenous peoples
more generally, we can surmise that ecocide refugees face health risks even after attempts have
been made to integrate these populations into the broader society. For instance, the Australian
government’s 2011 report offers an extensive list delineating a myriad of ways displacement and
urbanization harms the bodily health of indigenous citizens: between 2007-2009 urbanized
indigenous Australians were hospitalized for cardiovascular disease at a rate 1.7 times higher
than the general population; urbanized indigenous children (between the ages of 0-4)
experienced respiratory disease at a rate double the general population; 37% of urbanized
indigenous children were obese before turning two years old; the hospitalization rate of
urbanized indigenous children from pneumonia was three times the national average, and
mortality rates for urbanized indigenous adults (age 50-74) were more than double the national
average (Australian Government 2011).
Additionally, with regard to the capability of adequate shelter, half of the documented
cases of homeless children (age 0-4) in Australian were indigenous, even though they only make
up 2.5% of the general population (Australian Government 2011: XI). Accordingly, these
research findings demonstrate many of the ways in which displacement caused by ecocide can
undermine autarkic citizen’s bodily health. These and comparable findings delineate the aspects
of bodily wellbeing post-ecocide states must seek to improve, as well as establish a list of harms
for which victims ought to be compensated.

3. Bodily Integrity
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Nussbaum defines “bodily integrity” as “being able to move freely from place to place; to
be secure against violent assault, including sexual assault and domestic violence; having
opportunities for sexual satisfaction and for choice in matters of reproduction” (Nussbaum 2011:
77). Ecocide undermines bodily integrity in that it prevents autarkic citizens from moving freely
within their ancestral home. Furthermore, as we have emphasized many times, ecocide is often
precipitated by violent removal of the autarkic communities from their habitat (e.g., the Anangu
by the Australian government or the Wayúu and Tabaco villagers by the Colombian
government).
We have yet to mention ways in which ecocide can lead to sexual assault, rape, and
domestic violence. Such a result is likely common. As the 2010 U.N. Report on the State of the
World’s Indigenous Peoples repeatedly expounds, forced relocation often leads to higher rates of
sexual violence. For instance, in the United States, relocated Native American women are 2.5
times more likely to be raped or sexually assaulted than the general population (U.N. 2010).
There are many reasons why ecocide may lead to sexual violence, but it is important to
emphasize that the lack of socio-economic resources, limited educational opportunities, and
pervasive disrespect from the wider society all contribute to placing women from impacted
communities in positions vulnerable to sexual exploitation, trafficking, and prostitution. It is
clear that there are many ways in which ecocide can undermine autarkic citizen’s bodily
integrity. Hence, post-ecocide states must strive to ensure all citizens have control over their
bodies and offer compensation to victims whose right to bodily integrity has been violated.

4. Senses, Imagination, and Thought

Nussbaum defines “senses, imagination, and thought” as:
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[B]eing able to use the senses, to imagine, think, and reason–and to do these things in a
‘truly human’ way, a way informed and cultivated by an adequate education, including,
but by no means limited to, literacy and basic mathematical and scientific training. Being
able to use imagination and thought in connection with experiencing and producing
works and events of one's own choice, religious, literary, musical, and so forth. Being
able to use one's mind in ways protected by guarantees of freedom of expression with
respect to both political and artistic speech, and freedom of religious exercise. Being able
to have pleasurable experiences and to avoid nonbeneficial pain. (Nussbaum 2011: 78)
There are innumerable ways in which ecocide can limit autarkic citizens’ senses,
imagination, and thought. For instance, a key aspect that we have consistently emphasized is
how ecocide subverts one of autarkic citizens’ greatest epistemic assets: their knowledge of how
to sustain themselves within their local habitat, i.e., their habitat learning.
Furthermore, ecocide bars autarkic citizens from producing meaningful “works and
events of their own choosing,” in that the environmental destruction makes it impossible to
engage in many of their cultural, religious, ceremonial, and spiritual practices that are connected,
to and must be performed within, their ancestral land. For instance, just as the Anangu and the
Wayúu associated sacred powers with local mountains, the Mescalero Apache Indians of New
Mexico believe great spiritual forces dwell within the “sacred mountains” and thus their
ceremonial traditions, prayer, and cultural identity are tied to these mountains (Ball 2000).
Numerous religions around the world mention deities residing in “sacred groves” (e.g.,
Hinduism, Buddhism, Shintoism, Jainism, Maausk, etc.), which establishes these locales as
important places of worship and preservation.
Ecocide may also undermine the broader society’s capacity to imagine new modes of
sustainable living, change their relationship with nature, and develop more environmentally
friendly practices and norms, because they will lose the opportunity to witness and learn from
functioning autarkic communities. Essentially, anytime a way of life is lost, ways of perceiving,
imagining, and thinking about the world are lost with it. It is thus clear how environmental
destruction diminishes the capacity of senses, imagination, and thought in ecocidal societies.

267

Accordingly, post-ecocide states must ensure that such harms do not occur moving forward, as
well as foster opportunities for reestablishing (and if not possible, at least memorializing) lost
ways of perceiving, imagining, and thinking about the world.

5. Emotions

Nussbaum defines “emotions” as “being able to have attachments to things and people
outside ourselves; to love those who love and care for us, to grieve at their absence; in general, to
love, to grieve, to experience longing, gratitude, and justified anger. Not having one’s emotional
development blighted by fear and anxiety (supporting this capability means supporting forms of
human association that can be shown to be crucial in their development)” (Nussbaum 2011: 79).
Hopefully, per the discussion in the preceding chapters, it is clear that autarkic
communities place great emotional weight on their relationship with their local habitat (e.g., Nez
Perce viewing the land as their mother or the Karuk and Chinook tribes asserting their identity is
tied to the local salmon).307 Because of these intimate connections, any harm or destruction of
these natural entities will undoubtedly create an emotional void and sense of loss within the
impacted community.308
Furthermore, we have consistently emphasized how the shock, fear, anxiety, and feeling
of impotence accompanying the loss of their homeland will likely impede impacted citizens’
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Glenn Albrecht describes this emotional state as endemophilia: “the particular love of the
locally and regionally distinctive in the people of a place” (Albrecht 2019: 199).
308
For instance, as Kothari explains regarding the threat to the indigenous Sapara people
resisting oil extractivism in the Amazonian region of Ecuador: “The threat is not only physical –
the destruction of the forest and water on which the Sapara depend – though that is real enough.
Perhaps much more insidious, and very difficult for the modern world to understand, is the
violation of the spirit of the Sapara and all the beings they live with, an attack that could kill
them psychologically and emotionally even if they survive physically” (Kothari 2019).
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emotional health and development. As Albrecht states, “The impact of forced relocation of
indigenous people the world over reverberates as a wave of ‘sickness’ through their cultures to
the present day” (Albrecht 2019: 30). Accordingly, it should be evident that ecocide represents a
grave threat to autarkic citizens’ emotional capabilities. The psychic toll caused by
environmental destruction thus constitutes harms that post-ecocide states must seek to prevent
and repair, if they are be considered just.

6. Practical Reason

Nussbaum defines “practical reason” as “being able to form a conception of the good and
to engage in critical reflection about the planning of one’s life (this entails protection for the
liberty of conscience and religious observance)” (Nussbaum 2011: 79). We have discussed at
length throughout our analysis of Rawls how ecocidal states undermine autarkic communities’
conception of the good and disrespects their way of life.
For instance, the fact that, in our paradigm cases of ecocide, the environmental
destruction occurred without the impacted communities’ consent vividly demonstrates the extent
to which ecocidal states disregard autarkic citizens’ practical reasoning, in that these states do
not even afford members of these communities the chance to reflect on and plan their own lives.
Post-ecocide states must therefore strive to overcome these failings by ensuring that their
autarkic citizenry is afforded the opportunity to plan their lives according to their own
conception of the good.
Furthermore, because of growing ecoagnosy (Albrecht’s term describing a state of
environmental ignorance or indifference to ecology), which is both a cause of environmental
destruction and a result of eroding local subsistence practices, citizens will have lessened their
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prudential reasoning abilities with regards to interacting with the natural world.309 As Albrecht
laments: “It is disturbing to think that the current generation may be less ecologically literate,
less ecologically attuned, less ecologically aware, and less ecologically emotional than previous
generations. As a consequence, they may be unable to respond to the enormous risks posed by
ecosystem distress” (Albrecht 2019: 76). Accordingly, ecocide undermines citizens’ practical
reasoning by making them less able to plan eco-friendly futures.

7. Affiliation

Nussbaum emphasizes two distinct aspects of the capability of affiliation. First, the
capability entails that actors are “able to live with and toward others, to recognize and show
concern for other human beings, to engage in various forms of social interaction; to be able to
imagine the situation of another (Protecting this capability means protecting institutions that
constitute and nourish such forms of affiliation, and also protecting the freedom of assembly and
political speech) (Nussbaum 2011: 79). Secondly, it requires actors “having the social bases of
self-respect and nonhumiliation; being able to be treated as a dignified being whose worth is
equal to that of others. This entails provisions of nondiscrimination on the basis of race, sex,
sexual orientation, ethnicity, caste, religion, national origin” (Nussbaum 2011: 79-80).
With regard to the first component, it should seem obvious that ecocide bars autarkic
citizens from engaging in various meaningful forms of social interaction, in that the
environmental destruction makes it impossible to pursue many aspects of their traditional way of
life. Furthermore, since ecocide destabilizes autarkic citizens’ subsistence practices, the impacted
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Such an affliction may even metastasize into topophobia, i.e., “the fear of entering a
biophysical place” (Albrecht 2019: 201).
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actors are often unable to meet their social obligations and provide for themselves and others.310
Essentially, ecocide hinders autarkic citizens’ ability to contribute to their community and lead
meaningful lives with and towards others. Post-ecocide states must therefore end such
mistreatment, by fostering opportunities for autarkic and former-autarkic citizens to be able to
live and work together.
With regard to the second component, we have mentioned ad nauseum the litany of ways
ecocidal states undermine autarkic citizens’ social basis of self-respect. We have seen that
ecocidal states pervasively discriminate against autarkic citizens by engaging in, promoting, and
allowing activity that destroys their way of life. After the multitude of examples discussed, it
should be apparent that ecocidal states do not treat autarkic citizens with adequate dignity or
respect their way of life as equal to that of others. Thus, post-ecocide states must strive to
overcome these legacies of disrespect, by promoting autarkic citizens’ social basis of selfrespect.

8. Other Species

Nussbaum defines the capability of “other species” as “being able to live with concern for
and in relation to animals, plants, and the world of nature” (Nussbaum 2011: 80). Ecocide
obviously ruptures the relationships that autarkic communities have with local animals, plants,
and the ecosystem more generally. Hence, post-ecocide states must seek to provide opportunities
for affected citizens to reestablish or at least memorialize these relationships.
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In Albrechtian terminology ecocide undermines autarkic communities’ sumbiophilia, i.e. their
love of living together with both other humans and multiple other organisms (Albrecht 2019:
200).
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But it is important to emphasize, that while this capability is expressed in anthropocentric
terms (i.e., it pertains to human relationships with animals, plants, and the natural world),
Nussbaum has argued that the sphere of justice ought to be extended to encompass sentient and
agential animals, independent of their connection to humans. As she states, “it seems to me that
the idea of doing injustice to an animal makes sense in much the way that the idea of doing
injustice to a human being makes sense: both can experience pain and harm, and both are
attempting to live and act, projects that can be wrongly thwarted” (Nussbaum 2011: 306).311
Nevertheless, she maintains that for prudential reasons it is wise to focus policy
discussions on human-centered interaction with plants, animals, and the natural world because
there is currently a lack of consensus that “animal capabilities matter for their own sake”
(Nussbaum 2011: 318). Nussbaum’s recognition of the absence of political agreement on the
subject of natural entities’ intrinsic value lends support in justifying this work’s decision to frame
ecocide in purely anthropocentric terms. As Nussbaum states, “since action protecting the
environment is not a matter on which we can afford to wait, it is important to develop
anthropocentric positions” (Nussbaum 2011: 318).312
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Some capabilities scholars have argued that Nussbaum’s expansion of the sphere of justice
should extend beyond sentient and agential animals to include all life and entire ecosystems. For
instance, Katy Fulfer argues, “Whereas Nussbaum focuses on similarities between humans and
nonhuman animals, I focus on our acceptance that justice and dignity emerge out of interactions
with others, and that humans have a great deal of privilege relative to the nonsentient life we
make use of and interact with. We also (at least for the sake of argument) accept that justice
arises in our interactions and relationships with sentient, nonhuman animals. If justice arises in
these relationships, then it seems likely that justice also arises in relationships with nonsentients.
Since we relate to some nonsentient life within ecosystems, we can talk about justice emerging in
those relationships” (Fulfer 2013: 31). In other words, Nussbaum believes the capabilities
approach can justify animal liberation, whereas Fulfer argues it ought to expand to include
environmental ethics (i.e., concern for natural entities, such as ecosystems and species) as a
matter of justice.
312
Essentially, because of the gravity and urgency of our present ecological crisis, we do not
have time to wait for political consensus to coalesce around a broadened conception of justice
that includes the intrinsic value of sentient animals or ecosystems. Hence, while a broadened
conception of justice would have allowed for innumerable more ways of demonstrating the
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9. Play

Nussbaum defines “play” as “being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational activities”
(Nussbaum 2011: 80). It is reasonable to assume that the psychological toll and material
deprivation that ecocide causes in autarkic communities likely limits these citizens’ ability to
play, laugh, and engage in the type of recreational activities that bring them joy.313 Furthermore,
for many citizens (both autarkic and members of the general population), being able to enjoy
recreational activities means playing outside, exploring wilderness areas filled with trees, plants,
animals, and other wildlife, and communing with nature. By destroying natural habitats, ecocide
directly impedes opportunities for play and recreation, i.e., it diminishes availability of
environmental goods and proliferates environmental bads. Justice thus requires that such harms
do not occur in the future and that already impacted citizens are given the chance to return to a
life in which play and laughter are possible once again.

10. Control Over One’s Environment

Nussbaum emphasizes “political” and “material” aspects of the capability of being in
“control over one’s environment” (Nussbaum 2011: 80). With regard to the political component,
she defines the capability as “being able to participate effectively in political choices that govern

injustice of ecocide, it is wise to frame the issue on purely anthropocentric terms. Furthermore,
there is the methodological benefit of advancing an argument that proffers a strong and
provocative conclusion by proceeding from weak and uncontroversial premises that most readers
will accept.
313
Nevertheless, it is important to note that not all citizens have to take part in play or
recreational activities as a matter of justice, but they must all be afforded access to such activities
for a society to be considered just.
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one's life; having the right of political participation, protections of free speech and association”
(Nussbaum 2011: 80). Whereas the material component she defines as “being able to hold
property (both land and movable goods) and having property rights on an equal basis with
others; having the right to seek employment on an equal basis with others; having the freedom
from unwarranted search and seizure. In work, being able to work as a human being, exercising
practical reason and entering into meaningful relationships of mutual recognition with other
workers” (Nussbaum 2011: 80-81).
Of all the capabilities, it seems most straightforward that ecocide violates autarkic
communities’ “control over their environment” in both the political and material sense.
Regarding the political component, since ecocide in our paradigm cases occurred without the
consent of the impacted communities, it is clear that these citizens were not afforded an
opportunity to effectively participate in political choices that effect their lives. Thus, postecocide states must ensure that all citizens are granted full political agency and involvement in
social decision-making processes that may impact their lives.
Furthermore, regarding the material component, these citizens were not granted the
ability to hold property on an equal basis with others, in that outsiders were able to confiscate,
trespass upon, seize, and destroy their land in ways that would never be tolerated, if the autarkic
communities had acted similarly with the private or public property of mainstream society. For
instance, there are countless instances of ecocide refugees being assaulted and killed for trespass
when attempting to return to their ancestral land.314
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A vivid example of ecocide refugees being killed and abused for trying to return their
ancestral way of life is currently unfolding in Brazil, as military police kill and violently assault
“squatters” (indigenous citizens and environmental activists attempting to reestablish subsistence
communities in the Amazon) at the behest of the “new landowners” (Branford and Borges 2019).
As Sue Branford and Thais Borges report, “the Amazon has seen three probable massacres in
twelve days, as violence has exploded in areas of heavy deforestation where the building of large
dams has brought a capital infusion, sent land prices soaring, and invited land speculation by
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Hence, justice requires that impacted citizens are compensated for their material losses
caused by ecocide; which ideally entails returning their ancestral land to its traditional ecosystem
functioning. But if such an outcome is not feasible, then adequate material conditions may be
achieved by providing these citizens with the opportunity to reestablish their community in
similar habitat(s) or by allocating enough material resources to achieve a state in which all their
Central Human Capabilities can be met.315 Furthermore, moving forward, it is imperative that the
victimized citizens’ property rights be afforded the same respect, care, and consideration as those
of any other property holder.
In conclusion, we have seen how Nussbaum’s Central Human Capabilities provide postecocide states with a list of constitutional entitlements that all citizens ought to be afforded. We
have delineated the myriad of harms that post-ecocide societies must seek to reconcile and repair
if victims of ecocide are to receive justice. There still remains, however, the problem of how
environmental transformative justice is supposed to balance competing capability claims when
they come in conflict. Fortunately, Nussbaum’s interpretation of the capabilities approach can
provide helpful guidance on this point.

C. Nussbaum’s Guide to Prioritizing Capability Claims

Nussbaum’s Central Human Capabilities gain their status of being “central” from the fact
that these capabilities are not merely instrumental for a flourishing human life but are

land grabbers, loggers and ranchers” (Branford and Borges 2019). Furthermore, at the time of
writing the Bolsonaro Administration has yet to condemn or comment on the spike in violence.
Sadly, these kinds of violent reprisals are all too common, as Albrecht documents, “in late 2017,
164 people had been murdered, in various parts of the world, as they tried to defend special
places and creatures of this Earth” (Albrecht 2019: 179)
315
Obviously, a problem with such an approach is that it may be argued that habitats are not
interchangeable, that one cannot simply substitute one habitat for another.
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constitutive of such a life. Thus, if the Aristotelean conception of justice is correct, and justice is
related to human flourishing (as Sen and Nussbaum and other comparative scholars presuppose),
then, for a state to be just, it must satisfy all essential human capabilities to a minimum threshold.
As Nussbaum states, violations of these basic capabilities are “a cost of a distinctive sort, one
that in a fully just society no one has to bear” (Nussbaum 2011: 85).
But, as Nussbaum rightly emphasizes, it is not enough to simply provide people with the
necessary components of a flourishing life, it is important that the citizenry know that these
capabilities are secured, meaning they are confident that these capabilities will be protected in
the future (Nussbaum 2011: 96). As Nussbaum states in endorsing recent scholarship by
Jonathan Wolff and Avner De-Shalit, “security about the future is of overwhelming importance
in these people's ability to use and enjoy all the capabilities on the list” (Nussbaum 2011: 97).
Therefore, an important aspect of the capabilities approach is the need for states to instill
a sense of security that the basic capabilities will be enjoyed indefinitely. A common tactic for
achieving this objective is to include the basic capabilities as inalienable entitlements in a written
constitution – in the concluding section of the dissertation we will discuss the importance of
constitutional reform in furthering and achieving environmental transformative justice.
However, as Nussbaum rightly emphasizes, constitutional assurances are meaningless if
states lack mechanisms for citizens to bring claims that their rights have been violated, as well as
mechanisms for adjudicating these claims, and mechanisms for providing redress if these basic
rights have been violated. Nussbaum states, “but a constitution does not enforce itself, and a
constitution contributes to security only in the presence of adequate access to the courts and
justified confidence in the behavior of judges” (Nussbaum 2011: 109). Hence, it is important that
states in the process of pursuing environmental transformative justice enact political, legal, and
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judicial reform to ensure that their socio-political institutions are capable of adequately
protecting and enforcing constitutional entitlements.
But what happens in situations where it is impossible to deliver a threshold amount of
each of the ten capabilities? For instance, in tragic circumstances (i.e., when two or more of the
capabilities codified as basic entitlements in states’ constitutions are unable to be satisfied),
which capabilities should take priority? For Sen, such tragic situations are irreconcilable (Sen
2009). He argues we must leave it up to public reason and democratic processes to decide how to
proceed (Sen 2009). Conversely, Nussbaum thinks that Sen’s endorsement of abdicating
philosophical reasoning in these sorts of tragic situations is misguided; rather it is during these
crises that moral reasoning is most useful and necessary. Hence, she defends the view that it is
possible to rank one tragic state of affairs over another. As she states, “sometimes one choice
may be clearly better than another in a tragic situation, even though all available choices involve
a violation of some sort” (Nussbaum 2011: 86).316
She argues that recent work by Wolff and De-Shalit offers valuable insights for deciding
which outcomes are preferable, i.e., which capabilities ought to be prioritized over others in
tragic situations (Nussbaum 2011: 97). In summary, Wolff and De-Shalit emphasize that, in
deciding how to proceed in tragic situations, practitioners and theorists must consider the
“dynamic clustering” effect of promoting or discouraging a capability, i.e., how gaining or losing
a capability can cause accumulation and reproduction of (dis)advantage (Wolff and De-Shalit
2007). Accordingly, they argue that social policy can benefit from indexing “fertile functionings”
(capabilities that, “spread their good effects over several categories, either directly, or by
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Nussbaum relies on Aeschylus’s play, Seven Against Thebes, to illustrate this point: “For the
tragic hero Eteocles, it was a horrible wrong to choose to kill his brother, even though the
alternative, which involved the destruction of the entire city, was clearly worse” (Nussbaum
2011: 86).
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reducing risk to the other functionings”) and “corrosive disadvantages” (capabilities that, “have
negative effects on other functionings”) (Wolff and De-Shalit 2007: 121-122).317
Nussbaum endorses Wolff and De-Shalit’s conclusion, arguing that when two or more
capabilities cannot be satisfied, we ought to prioritize capabilities that promote “fertile
functionings” and discourage state of affairs that generate “corrosive disadvantages” (Nussbaum
2011: 98-100).318 For instance, imagine two proposed responses to ecocide: (A) provide ecocide
refugees with guaranteed basic income, so that they can purchase all their basic needs (food,
shelter, healthcare, etc.) or (B) provide ecocide refugees the chance to reestablish their traditional
subsistence practices by restoring (assuming that the degraded habitat can be restored) ecosystem
functioning in the degraded habitat (we can stipulate that each project costs the same amount of
social resources, but that there are currently insufficient social resources to enact both policies
simultaneously).
Option A seems likely to generate a multitude of “corrosive disadvantages” because
while ecocide refugees living in such conditions would have enough social resources to satisfy
their basic needs, they nevertheless would lack important aspects of control over their lives. In
Sen’s terminology, their well-being freedom would be compromised. For instance, by keeping
these citizens in alien environments (i.e., settings of which they have a limited understanding and
in which they have a precarious lack of meaningful social relations), they are likely to lead
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Nussbaum criticizes Wolff and De-Shalit for causing conceptual confusion by dubbing the
term “fertile functionings,” since the concept is more readily applied to “capabilities” instead of
“functionings” (Nussbaum 2011: 98) As she jests, “I fear that alliteration has superseded
theoretical clarity” (Nussbaum 2011: 98).
318
Obviously, it will often be an empirical matter regarding which outcomes promote “fertile
functioning” or “corrosive disadvantages” (Wolff and Deshalit 2007). Thus, it is important to
build up a body of empirical evidence by repeatedly employing and documenting the success or
failure of various environmental transformative justice mechanisms. Accordingly, the more
attempts at achieving environmental transformative justice are pursued, the more well-informed
practitioners will be in making decisions, and thus the better they will be at promoting the
desired outcomes of environmental transformative justice.
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isolated and unfulfilled lives. Furthermore, because it is likely the case that these citizens will be
unable to integrate and participate in the broader society, they will thus have limited opportunity
and capacity for influencing social decisions, which in itself poses a risk for their wellbeing. As
Michael Marmot explains in his book, Status Syndrome, “autonomy and social participation are
so important for health that their lack leads to deterioration in health” (Marmot 2004: 248).
Option B, on the other hand, seems designed to promote a greater convergence of
advantageous capabilities. For instance, returning ecocide refugees to a functioning ecosystem
will provide them the opportunity to reestablish self-sufficient subsistence practices, which will
endow them with greater control over their lives and life prospects, allow them to escape
conditions in which they exist at the periphery or bottom of the social hierarchy, and foster
feelings of satisfaction and contentment because they recognize that their life outcomes and
achievements are in their own hands.
Thus, we can see how focusing on promoting “fertile functioning” and avoiding
“corrosive disadvantages” can lead to better social policy. Interestingly, if we accept Holland’s
conclusion (that sustainable ecological capacity is fundamental to all other capabilities), then
restoring autarkic communities’ habitat to its traditional ecosystem functioning is a “fertile
functioning” that promotes all the capabilities on the list.
Essentially, if Holland’s conclusion is correct (which seems reasonable, particularly after
demonstrating that ecocide undermines all ten of Nussbaum’s Central Human Capabilities), then
protecting and restoring sustainable ecological capacity (at least up to the point where the
ecological systems have the capacity to sustain the conditions enabling the threshold level of
Nussbaum’s Central Human Capabilities) is the most fundamental aspect of achieving a just
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society – in that without such a minimum level of ecological functioning, no other capability is
possible.319
Such an insight lends support to our position that the discipline of Transitional Justice
would benefit from including environmental considerations as relevant matters of concern. If
sustaining ecological capacity is a necessary meta-component of just societies, then focusing on
underlying and ongoing environmental issues will assist the discipline in its aim of creating just
societies in the wake of grave political wrongs. To this end, the concluding sections of this work
will investigate how Transitional Justice mechanisms can work to promote positive
environmental outcomes when responding to the injustice of ecocide.
Before moving on to explore the ways in which Transitional Justice mechanisms can
further the aims of environmentalism, it is helpful to summarize the ground gained in the two
most recent chapters. The last chapter employed a constructivist approach to determine the ideal
principles of environmental transformative justice and diagnosed why ecocide is impermissible
in “well ordered” and just societies. Whereas, the first half of the current chapter applied a
comparative approach to establish how to proceed when enacting environmental transformative
justice measures, i.e., offer advice for how best to deal with competing justice concerns in postecocide settings.
The constructivist approach determined that environmental transformative justice
requires post-ecocide states to pursue four principle aims: (1) adopt sustainable environmental
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In fact, if we adopt Holland’s perspective when attempting to determine how best to
overcome the injustice of ecocide, then it seems clear that allocating social resources to
ecosystem preservation and restoration are more effective than other policy proposal functioning
(e.g., forcibly integrating ecocide refugees into the broader society, increasing welfare allocation
to ensure ecocide refugees basic needs are met). The reason for this stems from Holland’s view
that sustainable ecosystem functioning positively effects all other vital capabilities; and as such,
ecosystem preservation and restoration projects would most dynamically generate advantageous
outcomes. In other words, protective and restorative environmentalist policies would have the
greatest potential for clustering capabilities that promote and constitute human flourishing.
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practices – so long as such practices do not violate Rawls’s traditional principles of justice;320 (2)
respect multiple ecological-economic systems and cultures – so long as they do not violate (1);
(3) acknowledge and repair past wrongs, and (4) work to restore or construct impacted
ecosystems and communities (restoration ought to be preferred to construction, if possible – if
neither is possible greater emphasis must be placed on victims’ reparative compensation in [3]).
However, the constructivist analysis offered little guidance in determining how to
proceed in combatting the injustice of ecocide in the actual world. Hence, even after establishing
the above ideals, practitioners attempting to enact environmental transformative justice would
still face application problems, in that it is unclear how to proceed when the principles come into
conflict. The goal of applying the comparative approach was thus to provide direction regarding
how to balance the diverse requirements of environmental transformative justice, i.e., to specify
what outcomes should be prioritized when responding to ecocide.
To this end, this section first argued that environmental transformative justice should
proceed in such a way as to promote vital human capabilities (Nussbaum’s list of Central Human
Capabilities) over other social interests (e.g., economic growth and producing non-vital luxury
goods). Second, it defended the view that when these central capabilities come in conflict,
practitioners should prioritize capabilities that generate the greatest clustering (i.e., accumulation
and reproduction) of advantage. Pursuant to these parameters, the chapter ultimately argued that
preserving and restoring sustainable ecological functioning is of utmost significance for
achieving environmental transformative justice, in that such processes produce conditions on
which all other capabilities depend.
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The traditional Rawlsian constructivists principles are: (1) respect basic liberties of all
citizens; (2) respect fair equality of opportunity of all citizens; (3) prioritize the wellbeing of the
least advantaged, pursuant to the difference principle, and (4) promote the wellbeing of future
generations, pursuant to the just saving principle.
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At this point, the dissertation has offered a full account of environmental transformative
justice, in that it has specified the context in which it is operative (i.e., after ecocide), determined
its ideal aims (i.e., the insights of the constructivist approach), offered guidance on how to
pursue these aims (i.e., the insights of the comparative approach), and specified actors’
responsibilities for pursuing these aims (i.e., developed a notion of common but differentiated
responsibility, by applying Young’s two-tiered model of responsibility to ecocide). The
concluding section seeks to further support our assertion that environmental transformative
justice ought to be pursued from within a Transitional Justice framework, by demonstrating ways
in which Transitional Justice mechanisms (e.g., criminal tribunals, truth commissions, public
apologies, pardons, lustration, memorialization, reparations, and constitutional conventions) can
assist in furthering environmental aims (i.e., promoting ecological sustainability, preservation,
and restoration).

III.

Transitional Justice Mechanisms and Environmental Benefits

This project has sought to illustrate how certain instances of environmental destruction
(i.e., ones originating from direct, indirect, or negligent state actors and resulting in the social
death of non-consenting groups) fall within the purview of Transitional Justice (see 66-77). But
we have yet to explain the benefits of employing a Transitional Justice framework in responding
to these environmental injustices. The concluding section will thus demonstrate the ways in
which Transitional Justice mechanisms can assist post-ecocide societies in coming to terms with
the injustice of ecocide, i.e., enacting environmental transformative justice.321
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For an overview regarding the distinction between Transitional Justice and environmental
transformative justice (see 1).
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There is abundant literature canvassing the ways in which Transitional Justice
mechanisms balance the competing goals of ending hostilities, promoting social stability,
increasing democracy, dispensing punitive justice to perpetrators, providing reparations to
victims, establishing the rule of law, memorializing the past, seeking the truth, and transforming
social structures in transitional settings.322 We will therefore avoid rehashing arguments that
have been thoroughly discussed elsewhere and instead focus specifically on the ways in which
Transitional Justice mechanisms can further environmentalist ends (including habitat
preservation, environmental restoration, and ecological sustainability) when implemented in
service of justly responding to our paradigmatic and idealized cases of ecocide.323
This novel analysis will attempt to provide Transitional Justice practitioners insights
regarding the role played by policies to restore or sustain ecological functioning in the promotion
of human rights, social transformation, and the diminishment of social suffering.324 However,
these insights have broad applicability and should not be limited to cases of ecocide, since, as
illustrated in previous sections, the maintenance, preservation, and restoration of ecological
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See the International Journal of Transitional Justice that has numerous articles on all of these
topics.
323
As such, the analysis in this section offers a final justification for linking environmentalism to
Transitional Justice.
324
David Ong’s article, “Prospects for Transitional Environmental Justice in Socio-Economic
Reconstruction of Kosovo” provides a thorough discussion of the role that environmental justice
can play in overcoming human rights violations in Transitional settings (Ong 2017). As Ong
explains, the potential for transitional environmental justice to become a key component of
Transitional Justice more generally, stems from its ability to: “[A]ct as a means for conceptually
recasting otherwise inextricable social conflicts in more nuanced terms, such that these
underlying conflicts can be more practically mediated and eventually reconciled, even if never
fully resolved. Second, as economic development generally, and socioeconomic reconstruction
in particular, is now seen as a vital element for the rejuvenation of societies in transition and is
thus increasingly included within the conceptualization of ‘transitional justice,’ ‘transitional
environmental justice’ can play a significant role in ensuring that an otherwise unremitting and
unmitigated focus on economic reconstruction does not result in uneven levels of development
that either entrench old ethnic and social divisions or create new socioeconomic ones within
already fragile transitional societies” (Ong 2017: 272).
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functioning can further central human capabilities, which is an important objective in any
transitional setting.
To structure the analysis, we will divide the Transitional Justice mechanisms into four
broad categories for repairing and reconciling grave historical injustices:325 (1) punitive justice
mechanisms designed to bring perpetrators of mass atrocities to justice and to punish them for
the crimes committed (e.g., criminal trials, lustration, sanctions, etc.); (2) reparative justice
mechanisms designed to redress victims of atrocities for harms suffered, individually and
collectively, in both material and symbolic ways (e.g., reparations, rehabilitation,
memorialization, apologies, guarantees of non-repetition, etc.); (3) truth-oriented mechanisms
designed to allow the society to have a full accounting and documentation of what occurred and
why by investigating who suffered and how they were harmed, scrutinizing who committed the
atrocities and how they benefited, and determining the root causes and structures that led to the
injustice (e.g., truth and reconciliation commissions, reports, education programs, etc.), and (4)
institutional reform mechanisms designed to transform public institutions and the structure of
society in order to prevent such atrocities from occurring again and enable society to move
forward into a brighter future (e.g., change laws, amend constitutions, modify institutions,
etc.).326
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It is helpful to recognize that these mechanisms can serve multiple purposes. For instance,
truth and reconciliation commissions can further the truth-seeking mission by gathering
testimony from victims and perpetrators, but it can also play a role in the punitive process by
offering the public a chance to admonish perpetrators; as well as promote rehabilitation by
providing victims an opportunity to reclaim some of their agency through publicly airing their
grievances, and it can even further institutional reform by documenting the social institutions that
are in need of restructuring because of the role they played in facilitating atrocities.
326
This four-part categorization of Transitional Justice processes is fairly standard in the
international community, as evinced by the fact that it is endorsed by the United Nations Office
of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the United Nations Peacebuilding
Commission, and the United States Department of State Transitional Justice Initiative.
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But before we begin theorizing how these mechanisms designed to repair and reconcile
grave injustice can further environmental objectives, it is important to emphasize that we are not
offering a comprehensive guideline or recipe for balancing the various and sometimes conflicting
goals of Transitional Justice in post-ecocide states.327 Every case of ecocide is different and, as
such, will each require measures and strategies that fit the specific cultural, economic, political,
legal, and environmental context.
In order to effectively deal with the context-specific nature of each harm, it is imperative
that the transitional process include the participation, involvement, and consultation of local
actors regarding how best to proceed. In other words, successfully responding to ecocide requires
seriously engaging with the needs, aspirations, and goals of the impacted communities as a
means of ensuring stakeholder ownership of the environmental transformative justice process.
But as we will subsequently discuss, this may prove difficult in cases in which none of the
victims remains (i.e., the ecocide was so severe that the impacted community has effectively
disappeared).
Additionally, it is key to regard environmental transformative justice as a dynamic
process, in that decisions made and policies enacted will impact the range of future options
available, influence the efficacy of other decisions, and dictate the need for further involvement.
In other words, an adequate response must be iterative and flexible, since any policy decision
will influence other issues and generate unintended consequences in the treatment of the original
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Transitional Justice scholars have struggled with the prospects of determining a universally
applicable rubric for pursuing justice in transitional settings since the discipline’s conception. As
Colleen Murphy explains a central difficulty for theorizing such an account, is that: “The
appropriate way to conceptualize the relationship between the fundamentally forward-looking
aim of transformation and the fundamentally backward-looking claims entailed by wrongdoing is
not immediately obvious” (Murphy 2017: 112).
285

problem, i.e., there is constant and continuous feedback between problem/solution and
values/objectives.
Finally, to note: As a first foray into hypothesizing the environmental-upshot of
traditional Transitional Justice mechanisms, this theorizing begins as tentative and speculative
due to the lack of empirical evidence from real-world cases to aid in the assessment of the impact
of implementing such measures. With these caveats in mind, we can now proceed to considering
the ways in which conventional Transitional Justice mechanisms may promote habitat
preservation, environmental restoration, and ecological sustainability.

A. Punitive Justice Mechanisms

The need for punitive justice in transitional settings is commonly justified for various
reasons: as means of retribution (i.e., re-balancing the moral scales by treating perpetrators
harshly); as a means of deterrence (i.e., discouraging behavior by instilling fear that the
consequences will be detrimental if the act is performed); as means of imparting a pedagogical
effect on society (i.e., expressing that through harsh treatment of perpetrators that certain actions
will no longer be tolerated); as a socio-political means of upholding victims’ rights (i.e., enacting
punishment on behalf of victims), and as means of signaling a break from the past (i.e.,
repudiating the injustices of the prior regime and enacting punishment, which afford the new
state an opportunity to (re)establish the rule of law and strengthen civil society). In post-ecocide
states, punishment of perpetrators can serve all of these purposes. But at present we are
interested in theorizing how these punitive measures can further environmental aims in
particular.
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One of the central punitive mechanisms employed by Transitional Justice is the use of
trials and criminal punishment.328 Trials focus on specific wrongs that implicate individual
perpetrators. They involve gathering evidence to prove that perpetrators are responsible for
wrongs and hold the offenders accountable through rendering verdicts and sentencing the
wrongdoers to punishment.
Such juridical processes potentially offer many environmental benefits for responding to
instances of ecocide. For one, trials provide an opportunity to gain information and establish a
public record concerning the harm to the ecosystem (e.g., what species were lost, the scope and
scale of the damage, how the local communities were impacted, etc.). The environmental
evidence gathered in the course of fact-finding and litigating the criminal cases may unearth a
rich set of biological, ecological, and anthropological information that might never have been
discovered, documented, and publicized, absent the legal proceedings. This data could prove
invaluable in planning how to preserve comparable ecosystems, or it might provide insight on
guidelines for restoring the affected habitat.
But beyond the prospects of gleaning relevant environmental information, criminal trials
and punishment can assist environmental causes by incarcerating or socially isolating actors
proven to have little respect for nature, thereby restricting their ability to detrimentally engage
with the natural world. The legal punishment of ecocidal actors can furthermore function as a
deterrent and pedagogical tool to express to the wider society that wanton disregard for the
ecological health of habitats which communities rely on for their survival will no longer be
tolerated.
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Famous examples of criminal trials in transitional settings include: the Nuremberg and Tokyo
Trials after WWII; the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and
Rwanda (ICTR), and cases against Uganda, Congo, and the Central African Republic brought in
front of the International Criminal Court (ICC).
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There is, however, a limitation on individual criminal trials in that they focus on specific
individuals. As discussed, the cases of ecocidal harm we are considering are unlikely to have
been caused by rogue actors (see 136-138), instead we are predominantly concerned with
instances of collective action that implicate large swaths of the society. Therefore, while criminal
trials and punishment are well-suited for holding the authors of injustice (i.e., decision-makers
who craft, determine, and execute policies (see 140-142)) answerable, they fail to take in to
account the collective nature of the wrongs we are considering.
As seen in our case-studies, the ecocidal acts were often legal when undertaken,
presenting another difficulty in the use of trials. If the laws were not already on record, then it
seems unjust to hold actors accountable for ‘crimes’ that were not illegal at the time of their
commission. Since as Murphy explains, “a basic premise of all theories of criminal punishment,
both the utilitarian and retributive kind, is that punishment should not be ex post facto” (Murphy
2017: 91).329
The worry is that if post-ecocide states pursue criminal trials and punishment pursuant to
laws that were not on record, then it is likely those prosecuted will accuse the state of ex post
facto application of law, which may undermine the perceived legitimacy of the proceedings and
hinder the transition.330 Fortunately, Transitional Justice has employed putative measures that
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The problem with ex post facto prosecution is that it breaches the assurance of prospectivity
that undergirds the rule of law, which Transitional States are striving to (re)establish. As Lon
Fuller explains, rule by law is when the, “government says to citizens in effect, ‘These are the
rules we expect you to follow. If you follow them, you have our assurance that they are the rules
that will be applied to your conduct.’” (Fuller 1964: 40). However, occasionally in transitional
settings retroactive laws have been employed, e.g., the French, Danish, and Dutch used newly
enacted laws with no prior precedent to punish Nazi collaborators (Posner and Vermeule 2003:
791).
330
Also, if ecocide came to be respected as the 5th Crime Against Peace throughout the world
(precisely what this work is arguing should happen), it might weaken concerns over ex post facto
legitimacy (even in states that had not ratified the ICC or incorporated such legislation
domestically), because such prosecution might become internationally accepted as an appeal to
higher preexisting or natural law.
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may evade these worries and prove effective at holding the state’s decision-making apparatus to
account.
For example, lustration (i.e., the mass disqualification of those associated or complicit
with the wrongdoing from accessing certain public spheres positions).331 Lustration is able to
avoid some of the legitimacy issues posed by ex post facto application of the law because such
measures are not necessarily linked to criminal proceedings, in that the termination can be
framed as an employment decision.
Basically, the state can rationalize removing agents from relevant civil service and
political positions by arguing that these agents failed to live up to their duty of care and civic
responsibility when directing, sanctioning, and permitting ecocidal acts to occur. Additionally,
lustration has the potential to better express the collective aspects of the wrong in that it could
shutdown entire agencies (e.g., the environmental protection agency) or remove large swaths of
agents (e.g., managers of the department of the interior) from positions that might not have been
directly involved with the commission of the harm, but who nevertheless helped establish the
background conditions and social context that made ecocidal activity possible. Essentially,
lustration offers a way of holding state actors to account who are not guilty of ecocide per the
‘liability model’ but are responsible per the ‘social connection model’ (see 142-149).
Lustration can serve environmental objectives in a way comparable to criminal trials by
removing actors who failed to protect and preserve important ecosystems. Furthermore, it signals
to the wider society that the state takes seriously the importance of preserving the ecological
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The term ‘lustrate’ historically meant to, “purify ceremonially as a means of removing bloodguiltiness and cleansing a house,” as such it has consistently been concerned with coming to
terms with the past” (Cepl 1997: 230). But it became a more commonly recognized politicalcontrivance after the widespread purge of government officials that occurred during the
Revolutions of 1989 in Central and Eastern Europe, which resulted in the end of communist rule
in the Eastern Bloc -- see Natalia Letki for a thorough analysis of the role that lustration played
in democratizing Eastern and Central Europe (Letki 2002).
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health of habitats that communities rely on for their survival.332 One worry is that while the
mechanism is fitting for holding civil servants, political/public agents, and state actors to
account, it is ill-suited to displace private citizens from positions in private entities (e.g.,
corporate executives, partners of firms, and sole proprietors of private businesses) without
triggering the same ex post facto legal concerns at issue in criminal proceedings.
A prospective punitive mechanism allowing post-ecocide states to target private actors
and entities could be civil suits designed to dispossess perpetrators of the ill-gotten gains
received in the commission of ecocidal activity.333 For instance, the state could assist victims in
bringing tort claims (e.g., negligence, recklessness, wanton conduct, trespass, etc.) targeting
profits generated by corporate involvement in ecocidal activity. The benefit of employing civil
suits is that such claims can avoid ex post facto legitimacy issues because at least in the common
law tradition, ex post facto concerns are limited to criminal statutory law.334
Alternatively, the state could pursue fines and legal takings (i.e., confiscation of ill-gotten
assets), but such measures are once again more likely than civil suits to trigger ex post facto
legitimacy concerns if the initial acquisition and profit occurred legally. However, the benefit of
such an approach is that states can explicitly mandate the return of specific property (i.e., the
land or property an impacted community was forced to abandon), which may present a more
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Adjudicating which habitats satisfy this criterion would be an important component of further
environmental justice scholarship and practices.
333
For instance, in 1998-1999 Holocaust survivors settled civil suits against Volkswagen AG,
Siemens AG, Bayerische Motoren Werke AG, Daimler Benz AG, Leica Camera AG and I.G.
Farben AG for $5 billion dollars to be paid to the 1.2 million survivors because the companies
had forced them to work as slave laborers during the war (Buggeln 2014).
334
For example, in the United States: “Courts consistently find that since statutes are civil in
nature the Ex Post Facto Clause is not applicable…The standard retort to the laments of
unjustified punishment is that the Ex Post Facto Clause applies only in a criminal context and
therefore places no restriction on these civil legislative acts” (Aiken 1992: 324).
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straightforward remedy to the problem than the monetary damages likely awarded in civil
cases.335
Nevertheless, dispossessing private actors of ill-gotten gains through civil trials, fines, or
takings would undoubtedly further comparable epistemic aims as criminal trials because it would
require discerning who benefited from ecocide and in what ways. Furthermore, extracting funds
from actors who have demonstrated a propensity to exploit natural resources would weaken their
ability to finance other ecocidal projects. Additionally, dispossession would provide similar
pedagogical effect as criminal trials, punishment, and lustration, in that it too would signal to the
wider society that the state no longer tolerates the destruction of habitats that communities rely
on for their survival. Finally, the procured funds could be utilized to finance environmental
projects, such as conserving comparable ecosystems or working to restore the harmed ecosystem
to its prior functioning.
Any punitive measure post-ecocide states may undertake will require imposing a loss of
liberty on those responsible for the harm. Thus, for punitive measures to be effective, it is
important that the harsh treatment reflects the perpetrator’s culpability and is proportional to the
gravity of the harm. It is furthermore imperative that the state be mindful of not overreaching in
the distribution of harsh treatment. For if too many citizens are censured, then the general
population may turn against the transitional process before it is complete or, even worse, trigger
a backlash against these policies, which may lead to further environmental destruction and the
entrenchment of anti-environmentalist sentiments. With these caveats in mind, we can now move
on to discussing reparative justice mechanisms.
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For instance, Germany had to return the artwork and cultural artifacts the Nazi’s had
plundered in their attempt to create a super museum to reflect Hitler’s personal tastes and
supposedly glorify the Aryan race (Nicholas 1994: 10-11). More recently after the Persian Gulf
War the U.N. Security Council forced the Iraqi government to return the cultural property they
had looted in their invasion of Kuwait (Sandholtz 2008: 122-123).
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B. Reparative Justice Mechanisms

The need for reparative justice in transitional settings is commonly justified on various
grounds: as a material and moral corrective (i.e., a process of re-balancing the material and moral
scales by assisting victims); as a means of rehabilitation (i.e., restoring victims’ sense of agency,
self-respect, and other capabilities necessary for purposeful self-development); as means of
imparting a pedagogical effect on society (i.e., fostering social recognition that victims are equal
citizens deserving of respect and moral consideration as members of the political community); as
a means of overcoming pervasive structural inequality (i.e., providing aid and support - both
material and psychological - to ensure that victims’ life prospects are comparable to the rest of
society), and as means of acknowledging the past (i.e., memorializing the injustice and its impact
on the victims to preserve public memory, raise awareness of past abuses, apologize, mark a
break from the past, and help prevent reoccurrence). In post-ecocide states, repairing the harms
done to victims can serve all of these functions. But at present we are interested in theorizing
how these reparative measures can further environmental aims in particular.
For simplicity’s sake, we will divide the Transitional Justice reparative mechanisms into
two main categories: direct reparation (i.e., material compensation to those who have been
wronged) and symbolic memorialization (i.e., processes designed to change victims’ and
societies’ relationship with past wrongs). Reparative justice measures may include a mix of
material and symbolic benefits to individuals and groups of victims, but we are drawing the
distinction based on the measure’s central aspiration. For instance, if a group that has suffered
grave human rights violations receives a small sum from the state that is nowhere near
commensurate to the harm experienced or the material losses the community endured, then this
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compensation ought to be viewed as an act of symbolic memorialization in that the allotment
was intended as a public acknowledgement and apology for past injustice; whereas, if the
intention behind the payment was to meaningfully assist victims in materially rebuilding their
lives, then it would constitute a direct reparation (even if the payment proves inadequate for such
purposes).
In view of this distinction, we will begin by analyzing the many potential environmental
benefits of enacting direct reparations. To achieve this aim, we will further subdivide direct
reparations into three categories: (1) financial restitution (i.e., monetary payments aimed at
making victims whole);336 (2) “in-kind” compensation (i.e., restoring and returning specific
entities or objects that victims lost),337 and (3) rehabilitative service 338(i.e., support to assist
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Examples of financial reimbursement in transitional settings include: Morocco providing
financial restitution totaling over $100 million dollars to more than 5,000 victims of forced
disappearances and arbitrary detention from the “Years of Lead” (i.e., the period between 19601990 that saw mass political repression and human rights violations) (Morocco’s Equity and
Reconciliation Commission Report 2006); beginning in 1991 Argentina began offering financial
restitution in bonds worth between $220,000 and $256,000 dollars for 7,000 victims of persons
disappeared in the “Dirty War” (i.e., the period from 1975 to 1983 when the military junta ruled
the country and terrorized and political dissidents) (Wilson 2005: 788), and Germany in 2000
began offering financial restitution to those forced into slave labor during the Holocaust, which
has amounted to close to $5 billion dollars paid to over 1.6 millions victims worldwide (Reiter
2019).
337
Examples of “in-kind” compensation in transitional settings include: South Africa’s Land
Restoration Act of 1994, which compensated victims of apartheid with a right to their land
disposed after 1913 as a result of racially discriminatory laws or social practices (Atuahene 2010:
79-80); Australia’s Aboriginal Land Rights Act of 1976, which allowed aboriginal communities
to file for collective property claims for lands stolen during British conquest and colonization
(Atuahene 2010: 80), or when German authorities in 2013 discovered a collection of over 1,500
pieces of Nazi-stolen art valued at $1.35 billion dollars (including works by Picasso, Matisse,
Renoir, and Chagall) that they vowed to catalog and return to the rightful heirs (Klein 2013).
338
Vivid examples of rehabilitative service in transitional settings include: “The Historical
Reparation Fund for the Location and Restitution of Children Kidnapped or Born in Captivity of
1999,” which offered the Grandmothers of Plaza de Mayo a basic income guarantee of $25,000
dollars a month to provide these women with time and resources necessary to searching for and
recovering disappeared children still missing from Argentina’s “Dirty War” (Lois and Lacabe
1999); the Inter-American Court’s ruling in the case of Plan de Sánchez Massacre v. Guatemala,
which ordered Guatemala to implement development programs related to the enjoyment of
economic, social and cultural rights (e.g., constructing sewers, supplying intercultural teachers,
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victims in overcoming impediments resulting from past injustice). For instance, the British
government in 1995 paid the Anangu peoples $13.5 million dollars as compensation for the loss
of their land at Maralinga, such payment constitutes financial restitution (Korff 2017). But the
state also assisted a few survivors (only five to be exact) by providing them medical care to treat
their illnesses caused by exposure to radiation, which constitutes as a rehabilitative service
(Korff 2017). Additionally, in 2009 the Australian government returned most of Maralinga to the
Anangu as a place safe to “walk, build, camp, and hunt” and by 2014 the state had returned all of
the land including the weapons testing range, such acts constitute “in-kind” compensation (Korff
2017). Thus, we can see various ways in which direct reparations have been implemented as
remedies in the cases of ecocide we are discussing. But what are the environmental benefits of
these measures?
To begin, a clear environmental upshot of financial restitution, is that such reparative
measures may channel funds into the hands of groups and individuals who are concerned with
restoring and preserving natural habitats and protecting ecological functioning; which in turn,
diverts social-resources away from individuals and groups who may be more inclined to exploit
nature. A problem, however, is that victims of ecocide may be unable convert monetary
reimbursement into well-being because their way of life is not connected to or dependent on
purchasing goods and services from the market system, which would often be the case for former
autarkic citizens. Furthermore, even if they are able to convert financial gains into welfare, there

establishment of health care centers) as rehabilitative services to the victims of the Plan de
Sanchez massacre, which resulted in the abuse and murder of over 250 Mayan women and
children by the Guatemalan military (United Nations Human Rights Office of the High
Commissioner 2014), and the Lomé Peace Agreement and Truth and Reconciliation Commission
recommendation to provide, “health care, pensions, education, skills-training and
microcredit/projects, community and symbolic reparations” but no cash payments as
rehabilitative services to the victims of the Sierra Leone Civil War (United Nations Human
Rights Office of the High Commissioner 2014).
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is still the issue that victims of such grave harms may require massive financial allocation to
even begin approaching the life that they would have had if they had not been unjustly burdened
by ecocide.
One way to avoid the above worries is by instead focusing on “in-kind” resourcecompensation (i.e., providing victims with things that money just cannot buy, such as access to
ancestral lands). An environmental benefit of such measures is that they will likely require the
state to undertake environmental “cleanup” projects to repair the damaged ecosystem and restore
the habitat (at least, close as possible) to its prior functioning before transferring it back to the
rightful owners. For instance, the British and Australian government attempted to decontaminate
Maralinga of hazardous radiation three times before it was returned to the Anangu (Korff 2017).
Thus, the environmental advantage of such “in-kind” compensation measures are obvious
if successful, in that they would potentially restore the damaged habitat to its prior ecological
functioning. Sadly, while returning the communities and habitats to their pre-harm condition is
an optimal reparative outcome, it is likely entirely unfeasible in many instances of ecocide
because the habitat or community are too far degraded for renewal. Furthermore, the allocation
of resources to achieve such “in-kind” compensation may prove so drastic, as to begin
undermining the availability of resources for other pressing societal concerns.
Accordingly, pursuing rehabilitative services may avoid some of these worries, in that
attempting to support impacted individuals or groups in overcoming impediments caused by
ecocide can be conducted in a more gradual, partial, and fragmentary fashion than “in-kind”
compensation. For instance, the Canadian government’s pledge to assist Cree families by
providing them helicopter flights to their ancestral hunting grounds, which had become
inaccessible after the hydroelectric damming projects prevented the rivers from freezing, seems
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more feasible (while maybe less ideal) than attempting to undo or repair the environmental
transformation caused by the dams (Olsson, Folke, and Berkes 2004: 82).
Also, there are ample environmental upshots of delivering rehabilitative services to assist
autarkic communities’ in continuing their traditional lifestyles (since as we have previously
discussed, see 44-47, 63-65, 158-164 and 187-190), their subsistence and cultural practices often
play important ecological roles in their own right (i.e., promoting biodiversity and proper
ecosystem functioning). Furthermore, providing rehabilitative assistance to autarkic citizens
aimed at fostering and reestablishing their traditional practices after ecocide, will allow these
communities to preserve their rich body of knowledge regarding local ecosystems (i.e., their
habitat learning); which can in turn, provide the general population with access to greater
environmental information and opportunities to learn eco-friendly practices (see 48-51 and 187190). Thus, we can see the myriad of ways that pursuing rehabilitative assistance may further
environmental objectives.
However, as stated, a problem with all forms of direct reparations is that their aim of
making victims whole (i.e., returning victims to the state they would have been in had the
wrongs never occurred) is likely doomed to fail in the wake of grave injustice, including our
cases of ecocide. The reasons for pessimism are manifold: (1) the commensurate compensation
for such grave injustices and injuries may be impossible to calculate; (2) circumstances and
constraints may make restoring the victims to their prior state impossible, (3) and competing
justice concerns may make it unjustifiable to pursue making victims whole. For instance, how
much financial compensation do victims of ecocide deserve for the loss of their way of life and
connection to their ancestral home? Or how can ecocide refugees be compensated “in kind” if
restoring their ecosystem is impossible? Should rehabilitative measures be pursued if expanding
the economy to pay for these services could lead to further environmental destruction? Lastly,
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how can victims be made whole in the tragic case, in which ecocide was so devastating that the
impacted community has effectively disappeared (i.e., there are no members left)? These and
similar questions show the inherent difficulties and limitations of trying to pursue direct
reparations in response to ecocide.
Fortunately, Transitional Justice has other reparative mechanisms such as
memorialization, designed to symbolically respond to grave harms and abandon direct
reparations’ aim of making victims whole.339 Memorialization measures include the
establishment of museums, parks memorials, exhibitions, demonstrations, ceremonies, and days
of remembrance, which are designed to publicly commemorate the victims, raise awareness of
past abuses, apologize, and help prevent recurrence.340
Hence, a benefit of memorialization is that unlike reparations, these measures accept that
the harms of the past can never be entirely corrected, in that they may be forgotten or overcome
but not undone. As such, memorialization instead aspires to provide victims, perpetrators, and
society as a whole with opportunities to change their relationship with past wrongs. As Jeffery
Blustein explains, “memorialization can express moral attitudes of respect for value as well as
for persons, can embody a commitment to justice and can exemplify virtues like courage and
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Examples of memorialization in transitional settings include: monuments and annual prayer
services to commemorate the victims of the Lord’s Resistance Army in northern Uganda
(Hopwood 2011: 3); the Museum of Memory and Human Rights in Santiago, Chile that
commemorates the victims and raises public awareness of the human rights violations committed
under Pinochet’s dictatorship (1973-1990) (Balcells, Palanza, and Voytas 2018), and the
Auschwitz-Birkenau State Museum, which preserved the extermination camp as a research and
education center and in memory of the 1.1 million people who died there (auschwitz.org).
340
For a thorough discussion of the role of memorialization in transitional settings, see Jeffrey
Blustein’s book, Forgiveness and Remembrance: Remembering Wrongdoing in Personal and
Public Life chapters 4-7 (Blustein 2014).
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hope…they can implicate a community’s sense of what is integral to its collective identity”
(Blustein 2014: 12).341
Furthermore, an additional benefit of memorialization projects is that such measures can
provide reparations even in cases in which all the victims have disappeared, i.e., the tragic
situation in which the environmental destruction was so severe, that no members of the
community remain. Clearly, in such contexts, it is impossible to ‘make victims whole’ in any
normal sense, but memorialization projects can still aim to preserve the legacy of the ‘vanished
community’ and ensure that present and future generations acknowledge and never forget their
loss.
Nevertheless, a difficulty in such situations is that there are no direct victims available to
articulate their reparative interests, which as we have emphasized is an important part of the
environmental transformative justice process. Accordingly, it seems that at best what
environmental transformative justice can do in such situations is identify and motivate well
positioned actors to play the role of trustees and guardians representing the interests of the lost
community throughout the reparative process.342
There are already many examples of memorialization in response to environmental
harms. For instance, Earth Day (a holiday on the first day of Spring in the Northern Hemisphere
to demonstrate support for environmental protection and celebrate the Earth) began in 1970, in
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Blustein’s emphasis on the role of memorialization in fostering collective identity is pertinent
to our conception of environmental transformative justice in that it demonstrates how societies
can bridge divides between disparate, antagonistic, and hostile communities and build social
cohesion. As such, acts of memorialization in post-ecocide settings can nurture understanding
and acceptance that autarkic communities are part of the broader society by identifying autarkic
interests as pertinent to the collective interest.
342
The theory of responsibility that we developed in the Second Chapter of the dissertation, can
offer insights into identifying and motivating appropriate actors to take on the role of guardian or
trustee for ‘vanished communities’ - based on their connection to the harm or the lost
community, power to enact social change, or interest in memorializing the injustice or preventing
ecocide moving forward.
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response to an oil well blowout off the coast of Santa Barbara, California (Wheeling and Ufberg
2017). The oil spill spewed over three million gallons of oil and resulted in the death of seabirds,
seals, dolphins, sea lions, fish and other marine life over an 800 square-mile expanse of the
Pacific (Wheeling and Ufberg 2017). More recently, Iceland memorialized Okojokull, the first
glacier lost to climate change in the country, by holding a public ceremony to install a monument
where the glacier once stood.343
Another, vivid instance of memorialization after an environmental harm is Alberto
Banuelos-Fournier’s monolithic memorial sculpture entitled, The Wound, which was
commissioned by the Galician government in Spain to commemorate the sinking of a structurally
deficient oil tanker off the community’s coast in 2002 (Varona 2019: 9). The spill is considered
the worst in the history of Europe and was responsible for spewing close to 80,000 tonnes of oil
over two-thousand kilometers of the Spanish, Portuguese and French coast (Varona 2019: 7).
The monolithic statue (the largest in all of Spain) is supposed to commemorate the wounded
ecological landscape that resulted in the death of over 200,000 seabirds and countless other
marine life; as well as, acknowledge the thousands of volunteers who helped to clean up the spill
(Varona 2019 7-9). Interesting, since ecosystem functioning has been reestablished in the region
and the beauty of the coast has been restored, the monument reminds present visitors of past
ecological harm, “in this sense, this memorial might function as a time gate to reflect on the
possibilities of restorative memory” (Varona 2019: 9).
From these examples we can see that memorialization can play an important role in
acknowledging the past and raising awareness so that action can be taken in the present to
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The monument reads: "Ok is the first Icelandic glacier to lose its status as a glacier. In the
next 200 years, all our glaciers are expected to follow the same path. This monument is to
acknowledge that we know what is happening and know what needs to be done. Only you know
if we did it," which succinctly expresses the central aims of memorialization to publicly
commemorate a loss that should never be repeated (O’Dowd 2019).
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prevent similar harms in the future. From an environmental perspective symbolic
memorialization of ecocidal harm could serve to further environmental objectives in a myriad of
ways beyond decreasing the prospects of such harms reoccurring in the future. For instance, even
if the impacted habitat cannot be restored, memorialization efforts could focus on preserving
comparable habitats in other regions or provide special legal status to the flora and fauna that
once inhabited the area. Such measures could help ensure that these ecosystems and species do
not go extinct or disappear.
Additionally, memorialization efforts could include constructing museums, monuments,
and exhibits to commemorate the lost culture and habitat, which would raise awareness and
preserve knowledge of eco-social communities that previously flourished in the region. For
instance, zoological reserves, botanical gardens, and, national parks may serve important
memorialization functions post-ecocide. While such measures may not directly assist in
environmental conservation or restoration, they could nevertheless preserve valuable ecological
information about the lost habitat (e.g., taxonomies of the flora and fauna, food chains, energy
flows, etc.); which could provide insights into how best to protect or restore other habitats.
Furthermore, such measures could also offer the general population a chance to reflect on
their harmful treatment of the environment and present opportunities to teach eco-friendly
practices. For instance, the victims could be commissioned to offer tutorials, lessons, and
reenactments in celebration of their traditional autarkic practices. Or there could be days of
remembrance that could directly further environmental aims by including rituals, such as
planting a tree or cleaning up green spaces, to commemorate the injustice of ecocide.344
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As Blustein explains, commemorative rituals can have generative, educative, and regulative
emotive functions: “Rituals elicit emotions in participants (on an ongoing basis) by drawing their
attention to emotionally laden events; they teach participants what emotions it is appropriate for
them to have in relation to certain events; and they regulate the emotions that they elicit or that
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Hopefully, from this brief discussion, it has become apparent that there is abundant
potential for engaging in environmentally advantageous acts of memorialization. Hence, we can
now move on to discussing truth-seeking Transitional Justice mechanisms.

C. Truth-Oriented Mechanisms

The need for truth in transitional settings is commonly justified on various grounds: (1) as
a means of understanding and reconciling with injustice; (2) as a means of publicly and privately
acknowledging the past; (2) as a means of establishing and demarcating culpability for wrongs;
(3) as a means of justifying and motivating the need for social change, and (4) as a means
educating the public so such harms are less likely in the future. In post-ecocide states, truthoriented mechanisms can serve all of these purposes. But at present we are interested in
theorizing how these measures can further environmental aims in particular.
Truth-oriented mechanisms in transitional settings can be divided into three
interconnected processes: (1) truth-seeking (i.e., investigating past abuses); (2) truthdocumenting (i.e., collecting and recording past abuses), and (3) truth-disseminating (i.e.,
reporting on past abuses). Transitional Justice has developed mechanisms to further each of these
aims. For instance, the standard veridical process in transitional settings involves: first, enacting
truth commissions and offering amnesty to assist in discovering the truth; then commissioning
report(s) to document the findings, and finally releasing, publishing, publicizing, and
broadcasting the information to the general public. We will explore how each of these activities
may further environmental objectives.

participants bring to the ritual activity by providing channels for their expression. I call the latter
feature of rituals disciplined emotionality” (Blustein 2014: 207).
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Truth-seeking mechanisms (e.g., truth commissions and offers of amnesty in return for
information) generally aim at examining the root causes and patterns of violence.345 In postecocide states this may include establishing a truth and reconciliation commission as a venue in
which victims can share their experiences with the public and perpetrators can offer information
and take responsibility for their involvement in the environmental destruction in exchange for
amnesty from criminal prosecution.
Furthermore, employing truth-seeking mechanisms can serve reparative purposes, in that
the process of truth-seeking itself can be a form of reparation, reconciliation, and rehabilitation.
Accordingly, pursuing truth through these non-juridical institutions could further both punitive
justice (i.e., by publicly exposing, shaming, and embarrassing perpetrators) and reparative justice
(i.e., by publicly honoring victims, memorializing their harms, and rehabilitating their sense of
agency); as well as provide comparable environmental benefits.
For instance, the act of establishing a truth and reconciliation commission signals to
society that ecocide is an impermissible wrong, which hopefully diminishes the likelihood of
reoccurrence by influencing social norms against such practices. Furthermore, motivating those
involved to divulge information and admit what happened could offer insights into the pervasive
structures, institutions, norms, and policies that made such harms possible, providing policymakers with insights into how society needs to change to prevent similar injustices.
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Examples of truth-seeking mechanisms include: The South African Truth and Reconciliation
Commission, which in the wake of apartheid offered amnesty to individuals that fully admitted
their crimes and proved that they were political motivated, out of 7,112 applicants only 849 were
granted amnesty (Matthews 2018); Argentina’s National Commission on the Disappearance of
Persons, which was an institution created immediately after President Alfonsin took office to
investigate the fate of the disappeared during the “Dirty War” (Crenzel 2008), and the Chilean
National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation established in 1990 (which the first to use the
name) to investigate the deaths and disappearances that occurred under Pinochet’s military
dictatorship (1974-1990).
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Since, non-juridical truth-seeking mechanisms allow actors to divulge information
without the threat that such information may be used against them. It is reasonable to assume that
employing these mechanisms will assist post-ecocide societies in gathering valuable data and
developing a more complete understanding regarding the environmental harm, than by relying
exclusively on punitive justice mechanisms that likely suppresses actors’ desire to volunteer
information.
A further epistemic benefit of such non-juridical proceedings is that they likely enable
and encourage a wide segment of society to testify (at least when compared with individual
criminal trials), in that actors who might not have been directly involved with the commission of
the ecocide may nonetheless feel obligated and desire to volunteer information regarding their
role in establishing the background conditions and social context that made ecocidal activity
possible. Essentially, truth and reconciliation commissions offer means of gaining information
from actors who would not be prosecuted or implicated in criminal proceedings per the ‘liability
model’ but who nonetheless were involved per the ‘social connection model’ (see 142-149).
Moreover, permitting autarkic citizens to testify regarding how they were harmed could
provide a wealth of ecological information (e.g., detailing the species and populations that were
lost, the ecological functions that were impacted, the area of the harm, etc.) that might never
have been discovered, documented, and publicized, absent a venue for victims to share their
experiences. This wealth of ecological information could prove invaluable in planning how to
preserve comparable ecosystems, or it might provide insight on guidelines for restoring the
affected habitat. Likewise, autarkic citizen’s testimony regarding how they were harmed, affords
these citizens a chance to publicly describe how the environmental degradation impacted their
way of life; which in turn, would provide the general public an opportunity to learn of alternative
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modes of subsistence (i.e., more eco-friendly practices) and reflect on ways they might change
their relationship and treatment of nature.
Transitional Justice employs two central truth-documenting mechanisms: commissioned
reports and archives. Both aim at collecting and recording past abuses. The major difference
between the two is that reports attempt to condense the relevant information gathered from
criminal proceedings, truth commissions, and other forms of investigation into past abuses into
succinct narratives (i.e., articulate what happened during the repression/conflict, who committed
the atrocities, how the victims suffered, and recommend institutional reform so that such
atrocities do not happen again).346 Whereas archives attempt to unbiasedly catalog and store as
much of the collected information as possible.347
In essence, reports are normatively-loaded documents that aim to construct sanctioned
understandings, narrate accountability, and prescribe appropriate social memory and responses;
whereas archives are supposed to remain normatively-mute repositories, designed to save as
much of the unfiltered evidence as possible for future generations. Both approaches have similar
environmental upshots as truth-seeking mechanisms. Archives however are likely more effective
in their role at preserving valuable ecological information, while commissioned reports are likely
better suited to influence social norms, values, and conventions toward diminishing the prospects
of ecocide reoccurring.

346

For instance, Argentina’s Nunca Mas (“Never Again”) Report provided a detailed account,
analysis, and description of the treatment of the disappeared during the “Dirty War” it
successfully identified over 300 secret detention centers and documented 8,961 deaths and
disappearances (Crenzel 2008: 175).
347
For example, The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia Archive has
collected, documented, and preserved a wide range of materials: 3704 shelf meters of physical
records, 8000 terabytes of electronic records including 45,000 videotapes of proceedings and
another 5500 videotapes of evidence, nearly 6 million items of articles and still photographic
evidence, and more than 13,000 artifacts obtained as evidence (Campbell 2012: 4).
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Lastly, truth-disseminating mechanisms aim to broadcast the veridical information
gathered in criminal proceedings, truth commissions, commissioned reports, and other forms of
investigation. States in transition have distributed the information in various methods (e.g.,
publishing reports, radio and television broadcasts, opening museums, and other methods).348
The environmental benefits of truth-disseminating mechanisms are comparable to those covered
in our discussion of truth-seeking mechanisms.
In cases of ecocide, it is critical that the state employs eco-friendly distributive methods
as a means of demonstrating that it has reconsidered and reformed its attitude, treatment, and
relationship with the natural world. A straightforward example of an inappropriate and
environmentally harmful form of distribution would be if the state unliterally opted to provide
every citizen with a leather-bound and gold-accented copy of the full commissioned report.
Producing and distributing such a materially decadent report to all citizens (including those who
have no interest in reviewing the report) would undoubtedly cause environmental degradation
and waste. Moreover, the optics surrounding the decision to mass-produce and distribute such an
item (when less environmentally harmful options were available, e.g., printing it in paper-back,
removing the gold-trim, making it accessible in a digital-medium, sending copies to only parties
that have expressed interest, etc.) likely illustrates to the impacted community and the broader
society that the state has failed to internalize the importance of ecofriendly and sustainable
practices; has not taken the time to reconsidered how it intends to relate to the natural world, nor
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For instance, Argentina has kept the Nunca Mas Report continuously in print since 1984 and
it has become a national best seller with over 300,000 copies sold (Hayner 2001: 34); the South
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission televised live the first two hours of the human
rights violation committee hearings and broadcast the remainder of the hearings live via radio, as
well as, subsequently televising the hearings as hour long episodes from 1996 to 1998 (Thloloe
1998), and Germany has preserved the Dachau, Sachsenhausen, and Buchenwald extermination
camps as a means of disseminating information regarding the atrocities of the Holocaust and to
commemorate the victims.
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acknowledged the importance of consulting with and listening to the communities that will be
impacted by its decisions before taking action.
Nonetheless, it is important to emphasize that the extent of the environmental advantage
derived from the veridical process will largely depend on how broadly and to whom the
information is distributed. As such there is a potential tension between the goal of broad
distribution (which may require more environmentally intrusive methods) and pursuing
ecofriendly distributive practices (which may hinder broad distribution). How to balance these
competing distributive concerns will need to be conducted on a case-by-case basis and as such is
beyond the scope of our analysis.
Finally, it is imperative that the state be mindful of the fact that disseminating the results
of truth-gathering mechanisms may lead to social tension and further animosity between groups,
individuals, and the state. For instance, if the report brings to light previously unknown
injustices, it may trigger new rounds of hostility or if individuals and groups resent or disagree
with their portrayal in the report, it might cause them to lash out against the reparative and
reconciliatory process.
From an environmental standpoint such hostility is problematic because it may lead
directly to environmental destruction or undermine the environmental transformative justice
process. As such, it is vital for the state to be careful in not exacerbating or creating sources of
hostility during the truth-disseminating process. With this discussion of truth mechanisms
complete, we may now move on to discussing the environmental benefits of institutional reform
in transitional settings.

D. Institutional Reform Mechanisms
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As Murphy succinctly states, “transformation is the key overarching moral aim of
responses to wrong doing in transitional contexts” (Murphy 2017: 112). But the difficulty is that
this social transformation must be conducted justly by dealing with the wrongs particular
perpetrators committed against particular victims. Accordingly, Transitional Justice is concerned
with the just pursuit of social transformation. Relying on a structural analogy from just war
theory, Murphy conveys that Transitional Justice has two central aspects: the jus in bello criteria
validating the need for societal transformation (i.e., the end) and the jus ad bellum criteria
governing in what way the social transformation is conducted (i.e., the means) (Murphy 2017:
114-118).349
By employing Murphy’s structural analogy from just war theory, we can see that the
punitive and reparative measures already discussed are responsive to jus ad bellum moral
concerns that wrongdoing generates for both the victims and perpetrators in transitional contexts.
Whereas, institutional reform mechanisms focus directly on the jus in bello goal of social
transformation in transitional contexts.
Essentially, institutional reform mechanisms aim to transform public institutions from
instruments of oppression into institutions that generate social trust, respect for the rule of law,
foster hope, further social capabilities, spread acknowledgment of equality and reciprocity
between moral agents, restore confidence, and strengthen social stability. Institutional reform
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Murphy relies on the jus ad bellum and jus in bello distinction from just war theory as a
structural analogy helpful for conceptualizing the complex relationship between the need for
justice and the pursuit of social transformation in transitional contexts. As Murphy explains: “My
interest is not in the particular criteria for just war but rather in the widely recognized structure of
just war theory [i.e., the jus ad bellum and jus in bello distinction]. It is this basic structure that
offers a useful analogy for theorizing about transitional justice by providing a model for how two
distinct sets of moral criteria interact to jointly determine the justice of a given subject” (Murphy
2017: 115).
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may take the form of amending constitutions, enacting legislation, restructuring institutions,
increasing civilian oversight and involvement, and providing educational opportunities.
Most importantly institutional reform must aim to alter the basic structure of society to
prevent recurrence of injustice. To achieve this, it is vital that the reform measures combat the
pervasive structural inequities that facilitated and produced the injustice. Thus, it is imperative
that post-ecocide states end the normalized and collective wrongdoing against autarkic
communities, by altering the institutional structures and predominant mindsets that persistently
prioritize roving imperialist interests over autarkic citizens. In other words, post-ecocide states in
attempting to promote social stability must replace ecocidal social structures with sustainable
forms of governance that respect peoples’ ability to maintain their traditional relationships with
habitats and natural entities that they depend on for their wellbeing.
Fundamentally, for institutional reform to be successful requires achieving two criteria:
transformation of de jure conditions, which alters the basic institutional structure of society (i.e.,
changing the officially codified and sanctioned legal apparatus) and transformation of de facto
conditions (i.e., changing the collective hearts and minds of the citizenry). Both kinds of reform
are intertwined and mutually reinforcing, in that explicitly amending the written constitution,
enacting legislation, restructuring institutions will undoubtedly affect people’s behaviors and
attitudes; and conversely, changing the culture and subjective sentiments and mindset of the
citizenry will undoubtedly spur legal reform. We will begin by focusing on transformative
mechanisms targeting de jure structures (i.e., constitutional and legal reforms) before moving on
to those targeting de facto conditions (i.e., educational reform)
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Constitutional reform is a key mechanism for driving de jure social change in transitional
settings.350 Constitutions embody the supreme law of a state, establish the formal rules that direct
and constrain government power, and define the relationship between the government,
institutions, and individuals. As constitutional scholar, Patrick Monahan states, “a country’s
constitution is the set of fundamental principles that together describe the organizational
framework of the state and the nature, the scope of, and the limitations of the exercise of state
power” (Monahan 1997: 5). Hence, constitutional reform represents an important mechanism for
changing the political order and basic structure of society. Essentially, since constitutional
reforms play such a central role in establishing the basic structure of a society, they offer unique
benefits that other legal and social reform measures lack.
Over the past few decades, there has been a groundswell of pro-environmental
constitutional restructurings and amendments. David Boyd’s well-researched book, The
Environmental Rights Revolution: A Global Study of Constitutions, Human Rights, and the
Environment, documents the amount of countries that have incorporated “some form of
environmental protection provisions” in their constitutions; a number which has grown from zero
in the year 1975, to 147 out of the 193 countries with codified constitutions in 2012 (Boyd 2012:
76).351 For instance, “the right to live in a healthy environment” is now explicitly recognized in
ninety-two constitutions, which is remarkable since, as Boyd explains, “no other human right has
achieved such a broad level of constitutional recognition in such a short period” (Boyd 2012:
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A well-publicized example of constitutional reform in transitional settings, is the current
Constitution of South Africa that introduced a preamble that recognizes the injustices of the prior
Apartheid regime and enumerated a Bill of Rights that guarantees the protection and promotion
of human rights for all South Africans (Endoh 2015).
351
Portugal in 1976 was the first country to amend their constitution to protect environmental
rights. The Portuguese Constitution states: “Everyone shall possess the right to a healthy and
ecologically balanced human living environment and the duty to defend it,” and it goes on to
“charge the state” with fulfilling the obligation in eight specific ways (The Constitution of
Portugal, Article 66).
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76).352 Furthermore, in over 50 nations courts have interpreted and enforced the constitutional
right to a healthy and suitable environment (Boyd 2012: 279-280).
In order to ensure that these environmental constitutional reforms are effective in postecocide contexts, it is necessary that they contain both substantive and procedural elements. The
substantive component necessitates that the constitutional amendment entitles impacted actors
(i.e., citizens whose habitats have been intentionally destroyed without their consent) to bring
claims against perpetrators and the state, whereas the procedural element obligates state actors to
involve and consult with potentially impacted citizens and communities before enacting policies
or activities that may affect their environment.
The substantive components express the right of citizens and communities to maintain
their traditional relationship with habitats on which they depend. Consequently, it is a violation
of this right if the state directly, indirectly, or negligently allows these eco-social bonds to be
broken without the impacted parties’ consent. Such substantive constitutional requirements
clearly signal that post-ecocide states view ecocidal activity as impermissible in a just society,
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A benefit of enacting environmental provisions after an instance of ecocide, is that the gravity
of the harm can motivate support for social reform to prevent such harms from reoccurring. It is
commonly accepted in Transitional Justice that grave atrocities present important moments for
enacting social change. Another benefit of enacting constitutional environmental reform in postecocide settings is that, since there is a clear wrong in mind (i.e., the intentional destruction of
habitats that communities rely on for their survival, which occur without the impacted
communities’ consent), defining the rights, duties, and obligations necessary to confront the
problem becomes more feasible. This is beneficial in that environmental constitutional reforms
are commonly criticized as being perceived as ill-defined, ambiguous, or lacking actionable
standards. As Erin Daly explains, “The uncertain boundaries of substantive environmental rights
force courts onto a tightrope when they seek to enforce substantive rights. If they read the rights
too narrowly, they risk damage to the environment which could have deleterious effects on the
ecosystem and the dignity and health of the population for generations to come. Over-enforcing
substantive environmental rights, however, may unduly limit development and economic
progress that could have benefited the local population and perhaps the nation as a whole” (Daly
2012: 77). Therefore, constitutional reform that furthers environmental transformative justice
avoids these worries by stipulating a clearly defined and narrow range of environmentally
harmful activities that are deemed impermissible in well-ordered, just societies.
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which would hopefully drive social norms away from tolerating and accepting environmentally
destructive behavior.
There are many other environmental benefits of adopting substantive constitutional
requirements that hold governments accountable for destroying ecosystems vital to peoples’ way
of life. For one, if such habitats are intentionally harmed, then the impacted actors have
legitimate grounds for asserting the state is obligated to restore or construct the lost ecosystem
functioning. Secondly, such measures motivate the state to conduct extensive environmental
impact analysis before taking action or approving projects and policies that may violate the
substantive constitutional provision; which in turn, would likely expand environmental
knowledge, information, and understanding. Lastly, such substantive requirements would
motivate actors to develop new tools, policies, and procedures to avoid harming the environment
and violating constitutional provisions.
The procedural component expresses the right of citizens and communities to access
information involving state plans, agreements, or policies that may impact their traditional
relationship with nature, participate in the decision-making process, and have recourse to justice
if the state fails in these obligations. An environmental benefit of procedural constitutional
requirements is that they can proactively prevent environmental destruction by giving potentially
impacted communities the opportunity to express their concerns before environmentally harmful
activity occurs. Furthermore, the potentially impacted communities can request that the state
collect and research hypothetical environmental harms that state actors might not have thought to
consider (e.g., the Cree could have explained that they walk across the frozen rivers to get to
their traditional hunting grounds).
In other words, the greater the diversity of actors involved in the decision-making
process, the better the chances that potentially negative environmental impacts will be brought to
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light before the project progresses and harm ensues. As actors learn to take advantage of the
increased opportunity to participate, they will likely become better able and more sophisticated
in expressing environmental concerns. Lastly, building up a body of complaints and
documenting the various grievances will likely increase environmental knowledge, information,
and understanding.
Boyd has empirically demonstrated that “nations with environmental provisions in their
constitutions have smaller ecological footprints, rank higher on comprehensive indices of
environmental indicators, are more likely to ratify international agreements, and made faster
progress in reducing sulphur dioxides, nitrogen oxides, and greenhouse gases than nations
without such provisions” (Boyd 2012: 121). There is thus ample empirical evidence supporting
the claim that enacting pro-environmental constitutional reforms (regardless of if they are
substantive or procedural) will lead to positive environmental outcomes in post-ecocide states.353
Enacting legislation and restructuring institutions to promote environmentally-friendly
social transformation will undoubtedly have many of the same environmental benefits of
constitutional reform. Furthermore, constitutional amendments impact national legislation,
influence judicial decisions, constrain legal enforcement, shape governmental institutions, and
dictate social policy. As such, pursuing constitutional change offers unique benefits that other
legal and social reform measures lack.
Thus, at present we can refrain from analyzing these reform mechanisms in their own
right beyond stipulating that it is important they aim at the following: giving people true freedom
and opportunity to engage with habitats and natural entities central to their purposeful selfdevelopment; signaling that the state considers activities undermining these eco-social
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Although it is always important to be mindful of the fact that correlation does not equal
causation.
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connections to be grave wrongs; fostering widespread recognition of habitat preservation as a
key element of a just society, and, finally, reducing environmental degradation in order to
provide all segments of the population with a practicable chance at flourishing.
Regarding the social transformation of de facto conditions, we have already discussed
how punitive, reparative, and truth-oriented mechanisms each play an important pedagogical role
in changing the hearts and minds of the citizenry in transitional settings. For instance, truth and
reconciliation hearings, criminal trials, museums, public memorials, and monuments represent
informal educational spaces that provide citizens opportunities to learn about, interpret, and
reconcile with the past. Formal educational programs also play a vital part in directly
encouraging de facto social transformation in transitional contexts.354 As Michelle Bellino, Julia
Paulson, Elizabeth Worden succinctly explain, “At the most basic level, the goal of never again
requires knowledge of the past and commitment to ensuring that it is not repeated. This
obligation to (and of) future generations makes education essential to transitional justice”
(Bellino, Paulson, Worden 2017: 317).
We will therefore discuss how formal educational programs can promote environmental
benefits in post-ecocide societies. Since, as Lynn Davies states, “Transitional Justice approaches
in education are distinctive, potent, and impactful, and, while tremendously challenging, they can
shift education from being part of the problem to being part of the transition to a more peaceful
society” (Davies 2017: 1). To successfully further de facto social transformative, educative
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“The Shared Education Program” in Northern Ireland is a clear example of a formal education
measures designed to change hearts and minds by disrupting hostile narratives and diminishing
animosity between antagonistic groups (e.g., Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland) in
transitional settings. The program sought to overcome the lack of progress in integrating schools
and communities in the country by allowing: “Students to travel and share classes for certain
core curricular areas. Evaluations show that early fears that this arrangement would lead to
greater sectarian violence have been unfounded. Students enjoyed the activities and meeting
students from other areas” (Davies 2017: 9)
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programs must satisfy what Davies calls the “dual gaze” of looking back to understand the past
abuses and looking ahead to ensure that they never reoccur (Davies 2017).
Firstly, in order to prevent reoccurrence, it is imperative that the state undertake mass
public education programs to ensure the general public understands how these mechanisms
work, why they are being implemented, and what they aim to achieve. Since transitional justice
processes involve implementing novel and complex procedures and mechanisms, there is a
strong likelihood that fear of the unknown and resistance to change will cause the measures to
draw criticism, face opposition, and lose legitimacy, unless there are procedures and programs in
place to engender broad understanding regarding the transitional policies. For instance, in order
to prevent backlash against environmental laws and policies that may force citizens to change
their daily consumptive and productive behaviors, it is imperative that the state explain why
promoting more sustainable social practices is necessary for preventing unjust ecocidal harms.
Formal educative programs can aim to mass (re)educate the general public into
internalizing environmental values by offering narratives of the past that legitimize or
delegitimize particular experiences, practices, beliefs, and attitudes. For example, post-ecocide
states could strive to educate the populace regarding the valuable social contributions autarkic
communities provide the general public through preserving biodiversity, promoting agroecology,
and maintaining ecological health. Conversely, post-ecocide states could strive to educate the
public regarding the harms of roving imperialism by illustrating how continuing such a way of
life would potentially lead to eco-social collapse.
Additionally, the state might mandate curriculum changes requiring the purging of old
curricula employing environmentally harmful ideologies and materials and replacing them with
eco-friendlier and environmentally informed perspectives and lessons. Such curriculum changes
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would require hiring, training, and professionally developing teachers to become competent
purveyors of pro-environmental information.
Former autarkic citizens in many cases would be ideal candidates for providing such
services, in that they could offer instruction in their way of life, as a means of promoting
ecofriendly practices and explaining how previous (and current) social practices were (and are)
causing environmental harm. Courses of this kind could offer hands-on activities and
opportunities to educate the general public regarding their local environment, by using learn-bydoing approaches aimed at fostering tangible skills and developing tools and methods for
interacting with nature in more sustainable, nourishing, and meaningful ways.
These formal education procedures would hopefully radically alter the public’s
relationship with their environment, which obviously has the potential to produce innumerable
and far-reaching environmental benefits. Hence, we have seen how the institutional reform
mechanism of de facto social conditions can improve post-ecocide societies’ relationship with
nature, by transforming cultures once predicated on environmental destruction into cultures that
embrace and celebrate ecological sustainability.

IV.

Conclusion

The preceding discussion has attempted to make clear the environmental benefits of
employing Transitional Justice mechanisms in response to ecocide. The discussion has hopefully
further illuminated the potential intersections between the goals of Transitional Justice and
environmentalism, by demonstrating how promoting the reparative and reconciliatory aims of
Transitional Justice can further environmental sustainability, habitat restoration, and ecological
conservation – and vice versa.
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An additional benefit of situating responses to ecocide within the Transitional Justice
framework is derived from the framework’s focus on collective harms to peoples, communities,
and groups. Transitional Justice recognizes that repairing, correcting, and remedying only
individual grievances is inappropriate and inadequate for overcoming pervasive political
injustices, since the pertinent harms under consideration stem from social policies perpetrated
against specific groups.
Essentially, to combat systems of oppression that target and impact individuals because
they are members of a particular group demands that a just response take seriously the grouplevel nature of the harm. Such an insight is helpful in supplementing liberal conceptions of
justice designed to articulate societies’ negative and positive obligations to citizens as
individuals. For example, Sen and Nussbaum emphasize that a just society is one that allows
individuals to develop certain capabilities.
By utilizing Transitional Justice mechanisms designed to overcome group-level harms,
environmental transformative justice is able to effectively respond to wrongs committed against
communities, i.e., it can repair and reconcile injustices to autarkic communities at a group-level.
For instance, memorialization projects in transitional settings (e.g., establishing museums, parks,
memorials, exhibitions, demonstrations, ceremonies) are generally designed to help the
community as a whole, instead of assisting particular members beyond their connection to the
group. The same holds true in a post-ecocide context, as the environmental transformative justice
goal of restoring or constructing an ecosystem does not simply aim at aiding specific citizens but
rather seeks to reestablish a way of life for the betterment of the entire eco-social community.
In the concluding pages, I wish to raise some difficulties for the theory of environmental
transformative justice presented throughout this work. The intention is to highlight areas for
future scholarship, while further clarifying the concept.
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One worry is that the model of ecocide presented is overly narrow, in that it does not
apply to many important cases of environmental degradation. For instance, because the
environmental destruction must be caused intentionally, it excludes inadvertent environmental
harms produced by industrial production and consumption (e.g., islands sinking beneath the sea
because of climate change, algae blooms toxifying lakes because of fertilizer runoff, wildfires
fires resulting from inappropriate forest management, avalanches triggered by extractive mining,
etc.).
However, it is possible to partially overcome this objection by demonstrating how many
of these harms can be framed to fit within our conception of ecocide. For example, if there is a
pervasive, reoccurring, and recognized connection between an activity and an environmental
harm, then it can be argued that continuing to perform the activity is tantamount to intentional
environmental destruction. If an industrial process results in emissions that degrades surrounding
habitats, and it is well established that the factory’s activities are directly causing the harm, then
one can reasonably maintain that continuing the process, even if the factory owners do not desire
the harm, nonetheless constitutes intentional environmental destruction. Therefore, if the state
engages in, promotes, or continues to allow these harmful activities, directly resulting in the
destruction of habitats that communities are dependent upon for their wellbeing, and the activity
occurs without the communities’ consent, then cases such as this would constitute instances of
ecocide per our criteria.
A harder case for expanding our conception of ecocide would be an instance in which a
state is involved in an activity that might not necessarily lead to the destruction of an autarkic
community’s habitat, but there is a well-founded worry that it could. An example that illustrates
this point could be a case in which a state is involved in or approves the construction of a
pipeline adjacent to an autarkic community’s habitat (e.g., the United States government’s
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approval of the Dakota Access Pipeline adjacent to the Sioux Tribal Nation’s Standing Rock
Indian Reservation).
In such a scenario, it is by no means inevitable that the pipeline will result in an oil spill
or leak contaminating the community’s water supply or irreversibly degrading the land, but there
is a realistic chance that it could. Consequently, it is harder to argue that the construction of the
pipeline constitutes ecocide (pursuant to our framework) because the potential for environmental
harm is not as direct or immediate as in the ‘industrial process’ example mentioned in the
preceding paragraph. Essentially, the difficulty stems from the fact that it is difficult to justify
that building the pipeline is tantamount to an act of intentional environmental destruction when
the environmental harm does not invariably follow from the activity.
Whereas, if the scenario is amended slightly and the state is building the pipeline through
(instead of adjacent) to the autarkic community’s habitat, then it is much easier to justify
classifying such activity as ecocidal. The reason for this difference derives from the fact that the
construction of the pipeline itself causes environmental degradation to the autarkic community’s
habitat, independent of the prospects of oil spills or leaks. Consequently, per our framework, the
Canadian government’s approval of TC Energy’s Coastal Gaslink pipeline through
Wet’suwet’en Nation’s unceded territory in British Columbia constitutes ecocide and should not
be permitted in a well-ordered, just society.
Despite the attempt to expand the concept of ecocide (as defended above), one may still
object that the conception is still exceedingly narrow, in that the operative harm triggering
environmental transformative justice is the “social death” of a community, instead of the
environmental destruction in-and-of-itself. As stated previously, we must accept such a criticism
and admit that this framework offers an inherently anthropocentric conception of ecocide (unless
it can be shown that other species besides humans are capable of a comparable cultural loss).
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Nevertheless, the expectation is that by recommending an initial step towards altering
contemporary society’s perception of humanity’s place within nature, there will be a
proliferation of openings, opportunities, and forums for challenging anthropocentric prejudices.
Essentially, this work maintains that focusing on the need for environmental
transformative justice after ecocide (i.e., instances of intentional environmental destruction
responsible for causing social death) will provoke, guide, direct, and awaken awareness and
understanding of humans’ impact on the environment and the impact of the environment on
humans, i.e., recognize the complex, dynamic, imbedded, and mutually-constructing relation of
man-to-nature and nature-to-man (Moore 2015). As previously stated, there are prudential
reasons for focusing on a human-centric conception of ecocide, in that the lack of consensus
regarding the value of plants, animals, ecosystems, makes it politically unrealistic to defend more
eco-centric positions at a time when substantive change is needed urgently.
As we have seen, potential criticisms of the theory of environmental transformative
justice involve concerns pertaining to its scope, i.e., how broadly the criteria of ecocide can be
stretched.355 This is unsurprising since the work has focused on delineating the paradigmatic

355

Some might even object that our conception of ecocide is too broad and argue that the context
of environmental transformative justice may include cases in which no injustice transpired. For
instance, a situation in which state-sponsored environmental alteration is pursued without the
impacted community’s consent, but that nevertheless promotes and expands the community
members’ objective wellbeing, in that it expands their freedom and functioning despite
undermining their subjective agency. For instance, there could potentially be a situation in which
a community subsists on meager resources cultivated from an already environmentally degraded
habitat. If the state intervenes to “cleanup” the area without consulting the impacted community,
one may argue that this change to the environment satisfies our definition of ecocide, since it
“destroys” the local habitat and irreversibly alters the community’s way of life. For an example
of this dynamic, see James McCarthy’s analysis of the Wise Use movement in the Western
United States, in which local communities opposed the imposition of federal regulations to
preserve their land because of fears that such policies would undermine their traditional way of
life (McCarthy 2002). One may question if it is unjust for such an imposition to occur without
the community’s consent? And does environmental transformative justice require “re-degrading”
the environment to return it to its “pre-cleanup” functioning, if that is what the community
desires? Nevertheless, how such cases fit within our framework would requires far greater
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cases of ecocide, meaning there was little analysis pertaining to how the theory would apply in
contexts where not all the criteria are met. The hope is that presenting core cases of ecocide will
best capture the injustice, which in turn, will provide the most compelling normative justification
and greatest prospect of building consensus regarding the need for pursuing environmental
transformative justice in comparable settings.
If this project were to prove successful, and environmental transformative measures
began to be implemented, then a body of knowledge would gradually accrue offering empirical
insights regarding the successes and failures of various methods for responding to ecocide. As
this information grows, and environmental transformative justice is steadily refined, then the
practical insights can inform and offer guidance regarding how to best deal with various other
kinds of eco-social disturbances.
Accordingly, this project suggests that pursuing environmental transformative justice
provides an opening for (re)examining and (re)conceptualizing our practices, habits, values,
norms, and priorities towards nature. Enacting reparative and reconciliatory activities in postecocide settings represent an opportunity for progressively departing from current destructive
and exploitative treatments of nature, thereby achieving and promoting sustainable stewardship
and a healthier relationship with nature. But it is important to keep in mind that this project was
intended to be only a starting point along the difficult path of moving society away from the now

analysis than can be offered in these concluding pages. But it seems at least plausible that per our
conception of ecocide that the answer is to both questions is “yes,” which many may find rather
strange. However, per our theorization of environmental transformative justice, the most
important insight that such examples highlight, is that states should not intervene in ways that
radically alter peoples’ way of life without gaining their informed consent. Such a principle
would have likely prevented environmental destruction in most of the cases of ecocide we
examined. Essentially, state impositions are unjust when they fail to respect citizens’ agency.
Therefore, it is likely that injustices can be avoided if the state effectively explains and
demonstrates that the proposed policy is to the community’s benefit to gain their consent. But if
the community still does not agree to the project, then the state’s obligation is to leave them
alone.
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dominant roving imperialist culture and toward a more sustainable and eco-friendly relationship
with the natural habitats on which we depend for our survival.
Lastly, one may object that this project overemphasizes the role of the state and overly
depends on it for responding to ecological harms. It is important to accentuate that there is
nothing in this project that forecloses individuals, communities, groups, and institutions from
pursuing countless other environmentally friendly activities. The focus on the state stems from
the fact that ecocide as defined involves some level of state oppression (e.g., direct, indirect,
negligent, see 66-77). Hence, the central aim of environmental transformative justice is to
transition ecocidal states to ecofriendly states (i.e., ones that no longer engage in, promote, or
tolerate ecocidal activity). This does not, however, mean that only state actors have a role to play
in the environmental transformative justice process. It is exceedingly likely, for a litany of
reasons (e.g., it is profitable, it is how things have operated in the past, etc.), that the state policymakers and bureaucrats will not want to end their involvement in ecocidal activity on their own
accord.
In these contexts, a key aspect of overcoming ecocide will be concerned actors
advocating, campaigning, and pressuring the state to begin the environmental transformative
justice process and to maintain efforts overtime. As has been argued, pursuing environmental
transformative justice requires that all actors who are socially connected to ecocidal practices
(i.e., those who benefit from or take part in them) have a responsibility to engage in collective
political action to change social structures causing ecocide (see 152-155). Although
environmental transformative justice has a state-focused goal, the success of transitioning to an
ecofriendly state depends on the contribution and involvement of many non-state
actors. Responsibility for furthering environmental transformative justice is diffuse and
occasions all peoples and communities to play a role in combating ecocide.
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The notion of political responsibility employed is capacious because the kind of change
envisioned is ambitious. The dissertation argues for a radical shift not only in the social relations
between people but in society's relation to the natural world. It demands we recognize ecological
harms as a social harms and ecological benefits as social benefits. Environmental transformative
justice may appear as a daunting socio-political undertaking, yet hopefully this work has shown
that it is one which is entirely in our power to achieve.
Thus, my dissertation has provided an effective access point to theorizing the injustice of
environmental degradation, in that ecocide presents a clear and direct connection between harms
to the environment and harms to citizens, to which the conceptual tools of political philosophy
may be readily applied. Furthermore, from a strategic perspective, halting/preventing these
intentional and direct acts of environmental destruction may have an impact on more
theoretically elusive (i.e., many people would not agree that consumers in their everyday actions
of buying products are committing acts of injustice) causes of environmental harm (i.e., harms
caused indirectly and unintentionally via vast structural processes).
In other words, the form of environmental degradation easier for us to diagnose as unjust
has an impact on these other more elusive kinds of harmful practices. For example, instead of
attempting to establish the injustice of consumers buying bottled water (a highly discussed
environmental harm), we would focus on the injustice of beverage companies being allowed to
commit ecocide, such as Nestlé extracting millions of liters of water from Six Nations treaty
land, daily, absent the consent of the Six Nations (Shimo 2018). Thus, halting ecocidal activity
offers an effective and morally justifiable access point for diminishing/forcing changes in
powerfully harmful industries, which will undoubtedly result in eco-friendly ‘ripple effects’
throughout post-ecocidal societies.
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